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ABSTRACT
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In an effort to control access to certain online content, the U.S. Congress has repeatedly
mandated the use of powerful regulatory technologies such as Domain Name System
blocking, Internet Service Provider filtering, age verification systems, and commercial
filtering software. The application of these enforcement mechanisms may have serious
implications for constitutional rights, individual freedom, and autonomy. This research
will show that policies including the Communications Decency Act, the Child Online
Protection Act, the Children’s Internet Protection Act, the Stop Online Piracy Act, and
the PROTECT Intellectual Property Act all have the potential to negatively impact these
rights. Although the motivations for these policies differ, each requires the use of
technologies that legislators have often portrayed as instrumentally useful tools. The
primary question at the core of this project is to ask how Congress may have
misunderstood these mechanisms and may have failed to recognize the political and
constitutional impact they can have. By understanding how lawmakers have portrayed
technology, it will be possible to offer recommendations for injecting a more critical
understanding of these regulatory technologies within the policy process. This
understanding relies on core concepts from Science and Technology Studies.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Introduction
Jim Exon did not use the Internet much.1 Like many people in the mid-1990s he
did not truly understand what it was or how it worked but he did recognize the World
Wide Web as having the potential to “rival the invention of the printing press and
broadcasting in terms of how it will affect our daily lives” (Exon, 1995). Unfortunately,
along with this potential he saw the Internet as a threat, a threat to decency, and a threat
to vulnerable children who might stumble across pornographic pictures and videos,
predators and perverts. After all, dangerous and indecent content was only “a few clickclick-clicks away from any child” when they ventured online (141 Cong. Rec. S8088,
1995). The Internet, for all its revolutionary implications, was a dangerous frontier that
required regulation. Exon knew that online speech was important, knew that it often
qualified for constitutional protection, but like many concerned parents, he did not
believe the First Amendment was “so sacrosanct that we must stand idly by while our
children are inundated with pornography and smut on the Internet” (Id). Although he did
not know much about it or use it himself, Mr. Exon knew that the Internet was a problem
that Congress must fix before it could harm innocent children. What set him apart from
others with similar concerns was that, as the Democratic Senator from Nebraska, Mr.
Exon was in a unique position to do something about it.
If the problem was endemic to this new technological medium of the Internet, it
seemed self-apparent that technology might also provide the solution. As the co-sponsor

As noted by Cannon (1996, pp. 72-73), “At no time did Senator Exon ever profess personal experience on
the Internet. His staff indicated that he had no first-hand Internet experience. The material that Senator
Exon presented from the Internet to the Senate was always downloaded by someone other than himself.”
1

2

of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, this is exactly what Exon and other
legislators proposed. By using age verification systems and Internet service providers
themselves to police content, the federal government could accomplish the online
equivalent of confining adult bookstores to the seedier part of town. As Exon put it, “Just
as we have laws against dumping garbage on the interstate, we ought to have similar laws
for the information superhighway” (Id). Regardless, in their haste to protect children
from this “garbage,” Senator Exon and most of Congress failed to realize just how
seriously the technological “solutions” they were proposing would constrain access to
constitutionally protected speech.
In fact, the CDA prompted an almost instantaneous legal challenge from the
American Civil Liberties Union. Based on the requirements of the law and the
technological conditions under which Congress regulated content, the ACLU and others
argued that the limits imposed on protected speech by the CDA generally and its
technological mechanisms of enforcement specifically were unacceptable within the
framework of U.S. Constitutional guarantees. The ACLU recognized that “because of
the nature of online communications, a substantial number of content providers…simply
have no technologically or economically feasible way of screening out minors; the CDA
thus becomes a total criminalization of constitutionally protected ‘indecent’ or ‘patently
offensive’ speech” (ACLU Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief in Support of Their Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, 1996). The Supreme Court would unanimously find in favor of
the ACLU in the landmark case, Reno v. ACLU. The Court underlined the ACLU’s point
that there was no way for the technological arrangement required by the law to function
constitutionally within the context of the legislation.
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At the heart of this case lay Senator Exon and Congress’ fundamental
misunderstanding of the Internet and the technological mechanisms of enforcement
necessitated by the CDA. Although there is a distinct possibility that Senator Exon
“fundamentally misunderstood the medium which he sought to regulate”, the more
pressing issue is “how a senator with no technical knowledge of the [Internet] can draft
language which regulates it” (Cannon 1996, pp. 72-73). Particularly in a circumstance
where Congress applied more technology to fix the perceived problem, it may have been
inevitable that Exon and other lawmakers equally unfamiliar with such systems failed to
recognize just how deeply those systems could affect individual rights. Congress could
not begin to assess the implications of what they proposed without a critical
understanding of the Internet and the technological mechanisms of enforcement that they
imposed to regulate it. This is a recurring theme in recent legislative history where
lawmakers have attempted to regulate the Internet at the national level. In addition to the
CDA, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), the Children’s Internet Protection Act
(CIPA), the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT Intellectual Property Act
(PIPA) exemplify this phenomenon. To date, these have been the major federal attempts
to manage online content in the United States. In each case, Congress has mandated the
use of powerful regulatory technologies often vaguely described as “technology
protection measures” (see CIPA) and individual rights have consistently been implicated
as a result. Below is a more detailed introduction to these policies and their key
requirements.
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Introduction to the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and PIPA
With passage of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in 1996, the United
States took its first steps to construct policy designed to regulate Internet content on a
national scale. Legislators intended the CDA to address the issue of minors’ access to
indecent and pornographic content on the Internet. As the means to address this problem,
Congress offered two primary solutions. The first required that any online content
producer or provider implement age verification systems in order to ensure that children
would not be able to proceed to the harmful content beyond the verification screen. The
primary surrogate for proof of age would be credit or debit card information and/or the
creation of an online identification. Second, the Internet service and network providers
that controlled access for customers would be obligated to screen for indecent content on
their systems. The CDA would afford these service providers with legal immunity for all
such blocking and filtering actions taken in good faith for the protection of children.
Several oppositional groups led by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) would
oppose these policies both publicly and in the courts. The substance of the argument was
that the CDA’s broad definitions of indecency and the technological enforcement
mechanisms it required placed too severe a burden on constitutionally protected speech.
As will be described, the Supreme Court eventually struck down this Act on these
grounds in the case of Reno v. ACLU (1997).
The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998 was the immediate successor to
the CDA and lawmakers had a similar desire to protect children from online
pornography. In an effort to address the Supreme Court’s concerns (and, by inference,
the concerns of the opposition), Congress shifted the scope and target of enforcement.
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Specifically, while COPA would continue to require the implementation of age
verification systems as the primary mechanism of enforcement, Congress would narrow
the breadth of enforcement from all content providers to only commercial outlets.
Despite the adaptations embedded within this policy, it too faced strong opposition from
a number of groups. Again, the ACLU and other organizations such as the Center for
Democracy and Technology (CDT) argued that this policy was overly broad and unduly
burdensome for protected speech. In particular, even the limited use of age verification
systems was onerous for adult access and did not accommodate First Amendment
protections. This challenge led to a temporary injunction barring enforcement of the Act
and, after a lengthy legal battle over this policy and its technological provisions, the
courts imposed a permanent injunction.
Following the defeat of both the CDA and COPA, Congress passed the
Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) of 2000. For the third time, Congress
attempted to protect children from potentially harmful material on the Internet and relied
on technological solutions to accomplish its goal. In this case, however, legislators
proposed a drastic shift from either of the policies that had preceded CIPA. Specifically,
CIPA narrowed the focus of enforcement even further, limiting regulation only to public
schools and public libraries. In addition to confining the policy to these venues,
legislators called for the use of commercial filtering software as the primary regulatory
system. This differed significantly from the broad application of age verification systems
at the level of Internet speakers and, instead, limited access only at the level of recipients.
Again, despite this regulatory adaptation, oppositional groups took issue with the
constitutionality of CIPA and commercial filters. Led by the American Library
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Association (ALA), the opposition argued that this policy and this technology unduly
limited access to a considerable amount of protected speech and that it harmed the ability
of adult library patrons to seek out protected speech within a public institution. Like the
CDA and COPA before it, CIPA would face a Supreme Court challenge. What sets
CIPA apart is that the Court did not find either the policy or its technological mandate to
be significantly burdensome for adult access to protected speech and the policy remains
in force today. Despite this, and as will be discussed, the application of CIPA has been
problematic and has led to additional legal challenges.
With CIPA Congress was finally able to implement policy that addressed the goal
of protecting children from indecent material online. In addition to this, legislators have
since pursued content regulation schemes in other policy domains as well. For example,
in 2011 Congress proposed the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in order to halt the theft
of intellectual property on the Internet. The Senate introduced the Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of
(PROTECT IP Act or PIPA) almost simultaneously to SOPA. The goals of both SOPA
and PIPA were identical and each proposed that technological mechanisms must address
the problem of online piracy including Domain Name System (DNS) blocking of
allegedly infringing sites and the adulteration of search engine results to halt the flow of
traffic to these sites. Oppositional groups took issue with these policies as well and
argued that the law would affect a number of legitimate websites and entangle a great
deal of protected speech in the state’s regulatory scheme. Due to the public and political
unpopularity of these Acts, neither would reach a vote in Congress.
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Identifying Frames and the Theoretical Lens
Throughout all of these examples, the primary question at the core of this
dissertation asks how federal legislators may have misunderstood technology and may
have misused technological systems in an attempt to “fix” the Internet by regulating
content online. Specifically, have lawmakers applied these systems without a critical
understanding of how regulatory technologies can impact individual rights, freedom, and
autonomy? This potential for misapprehension of regulatory technology leads to
important and novel research questions that will be the focus of this dissertation. Broadly
put, have lawmakers misunderstood technology and misapplied it as a tool to effect
policy? If so, where in the policy process are these conceptual errors most prevalent? By
understanding how lawmakers might have (mis)portrayed technology and where in the
policy process these mistakes have occurred, it will be possible to offer recommendations
for injecting a more critical understanding of technology within that process.
In order to address these broad questions, this research will first identify the initial
motivations for these policies (e.g. protecting children, protecting intellectual property
and protecting national security) and will describe how those justifications have or have
not included a simplistic assessment of technology. Next, this research will isolate
moments within the policy process where lawmakers chose to portray aspects of the
Internet as problems that required intervention through policy and where they chose to
employ technological systems as the means to address those problems. This research is
necessary and novel in that it will identify instances within the legislative process where
this potentially naïve portrayal of technology may have manifested. Understanding
where and how this occurs will help to demonstrate why these policies have consistently
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met with constitutional difficulties and will pinpoint where a more critical view of
technology might fit within the process of policy formulation, negotiation, or even
implementation. This dissertation will argue that inserting a critical assessment of
technology into the policy process at these points will help to remedy the constitutional
and ethical difficulties that these laws have so consistently caused.
In order to isolate how and where these kinds of misunderstandings about
technology manifest, the policy process itself will be organized into discrete segments in
order to locate instances where Congress has failed to recognize that technology is not
simply a neutral tool free from ideological and political bias (see Friedman &
Nissenbaum, 1996) and that regulatory technologies are not simply expedient policy
instruments (Brey, 2006, p. 360). To accomplish this, each of the policies listed above
will be broken down into frames and a “frame analysis” (Goffman, 1974) will be
conducted. These frames can be divided into three categories: first are the “master
frames” (Williams & Benford, 2000, p. 134) that describe the initial motivations and
justifications for these policies; next are the “diagnostic frames” (Benford & Snow, 2000,
p. 615) that illustrate how lawmakers have rhetorically defined aspects of the Internet as
“problems” that require federal intervention; and third are the “prognostic frames” (Id)
that demonstrate how lawmakers have proposed to solve the perceived problem through
policy and through regulatory technologies. Across all of these frames, it will be
necessary to examine how legislators are portraying technology. It is crucial that this
analysis categorize policies into these frames in order to locate precisely Congress may
have inaccurately portrayed technology as a neutral object and how it is being misapplied
in a way that implicates individual rights. Locating these instances also serves to isolate
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points in the process where a more critical view of technology can and should be
included.
For example, as federal legislators, Exon and other supporters of the CDA
recognized the need to protect children from “smut” (Exon, 1995), identified the Internet
as a “unique medium” (Id) that offered unprecedented access to this kind of harmful
content and proposed a unique solution to the problem in the form of regulatory
technologies that would essentially zone this material to the dark corners of the Web.
What Exon and others may have failed to do at any point within these frames was
adequately recognize that the technological fix they were proposing could impose its own
ideology on citizens and unduly limit access to protected speech. The philosophy of
those designing regulatory technologies and the systems that actually made filtering
decisions on behalf of Internet service providers were not themselves impartial. As social
science and technology scholar Wiebe Bijker has argued, technologies, including these
systems, are shaped by social processes and value judgments, political perspectives and
normative rationales (1997, p. 281). By their very nature, these technological
enforcement mechanisms restrict access and impose points of view on the individual user
that may be as distasteful to them as pornography was to Senator Exon. What is required
in these instances and what this dissertation will demonstrate is that Congress must
examine the political, constitutional and ethical implications of regulatory technologies
when formulating broad “information policies” (Trauth, 1986, p. 41) such as these.
Examining how these systems can impact rights and freedoms when mandated by federal
law is a prerequisite for crafting sound policy and this research will dissected each of the
laws identified above into frames in order to illustrate this point. Lawmakers must
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scrutinize the design of regulatory technologies, the potential biases of these systems, and
the implications they have for constitutional rights. Describing the legislative portrayal
of technology within all of these policies and identifying specific instances in the policy
process that would benefit from a critical understanding of technology is one of the
primary scholarly contributions of this dissertation. The principal data set for this portion
of the research includes direct documentary evidence taken from the legislative process.
In addition to the policies themselves, this analysis will include legislative histories,
congressional reports, press releases, and other public statements of key legislators. This
documentation most thoroughly articulates the fundamental frames employed by
lawmakers.
Parallel to this investigation of the legislative process, this dissertation will
demonstrate how oppositional groups have already used these critical points of view to
redefine these kinds of information policies and their associated regulatory technologies.
For example, in the case of the CDA, the American Civil Liberties Union provided a
much more nuanced discussion of the nature of these systems and the potential harm they
could cause to individual rights. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s unanimous
opinion in Reno v. ACLU validated the critical analysis of technology presented by the
ACLU. This validation strongly suggests that Congress could benefit from this kind of
critical understanding and, if it were to be included in the policy process from the outset,
legislators could address many of the legal and constitutional difficulties these laws have
faced prior to implementation. In addition to isolating points in the legislative process
where this critical perspective can be most usefully inserted, this dissertation will identify
instances where oppositional frameworks have employed exactly this kind of critique.
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Again, it will be necessary to break down the oppositional process into key frames in
order to locate those moments. The identification of master, diagnostic, and prognostic
frames are crucial for this analysis as well and will provide a novel contribution to the
study of oppositional movements in the context of information policies such as the CDA,
COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and PIPA.
Additionally, this research will demonstrate how the judiciary has taken up the
critical view of technology used by these oppositional groups. Court rulings are used
here as the benchmark for the validity of these critical perspectives because they provide
the final judgment of how these policies and their technological mechanisms of
enforcement impact the constitutional rights and civil liberties of the populace within the
context of the U.S. political system. Several of the policies analyzed throughout this
dissertation have come before the Supreme Court and, because of the arguments put
forward by oppositional groups, have either been struck down as unconstitutional or have
been heavily modified to ensure that the regulatory systems they require function
constitutionally in application. Based on the frames presented by the opposition, the
Court has consistently recognized that these technologies function politically in the sense
that they deeply impact individual rights.
Furthermore, because various courts have found these policies to be
constitutionally unsound, these laws have had to evolve and shift. After the Supreme
Court struck down the CDA, Congress attempted to narrow the scope of the law and its
enforcement mechanisms in order to address this constitutional infirmity. Due to the
more technologically nuanced arguments put forward by the opposition and the
endorsement of those arguments by the Court, the law shifted slightly resulting in passage
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of the Child Online Protection Act. When the Court struck down COPA for many of the
same reasons as the CDA, Congress tried yet again to pass similar legislation. When the
Children’s Internet Protection Act became federal law in 2000, legislators had again
narrowed the scope of enforcement, this time strictly to minors in certain controlled
locales, thereby shifting the focus of the policy and its technological enforcement.
Although challenged on similar grounds, the Court eventually found CIPA to be
constitutional as long as Congress placed significant limits on the filtering mechanisms
required by the law. Despite this, it is possible that legislators again failed to consider the
political nature of the technologies they were proposing and CIPA may yet face
additional constitutional hurdles (see Bradburn v. NCRL and PFLAG v. Camdenton).
One of the goals of this dissertation is to examine whether or not these shifts in policy
relate directly to the opposition’s competing framework. Again, these competing
oppositional frameworks often include the assertion that a critical view of technology
must be included within the structure of the policy’s enforcement. As long as this critical
view is absent from the policy process, information policies such as these will continue to
face constitutional obstacles.
Although a wide array of individuals and organizations have opposed these
policies in a variety of ways, this dissertation will focus on those groups that were most
active in challenging these laws, the most vocal in their criticism and that most
effectively employed a critical understanding of the Internet and associated regulatory
technologies. Particularly in the examples of the CDA, COPA, and CIPA, those
organizations primarily responsible for articulating and advancing the opposition were
those that pursued legal action against the policies on constitutional grounds. While
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several organizations may have spoken publicly on issues related to these laws, only a
few were active in the judicial process (and had the financial clout to pursue such
challenges). These primary oppositional actors are, for the most part, the named
plaintiffs in these actions. These groups filed the initial complaints and various court
documents that will be part of the fundamental documentary evidence for this research.
Additionally, this research will analyze the amicus briefs, expert reports, press releases,
and other public statements made by these groups as they relate to key frames and to
technology.
Although identifying key frames within direct documentary evidence is crucial to
this research, it is not enough to chide the legislative branch for its apparent
misunderstanding of technology or its failure to recognize the impact regulatory
technologies can have on individual rights. It is also insufficient to compliment
oppositional groups for the clarity of their argument. Equally, isolating instances in the
policy process where critical perspectives can be included is useful but incomplete. In
order for this research to provide a more meaningful contribution to policy research, in
order to enrich the methodology of frame analysis and to explain what, exactly, a critical
view of technology looks like, it is necessary to provide a specific lens for the
consideration of frames. The theoretical framework that most thoroughly critiques the
political nature of technology, technological systems, and their impact on individual
rights, freedom and autonomy is Science and Technology Studies (STS). Additional
work from the philosophy of technology (such as Andrew Feenberg’s critical theory of
technology and Philip Brey’s disclosive ethics) will be considered as well but
perspectives from STS provide the fundamental structure necessary to guide the analysis
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of both legislative and oppositional frames and can offer a roadmap of sorts for
lawmakers when considering information policies of this kind in the future. By including
perspectives from STS, this research can more adequately address why a critical
assessment of technology needs to be part of the policy process and how oppositional
groups have already advanced such viewpoints so successfully. As will be explained
more thoroughly in Chapter 2, STS as a field of study is fundamentally concerned with
the socially constructed nature of technology and the ideological biases that the design
process can embed within it. As STS pioneer Langdon Winner has argued, one of the
core theoretical assumptions of STS literature is that the technologies used to implement
and enforce social policy are not merely tools. Instead, “What appear to be nothing more
than useful instruments are…enduring frameworks of social and political action”
(Winner, 1986, p. x).
Contrary to this more nuanced view, there appears to be a pervasive attitude in
policy circles implying that regulatory technologies are intrinsically impartial and
unbiased. This perspective holds that “tools and technical systems are inherently
ideologically neutral. Individuals with particular axes to grind may employ a tool to
achieve their ends, but this does not make the tool itself ideological” (Pitt, 2000, p. 72).
The rationalist underpinnings of science and the perceived nature of the technological
design process leads some legislators to believe that these “tools” are apolitical. From
this point of view, technology has no values of its own or ideology embedded within it
through the course of its development (Feenberg, 1991, p. 5). This “neutrality thesis”
(Brey, 2010, p. 43) suggests that technological artifacts can be applied in any number of
ways without consequence. In contrast, as technological ethicist Deborah Johnson has
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argued, “It is now well-accepted…that technology…is value-laden…that technologies
are developed in a social context that pushes and pulls and shapes its development”
(Johnson, 1997, p. 20).
Normative Framework
It is important to note that this dissertation and this author proceed from the
normative position that access to information is a benefit to the individual and to
democratic society. This principle ensures that “those resources and circumstances
necessary for living a minimally good life” (Nickel, 2007) remain unrestricted. The
ability to read, write, speak, and listen without undue constraint from the state is crucial
to the ability of the citizen to exercise individual autonomy and for the state to function
for the benefit of its citizens. As Philip Brey has noted, individual autonomy is a good in
itself because “it ensures that human beings are able to draw out their own life plans that
reflect, as much as possible, values and needs of their own, instead of those of the
government or of other citizens” (1998, p. 2). Therefore, access to information serves
both individual interests and the interests of a democratic state. This supports the
suggestion that, “A minimally good human life is not possible without access to a rich
array of expressions and to knowledge for both practical ends and intrinsic benefits to the
human spirit” (Mathiesen, 2008).
The exercise of individual autonomy is dependent on a number of freedoms
including the freedom to speak, listen, and access the information necessary to make
decisions that reflect the person’s motivations, values, and goals (Brey, 1998, p. 2). This
is equally true when considering access to the vast informational resource and democratic
forum that the Internet has become. From this perspective, any policy or technology that
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Congress implements to restrict access online requires thoughtful analysis prior to its
application. In the U.S. constitutional context, the First Amendment increases the state’s
responsibility to its citizens in this regard and demands that policy preserve adult access
to protected speech. If we accept the idea that access to information is a basic right and a
boon to society, then Congress bears the burden of proving that the policies they choose
to implement and the technologies they choose to employ do not illegitimately damage
this fundamental good. The normative framework for this dissertation is fundamentally
based on John Stuart Mill’s assertion that there “ought to exist the fullest liberty of
professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however
immoral it may be considered” by the state (1859/2008, p.26). Embedded within this
assumption is the ideal that discussion is meaningless without access. If the individual is
unable to hear and speak or is otherwise restricted from participating in the conversation,
then a basic right has been illegitimately constrained.
That being said, there are and should continue to be some constraints on the
exercise of free speech. Lawful restraints on individual speech and the First Amendment
are not mutually exclusive. As First Amendment advocate Alexander Meiklejohn has
suggested, “When self-governing men demand freedom of speech…They do not declare
that any man may talk as he pleases, when he pleases, about what he pleases, about
whom he pleases, to whom he pleases” (1948/2004, p. 24). Democratic societies can and
should restrict speech and access when, for example, the welfare of a child is at risk.
This is equally true when speech directly incites violence or causes injury. The problem
with this and the question taken up by this dissertation is; how do we enforce any
“exceptions to the presumption of free speech [and access] in such a way that consistent
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application of the principle doesn’t permit less desirable censorship” (Warburton, 2009,
p. 4)? The normative framework presented here suggests that the application of
technological barriers to access, as mandated by the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and
PIPA, directly causes undesirable censorship. The motivations of policymakers in these
examples may superficially appear to qualify as valid restraints on access and speech
because lawmakers desire to protect children from indecent content, protect property
rights, and defend national security. Despite this, a careful analysis of the enforcement
mechanisms used to accomplish these seemingly worthwhile goals demonstrates that a
great deal of legitimate speech is subject to the state’s regulatory zeal. Particularly when
the state sets limits on adult access to speech it deems controversial, this damages the
constitutional foundations of democratic society and the ability of the individual to decide
what constitutes information that is right, proper, and necessary.
Summary
By employing an STS framework to unpack legislative frames, this research can
identify instances where lawmakers have failed to consider technology critically. STS
also provides a means for addressing how oppositional frames have used a more nuanced
argument that includes this technological critique to great effect. This research will also
illustrate how judicial rulings have incorporated oppositional frames dealing with
technology as well as how those frames and judicial opinions may have forced an
incremental shift in the scope and technological enforcement of these policies. Finally,
by showing how STS can improve the formulation of these kinds of laws and where in
the policy process STS can be included to the greatest benefit, this research can provide a
set of coherent recommendations. This dissertation will demonstrate that the inclusion of
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STS perspectives within key frames can result in better outcomes for lawmakers and a
better, more thoughtful use of regulatory technologies. By improving the policy process
and ameliorating constitutional deficiencies prior to implementation, Congress can better
preserve the rights and autonomy of individual citizens.
Following the literature review and methodology sections in Chapters 2 and 3,
this dissertation will proceed with a frame analysis of the CDA (Chapter 4), COPA
(Chapter 5), CIPA (Chapter 6), and SOPA/PIPA (Chapter 7). Each of these chapters will
describe these policies in depth and will detail the master, diagnostic and prognostic
frames for each. Chapter 8 will provide a theoretical discussion analyzing several core
concepts from Science and Technology Studies alongside this descriptive frame analysis.
Finally, this dissertation will conclude by offering some recommendations for including
these critical perspectives from STS within the policy process so that lawmakers may
create more sound policy going forward.
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework: Science and Technology Studies (STS)
Introduction
In order to undertake the research described above, perspectives from Science and
Technology Studies (STS) will help describe the frames of both legislative and
oppositional groups. STS will be the theoretical lens employed in conjunction with the
frame analysis methodology because, as Richard Sclove’s work on democracy and
technology suggests, it recognizes that “all government policies involving technology
need to be reevaluated from the standpoint of their implications for achieving a more
democratic technological order” (1995, p. 224). The intersection of policy, technology
and democratic rights relates directly to the fundamental principles of STS research
making this discipline the most appropriate for addressing policies that attempt to
regulate online content including the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA and PIPA. This is
particularly true in the context of this research where specific moments within the policy
process are to be unpacked and described. As communications studies researcher and
STS contributor John Monberg suggests, STS can help provide a “rich analysis of the
complex and tentative nature of policies” and can “identify multiple points of
intervention” within policy deliberations “that can expand the democratic potential of the
Internet” (2005, p. 283). One of the primary goals of this dissertation is to provide that
kind of analysis to the policies listed above and to help both policymakers and
oppositional groups realize this democratic potential.
While frame analysis provides an organizational tool for isolating how groups
portray technology within key frames and points within the policy process where
misunderstandings may occur, STS explains how technology functions politically and
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how it can constrain individual rights. Broadly stated, STS is “an interdisciplinary field
that is creating integrative understanding of the origins, dynamics and consequences of
science and technology…STS scholars engage activists, scientists, doctors, decision
makers, engineers and other stakeholders on matters of equity, policy, politics, social
change, national developments and economic transformation” (Hackett, et al., 2008, p. 1).
STS can also critically examine the use of regulatory technologies, the scientific expertise
that underpins them, and how that expertise is “produced, maintained, stabilised, closed,
contested or negotiated” (Guggenheim & Nowotny, 2003, p. 242). This is particularly
useful in the context of entrenched political institutions and the oppositional groups that
have arisen to contest policies that depend on instrumental understandings of policy and
technological enforcement. The scope and intent of STS research can address the frames
employed by both legislators and oppositional movements and can describe their varying
portrayals of technology as well as technology’s place in policy. Some core concepts
from STS can help describe these processes and may offer insight into the implications
they may have for democratic society.
Technology is Political and Non-Neutral
This is particularly true in an environment where policymakers may not be aware
of the political ramifications of the technologies they are employing to solve social
problems. Policies such as those addressed in this dissertation mandate the imposition of
technological systems to regulate the terms and conditions under which individuals may
access information online. Not only is the use of technology in these instances a political
decision, but it is also increasingly the manner in which policy goals are accomplished
(Winner, 1977, p. 323). STS researchers Emilie Gomart and Maarten Hajer suggest that
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STS as a field acknowledges this, provides the tools necessary for critically evaluating
technology in such a situation and “STS has a long tradition of warning [against]
‘technological fixes’” (2003, p. 55). Specifically, some STS scholars have recognized
that “Politics…takes the form of a general concern about which political systems,
institutions, and understandings; which participants with what qualifications, roles, and
responsibilities; and which kinds of civil society would be most democratic while
preserving the benefits of scientific and technical expertise” (Hackett, et al., 2008, p. 3).
STS research can also help to explain how and why some legislators may have
failed to address the regulatory technologies they have mandated through policy.
Specifically, it is possible that lawmakers have proceeded from the position that age
verification systems, DNS blocking and even commercial filtering software are apolitical
instruments of action. From this view, as political theorist Yaron Ezrahi has noted,
technology and the scientific processes that underpin its design seem above reproach. As
the products of scientific reasoning, technological artifacts appear “non-arbitrary,
impersonal and therefore rarely contestable” from a legislative point of view (Ezrahi,
2003, p. 64). These tools, then, provide a means to exercise governmental force without
the appearance of bias and with complete viewpoint neutrality. The scientific method
and the mechanisms it creates appear to stand apart from the social and political
processes that define policy and some legislators have demonstrated a keen “willingness
to privilege science based technologies as neutral modes of action” (Id). This reifies
“expert” knowledge and allows those in Congress to apply seemingly neutral
technological objects without first exploring their implications for rights and autonomy.
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Why should the state investigate such a possibility if scientific rationality and the
technical design process have already stripped these objects of any values or biases?
Technological Ordering
Legislative action, then, requires these technological mechanisms to “appear
distinct from political authority” (Ezrahi, 2003, p. 64). Congress may portray such
“tools” as the best means to accomplish the instrumental ends of policy. Despite this, as
STS has recognized, this fails to account for the socially constructed and contingent
nature of technological design. This perspective also obscures the kinds of power
relationships that may result from broad application of these regulatory systems. As
anthropologist and political scientist James Scott has suggested in his work on
technocratic ordering by the state, these uncritical political processes can demonstrate
“the dangers of dismembering an exceptionally complex and poorly understood set of
relations and processes in order to isolate a single element of instrumental value” (1998,
p. 21). As will be described in the examples of the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and
PIPA, these policies drastically altered the complex relationships of those speaking and
listening on the Internet through the application of apparently neutral tools. In Scott’s
view, this technological exercise by the state exemplifies “high modernism” (Id, p. 90).
High modernism demonstrates a tendency within government to apply the “benefits of
technical and scientific progress” uncritically across a wide variety of actions (Id). While
the intent of these policies may be benevolent, by employing technology in this way,
lawmakers can strip the individual of his or her rights and basic freedoms because they
have failed to account for the impact these systems may have on the complex
speaker/listener relationships that constitute Internet-based discourse.
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Specifically, the goal of the high modern state is to engineer a society according
to rationalist scientific and technological principles. This eliminates the ambiguity of
societal practice dictated by “custom and historical accident” and allows the state to order
the activities of the individual according to “conscious, rational, scientific criteria” (Id, p.
92). From this view, the exercise of rights and the implementation of technocratic policy
appear to be distinct and separate phenomena. If the state is applying the fruits of science
and technology for the benefit of its citizens and if technological policy instruments are
apolitical due to the neutrality of the design process, this does not implicate the freedom
and autonomy of the individual. Despite this, the relationships dictated by the use of
regulatory technologies at the policy level and the individual activities constrained by
those systems lead to the opposite conclusion. As STS researcher Sheila Jasanoff has
argued, instead of standing apart from technology or “lying in an altogether separate
normative domain,” the rights and freedoms of the citizen are “being constituted in
significant part through technology” (2003, p. 164).
Legislative supporters of those policies at issue here appear to have been
oblivious to the assertion that individual rights may become subordinate to the political
nature of technological mechanisms of enforcement. The use of these technologies can
be constitutive in the context of freedom and autonomy due to the affordances they
provide (or lack) (Brey, 1998, p. 2). As Internet law scholar Lawrence Lessig (1999) has
argued, this may be especially true in a technological environment such as the Internet
where access and choice may be entirely subservient to technological architecture and
code. This does not imply technological determinism - quite the opposite. The high
modern society has chosen to construct a technological regulatory environment where
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Congress applies artifacts like commercial filtering software uncritically. Equally,
scientists and technologists have designed systems that embed, reflect, and advance a
distinct set of norms and values. The Internet also embeds values and ideology and, as
Tim Berners-Lee (the Web’s original designer) has suggested, from the beginning
designers intended the Internet to allow for the broad dissemination and receipt of
information without prioritizing messages based on their content (2010). When policy
demands the imposition of technological barriers to access that impede this design
principle, something is lost. Again, this diminishment of the Internet’s communicative
potential is unacceptable if the state applies such systems without some critical
understanding of their nature. Nevertheless, these choices are completely within our
control. Exposing both technology and policy to critical review allows us to unpack
these contradictions and implications. As historian and STS scholar Gabrielle Hecht
(1998) has argued, “Opening the black boxes of culture and technology simultaneously
can…give us insight into how technologies constitute a terrain for transforming, enacting,
or protesting power relations within the social fabric. Taking politics [and technology]
seriously as objects of analysis greatly deepens our understanding” of both (p. 10,
emphasis in original).
Advocacy and Local Knowledge
The problem here, then, is to identify when those policy choices and design
practices clash with democratic rights, constitutional guarantees, and individual agency.
As instruments of federal policy, these technological barriers to access, and the values
they embody, have the significant ability to determine the boundaries of behavior and the
borders of access. Essentially, lawmakers have imbued these technologies with
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“constitutional force” and, as such, that force “should be explicitly authorized” (Jasanoff,
2003, p. 175). Without such authorization, these systems have received governmental
approval in the absence of thoughtful deliberation. It is no wonder, then, that poorly
understood technologies hinder rights when the state delegates its police power to them.
This is entirely unacceptable in the context of U.S. constitutional guarantees and is
particularly tragic considering the potential of the Internet as a vast democratic forum.
Rather than being constrained, these freedoms could and should be magnified and
enhanced by technology. Again, this is not to suggest that these technologies determine
the actions of individuals but instead, as sociologist and STS scholar Chandra Mukerji
has argued, these artifacts shape the material conditions within which politics and dissent
may be exercised (Mukerji, 2007). As Jasanoff has suggested, “For good or for ill,
science and technology are important aids to human self-expression, not merely iron
cages within which a passive humanity languishes imprisoned by forces beyond its
control” (2003, p. 174). Therefore, if we allow it through ignorance or indifference,
poorly understood regulatory technologies become the means for illegitimate control
rather than empowerment.
In addition to recognizing this condition of the high modern society, it is
important to treat “expert” scientific and technical knowledge with a degree of
skepticism. By accepting the efficacy and neutrality of regulatory systems as a given,
some legislators may have been far too credulous and, in the process, may have failed to
address the importance of practice and local knowledge (Gomart & Hajer, 2003, p. 36).
Without this recognition, the circumstances created by policies that depend so heavily on
technology often bear “only a schematic resemblance to the lived realities of those being
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governed” (Jasanoff, 2003, p. 172). This local knowledge, although often ignored, is
consistently a powerful force in defining and contesting the limits of what policies and
technologies can do (see Mukerji, 2009). As the oppositional groups discussed
throughout this dissertation have shown, legislators disregard the influence and
importance of local knowledge at their own peril. In the context of this research, activist
and professional organizations often represent local knowledge and the ideological
commitment of those groups to technological regulation and positivist policymaking are
minimal at best. Instead, these groups rely on the lived experience of those who would
be regulated and focus on the protection of rights instead of the exercise of technocratic
government. This struggle is also exemplified by institutions such as public libraries that
have often argued that the application of regulatory systems to delineate “community
standards” should instead be defined by local practitioners rather than distant legislators
or technologies designed with other criteria in mind. Fashioning their opposition around
constitutional guarantees and local norms of practice, these groups have taken what some
in STS would describe as a “democratic approach to science and technology” that, in
part, is intended “to criticize scientific experts’ [and policymakers’] reluctance to include
local knowledges and stakeholders” within policy debates (Gomart & Hajer, 2003, p. 36).
STS, then, as part of its research agenda attempts to describe these “subpolitical”
groups that construct themselves “outside the domain of formal politics” (Id). As will be
described, this extra-institutional political phenomena manifested most clearly during the
debate over SOPA where grassroots organizations, individuals and websites that were in
no way traditional advocates banded together to contest the policy being imposed upon
them. Rather than remain subservient to the vagaries of political representation in a high
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modern state, these groups used their shared experience within various Internet
communities as a counterargument to the rationalist assumptions of those who supported
SOPA in Congress. As Gomart and Hajer (2003) have observed, this exemplifies “a
reversal of the political order” where oppositional groups, assembled around a common
complaint, have employed their local knowledge of a technological circumstance to
challenge the “classical-modernist order of politics” (p. 43). Again, STS is uniquely
suited to address “both important intellectual questions” surrounding politics and
technology while advancing “an activist agenda aimed at improving society” (Monberg,
2005, p. 283). Even more specifically in the context of Internet research, and in
alignment with this dissertation, STS helps to provide “a critique of specific Internet
public policy choices including privacy, censorship, access, and intellectual property [all
of which] offer myriad scholarly and advocacy opportunities” (Id).
Governance
In addition to case-specific opportunities for advocacy, STS research provides
insight into the workings of government in general and Internet governance in particular.
As communications scholar Mikkel Flyverbom (2011) has argued, in any new
technological arrangement it is almost inevitable that artifacts like regulatory systems
become “sites of contestation” (p. viii). In any such contest over the legitimacy of these
objects “questions about governance and power move to the fore: who does this space
belong to, what rules and forms of governance should apply, and who should set and
enforce them?” (Id). The questions addressed throughout this dissertation align with this
research agenda and the conflicts between legislative and oppositional groups
demonstrate the contested nature of these spaces and technological systems. Specifically,
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in online spaces, what limits is the state authorized to place on access to information?
When and by what means? Does such a thing as a “community standard” exist online?
Does the federal regulation of “indecent” content implicate the right of adult access?
When Congress requires the use of technological barriers to mediate access, are those
barriers appropriate? As will be described, all of these questions have been central to the
debates around the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and PIPA.
Furthermore, oppositional groups have demonstrated significant power in these
debates and have been able to shape both policy and the technological conditions of
Internet access in the United States. This validates the assertions of telecommunications
scholars Peter Cowhey and Milton Mueller that Internet governance is increasingly a site
for new kinds of struggles where “Changes in the rules of decision making and the forms
of stakeholder participation will drive outcomes in novel directions even if the parameters
of choice still remain under the control of governments” (2009, p. 193). In cases such as
these, oppositional groups have demonstrated the ability to mobilize quickly and
coherently to address what they often see as a misuse of power and a misapplication of
technological mechanisms of enforcement. It is possible that the ability of these groups
to assemble rapidly and affect policy initiatives so drastically represents an example of
political scientist Bruce Bimber’s “accelerated pluralism” (1998). Such a phenomenon
demonstrates that these groups coalesce around issues that are about the Internet and, in
some cases, are so effective because they organize on the Internet. As Bimber suggests,
the Internet may be “accelerating the process of issue group formation and action, leaving
the structure of political power in the U.S. altered” (p. 136). Again, the examples of
SOPA and PIPA, and the array of groups that organized online to oppose these policies,
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demonstrate this possibility most clearly. These groups were primarily Internet
communities who used their online “spaces” as sites of protest against restrictive policy
and technology.
Exercising force over the material and technological conditions embedded within
the architecture of the Internet is hugely important when determining the contours of
Internet governance. As mentioned above, Lawrence Lessig’s work in this area
demonstrates the principle that code is law in the online environment and, if we are to
preserve the open nature of the Internet’s original architecture, we must exercise caution
when confronted with mechanisms designed to control and regulate without consideration
for rights or autonomy (1999, p. 6). Age verification systems, DNS blocking, search
result adulteration and commercial filtering software epitomize these architectural
barriers to freedom and access and should be closely examined accordingly. Some
researchers within STS have made observations similar to Lessig’s and have tied the
shape of network architecture to “the shaping of user rights” (Musiani, 2013). STS
scholar Laura DeNardis has been particularly eloquent on this subject and has repeatedly
warned that the “Technologies of Internet governance increasingly mediate civil liberties
such as freedom of expression” (2014, p. 1) and we ignore this possibility to our own
detriment. DeNardis also warns us that the kinds of technological mechanisms of control
described throughout this dissertation demand critical reassessment because they are
nothing less than “expressions of mediation over societal values such as security,
individual liberty, innovation policy, and intellectual property rights” (Id, p. 2). The
regulatory technologies mandated by the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and PIPA require
such careful analysis because they have the potential to redefine the scope and variety of
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speech on the Internet. Without meaningful review of the technological barriers to access
required by these policies, we allow the unchecked “technical mediation of the public
sphere and the privatization of conditions of civil liberties” (Id, p. 242). This dissertation,
and the STS framework it employs, can reexamine the implications of the technical
mediation that legislators may have applied uncritically.
Alternative Models of Internet Governance
In relation to questions of governance, it is important to note here that the initial
rise of the Internet as the key platform for the global dissemination and receipt of
information has resulted in several theories about how to regulate that platform. Most
notably, Cyberlibertarianism and exceptionalism typified some of the earliest conceptions
about policymaking online. Oppositional groups and grassroots campaigns that fought
against the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA and PIPA all, to some extent, share the basic
ideology of these movements. This ideology includes the concept that the Internet
functions best when left largely unregulated and that those who participate online should
formulate a normative and regulatory framework tailored to their own needs. As noted
by legal scholar Lawrence Solum, this typifies the Internet governance “model of
cyberspace and spontaneous ordering” that “is premised on the idea that the Internet is a
self-governing realm of individual liberty, beyond the reach of government control”
(2008, p. 57). Centralized regulation and the imposition of technological barriers to
access runs counter to this framework and many of the opposition’s arguments across all
of these cases typify this perspective. For example, early Internet scholars and activists
including John Perry Barlow (founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation) argued that
the Internet required no regulation. Barlow believed that the Internet was a unique
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domain that would suffer under the imposition of traditional legal constraints. Barlow’s
“Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” (1996) repudiated all of the sovereign
territorial claims necessary for regulatory legitimacy and the Internet, in his view, was
not subject to legitimate regulation by states bounded by physical borders. Those in
“cyberspace” constituted a new citizenship that did not need or wish to consent to the will
of these states. Regulation imposed by those who did not participate in this new medium
or those who did not understand the technological conditions that define online speech
was, by definition, harmful to this citizenship.
Barlow was one of the first to question the right of territorial governments to
dictate regulations in a medium that allowed individuals to receive or distribute
information anywhere in the world. Barlow argued that laws did not engage the consent
of those online if states geographically removed from the subject implemented national
laws hindering access. As Barlow noted, if considered a coherent citizenry, those in
cyberspace had not agreed to be governed. Other scholars took Barlow’s claims quite
seriously and began to articulate a new conception of how to regulate cyberspace.
Perhaps the best articulation of this new “exceptionalism” came from legal
scholars David Johnson and David Post. Johnson and Post suggested that new legal
structures would need to be defined – structures independent of national borders. Since
online space constituted its own territorial boundaries, the idea of physical sovereignty
had, in their opinion, to be reexamined. Precisely because cyberspace was a disembodied
medium, new laws would need to be formulated and these new regulations would have to
acknowledge that traditional enforcement mechanisms were no longer adequate. Johnson
and Post point out that, in order to create meaningful law, some sort of coercion is
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necessary as a threat for noncompliance. Lacking the ability to physically punish or
incarcerate an online actor outside their borders, states no longer possessed the means to
effectively coerce individuals to obey the law (1997, p. 5). Johnson and Post’s solution
to regulating this borderless world was to conceptualize the Internet as its own unique
territory - an independent sovereign in its own right that would formulate, enforce, and
adjudicate its own laws. Simply participating in the online space granted rights akin to
citizenship to those individuals. Consent of the governed would come from those
participants and the borders separating the physical from the virtual defined this
regulatory terrain. Rather than being forced to negotiate a confusing and contradictory
set of guidelines, online citizens would operate under a unified system whereby
cyberspace was independent of any national policy but its own (Id, p. 13). Like Barlow,
Johnson and Post proposed nothing less than a declaration of independence from
traditional legal processes.
There are many similarities between these early regulatory approaches and the
approach taken by many of the oppositional groups described here. However, the key
difference between the two and the difference that informs all of the opposition’s
arguments against these policies is that regulatory systems became the coercive
mechanism by which the state could enforce its policy. Age verification systems,
filtering software, DNS blocking and other technologies undercut the argument that
physical states did not have the ability to regulate effectively. While many of the
oppositional groups described throughout this dissertation have argued that the Internet
works best when left alone, they were also forced to contend with enforcement
technologies that were unanticipated by Barlow, Johnson or Post. Due directly to the
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state’s demonstrated ability to coerce behavior online, the opposition was less concerned
with the issue of sovereignty and more disturbed by the potential for regulatory systems
to harm the constitutional rights of users within U.S. borders. Although sympathetic to
many of the cyberlibertarian arguments for global informational rights, as will be
described, the opposition’s arguments tend to favor the protection of domestic liberties
and the preservation of access to protected speech according to U.S. constitutional
principles.
The countervailing principle that guided Senator Exon and others as they
attempted to reconcile the challenges posed by the new medium of the Internet is
analogous to the “law of the horse.” As legal scholar and eventual Appellate Court Judge
Frank Easterbrook suggested, there should not be two legal systems competing with one
another where the first applies only to the physical world while the second applies only
for the Internet. As Easterbrook argued in his analogy, simply because issues of
ownership or injury were related directly to a horse, these cases should reflect traditional
and unifying precedent that recognizes these instances as representative of property and
torts law generally rather than some unique law related only and specifically to horses.
Equally, when seemingly novel implications of new technology such as the Internet
confronted legislators, they should not rush to institute laws separated from the long and
proven history of legislation applied to the physical world. As Easterbrook would
suggest, “Error in legislation is common, and never more so than when the technology is
galloping forward. Let us not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an evolving
world that we understand poorly. Let us instead do what is essential to permit the
participants in this evolving world to make their own decisions” and “make rules clear”
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(1996, p. 5). Exon’s regulatory approach to the problem of online pornography through
the CDA was emblematic of this approach and his reliance on traditional regulatory
history as well as his argument that regulations such as physical zoning laws have “been
in effect and been approved constitutional with regard to pornography…We’re not out in
no-man’s land…We’re trying to expand that as best we can to the Internet” (Exon, 1995,
p. 2) demonstrates this. This coincides with another model of Internet governance that
relies on “national governments and law” and is “based on the idea that as the Internet
grows in importance fundamental regulatory decisions will be made by national
governments through legal regulation” (Solum, 2008, pp. 57-58). That being said, the
law of the horse remains more grounded in legislative precedent than the model of
national governments Solum describes.
Interestingly, as the opposition would find and as all of the policies described
throughout this dissertation demonstrate, neither the cyberlibertarian model nor the more
traditional law of the horse would dominate the debate. Instead, each side would find
itself arguing for or against a much different conception of Internet governance. In
contrast to the more utopian ideals of self-governance free of national regulation or even
the historically proven models of traditional legislation, these debates would focus on a
third model of governance. Specifically, both sides had to confront the idea that
technological enforcement mechanisms could dictate the substance of online content and
the direction of online behavior. This reflects Solum’s “model of code and Internet
architecture” that is “based on the notion that many regulatory decisions are made by the
communications protocols and other software that determine how the Internet operates
(Id, p. 57).
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Technical Rationality and Political Design
Despite this, the imposition of technology at the legislative level may quash
exactly this kind of mobilization by its very nature. As noted above, because
technological artifacts represent scientific rationalism and technical expertise they may
appear beyond the realm of legitimate debate (Winner, 1977, p. 324). Several social
theorists have noted this aspect of technology including Jurgen Habermas, Helmut
Schelsky, Jacques Ellul, and Max Horkheimer all of whom have argued that the apparent
logic and rationality of technology “cannot be easily criticized in a democratic political
arena” (Brey, 2006, p. 361). Legislators and ordinary citizens may not be inclined to
question the use of technology or dispute its ability to resolve social problems because of
this. Yet, as Andrew Feenberg’s critical theory of technology suggests:
“A good society should enlarge the personal freedom of its members
while enabling them to participate effectively in a widening range
of public activities. At the highest level, public life involves choices
about what it means to be human. Today these choices are
increasingly mediated by technical decisions. What human beings
are and will become is decided in the shape of our tools no less than
in the action of statesmen and political movements. The design [and
use] of technology is thus an ontological decision fraught with
political consequences” (1991, p. 3).
Investigating how lawmakers portray the use of technology to implement policy can
demonstrate how and where they have neglected to examine or understand its political
nature and are practicing, as Winner suggests, the kind of “somnambulism that
characterizes technological politics” (1977, p. 324). Exploring how oppositional groups
have exploited that somnambulism and employed contradicting frames to portray
technology is an important means for understanding how various publics have re-opened
the debate. STS provides the foundation necessary to accomplish both of these tasks and

36

can go beyond this descriptive function to offer specific and nuanced recommendations at
crucial points within the policy process (Monberg, 2005, p. 283).
A wide cross-section of STS research provides the background necessary to
examine the political nature of technology, how the design and implementation of these
systems function politically, and how to ameliorate negative effects on individual rights.
One possibility within this view suggests that political outcomes are an intentional design
feature of technology. Therefore, as science and technology scholar Bryan Pfaffenberger
argues, those responsible for creating these systems “have created technological artifacts
with technical characteristics specifically designed to exercise force, that is, to coerce
obedience and suppress deviance” (1992, p. 283). This can include the design and
construction of large-scale, public structures that serve the function of reinforcing the
social and political order. The famous example provided by Winner is that of the
parkway overpasses on Long Island. In order to prevent lower income minorities from
crossing the bridges via public transportation, Winner asserts that city planners
intentionally designed the overpasses to be too low to allow buses to pass through. This
was a conscious choice on the part of the designer to “achieve a particular social effect”
(1986, p. 23). This demonstrates that technological artifacts can indeed have politics as
Winner suggested. While the bridge itself is simply concrete and steel, its design can
accomplish political goals within its specific historical and societal context.
Many other examples of this phenomenon exist within the STS literature and each
demonstrates the political aspects of what superficially appear to be neutral artifacts.
Each instance illustrates not only intentional design choices that have social
consequences but also how the decision to implement these technologies can reflect
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political ends. As Bryan Pfaffenberger has noted, the “elite, the supposedly ‘traditional’
values, and the technological artifacts [of a society] are reciprocally and recursively
constructed in interaction with each other, producing an outcome that ideally generates
both political authority and a technological system” (1992, p. 290). To illustrate his
point, Pfaffenberger describes the deployment of irrigation technology by the Sri Lankan
government. Although seemingly neutral, the state implemented this technological
structure in a manner that entrenched the property rights and political authority of the
Ceylonese majority while marginalizing the Tamil minority. In this way, “Sri Lankan
irrigation technology may have succeeded in its political aims of legitimating the elite’s
status, discouraging industrial development, and packing the landless [minority] off to the
settlements, where they could do no harm” (Id, p. 289). Again, the context of the
technology’s use may be equally as important as the purpose of its design.
Technology can uphold social hierarchy and entrenched power relations in a
similar manner. For example, Pfaffenberger relates how the placement of benches in the
hallways of aristocratic homes during the Victorian era served to reinforce class
differences between servant and master. While a bench may seem somewhat
unsophisticated in a technological sense, it functioned exceptionally well in fulfilling the
purpose for which it was designed and implemented. These benches emphasized
“Profound decorum standards [that] called for members of the master’s class to be
admitted straightaway into the interior of the house, while members of the servant’s class
were seated on the bench, signifying their inferiority” (Id, p. 294). Yet Pfaffenberger
cautions that while artifacts have the potential to function politically, they must be
employed within a specific social and historical context to do so.
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This reminder can serve to caution legislators that technological artifacts are
socially constructed and can function politically within the precise social and historical
milieu in which they are created (Bijker, 1997, p. 281). This context becomes important,
especially when the interpretation of objects is contested (Pfaffenberger, 1992, p. 284).
Specifically, “a proper analysis of such political changes requires that an important role is
also assigned to social factors, and particularly to the way users and others interpret and
represent the technology” (Brey, 2005, p. 66). For instance, as Philip Brey relates, at one
time seatbelts in cars were mandatory in that the vehicle would not start unless
passengers buckled their belts. Although designed as a safety precaution, this kind of
“behavior-steering technology” (2006, p. 357) has moral implications related to freedom,
democracy and personal responsibility. Even technology intended to save lives has
political implications when those forced to use it take issue with its effects on their rights
and autonomy. As this example demonstrates, “behavior-steering technologies are
sometimes controversial. U.S. car drivers did not appreciate being mechanically forced
to wear their seat belts…Some people even mounted a court challenge: they felt that the
coercive mechanism in place went against their civil liberties” (Id). Within the political
and social context of the United States, this kind of technological imposition had
implications that were not immediately apparent and those sponsoring the law may not
have adequately recognized this in their haste to implement the regulatory system.
This observation leads to a second conclusion that not all technology is
specifically designed with a political purpose in mind but may have political implications
nonetheless. Richard Sclove goes further to suggest that, even without intention, the
implementation of technological artifacts through policy can undermine democratic
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practices and democratic societal frameworks. In the case of Ibieca, a Spanish village,
Sclove argues that the villagers found the introduction of technology (in this case, indoor
plumbing) to be a disruption of the community. Instead of gathering at a communal
water source, villagers found themselves isolated by the new system thus upsetting a
traditional social relationship and introducing a new structure (1995, p. 11). Where
democratic society is concerned, technology may be problematic in that it can function to
coerce the compliance of the individual at the expense of freedom and autonomy (see
Noble, 1986 and Barker & Downing, 1985). Just as Brey’s behavior-steering
technologies have moral implications, so too do regulatory systems when “in
contemporary society [technological processes] have become the equivalent of a form of
law – that is, an authoritative or binding expression of social norms and values from
which the individual or group may have no immediate recourse” (Carroll, 1977 in Sclove,
1995, p. 11). The imposition of regulatory technologies by policymakers within a
representative democracy such as the United States must be examined prior to
implementation if, as Brey, Sclove, Carrol, Winner and others suggest, the potential for
harm to individual rights exists. Whether designed intentionally or not, employed
deliberately or not, technologies are political and not simply neutral tools that serve a
useful function. STS provides the vocabulary for exploring the political implications of
technology and strongly requires that lawmakers explore those implications as part of the
political process. STS “has as its central thesis that better technology is arrived at
through a democratization of the process of development and implementation. Better
technology is attained if more stakeholders (social groups or actors that have a stake in
the way the technology is developed and implemented) have had a say in these

40

processes” (Brey, 1998, p. 65). Inserting these kinds of critiques into the policy process
prior to passage of laws such as the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA and PIPA can help
achieve more beneficial and democratic outcomes.
Affordances
Furthermore, technological artifacts, whether they are bridges, irrigation systems,
seatbelts, or software filtering programs, can function politically because they afford the
user only specifically prescribed activities. Generally speaking, affordances make some
actions possible while limiting others. As design engineer William Gaver explains,
through these affordances, individuals can and cannot interact with their environment
(1991, p. 80). From this perspective, the concept of affordances “encourages us [i.e.
designers] to consider devices, technologies and media in terms of the actions they make
possible and obvious. It can guide us in designing artifacts which emphasize desired
affordances and deemphasize undesired ones. Perhaps most important, it allows us to
focus not on technologies or users alone, but on fundamental interactions between the
two” (Id, p. 83). As Bruno Latour (1992) has argued through his sociology of science,
this aspect of technology can guide and limit a user’s range of available actions and
constrain a variety of possibilities. Therefore, technological affordances are “a perceived
property of an artifact that suggests how it should be used” (Pfaffenberger, 1992, p. 284).
The political implications of affordances become obvious when considered in the context
of democratic rights for those forced to operate under technological systems. When those
systems constrain the exercise of individual autonomy, when those constraints are not
immediately apparent to the user, and when access to constitutionally protected content is
limited, this harms democratic rights. It is clear that the affordances present (and absent)
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within those regulatory technologies mandated by the policies at issue here constrain
rights in this manner and the political implications of these systems may not have been
adequately addressed at the legislative level.
When legislation requires the use of regulatory technologies such as age
verification systems, domain name blocking at the ISP level or Internet filtering software,
the actions afforded to the user by the system become fundamentally important. If the
system “discourages or prevents a user from behaving in certain ways while using an
artifact” (Brey, 2006, p. 73), the rights of the individual are implicated. Within the
context of liberty, autonomy and democratic rights, such affordances and constraints may
affect the user in two ways. First, this may hinder the negative rights of the user. As
described by legal philosopher Isaiah Berlin, questions related to negative liberty ask,
“What is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons - is or should be
left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?” (1969,
p. 2). Within the context of the research described here, lawmakers should ask this
question when considering the implications of the constraints imposed by regulatory
technologies. Failing to address such issues at the policy level can harm negative liberty.
In the examples used throughout this dissertation it seems to be the oppositional groups,
through critical analysis of the technology, who have recognized that “If I am prevented
by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this
area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being
coerced, or, it may be, enslaved” (Id, p. 3). Questions of positive liberty are equally
important when addressing affordances and technological constraints because they ask
“What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do,
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or be, this rather than that?” (Id, p. 2). When the source of that control is technological in
nature and mandated directly by policy, individuals must ask if that interference is
legitimate. Legislators should not mediate the ability of the individual to pursue personal
goals and access desired information through technology unless they have thoroughly
explored that mediation prior to implementation. Again, STS provides the foundation for
pursuing these issues and for guiding the policy process.
Hegemony
Additionally, an STS critique should be included at necessary points within the
policy debate because the technologies at issue may have hegemonic attributes. Control,
power, and illegitimate hierarchical relationships relate directly to the issue of hegemony.
Broadly defined, “hegemony is a form of domination so deeply rooted in social life that it
seems natural to those it dominates. One might also define it as that aspect of the
distribution of social power which has the force of culture behind it” (Feenberg, 1992, p.
7). Those in power can reinforce this kind of domination through the endorsement of
technological systems. By mandating their use, policymakers are imposing technologies
that “shape aspects of social roles and relations by requiring, fostering, enhancing,
discouraging, eliminating or modifying certain social behaviors and patterns of social
interaction, or by changing or fostering certain perceptions of social status or the criteria
by which people agree to the assignment of certain statuses or roles” (Brey, 2006, p. 75).
Regulatory technologies can steer behavior and implicate positive and negative rights
through technological affordances but first those in power must approve and
institutionalize these technologies. In order to reach the level of legislative
implementation, technologies, both large scale and small, must have the imprimatur of
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the state. Put another way, “The principle dimensions of such culture institutionalization
are the state, which articulates its interests through political codes, technology and its
technical codes…an effective hegemony is characterized by a cultural unity traversing
the domains of economics, technology, and politics” (Feenberg, 1991, p. 135). Through
policy, the state can institutionalize hegemonic technologies that can detrimentally
impact individual rights.
If regulatory technologies are not neutral tools and if they are socially constructed
artifacts with embedded values of their own, the hegemonic dominance of those values
may become pervasive. Particularly if those values remain undetected at the policy level,
by default, they may impose a certain point of view on those forced to operate under
them. If lawmakers implement regulatory technologies without a critical understanding
of the values they embody, those forced to implement these systems may be tacitly
endorsing these values (Johnson, 1997, p. 22). This possibility is reminiscent of Marxian
political theorist Antonio Gramsci’s conception of cultural hegemony. Gramsci argued
that this phenomenon is comprised of the “consent given by the great masses of the
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental
group” (Gramsci, 1971/2005, p. 12). While Gramsci’s analysis deals primarily with the
power afforded to those in control of the means of production, this concept applies
equally to those with the power to impose artifacts specifically designed to enforce a set
of prescribed norms and quash behavior deemed to be outside of those norms
(Pfaffenberger, 1992, p. 283). In addition, Gramsci emphasizes that hegemony and the
exercise of power requires, to some extent, the consent of those who acquiesce to the
cultural norms of what constitutes acceptable behavior, what is deviant and the
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mechanisms used to mediate both. In Gramsci’s estimation “consent and force nearly
always coexist, though one or the other predominates” and those in power rule “primarily
through domination – that is, by monopolizing the instruments of coercion” (Lears, 1985,
p. 568). In the examples discussed throughout this dissertation, those instruments
mandated by policy may coercively limit access to a range of constitutionally protected
speech.
The policies at issue in this dissertation all deal with some coercive instrument
that disallows the free flow of information. Yet those with legislative authority, in some
measure, have surrendered their power in that they have employed these technologies
without an adequate understanding of how the objects themselves mediate access and
exercise power over the individual. In these instances, policymakers have handed over
some hegemonic authority to the technical specifications of regulatory systems and, by
inference, to those who designed those systems. As philosopher Martin Heidegger has
suggested, based on a strong belief in scientific expertise, rationality, technical
knowledge and the certainty that technological problems can only be remedied by
technological solutions, power is delegated to those mechanisms (1977, p. 3). This
compromises the power of the individual in that their consent is now dependent on
accepting the terms of access placed upon them by technology. If they do so without
question, individuals have, in a sense, given up the power inherent in their consent by
trusting that elected representatives, the policies they impose and the instruments
employed to accomplish policy goals are the only rational solution to perceived social
problems. Again, this demonstrates a hegemonic relationship if the “social power which
has the force of culture behind it” (Feenberg, 1992, p. 7) is granted to regulatory systems
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without a critical analysis of those systems. As philosopher Michel Foucault has
suggested, if power “only exists in action” and manifests as the “way in which relations
of forces are deployed and given in concrete expression” (1976/1980, pp. 89-90), then
regulatory technologies assume the power granted to them by the state that employs them
and the citizens who accept them if that power is delegated without first understanding
how it will be exercised. When we blindly accept low bridges that refuse entry to
minorities or filtering software that refuses access to constitutionally protected content,
we are forfeiting our power to artifacts we may not understand and systems that make
political decisions on our behalf. The power of individual consent is meaningless if our
relationship to technology allows no room for solutions other than those that are
technological.
In this sense, the true danger of technology and technocratic policy is that it can
restrict how we may choose to address social problems (Dreyfus, 1995, p. 99). By
conceiving of technology as the only viable solution, legislators may restrict themselves
to only those options when formulating policy. As sociologist Todd Gitlin argues, this too
becomes a “hegemonic ideology” that subsumes our world view and “meshes with the
‘common sense’ through which people make the world seem intelligible” (2003, p. 10).
Yet, even when presented as “common sense” and outside the realm of controversy, it is
possible to oppose hegemonic ideology. The oppositional movements described within
this dissertation have framed the debates surrounding these policies in a way designed to
“stretch, dispute, and…transform the hegemonic ideology” (Id, p. 11). These groups may
have recognized that a different relationship with technology is possible and that
powerful counterarguments to its use as regulatory mechanisms exist. Within the social
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and historical context of these artifacts and within the political environment they have
been deployed, oppositional groups have recognized that “the dominant ideology”
includes contradictions that position democratic values against state control and the
tyranny of rationalism against informed and legitimate debate (Id). By exploiting these
contradictions, these groups have found a means for once again exercising the power of
their consent and reinvigorating the debate over the objectivity and neutrality of
technological systems. Questioning hegemonic ideology as it relates to technological
policy instruments may once again bring these issues, as political communications
scholar Daniel Hallin argues, within a “sphere of legitimate controversy” (1989, p. 116)
that is recognized by legislators and the courts as worthy of debate and critical discourse.
Conclusion
STS provides the tools necessary to address all of the technological issues
addressed above including the possibility that legislators have assumed that regulatory
systems, as the end result of a rational design process, are neutral and apolitical policy
instruments. This analysis will provide insight into the potential for these systems to
function politically due to the values and bias that the design process may embed within
them. Additionally, this research will describe how these regulatory technologies may
have functioned politically constraining individual rights, local autonomy, and
constitutional liberty in the process. This potential extends to unintended consequences
resulting from these policy actions including the formation of anti-democratic power
relationships and the exercise of hegemonic power. In the context of Internet research, it
is hoped that the “payoff” of using STS as a theoretical lens will be to provide an
enlightening “exploration of the political consequences of technologies seemingly most
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apolitical” (Monberg, 2005, p. 284). By isolating these policy moments and analyzing
them within an STS framework, this dissertation provides a novel contribution to both
frame analysis and to information policy studies. Structurally, frame analysis locates
where to apply a critical understanding of technology within the policy process but,
without STS, there would be no way to discern what that critical view should encompass.
If lawmakers have neglected the implications of these technologies, STS can help explain
why these policies have met with such difficulties and how to ameliorate concerns as
Congress negotiates future policies. Bijker has called for STS to take up the kind of
empirical work that this dissertation will attempt to accomplish while embracing rich
theoretical perspectives that encompass both policy and technology (1997, pp. 289-290).
By combining a descriptive account of the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA and PIPA with the
theoretical lens provided by STS, this research is intended to, as Bijker has suggested,
“strengthen the links between academic STS studies and politically relevant action” (Id).
By conducting this analysis, and by examining lawmakers’ actions in the context of these
important concepts, it is possible that more democratic outcomes may result.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
Methodological Framework: Frame Analysis
Frame analysis provides the methodological grounding necessary to organize and
understand both the legislative and oppositional processes at issue within these policies.
It allows these policies to be broken down into functional units that relate to the portrayal
of technology and technological mechanisms of enforcement. Coupled with the use of an
STS lens, frames provide a structural mechanism for parsing out moments in time where
the policy process and its oppositional counterparts have or have not employed some
critical view of technology. Locating those moments will isolate where lawmakers may
have failed to examine the implications of regulatory systems and where oppositional
groups have used arguments similar to those provided by STS to the greatest advantage.
Furthermore, by identifying those points in the policy process it will then be possible to
make recommendations as to where legislators can most beneficially employ a more
critical analysis. This research suggests that including an STS critique within the
legislative process can result in better, more nuanced information policies and frame
analysis provides the entry point necessary to accomplish this.
Frame analysis began as a sociological instrument for studying representation and
meaning (Fisher, 1997). Sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) suggested that frames
provide a structure through which individuals and groups can make sense of their
physical surroundings as well as their social context and, through frame analysis, “what
would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene [becomes] something that is
meaningful” (p. 21). This dissertation will explore the context of both policymakers and
oppositional groups frame analysis will provide a method for coherently organizing the
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themes that emerge. Frame analysis will help explain the motivations of these groups
and will offer a structural and organizational point of reference to describe how
stakeholders understand these issues and present alternatives (Zald, 1996, p. 265). Frame
analysis will allow this research to isolate crucial moments within the policy process
where a better, more thorough understanding of technology can and should be included.
Specifically, this methodology provides insight into the policy process and the
movements that oppose those policies by “offering a point of comparison, or a conceptual
structure, through which people can digest information” (Fisher, 1997). The “conceptual
structure” of frame analysis can take two primary forms: cognitive representation and
discourse related to the subject. The cognitive approach defines frames as an individual
interpretive scheme for understanding and representing situations based on prior practice,
successful experience, and cultural foundations (Johnston, 1995, p. 217). Although
useful, this dissertation will not pursue this approach because it has tended to focus on
“individual cognitive organization and to blur the distinction between frames and other
ideational factors such as values, norms, identity, solidarity and grievances” (Id, p. 218).
Instead, this research will address frames at the oppositional and institutional levels
because describing individuals at the cognitive level is neither feasible nor useful in the
context of this research (Id). Furthermore, this project is very concerned with values and
norms and those ideological features of policy and will explore these features through
their manifestation within the primary source documents. For the purposes of this
research, these documents will provide a more holistic view of these information policies
and the oppositions that have coalesced around them. As political scientists Donald
Schon and Martin Rein have argued, in order to understand the policy process, and
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discrete moments within it, “we must become aware of our frames, which is to say that
we must construct them, either from the texts of debates and speeches or from the
decisions, laws, regulations, and routines that make up policy practice” (1994, p. 34).
The use of documentary evidence is crucial to this research because it is the best, most
direct and most concrete artifact of how these policies were justified, negotiated, and
opposed.
Frame analysis is particularly useful for policy studies like this because it allows
the researcher to identify and “examine political language as used at various stages of the
political communication process” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 70). This is true in the
context of both institutional actors such as legislators and social movement organizations
that employ frames to mobilize the opposition (see Gitlin, 2003, p. 6). As social
movement researchers Robert Benford and David Snow have argued, frame analysis also
provides a means for investigating the “collective action frames” (2000, p. 615) used by
both oppositional groups and policymakers. Identifying these collective action frames
will help explain how “adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic
condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who
or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in
concert to affect change” (Id). In the context of information policies that manage access
to online content, understanding how the opposition frames problems related to policies
that employ technological systems is particularly important. Just as important is to
understand why lawmakers implemented those solutions in the first place.
In the literature, these “core framing tasks” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615) have
generally been applied only to social movement organizations (SMOs) and not to

51

institutional actors such as policymakers (for seminal examples, see Snow & Benford,
1988, Snow et al. 1986, Klandermans 1984 and Klandermans 1986). This is equally true
for online collective action (see Postigo, 2012, Jordan, 2001, and Milan & Hintz, 2013).
Scholars position these SMOs external to traditional power structures and conceives of
these groups outsiders in any political struggle where policy clashes with values held by
the SMO. In contrast, this dissertation will apply these concepts equally to those inside
and outside the policy process. Just as SMOs coalesce to contest the presence or absence
of certain policies, so too do legislators take concerted action to address their concerns
and those of their constituencies. Both policymakers and oppositional groups employ
frames to advance an ideological position, rhetorically define a problem, and propose a
solution to that problem (Nisbet, 2010, p. 47). Within this dissertation, this will also
include the core framing tasks related to the characterization and application of
technological systems.
Framing occurs at several levels throughout the policy process. The primary
frames at issue here are those that are most fundamental to the cultural, political, and
technological narratives formed around these policies. These foundational themes are
referred to as the “metacultural frames” (Schon & Rein, 1994, p. xiii) or “master frames”
that are the “dominant logic or grammar that provides syntactic (formally ordered)
‘codes’ that structure the framing process [and] enable movement actors to communicate
with a reasonably wide audience by connecting the frame to already recognizable codes”
(Williams & Benford, 2000, p. 134). As mentioned previously, at the policy level
lawmakers have invoked as master frames the need to protect children from harmful
content, the need to protect intellectual property from theft and the need to defend
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national security. Despite the fundamental cultural importance of these ideological
motivations, these policies have met with intense opposition based on competing
foundational principles. The opposition in these instances has focused their arguments on
ideals such as free speech, free access, autonomy and the need for transparent
mechanisms of enforcement. These are the master frames embedded within these
movements and, to a large extent, these oppositional frameworks have been more
nuanced about policy and the implications of technology than the legislative master
frames invoking the need to protect children, property and national security. Put another
way, the master frames articulated by the opposition may have broader “resonance”
which is “relevant to the issue of effectiveness or mobilizing potency of proffered
framings” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). Todd Gitlin (2003) and Daniel Hallin (1989)
have demonstrated how frames used to mobilize opposition to the Vietnam War have
resonated with both the public and with policymakers and, in some cases, forced the
direction of policy to adapt or shift to a more widely resonant master frame. Determining
if the master frames employed by the movements opposed to the CDA, COPA, CIPA,
SOPA, and PIPA have greater resonance than the legislative master frames and finding
out if that resonance relates to a critical understanding of technology similar to STS is an
important first step in this research.
Master frames reflect core cultural and political values. Although many frames
may resonate widely “Only a handful of collective action frames have been identified as
being sufficiently broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility, and cultural
resonance to function as master frames, including rights frames, choice frames, injustice
frames…and a ‘return to democracy’ frame” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). It is
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hypothesized that the master frames employed by oppositional groups in these instances
may have garnered judicial support and influenced the direction of policy because they
rely on some of the most powerful master frames identified by Benford and Snow and
because they better account for the implications of the technology required by policy.
Specifically, the opposition in these instances has based its dissent on rights frames,
choice frames and democratic frames and these arguments have rested on the supposition
that technological mechanisms of implementation and enforcement negatively impact
those rights and choices. Within the context of master frames and the ideological
principles they represent, these oppositional frames may “rank” more highly than those
articulated by policymakers. If the research shows that judicial decisions have endorsed
the frames employed by the opposition or woven directly into modified versions of these
policies, this would be a strong indication of their resonance. This would support prior
research “on values and beliefs [which] indicates that they are typically arrayed in a
hierarchy…the more central or salient the espoused beliefs, ideas, and values of a
movement to the targets of mobilization, the greater the probability of their mobilization”
(Id, p. 621). This would also validate the assertion that a critical analysis of the
technological mechanisms these policies require in application is a prerequisite for
crafting sound information policy.
Additionally, this dissertation will focus only on policies contemplated by the
United States because the frameworks employed by both lawmakers and the opposition
are grounded in the political, social, democratic and constitutional context of that
government. Master frames that invoke choice, transparency and access “make sense
only in a cultural discourse that highlights notions of individual autonomy and equality of
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citizenship rights” (Zald, 1996, p. 267). In order for the opposition to be even remotely
successful, the political process must make room for dissent and policymakers must be
vulnerable to the processes that validate these competing democratic/technological
frames. The difficulties these policies have faced may be a direct result of not only the
oppositional position, but also a political context that allows for and responds to public
pressure. Within this democratic and constitutional context the “framing of injustice and
of political goals almost always draw upon the larger societal definitions of relationships,
of rights, and of responsibilities to highlight what is wrong with the current social order,
and to suggest directions for change” (Id). In particular, the opposition has focused its
argument on the need to reconsider the technological mechanisms required by these laws
because they may unjustly impact the affordance of rights.
Scholars who conduct frame analysis are often concerned with the narratives of
injustice that have appeared as a common thread among social movement organizations.
These studies “focus on the development and articulation of…’injustice frames’ [and]
call attention to the ways in which movements identify the ‘victims’ of a given injustice
and amplify their victimization…injustice frames appear to be fairly ubiquitous across
movements advocating for some form of political and/or economic change” (Benford &
Snow 2000, pp. 615-616). This dissertation will argue that the opposition has effectively
applied these injustice frames to advocate for technological change. To accomplish this,
social movements employ frames reminiscent of STS perspectives in order to advance
their position and “draw on the cultural stock for images of what is an injustice, what is a
violation of what ought to be [in order to] frame a problem and suggests a policy
direction” (Zald, 1996, p. 266). Those opposed to federal attempts to regulate the
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Internet have drawn from these same narratives of injustice and have argued that “larger
state or government structures are not needed in cyberspace” because they harm the
ability of the individual to self-govern (Jordan, 2001, p. 9). For example, movements that
have opposed online intellectual property regulations have drawn from a similar pool of
injustice frames arguing that “user-centered notions of fair use [and] free speech…are
often bargained away in click-through agreements” (Postigo 2012, p. 5). Opposition to
the policies discussed here have all, in one way or another, focused on the injustices
inherent in the technological mechanisms required by these policies. These groups have
crafted arguments strikingly similar to STS perspectives and have used them effectively
to address the unjust nature of some technologies.
In conjunction with all of these strategies and in addition to master frames, each
competing side also employs a “diagnostic” frame (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615) that
rhetorically defines the “problem” as that side sees it. The process of diagnosis requires
an identification of that which is responsible for the problem and, in the examples of the
CDA, COPA and CIPA, Congress suggested that the Internet was a potentially harmful
medium for children. They argued that it was a compelling government interest to solve
this problem. Despite this, the opposition in these examples based its position on the idea
that the “solution” proposed by lawmakers was a problem in itself. Since “social
movements seek to remedy or alter some problematic situation or issue, it follows that
directed action is contingent on identification of the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or
culpable agents” (Id, p. 616). By hindering access and choice, the opposition has argued
that these technologies unjustly restrict access to protected speech. By identifying the
technological mechanisms of implementation and enforcement as the cause of the harm,
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oppositional groups in these instances demonstrated this “attributional component [of]
diagnostic framing [that] attends to this function by focusing blame or responsibility”
(Id). Policymakers performed the same task by identifying indecent online content (i.e.
the Internet) as that which was to blame for the problem.
The language used to frame the problem is also important to the process and
frame analysis can identify the underlying values and the associated portrayal(s) of
technology that rhetoric may advance, obscure, define, or re-define. Regardless of how it
is used, rhetoric demonstrates how ideological positions form frames that can advocate
for the creation of law, including information policies such as the CDA, COPA, CIPA,
SOPA, and PIPA. Frame analysis can shed light on the political nature of problem
definition and the value-centric nature of policymaking where “‘[P]roblems’ are viewed
as interpretations of conditions that have been subjectively defined as problematic and,
as such, demand some type of ameliorative action. It follows, then, that problem
definition is fundamentally a political exercise, that is, labeling a phenomenon to be a
‘problem’ is a political calculus largely based on values” (Ingram et al., 2007, p. 94,
emphasis in original). Frame analysis can address the values and ideology that
lawmakers employ to advance political positions and those positions that oppose
institutional interpretations of the need for and direction of policy (Zald, 1996, p. 262).
This includes the tendency of legislators to describe the Internet as a problem that they
must solve through policy and technology. Despite this, within all of the policies
discussed here, the opposition has invariably offered alternatives that critique the
implications of the technologies imposed by these laws in a manner reminiscent of STS.
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Frames can manifest at the policy level through the identification and presentation
of social problems. Policy is often the result of the perceived need for change in a given
circumstance where lawmakers see government intervention as the primary mechanism
for achieving that change. Furthermore, due to the political nature of policymaking,
lawmakers must persuade people that a problem exists. In such situations, “not every
condition is seen as a problem. For a condition to be a problem, people must become
convinced that it requires change. People in and around government make that
translation by evaluating conditions in light of their values” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 114). In
addition, the frames underlying the identification and definition of the problem must be
acceptable to others. By making a particular value set explicit, a policymaker “selects
some aspects of a perceived reality and makes them more salient…in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, or policy
alternative” (Weimer & Vining, 2011, p. 272).
For instance, in the examples of the CDA, COPA, and CIPA, policymakers
framed the issues in a way that portrayed technology in general and the Internet in
particular as dangerous and children as a group that required protection from it.
Legislators intended the CDA to “address an increasing number of published reports of
inappropriate uses of telecommunications technologies to transmit pornography [and]
engage children in inappropriate adult contact” (Senate Report 104-230, 1995).
Lawmakers presented CIPA as a way “to protect America’s children from exposure to
obscene material, child pornography, or other material deemed inappropriate for minors”
(Senate Report 106-141, 1999). Yet others may have framed the issue quite differently
and would not have found a problem; at least not a problem that required intervention
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through policy or technology. The difference between the two positions is the use of
rhetorical framing to push a policy alternative and with it a preferred set of values. This
strategy demonstrates “the use of persuasive language to frame issues in favorable ways.
At one normative extreme, rhetoric provides correct and relevant information that
clarifies the probable impacts of proposed policies. At the other normative extreme, it
provides incorrect or irrelevant information that obfuscates the probable impacts of
proposed policies” (Weimer & Vining, 2011, p. 283). The simplistic portrayal of
technology by policymakers combined with a lack of critical understanding results in
exactly the kind of rhetorical framing that can obfuscate the probable impacts of these
kinds of information policies and their associated regulatory technologies. Oppositional
groups have seized on this and crafted their arguments in a way that isolates these
impacts as the problem. This research will explore how both legislators and these
oppositional groups employ diagnostic frames during the course of problem definition.
Diagnostic framing then leads directly to “prognostic framing” that articulates
potential solutions to the problem and the means for realizing those solutions (Benford &
Snow, 2000, p. 615). Continuing with the example of the CDA, legislators suggested a
handful of technological solutions to the problem of minors’ exposure to indecent online
content. In contrast, for the opposition, this has formed the basis of the competing
prognostic frame that Congress should reconsider use of these technologies or that the
courts should strike down the law (or portions of it) in order to resolve the problem.
Based on the argument that policymakers essentially failed to recognize the impact that
technological mechanisms of enforcement could have, the Supreme Court accepted the
opposition’s position that these mechanisms resulted in a situation where “the CDA thus
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becomes a total criminalization of constitutionally protected ‘indecent’ or ‘patently
offensive’ speech” (ACLU Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief in Support of Their Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, 1996). This is a common feature of prognostic frames and “it is
not surprising that an SMO’s prognostic framing activity typically includes refutations of
the logic or efficacy of solutions advocated by opponents as well as a rationale for its
own remedies” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617). This oppositional rationale has often
included the suggestion that lawmakers do not understand how regulatory technologies
impact individual rights. The opposition has asserted that, because lawmakers have
approached technological mechanisms of enforcement as expedient tools, they are
employing these systems without first addressing the potential effect they can have on
constitutional guarantees. This kind of assertion often employs arguments similar to
those provided by STS scholars and, by using this kind of framework at this point in the
process, the opposition may have forced the legal challenges and policy shifts these laws
have so often faced.
Building on this supposition, another key area for investigation within this
dissertation will be to examine “frame shifts” (Rein & Schon, 1991, p. 283). Both Todd
Gitlin (2003) and Daniel Hallin (1989) have described how extenuating factors can shift
the dominant frame bringing previously marginalized groups into a position of power
within a national conversation or policy debate. In the examples provided by Gitlin and
Hallin that factor is the media but as both acknowledge, oppositional groups and SMOs
can serve the same function. While the media no doubt influenced the public’s
perception of these policy frames, this research will focus instead on oppositional groups
and their subsequent challenges to policy. Regardless of the focus of analysis, both
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authors suggest that all of these forces may act on one another to a greater or lesser
degree eliciting action, reaction, framing and re-framing. By inference then, the groups
identified within this research can place pressure on institutional actors to reassess or
modify the prevailing frame - in this case the portrayal of technology as the only logical
policy solution. In recognition of the competing frames offered by the opposition,
policymakers may have changed the narrative and/or the scope of these laws in an effort
to advance the original master frame. In these examples, lawmakers incorporated
portions of the opposition’s competing frames into the modified policy either directly or
via judicial opinion. Specifically, those frames that offer a more critical view of
technology and that align with perspectives from STS.
For example, the CDA underwent just such a shift after the Supreme Court’s
ruling in 1997. In recognition of some of the oppositional frames that helped strike down
portions of the original policy, legislators narrowed the focus of the law to ameliorate
concerns about overly broad limitations on adult choice and undue restrictions on
constitutionally protected speech. This shift eventually resulted in introduction of the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA) and then the Children’s Internet Protection Act
(CIPA). Like the CDA, lawmakers designed these policies to filter harmful content for
minors but the focus of that restriction became successively narrower as the policy
evolved. Although the master frame of protecting children from harm did not change,
policymakers eventually tailored the law to target children specifically within public
institutions such as schools and libraries. Despite this, like the CDA before it, CIPA
continues to face strong opposition based on its technological shortcomings. Although
the Supreme Court found CIPA to be constitutional, it remains controversial due to

61

policymakers’ potential failure to address the biased and political nature of the technical
systems it continues to require. While the modifications to CIPA suggest that
policymakers have acquiesced to some oppositional frames and have ameliorated some
technological concerns, this possible failure to address the impact of technology fully
may result in additional legal challenges (see Bradburn v. NCRL and PFLAG v.
Camdenton).
Across all of these frames, oppositional movements have often articulated the
position that the technological solutions proposed by these policies limit choice by
restricting access unnecessarily and that those restrictions unduly restrain access to
protected speech. This dissertation will describe how the opposition has articulated
competing frames and how these groups have been able to modify or defeat the policies
in question. This research suggests that the ideological framing of the opposition has
been successful because it more appropriately accounts for the political nature of the
technologies at issue in a manner similar to STS research. As a result of this more critical
view of regulatory systems, the opposition has forced lawmakers to shift these policies to
reflect this. By examining the opposition’s framing process, this dissertation will isolate
precise points where these groups have advanced positions similar to those provided by
STS. In turn, this analysis will dissect the policy process to locate instances where
lawmakers may have failed to understand the political nature of technology or critically
assess the implications it can have for individual rights and autonomy.
Frame Analysis Accommodates the Theoretical Lens of STS
As described above, frame analysis provides the best possible methodology for
this project for several reasons but one of the most important is that it can accommodate
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the theoretical framework of STS. As noted in Chapter 2, STS provides the most
appropriate theoretical lens for approaching these policies and technologies because it
provides insight into the subjectivity and potentially biased nature of regulatory systems.
Although this research relates directly to the policy process and would seem, for
example, to suggest the need for formal policy analysis, the fundamental worldview that
underpins that approach is insufficient to address the technological and ideological topics
at issue here. Instead, frame analysis allows for an examination of the policy process
through the constructivist lens of STS. Therefore, a combination of the frame analysis
methodology and STS concepts offers significantly different avenues for research than
the more rationalist framework that defines policy analysis.
By way of comparison, the framework represented by the policy analysis
approach has several shortcomings that frame analysis does not. First, from its inception,
policy analysis and the “policy sciences” have emphasized the role of quantitative data,
positivist assumptions, economic metrics, and “the use of scrupulous objectivity”
(Laswell, 1951, p. 14) to anticipate the outcomes of specific policy decisions. Instead, as
political scientist Giandomenico Majone (1989) has suggested, the construction of policy
and its subsequent analysis requires a constant appraisal of socially negotiated values,
norms, and priorities. Recognizing this becomes even more important with the
introduction of technocratic regulation that relies on technological policy instruments (Id,
p. 2). Where these technologies directly impact individual autonomy and democratic
freedoms, positivism and economic considerations fail to acknowledge that these
regulatory systems are socially constructed artifacts that are distinctly political in nature.
Frame analysis goes beyond the rationalist tools used by policy analysts and
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accommodates alternative perspectives from STS that recognize “Whenever technologies
structurally affect democracy or other important shared values, democratic politics ought
to take precedence over economic calculation or unregulated market outcomes. This
implies that contesting democratic design criteria can be superior to using today’s formal
methodologies for public policy analysis” (Sclove, 1995, p. 161). In fact, the metrics
provided by traditional policy analysis may serve to echo the instrumental assumptions
that already permeate the legislative portrayal of technology as value neutral. By offering
a seemingly objective, unbiased examination of technocratic policy, policy analysis may
serve to reinforce legislators’ uncritical view of the technologies they are imposing. As
Richard Sclove suggests, “As applied within the context of pending political decisions,
[positivist] methodologies are often portrayed as value-neutral machines operated
impartially by expert practitioners to generate social policy analyses or
recommendations” (Id, p. 173). Contrasting perspectives provided by STS require a
greater depth of analysis for issues related to the portrayal of technology by policymakers
and parallel oppositional movements within key frames. This research employs frame
analysis in conjunction with STS to approach policy and technology in a way that policy
analysis alone cannot.
By filtering this frame analysis through the lens of STS, this research can provide
exactly the kind of critical, democratic foundation required for the inquiry described here.
Frame analysis allows for the systematic evaluation of policy and it can incorporate the
theoretical framework of STS that provides the necessary skepticism about such systems.
The economic and other metrics that form the theoretical lens for policy analysis cannot
be easily reconciled with these features of STS.

64

Research Questions
1.) How are the motivations and justifications for these policies articulated within
legislative master frames? In contrast, how are the oppositional master frames
articulated? In the context of the Internet and the regulatory systems required by the
policy, how is technology being (mis)portrayed? Do legislative master frames lack a
critical view of technology (per STS) and do oppositional master frames include more of
these critical perspectives? Are master frames a point within the policy process where
lawmakers would benefit from the framework provided by STS research? Are
oppositional groups already employing such a framework within their master frames in a
manner that would assist policymakers?


Purpose – To identify how policymakers articulate the key themes and
justifications for intervention through policy and, by inference, through
technology. Also, to identify how oppositional groups have taken a critical view
of policy and its related use of technology. To identify how both sides are
portraying technology and if those portrayals include a critical assessment of how
these regulatory systems would function in application. To isolate master frames
as a potential location within the policy process that would benefit from this kind
of critical assessment.



Method – Frame analysis will be used to identify the master frames articulated
within the policy and oppositional discourse. This discourse takes the form of
documentation including the policy itself, congressional reports, legislative and
oppositional press releases, hearing testimony, legal challenges, and other judicial
documents.

2.) Within the context of diagnostic framing, how do policymakers define technology as a
“problem” that requires government intervention through policy and through
technological mechanisms of enforcement? How does the opposition define
technological aspects of the policy itself as the “problem” that requires amelioration?
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How do both sides frame the argument and rhetorically define the “problem” in the
context of technology and policy? Does the process of problem definition include a
critical view of technology (per STS)? Are diagnostic frames a point within the policy
process where lawmakers would benefit from the framework provided by STS research?
Are oppositional groups already employing such a framework within their diagnostic
frames in a manner that would assist policymakers?


Purpose – To analyze how policymakers describe access to online content as a
“harm” that must be addressed by policy and by technology. Also, to analyze
how the opposition describes the “harm” caused by the policy and its
technological requirements. To identify if these diagnostic frames include a
critical view of technology. To isolate diagnostic frames as a potential location
within the policy process that would benefit from this kind of critical assessment.



Method – Frame analysis of the same documentation identified in #1 will also be
analyzed here in order to describe the diagnostic frames related to problem
definition and the associated portrayal of technology.

3.) How do both sides in these policy debates propose to solve the problem within the
context of prognostic frames? By what technological measures do policymakers propose
to protect children from harmful content, protect intellectual property from theft, and
safeguard national security? In what ways does the opposition propose to address the
problems created, as they see it, by the policies themselves and the regulatory
technologies they require? Is a critical assessment of technology included in either the
legislative or the oppositional process of prognostic framing? Are prognostic frames a
point within the policy process where lawmakers would benefit from the framework
provided by STS research? Are oppositional groups already employing such a
framework within their master frames in a manner that would assist policymakers?


Purpose – To understand the solutions proposed by both sides to ameliorate the
“problem” as that side sees it. This includes the role of technology in those
solutions and the potential implications of those systems. To isolate prognostic
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frames as a potential location within the policy process that would benefit from a
more critical assessment of technology.


Method – Frame analysis of the same documentation identified in #1 will also be
analyzed here in order to identify the prognostic frames where technological
solutions, and their potential implications, are discussed.

4.) Has the judiciary incorporated the opposition’s critical view of technology within its
opinions? Have these opinions validated oppositional views and has this resulted in
policy shifts that have modified the technological requirements and scope of these
policies? Do the revised policies include any of the critical perspectives of technology
provided by oppositional groups (either directly or via judicial opinion)? Specifically, do
the modified policies, in any way, echo the opposition’s arguments that the technological
mechanisms of implementation and enforcement harm individual rights, autonomy and
unduly restrain access to protected speech?


Purpose – To analyze the potential shifts these policies have undergone and to
identify whether or not the opposition’s more critical view of technology has been
incorporated into these new iterations. If policy revisions and judicial decisions
echo the arguments provided by the opposition, this will help to establish the
validity of oppositional frames (and STS perspectives) that characterize
technology as non-neutral and political in nature.



Method – Using frame analysis to identify the frame shifts, the “new” policies
will be analyzed and compared to previous iterations. Modifications to the
technical requirements of these policies will be examined to understand how they
do (or do not) include the opposition’s characterization of technology.
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Data Selection
The documents that comprise the legislative portion of this analysis were located
using several public and private databases. Full text versions of these documents were
collected from official government sources including the Government Printing Office and
Library of Congress or, when necessary, from third-party databases such as LexisNexis.
The results of the initial search were numerous and the selection process was refined by
targeting only primary source material including the bills, amendments, and laws that are
the focus of this research. Other primary sources collected through this process include
Senate and House reports, Congressional Records, governmental hearing transcripts, and
other official reports (“official” being defined as any report that was authored by a
Congressional committee, Congressional commission, the Congressional Research
Service, or some other governmental agency). Secondary sources such as media articles
and scholarly publications not authored by those directly involved were eliminated
because they do not always represent the direct arguments put forth by legislators. That
being said, all available press releases and some editorials were included in the sample
but only if the legislative sponsor of the Act was the author.
Oppositional documentation was collected directly from the websites of these
organizations (described below). These materials include press releases, informational
reports, and any other public statements (such as hearing testimony) that were produced
directly by these organizations. Again, this does not include secondary media sources or
any other material not authored directly by these organizations.
Next, the legal filings, amicus briefs, and court opinions that make up the judicial
documentation for this research were identified. These documents were located primarily
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through court websites and, when necessary, through third-party databases such as
WestLaw and Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute.
Based on the conditions for inclusion outlined above, from an initial sample of
several hundred documents, 144 items remained for coding. Table 1 provides
information on the total number of and the kinds of documents collected for both the
legislative and oppositional sides of the debate.
This investigation also identified the primary oppositional groups that would be
the focus of this research. Again, because the majority of these policies were the subject
of legal action, those oppositional groups most active in these court challenges were
chosen as the primary target of investigation. Specifically, the named plaintiffs in the
cases against the CDA, COPA, and CIPA became primary sources. The major
organizations represented throughout this dissertation include the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), the
American Library Association (ALA), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).
Finally, although neither SOPA nor PIPA ever became the subject of any court
challenge, it was necessary to isolate a core group of organizations opposed to these
policies as well. In order to maintain consistency, and because they remained essential to
the opposition in this instance, many of the same groups involved with the CDA, COPA,
and CIPA became the focus of the investigation on SOPA and PIPA. These groups
include the ACLU, CDT, ALA, and EFF. Many of these groups authored press releases
opposing these policies, testified before Congress against them or submitted committee
reports on these issues. That being said, there were dozens of websites and individuals
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that opposed these policies at the (online) grassroots level. This analysis is not intended
to privilege traditional activist organizations above these other actors and, for the sake of
inclusiveness, some public statements made by interested parties such as Google and the
Wikimedia Foundation were included in the coding sample as well. However, these
primary activist organizations remain the focus of this research both for the sake of
continuity and because these groups produced a great deal of the material opposing
SOPA and PIPA. Table 2 provides a breakdown, by policy, of the oppositional groups
that comprise the documentary evidence for this part of the research.

Table 1 – Legislative and Oppositional Documents Collected
Document Type
CDA
Bill/Amendment/Law
1
Senate or House Report
2
Congressional Record
2
Hearing Transcript
1
Press Release
12
Legal Filing
6
Court Opinion
2
Editorial/Publication
3
Report
2
Other
2
Total
33

COPA CIPA SOPA/PIPA
1
1
4
1
2
0
2
3
6
1
2
3
12
11
9
9
6
0
6
6
0
6
0
5
4
5
1
1
3
1
43
39
29

Total
7
5
13
7
44
21
14
14
12
7
144
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Table 2 – Primary Oppositional Groups Represented
Policy
CDA

COPA

CIPA
SOPA/PIPA
















Groups
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
American Library Association (ALA)
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
American Library Association (ALA)
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)
American Library Association (ALA)
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
NetCoalition

Coding Scheme
The collection of 144 documents obtained through the process described above
comprised 3891 pages of material. Those pages provided the documentary evidence for
the more substantial coding that took place. This section will explain the coding process
that was used to evaluate the central themes and frames that emerged from this source
documentation.
Based on a first review as documents were being collected and organized, an
initial coding scheme was developed. This scheme represented the general themes that
emerged from the documentary evidence and formed the basis for the more thorough
coding process that followed. First, the basic master frames for both the legislative
supporters of these Acts and the oppositional groups were identified. As noted
previously, master frames represent the primary motivations and justifications for these
policies as well as the motivations of oppositional groups. From the legislative
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documents, three primary master frames appeared and indicated that the state based these
policies on its interest in protecting children from harmful online content (LMF1), the
government’s interest in protecting intellectual property from theft (LMF2), and the
desire to safeguard national security (LMF3). The opposition’s primary interest was
protecting individual autonomy (OMF1), preserving transparency for the user/citizen
(OMF2), and safeguarding access to protected speech (OMF3).
The diagnostic frames, or how each side defined the problem, were also isolated
through this process. Across all of these policies, legislators consistently argued that the
Internet, and unregulated access to it, was the source of the problem. Specifically,
unregulated access to online content harmed children (LDF1), led to the theft of
intellectual property (LDF2), and endangered national security (LDF3). The opposition,
on the other hand, argued that serious problems were created by these policies and the
technological mechanisms of enforcement they required. For instance, these policies in
general and their technological access controls in particular harmed individual autonomy
(ODF1), introduced opacity for the user (ODF2), and had the tendency to reduce access
to protected speech (ODF3).
The basic prognostic frames, or the solutions proposed to address these problems,
were identified as well. Legislative supporters of these policies repeatedly argued for
technological solutions and insisted that access controls would protect children (LPF1),
intellectual property (LPF2), and could help ensure national security (LPF3). For the
opposition, the solution relied on the minimization of technological systems. These
groups argued that regulatory technology should be narrowly enforced or removed from
statutory language altogether (OPF1), access controls should be made as transparent as
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possible for the citizens forced to operate under them (OPF2), or that these policies
should be heavily revised or simply struck down as unconstitutional (OPF3).
Figure 1 provides the coding scheme based on this initial review.

Figure 1 - Coding Scheme
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Data Coding and Analysis
With the basic coding scheme established, document analysis began. After the
source documentation was organized by policy, the items were reviewed manually.
Beginning with the earliest policy (the CDA) and ending with the most recent
(SOPA/PIPA), the codes were marked on individual passages of text that were responsive
to the themes outlined in Figure 1. Writing in the margins of these documents, these
passages were labeled with all codes that applied. Most responsive passages were
relevant to more than one theme and were coded accordingly. After this manual review
process was done thoroughly for each document, some re-review took place to ensure
accuracy in the coding. It is important to note that this coding scheme was not
considered exhaustive and documents were reviewed from the perspective that additional
themes might emerge. Even with this possibility in mind, no additional codes were
warranted and the original coding scheme provided the necessary framework.
As the documents were reviewed, a number of code indicators became apparent.
These indicators consisted of specific words and phrases that, taken in context, implied
the need for one or more codes. For example, terms such as “protection” or “harmful”
often indicated a relationship to the government’s master frame regarding the protection
of children (LMF1). Similarly, terms such as “empowerment” and “access” became
useful indicators of the opposition’s master frame related to the protection of individual
autonomy (OMF1). A sample of these coding indicators is provided below in Table 3.
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Table 3 – Sample Code Indicators

CODE

SAMPLE INDICATORS

LMF1 Protection, Pornography, Children/Minors, Harmful, Indecent
LMF2 Property, Theft, Infringing, Piracy, Illegal, Rogue, Protect
LMF3 Security, Counterfeit, Health, Prescription, Consumers, Rogue
LDF1 Children/Minors, Access, Harmful, Regulate, Restrict, Problem
LDF2 Theft, Piracy, Infringing, Property, Illegal, Rogue, Regulate
LDF3 Security, Protect, Counterfeit, Prescription, Consumers, Health
LPF1 Protect, Children/Minors, Harmful, Access, Pornography
LPF2 Property, Intellectual, Protect, Theft, Illegal, Rogue
LPF3 Security, Protect, Property, Counterfeit, Consumers, Health
OMF1 Autonomy, Empowerment, Control, User, Content, Access
OMF2 Transparency/Opacity, Blocking/Filtering, Categories, Keywords
OMF3 Speech, Access, Constitutional, Protected, Censor
ODF1 Autonomy, Empowerment, Harm, User, Control, Access
ODF2 Transparency/Opacity, Categories, Keywords, Trade Secret
ODF3 Speech, Access, Protected, Constitutional, Censor, Block/Filter
OPF1 Blocking/Filtering, Access, Constitutional, Software, Technology
OPF2 Transparency/Opacity, Blocking/Filtering, Trade Secret, Access
OPF3 Constitutional, Access, Amend, Revise, Strike Down, Illegal
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For the sake of clarity and so that the analysis may be replicated if necessary, it is
also useful to provide examples of the coding process itself. For instance, a responsive
passage appears in Representative Mike Oxley’s (R-OH) press release of October 13,
1998 regarding the Child Online Protection Act (see COPA07). On page two of this
press release, Oxley states that “The ready availability of hardcore pornography to kids
on the Web is a problem that we need to solve.” This passage is responsive to two
separate codes. First, Oxley addresses the government’s compelling interest in protecting
children online. This is directly related to the state’s first master frame and triggers code
LMF1. Second, because Oxley references the legislative definition of the problem, the
diagnostic frame is indicated and code LDF1 is applied. Thus, both LMF1 and LDF1 are
noted in the margin for future reference.
Another example appears in the transcript from the Judiciary Committee’s
November 16, 2011 hearing on the Stop Online Piracy Act (see SOPA06). On page 262
of this transcript, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), as a critic of SOPA and PIPA, describes
competing approaches to online regulation and argues that, “Instead of having
government censor the web, we developed an approach that would empower users and
technology to address content concerns on their own.” Wyden’s reference to user
empowerment is directly responsive to the opposition’s master frame regarding the
protection of individual autonomy (code OMF1). Wyden also mentions the potential for
state censorship of online content. This suggestion triggers code OMF3 related to the
opposition’s call for the preservation of protected speech online. Wyden’s reference to
the voluntary use of technology to control content is also important and makes this
passage of particular interest within the context of this oppositional frame.
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Once these responsive passages had been identified, these segments of text were
copied into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, or, where electronic versions were
unavailable, manually transcribed. The review process of this legislative and
oppositional documentation yielded 4949 total coding entries. The actual number of
unique entries, however, was lower owing to the fact that passages were often responsive
to more than one code. In such cases, individual entries for each code were made in the
Excel coding spreadsheet. A separate spreadsheet for each side of the debate (legislative
and oppositional) was created for each policy. Once this process was complete and all
documents had been reviewed, coded, and transferred to Excel, these spreadsheets were
imported into the NVivo 10 qualitative coding software for organization and further
analysis. A breakdown of the total number of coding entries imported into NVivo is
included below in Table 4.
Once in NVivo, the entries could be analyzed by code, by policy, or by some
combination thereof. NVivo was then used to examine each of the codes as it applied to
each policy. For example, all 117 entries responsive to code LMF1 for the CDA were
reviewed in order to isolate the thematic narrative that formed around this code. This
process was repeated for LMF2, LMF3, etc. In this sense, a form of open coding was
performed where the data represented within the coding entries was “broken down into
distinct incidents, ideas, events, and acts” in order to “open up the text and expose the
thoughts, ideas, and meanings contained therein” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 102).
Again, this was done for each code and within each policy and the end product of that
additional review formed the basis for the frame analysis provided within Chapters 4
through 7 of this dissertation.
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Table 4 – Coding Totals
Code
LMF1
LMF2
LMF3
LDF1
LDF2
LDF3
LPF1
LPF2
LPF3
OMF1
OMF2
OMF3
ODF1
ODF2
ODF3
OPF1
OPF2
OPF3
Total

CDA
117
0
0
107
0
0
80
0
0
100
0
179
90
0
220
86
0
41
1020

COPA
73
0
0
96
0
0
124
0
0
88
5
312
95
10
304
127
0
71
1305

CIPA
120
0
0
120
0
0
113
0
0
89
50
402
88
51
382
120
29
39
1603

SOPA/PIPA
0
138
52
0
130
27
0
123
21
2
0
213
0
0
197
56
0
62
1021

Total
310
138
52
323
130
27
317
123
21
279
55
1106
273
61
1103
389
29
213
4949

Additional analysis of these policies, frames, and codes remains for future
research. Specifically, although this investigation provides detailed insight into each
policy and each code, the convergence of these codes across policies was not examined.
Similarly, a longitudinal analysis of these frames from the earliest policy to the most
recent could provide a deeper understanding of how these themes evolved incrementally
over time. Next, secondary sources such as media reports could be examined to further
triangulate information related to the portrayal of these policies and the regulatory
technologies they required. In addition, in the event that similar policies are proposed in
Congress, those new cases could help refine and verify the conclusions of this research.
Finally, examples of these kinds of policies from other national contexts could be
analyzed in a similar manner for additional insight.
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Delimitations
There are three primary delimitations predicated on the structure of this
dissertation. The first relates to the national context of this research. Confining this
investigation solely to United States policy obscures the broader international picture. In
addition, by narrowing this analysis to the U.S. example, this research does not answer
questions related to the larger effects of local regulation in a global medium. This
approach also does not account for any other country’s efforts to regulate content online
or address their specific constitutional, ethical, or political commitments (or lack thereof).
Nevertheless, these questions are important and remain of interest for future research.
Second, the methodological approach of this dissertation creates necessary but
important limitations. Specifically, by focusing the frame analysis only on
governmental/legal sources and other direct documentary evidence, some of the richness
of the national dialogue on these issues is lost. For example, this excludes the voices of
media outlets, citizen bloggers, and other interested stakeholders. Yet, by narrowing the
investigation to a representative yet practical sample of the evidence, it is possible to
conduct a thorough study of these issues while maintaining a manageable scope.
Finally, although this dissertation is deeply concerned with the non-neutral nature
of regulatory technologies, this research will not delve into the minutia of the
technological design process. In order to address the macroscopic issues of policy and
democratic rights, this analysis will focus more broadly on the portrayal of these
technologies and the immediate implications they have had when mandated by federal
regulation. Again, each of these delimitations is ripe for future research.
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Summary
This dissertation will describe policies that span a period of fifteen years. During
that time, technology has become more prevalent in our society and the Internet has
penetrated more deeply into our daily lives. Managing the kinds of content that are
available and deciding how to mediate access remains an important regulatory concern.
Yet, despite the passage of time, a fundamental lack of technological sophistication at the
legislative level and a failure to recognize the political nature of technology seems to
remain. Like Senator Exon, subsequent policymakers have sought to control a medium
they may not completely understand. Coupled with this misunderstanding is a tendency
on the part of lawmakers to compound the problem by using technological solutions to
regulate online content. Without exception, these policies have faced serious
constitutional challenges directly related to these regulatory technologies.
It is necessary to address these constitutional concerns with a more nuanced, more
critical assessment of how these kinds of technological systems will function after
implementation and an appraisal of how they will affect individual rights and autonomy.
Science and Technology Studies provides the kind of theoretical lens necessary to bring
these problems into sharper focus. Although there a number of differing points of view
among STS scholars and although STS is not itself a panacea, as a discipline it has
consistently offered the kinds of critiques necessary to understand the non-neutral nature
of technology, the socially constructed character of its design and the manner in which
technology functions politically. Combined with the frame analysis methodology, the
theoretical lens of STS can demonstrate the kind of critique necessary to improve future
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information policies and points within the policy process where this analysis can be
included to the greatest benefit.
At the conclusion of this research, it will be possible to isolate specific points within
the policy process (master, diagnostic, or prognostic frames) where lawmakers have
failed to consider critically the technological barriers to access that these policies would
impose. Parallel to this, it will be possible to locate where in the oppositional process
various groups have offered a more critical assessment of technology and technological
mechanisms of enforcement. In order to accomplish this, it will be necessary to identify
where in the process both groups have or have not discussed how technological systems
can impact individual rights and autonomy in a manner consistent with STS.
By describing how legislators have portrayed technology, this research can offer
recommendations as to where a more critical assessment can best be included in the
policy process. By illustrating how and where oppositional groups have made use of a
more critical understanding of technology, this will demonstrate the kind of critical
analysis legislators should be including within their debates. Particularly if the judiciary
has incorporated these arguments into their opinions and if subsequent laws echo those
rulings, this will help to validate both the oppositional arguments and, by inference,
arguments provided by Science and Technology Studies. STS provides the substance of
the critical analysis that should be included in the legislative process and frame analysis
pinpoints where to apply STS concepts. If lawmakers employed such a framework at the
necessary points within the policy process, future information policies may be less likely
to harm individual rights, autonomy and constitutionally protected speech.
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Chapter 4 – The Communications Decency Act
Introduction
This chapter will describe the background and history of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996. In keeping with the frame analysis methodology outlined in
Chapter 3, what follows is a primarily empirical description of the master, diagnostic and
prognostic frames advanced by both the legislative supporters of the Act and those
groups who vehemently opposed this policy.
Congressional supporters of the Communications Decency Act based their frames
on the premise that it is one of the fundamental duties of the state to protect children. In
this case, supporters of the Act believed that they must intervene through policy and
through technological mechanisms of enforcement in an effort to protect children from
online content they deemed to be indecent. That compelling government interest
underpins the entire debate surrounding this policy and extended to the government’s
assessment that unregulated access to the Internet was the source of that harm.
Therefore, from this point of view, the only sensible means for addressing this problem
was to impose technological barriers to access around that content.
Despite this, as will be described, the opposition would argue that the
fundamental duty of the government in this situation was not only to protect children but
also to safeguard adult access to constitutionally protected speech online. In doing so, the
state was obligated to ensure the autonomy of the individual – especially when
considering the nature and potential of this new medium. The opposition would go on to
assert that the scope and technological requirements of this law would have the direct
effect of diminishing autonomy and reducing access to protected speech.
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Part I – Legislative Master Frames
When drafting the amendment that would eventually become the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), Senator Exon and his supporters were
overwhelmingly motivated by the perceived need to “protect children from exposure to
sexually explicit material that is now widely disseminated on the Internet” (CDA14 p.
20).2 In service of this master frame, the government sought to advance “methods of
compliance [that] are technologically feasible” (CDA16 p. 25) in order to achieve the
“compelling interest that government and all of society have in protecting minor children
from premature exposure to patently offensive pornography” (CDA16 p. 10). In effect,
the CDA was to be nothing less than a means to “establish a uniform national standard of
content regulation” (CDA13 p. 49). This new standard would draw a clear and bright
line, safeguarding generations of children from online perverts and predators who would
seek to do them harm and, in the process, ruin the nascent “educational and
informational” (CDA01 p. 100) resource the Internet might become.
From the first, the CDA seemed to be at cross-purposes with its host legislation.
Embedded within the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the CDA sought to expand the
scope of federal law “to provide for consistent national and State and local content
regulation of both commercial and non-commercial providers” (CDA03 p. 203). In
contrast, Congress intended the Telecommunications Act itself “promote competition and

2

The exact statutory language reads as follows: “Whoever--in interstate or foreign communications
knowingly--uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of
age, or uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of
age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication” (CDA01 pp. 95-96).
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reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers” (CDA01 p. 1). The stated purpose of the CDA seems to
directly contradict national policy directives which called on legislators “to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation” (CDA01 p. 101).
Despite this, the master frame of protecting children allowed Exon and his colleagues to
convince most of Congress that a strict national standard for content regulation should be
included within a bill meant to limit barriers to competition. By invoking the need to
safeguard America’s children, Exon had at his disposal a strongly “resonant” rhetorical
frame that was difficult for other legislators to oppose (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619).
What politician wanted to vote against the need to safeguard kids in cyberspace?3
Initially, the CDA and its technological mandate may have passed not on its merits but
because it was “seen as a good press release back home so people voted for it” (CDA24
p. 1). Supporters seem to have thrust aside concerns over the scope of the law or the
constitutional implications of its enforcement in the interest of safeguarding kids without
delay. Political expedience may also explain the ease with which the amendment passed
the Senate in a landslide 86 to 14 vote (CDA24 p. 2). The master frame of protecting
children implied an urgency that pressured elected officials to act too quickly. In their
haste to do so, lawmakers may have overlooked important considerations regarding the
efficacy of the policy and the imposition of regulatory technologies. 4

3
As Senator Leahy, a vocal opponent of the CDA, would later recall, “Too many Members feared the
demagogic syllogism that if they voted against a censorship law purporting to protect children, they must
be in favor of exposing children to inappropriate violent or pornographic material. This is a false syllogy”
(CDA05 p. 1).
4
Exon introduced the CDA on February 1, 1995 and Congress had already passed it as an amendment to
the Telecommunications Act by June 14th of that same year.
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Aside from its political and ideological attraction, the CDA also included a
number of affirmative defenses intended to make it more palatable to industry
stakeholders as well as to lawmakers who wished to preserve the anti-regulation bent of
the Telecommunications Act. The first of these provisions provided a safe harbor for
Internet service providers (ISPs) and absolved them from liability if their involvement
was “solely for providing access or connection… that does not include the creation of the
[indecent] content of the communication” (CDA01 p. 96). Supporters predicated the
remaining affirmative defenses on the need to impose technological barriers to access in
exchange for immunity from prosecution under the CDA. These technological “enabling
tools” would provide ISPs, employers and others with the means to “filter, screen, allow,
or disallow content” (CDA01 p. 102). Despite this, in what appears to be a rhetorical
inconsistency, the text of the CDA itself marveled at how the Internet had “flourished, to
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation” (CDA01 pp.
100-101) while supporters of the Act publicly lamented its necessity. They sadly
acknowledged that “Sometimes our technology races beyond our reflection, and we are
left with a dangerous gap - a period when society is unprepared to deal with the farreaching results of rapid change. That is the situation we have on the Internet. This is the
situation which [the CDA] will address” (CDA16 p. 28). More regulation, although
regrettable, was the only solution to the blight of pornography. This was nothing less
than a war for the purity of America’s children and the future of the Internet. “Failure to
enact strong laws is a concession that the information superhighway should belong to
pornographers” and, by extension, the technological mechanisms required by the CDA’s
affirmative defenses should be the means to cast out pornographers.

85

From this point of view, the imposition of technological enforcement mechanisms
to accomplish this goal was not only a natural but also a necessary solution. If
technology (i.e. the Internet) created the problem then technology would have to solve it
(CDA26 p. 50). Besides, from the legislative point of view, the CDA was a “technology
flexible statute” that did not place onerous burdens on content providers but only required
that they take “good faith actions under available technology to limit” access by minors
to indecent material (CDA16 p. 24). Supporters of the CDA confidently proceeded from
the assumption that there were “sufficient and adequate means already available under
present technology” (CDA16 p. 25) that would satisfy this new content standard.
Furthermore, as technology advanced, there would “undoubtedly be more ways to
comply” with the law and the mere existence of the CDA would spur future innovation in
regulatory technologies as “the market is encouraged by the presence of a legal
obligation” (CDA16 p. 25). One of the unique aspects of the CDA is policymakers’
reliance on the promise of future enforcement mechanisms. Technological “tools” for the
protection of children would evolve as the landscape changed and forthcoming regulatory
systems promised, “the potential for even greater control in the future as technology
develops” (CDA01 pp. 100-101). The CDA’s technological flexibility was its strength
and the design of future regulatory systems would make this policy even stronger in years
to come.
Despite its clarity of purpose and the promise of technological enforcement, the
CDA was a policy in search of a metaphor. How to regulate the Internet and the content
it carried depended uniquely on how both sides portrayed this new medium. What,
exactly, was the Internet comparable to? Was it more like radio and television or was it
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more like print? Were website operators individual speakers protected by the First
Amendment or were they broadcasters who had “unique access” (CDA16 pp. 9-10) to the
children of America? Were Internet Service Providers publishers in control of the
content they carried or were they simply the “mailmen” (CDA25 p. 21) who delivered
messages? The answers to these questions carried with them a framework for regulation
that would permit or disallow certain technological configurations for enforcement of the
CDA. That the CDA found a home in the Telecommunications Act is telling in this
regard. Proponents of Senator Exon’s amendment rallied around the notion that “the Net
is still closer to broadcasting than to print” (CDA08f p. 25) and, thus, the CDA was both
constitutional and clearly within the federal government’s regulatory purview. By
portraying the Internet as a broadcast medium, Congress could imply constitutional merit
by association. If it “was constitutional for the FCC to channel indecent broadcasts to
times of the day when children most likely would not be exposed to them” it was
certainly acceptable to legislatively “channel indecent communications to places on the
Internet where children are unlikely to obtain them” (CDA14 p. 18). Here the
government turned to broadcasting case law that emphasized the persistent nature of the
medium and its unique ability to invade the home. Specifically, the government argued
that in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court had settled that the state could regulate
radio and, by extension, the Internet differently.5 In fact, the problem was exacerbated by
the number of broadcasters on the Internet and “Because millions of people disseminate
information on the Internet without the intervention of editors, network censors, or

5

“Among the reasons for specially treating indecent broadcasting is the uniquely pervasive presence that
medium of expression occupies in the lives of our people [and children]. Broadcasts extend into the privacy
of the home, and it is impossible completely to avoid” (438 U.S. 726, 1978).
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market disincentives, the indecency problem on the Internet is much more pronounced
than it is on broadcast stations” (CDA14 p. 25). This new medium must be analogous to
radio and television because it was everywhere all the time and kids could not help but be
“inundated with pornography and smut on the Internet” (CDA19 p. 2).
Supporters also appealed to the preservation of public decency and invoked
analogies to zoning laws as these areas offered some of the most familiar metaphorical
ground for legislators. Lawmakers intertwined allusions to FCC broadcast regulations
with the concept of zoning precisely because they allowed supporters of the CDA to
advance the idea that online content fell under federal jurisdiction and that it was a
tangible thing that the law could shuffle from place to place as decency dictated. Case
law on these points had reliably demonstrated that the state not only had the ability to
protect children from pornography6 but that purveyors of it could be swiftly and
constitutionally relegated to areas of town where children would not wander.7 The
government rested heavily on this kind of justification and consistently invoked
geographic zoning law despite its potential inapplicability to a discorporate medium. In
fact, the legislative master frames for this policy are replete with references to
“cyberzoning” and assertions that, just as municipalities could “direct adult theaters away
from residential neighborhoods, so Congress could direct purveyors of indecent material

6

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), “While the supervision of children’s reading may best be left
to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society’s
transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of
material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute designed to
regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards, broader than those embodied in legislation
aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults.”
7
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), “The Renton ordinance…does not ban adult
theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The ordinance is therefore
properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.”
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away from areas of cyberspace that are easily accessible to children” (CDA14 p. 18).
Therefore, in the context of this argument, websites that provided access to indecent
content were indistinguishable from indifferent cashiers who obligingly sold
pornographic magazines to curious minors. That the CDA should essentially “move”
those storefronts away from schools and neighborhoods was a natural corollary. Again,
the technological means for doing so seemed self-apparent and the Internet, as a
technological medium, would undoubtedly be uniquely conducive to technological
regulation. Since the Internet was “malleable” it would be a simple matter “to construct
barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for identity, making cyberspace more like
the physical world and, consequently, more amenable to zoning laws” (CDA18 p. 29).
The barriers themselves were nothing more than a technological “gateway” (Id) keeping
kids away. By defining the need for and scope of enforcement in this way, these
gateways would have no more impact on democratic society than did fencing around
school playgrounds.
Therefore, for Senator Exon and other supporters of this legislation, the CDA was
based on “law that has been in effect and been approved constitutional with regard to
pornography…We’re not out in no-man’s land…We’re trying to expand that as best we
can to the Internet” (CDA24 p. 2). Like Easterbrook’s law of the horse, the master
frames here consistently rely on rhetorical references to traditional forms of regulation
and traditional notions of community decency. In addition to broadcast conventions and
zoning laws, other metaphors of physicality continually underpinned legislative
justifications for the CDA and Senator Exon often appealed to the hypothetical “public
outrage” that would result if pornographic images were posted on “lampposts and
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telephone poles for all to see” (CDA25 p. 20). Failure to take action against such
atrocities was nothing less than “taking a porn shop and putting it in the bedroom of your
children” (CDA25 p. 24) or “leaving a loaded gun on a playground” (CDA08d p. 13).
This hyperbole served to clarify the legislative master frame that Congress must protect
children and that, although the Internet was something new, it was not so new as to be
exempt from centralized regulation and control.
Reliance on these metaphors and the concept of cyberzoning was not only
constitutionally proper from a historical and precedential perspective; it also served to
ameliorate any First Amendment concerns that might manifest. Cyberzoning did not
implicate the rights of adults because Congress focused the law and its technological
requirements solely on children. The CDA was not inhibiting speech, simply relocating
it to clearly demarcated areas cordoned off by regulatory systems. There were no
constitutional effects because the law would not harm the ability of consenting adults to
communicate directly with one another. As the government put it, the state’s “interest in
protecting children from patently offensive sexually explicit depictions and descriptions
is as legitimate and unrelated to the suppression of constitutionally protected expression
as the government’s interests in reducing crime, maintaining property values, and
preserving the quality of urban life” (CDA14 p. 27). Therefore, “as long as a government
zoning scheme is justified by the effects of indecent communications on children rather
than adults, and leaves open reasonable opportunities for adult-to-adult communication, it
is constitutionally permissible” (Id).
This focus on the protection of children to the exclusion of all else is a defining
element of the CDA’s legislative master frames. Supporters often swept aside any
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concerns about prohibitions on access with rhetorical flourishes that prioritized the needs
of children above the constitutional rights of adults. Senator Exon argued that Congress
should not play politics while children were encountering online pornography on a daily
basis. It was important that other legislators and the public recognize the necessity of
regulation when “We are talking about our most important and precious commodity - our
children” (CDA19 p. 2). It was equally unthinkable that speech rights could take
precedent over the innocence of children. “We cannot simply throw up our hands and
say a solution is impossible or the First Amendment is so sacrosanct that we must stand
idly by” (CDA19 p. 2). Besides, Exon and his supporters repeatedly affirmed that
allowances for the First Amendment were built into the CDA and that the law would “not
ban any constitutionally protected material from adults” (CDA06 p. 1). In fact, this new
law and the technology it would require would protect “children in ways that are
consistent with America’s free speech values” (CDA08a p. 4). With “the right
technology”, regulation could keep kids safely out of the “red light districts of
cyberspace” (Id) while permitting adults entry. Even if the CDA might “impose some
burdens and costs on adult-to-adult communication of indecent material”, it was far better
to burden those who peddled “offensive material…than it is to leave children
unprotected” (CDA14 pp. 18-19).
In fact, Exon frequently characterized those opposed to the CDA “as a bunch of
First Amendment belly-achers” (CDA02 pp. 21-22) who hid behind the Constitution at
the expense of America’s youth. In their opposition to the Act, these misinformed
activists mistakenly believed “that Thomas Jefferson and all of the good people who
wrote the Constitution worked overnight and planned and plotted to make sure that the
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Constitution protected the most gross pornographers, pedophiles, those who are trying to
lure children today” (CDA02 p. 71 actual). This was a common theme used frequently to
assuage any constitutional misgivings expressed by those who did not support the CDA.
In Exon’s view, nothing should supersede the duty of the state to protect children. Only
misguided “opponents of the Decency Act [would] rationalize that the framers of the
Constitution plotted at great length to make certain that the profiteering pornographer, the
pervert and the pedophile would be free to practice their pursuits in the presence of
children on a taxpayer-created and subsidized computer network” (CDA04 p. 4). With
the stakes so high, it was preposterous that opponents of the CDA would allow the
Internet to go unregulated. It was nothing less than anarchy when “critics say that on the
Internet, anything should go, no matter how outrageous” (CDA19 p. 1).
This may indicate that the master frame of protecting children qualifies is a core
“metacultural frame.” The power of this frame derives in part from its appeal to “the
broadly shared beliefs, values, and perspectives familiar to the members of a societal
culture…on which individuals and institutions draw in order to give meaning, sense, and
normative direction to their thinking and action in policy matters” (Schon & Rein, 1994,
p. xiii). Therefore, the normative need to establish “rules of the road” for the information
superhighway trumped other considerations when “the most vile” content was “only a
few click-click-clicks away from any child” (CDA14 p. 13). This may account not only
for the ease with which the CDA passed the Senate but also why legislators felt it was
unwise to vote against such a policy for fear of the political consequences.
Master frames of this kind may also make it less likely that legislators will devote
serious time or effort to conducting a critical analysis of the policy’s enforcement
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structure. In this case, lawmakers essentially tabled any serious review of the
technological mechanisms outlined in the CDA’s affirmative defenses. Politicians may
have been so concerned with advancing the fundamental value of protecting children that
they failed to address the technological specifications of the systems that the policy
required. Empirical evidence does exist suggesting that policies surrounding morally
charged, ideological issues are less likely to undergo serious analysis8 and documentary
evidence here does support that conclusion. For example, when Senators Leahy,
Feingold requested that the Department of Justice examine the amendment and its
technological requirements prior to calling for a vote, there was outrage that politicians
would delay such an important matter for something so trivial as review and analysis.9
All of this would seem to indicate that the articulation of master frames might be
one of the key moments in the policy process where a significant critical review of
technological mechanisms of enforcement may be lacking. Specifically, when Congress
invokes the need to safeguard the innocence of America’s children as the primary
justification for online regulation, it appears to result in a knee-jerk reaction that leaves
little interest in any technological or constitutional scrutiny.

8

Literature describing “morality policy” and its effects explores this phenomenon most thoroughly. “When
designing morality policy, members of Congress and their staff use more information about constituents’
personal experiences and other emotive information than technical policy analysis, they seek out less
information, and they use the information they receive more selectively than when they are designing
nonmorality policy” (Goggin & Mooney, 2001, pp. 130-131).
9
“Although Senator Patrick Leahy and others may urge that the matter be referred to the U.S. Department
of Justice for its review and analysis, we [the Christian Coalition] oppose such a course of action. The
increasing existence of computer pornography today requires action, not more study” (CDA25 p 28).
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Part II – Oppositional Master Frames
Opposition to the CDA coalesced almost instantaneously. In addition to the
legislative disapproval of Senators Leahy, Feingold and others, several external groups
quickly joined the fray. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was one of the first
and most vocal groups to criticize the law and its technological assumptions. The ACLU,
as an organization primarily concerned with First Amendment considerations, would also
go on to file the legal challenge to the CDA, eventually taking the case to the Supreme
Court. Other groups focusing on rights-based and technology-based frames also
contributed significantly to the debate. The desire to preserve a mostly unregulated
Internet and to advocate for a more democratic application of technology motivated the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT). The stated goals of both the EFF and CDT rhetorically align with the STS
framework outlined in Chapter 2. Whether consciously or not, these organizations echo
the research of Richard Sclove, Langdon Winner and others in their mission to “support
freedom-enhancing technologies” (About EFF, 2014) and “define the boundaries of
technology in our daily lives” (CDT Mission and Principles, 2014). The opposition of
these organizations and others would offer a striking counterpoint to the legislative
justifications for the CDA. Instead of focusing exclusively on the need to protect
children, these oppositional groups suggested that a more nuanced approach was
required. This included a much different narrative emphasizing the need to safeguard
individual autonomy and the absolute requirement that any regulation preserve access to
constitutionally protected speech. The opposition’s master frames provide an alternative
portrayal of the Internet and the technological mechanisms of enforcement required by
the CDA.

94

First, the opposition’s conception of the Internet differed drastically from that put
forward by Exon and his supporters. Rather than characterizing this new medium as a
wild frontier desperately in need of regulation or as a dangerous conduit for minors’
access to pornography, these groups emphasized the promise of the Internet as a means of
communication (CDA13 p. 24). The Internet had unprecedented potential as a
democratic forum (CDA23 p. 5), with vast “social and political significance” (CDA26 p.
176). Its lack of regulation was precisely what made this medium so important. The
imposition of technological controls and government standards would “stifle” both the
growth of the Internet and the vibrancy of the conversations already underway (CDA26
p. 12). Where Exon and his supporters were, by necessity, bound to metaphors of
physicality, zoning, and broadcasting, the opposition articulated a different conception
entirely. The Internet, “unlike every other mass medium that has ever existed…has no
central authority. There is no person in charge of the ‘printing press,’ no ‘editor-inchief,’ no holder of a broadcast license. Americans have discovered that one can reach a
large audience on the Internet without having to assemble a lot of capital or seek the
approval of an editor” (CDA26 p. 178).
Opposition to the CDA consistently emphasized how the Internet defied
comparisons to existing broadcast media and the associated regulatory frameworks.
Unlike radio and television, the Internet was neither ubiquitous nor pervasive. If
anything, affirmative action was required to access indecent content and the “user [was]
not likely to stumble upon the offensive” (CDA02 pp. 30-31). In fact, autonomy of the
user was one of the primary master frames employed throughout the course of the
opposition’s campaign. Congress and the FCC, as regulatory bodies, had no place online
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because the introduction of any central authority was antithetical to the decentralized
nature of the medium (CDA13 p. 7). Not only would government regulation fly in the
face of the Internet’s design principles, as a practical matter, “it would not be technically
feasible for a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on the Internet” (Id
p. 8). As the Telecommunications Act and the administration’s policy initiatives implied,
the Internet must be free in order to flourish. From the opposition’s point of view (and
reminiscent of cyberlibertarian philosophy), regulation and technological mechanisms of
enforcement must be “rejected in favor of decentralization and self-determination;
censorship [must be] rejected in favor of democratic discourse” (CDA02 p. 44).
User empowerment was at the heart of the opposition’s master frames and offered
a rhetorical device that may have been as resonant as the legislative frame of protecting
children. A report prepared for Senator Leahy by several technology and media
companies underlined this point. If the Internet, as a democratic forum, was to retain its
unique potential “individuals should be able to speak freely and frankly about issues of
their choosing, without fear of reprisal because many people may not agree with or
appreciate the nature and content of their messages” (CDA23 p. 16). Numerous scholars
cited previously in this dissertation have written extensively on the absolute requirement
of individual autonomy when considering policies that employ technology to constrain
behavior (e.g. Sclove, Brey, Carroll, Noble, Barker & Downing, etc.). Although the EFF,
ACLU, CDT and other opponents of the CDA did not rely on this literature to advance
their arguments, both underline the importance of user empowerment.
Although the opposition here emphasized the differences between Internet access
and traditional broadcast media, they were just as subject as Exon and his supporters
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were to reducing the Internet to a comfortable metaphor. In this case, the opposition
emphasized how the medium was very much like print and, consequently, deserved the
same rigorous constitutional protection (CDA07 p. 1). Just as print was not subject to
centralized editorial control, neither should online content producers be subject to a
uniform regulatory standard. This metaphor was bound to the master frame of
safeguarding individual autonomy and helped advance the argument that, “every
individual is a potential publisher on the Internet” (CDA08f pp. 17-18) who should be
free to “exchange information on a vast array of subjects with a worldwide and virtually
limitless audience” (CDA15 p. 2). This master frame of individual choice (and
individual responsibility for protecting one’s children) would go on to form one of the
pillars of the opposition’s legal argument. As will be discussed later, it also led to
oppositional advocacy for screening and blocking technology (such as the voluntary use
of commercial filtering software) meant to empower the user. Again, this argument
relied on the need to strengthen individual autonomy but, as will be shown, it also
demonstrated some oppositional misconceptions about the neutral and instrumental
nature of content filters – misconceptions that would haunt these same groups during the
negotiation of future policies.
In addition to arguments of autonomy, the motivation for the oppositional master
frames included the desire to safeguard access to constitutionally protected speech. Here
the opposition focused intensely on the government’s fundamental misunderstanding of
the medium as well as the nature of regulatory systems. First, Exon’s failure to recognize
the Internet as a “unique and emerging medium of communication” had, from the
opposition’s point of view, “led to a constitutionally offensive statute” (CDA02 p. 32).
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Furthermore, the “failure of Congress to appreciate this emerging technology” (Id)
completely undermined their attempts to regulate it. As the opposition repeatedly argued,
“legislators simply do not understand how this medium really works” and, because of
this, “We should all be very concerned when anyone tries to stop us from sharing ideas
and communicating with each other simply because they do not understand that new
technology” (CDA08e p. 14). Appeals to the unique nature of the Internet and its vast
differences from traditional broadcast media undercut the CDA’s regulatory legitimacy
(CDA20 p. 1). For example, the opposition argued that the Internet, as a medium for
instantaneous and widely distributed communication, did not distinguish between
audience members. Taking the time and technological steps necessary to do so would
cripple content producers’ ability to communicate effectively. The CDA essentially
required that these content producers “assure that their indecent expression is not
‘available’ to minors” (CDA17 p. 21). Ensuring that access to children was prohibited
“has precisely such an unconstitutional effect for most speakers and most modes of
communication, because there is no way to satisfy that requirement other than by
refraining from speech” (Id). The practical and technological necessities of the CDA,
combined with Congress’ misunderstanding of the medium had the direct effect of
reducing access to constitutionally protected speech. As the opposition would argue
through this master frame, “Because it misunderstood the nature of the Internet, Congress
thought it could protect indecent speech between adults while regulating speech available
to children” (CDA17 p. 22). Yet this was neither technologically feasible (CDA15 p. 1)
nor desirable and required online speakers to censor themselves to safer content. Not
only did this neuter the potential of the Internet as a democratic forum but, as the
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opposition argued, any “statute that reduces adults to reading and seeing only what is fit
for children cannot be sustained under the First Amendment” (CDA15 p. 10). As will be
discussed below in the context of diagnostic frames, the opposition also had deep
concerns about how the specific technological mechanisms required by the law would
function as deterrents for free speech and would reduce access to constitutionally
protected content. The very nature of these regulatory systems, the opposition would
argue, hindered the vibrancy of conversations already underway and, more insidiously,
chilled speech preemptively.
In addition to these master frames of safeguarding individual autonomy and
safeguarding access to protected speech, the opposition here consistently called for a
more in-depth and critical process of review prior to enacting the CDA. Legislative
opponents of the policy connected the need for further study with both individual
autonomy and free speech guarantees. The need to “empower parents and users” related
directly to the need to engage with experts and other stakeholders “before we start
imposing liability in ways that could severely damage electronic communications
systems, sweep away important constitutional rights, and possibly undercut law
enforcement at the same time” (CDA25 p. 32). There had been only one major hearing10
on these issues prior to passage of the Act and important provisions “were either added in
executive committee after the hearings were concluded or as amendments offered during
floor debate on the legislation” (CDA18 p. 10). In some cases, “Congresspersons voted
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See “Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for
Congressional Action.” Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One
Hundred Fourth Congress 1st Session on S. 892 – A Bill to Amend Section 1464 of Title 18, United States
Code, to Punish Transmission by Computer of Indecent Material to Minors. July 24, 1995 (Serial No. J104-36) (CDA26).
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for passage of this regulation without even having time to read, much less consider the
impact of, the bill” (CDA09 p. 3). The opposition roundly criticized Exon and his
supporters for failing to contemplate the constitutionality and technical requirements of
the policy in their rush to push it through Congress. In addition to the Justice Department
review advocated by Senators Leahy and Feingold, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
had called for a wider conversation on these issues. They lamented that “There have
been no public hearings on this legislation. Neither the CDA, nor the larger Telecom Bill
have been presented openly to the public” (Id). Due to this, “Congress has neither heard
expert testimony about the medium and industry, nor allowed constituents to review and
comment on what their ‘representatives are doing’” (Id). Intertwined with its master
frames was the opposition’s repeated insistence that there was a need for critical review
of the policy and its associated technology. These groups made a significant connection
between the oppressive character of the CDA’s mandate and the inability of many
stakeholders to comment on it. As Winner has suggested, “Shielded by the conviction
that technology is neutral and tool-like, a whole new order is built…without the slightest
public awareness or opportunity to dispute the character of the changes underway”
(Winner, 1977, p. 324).
Although the legislative master frame of protecting children had the necessary
resonance to carry the vote in Congress, the opposition countered with several equally
powerful frames. Appealing to the nature of the Internet as a communication medium
and vast democratic forum, the ACLU, EFF, CDT, and other groups were able to provide
a convincing counterpoint to the analogies of broadcast radio and television that defined
the legislative portrayal of technology. The opposition had seized on some of the most

100

widely resonant “collective action frames” that included frames based on rights, choice
and democracy (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). This provided powerful ammunition in
the public debate over the CDA.
When considered as a platform for free speech with minimal barriers to entry, the
Internet ceased to be a “place” where large swaths of content could be roped off from
public view. The concept of cyberzoning and other notions of physicality, the opposition
argued, were outdated and did nothing to address the realities of this emerging
technology (CDA18 p. 30). Julie Cohen and other scholars have remarked on the
limitations of these metaphorical commitments and have cautioned against the invocation
of “place- and space-based metaphors” to justify the extension of existing case law
(Cohen, 2007, p. 211). The opposition here argued that this appeal to physical zoning
laws and the imposition of technological barriers around content “would destroy a
principal advantage of the Internet as a medium of communication: the ability of Internet
users to research and communicate seamlessly and without interruption across its vast
variety of available resources” (CDA12 pp. 7-8). Its competing portrayal of the medium
led the opposition to several important arguments about the nature of the policy and the
technologies it required. First, lawmakers should carefully evaluate these systems prior
to implementation with an eye toward safeguarding individual autonomy. Second, all
stakeholders should have the opportunity to comment on the policy prior to its
implementation and should have the ability to critique the regulatory systems they would
be forced to operate within. Third, this policy and the mechanisms it required had the
direct effect of hindering both speakers and listeners in ways contradictory to the First
Amendment.
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Part III – Legislative Diagnostic Frames
Inextricably bound to the legislative master frame of protecting children from the
pervasive presence of indecent material on the Internet was a diagnostic frame that
emphasized how the ubiquity of pornography caused immense harm to minors. The
invasive nature of the Internet, “if anything, deepens the Government’s interest in
protecting children from access to or receipt of online pornography” (CDA16 p. 20) and
both the harm to children as well as the government’s need to act were magnified because
pornography was rampant online. The “problem” as defined by Exon and his supporters
related directly to the unique access that children had to the Internet and their inability to
process adult content that the Web would expose them to. Whether at home or, “more
often, outside the home and outside parental control” (CDA16 pp. 9-10), minors could
not help but encounter the “spine-tingling” content that the CDA forbade (CDA14 p. 13).
It was a duty of the state to constrain access and, accordingly, “Congress sought to ensure
that the ‘brave new world’ of interactive computer services would not be ‘hostile to the
innocence of our children’” (Id). This is the fundamental pillar of the legislative
diagnostic frame: the government had to exert its authority to reduce, as much as
possible, the harm that an unregulated Internet could inflict on kids. Adult content would
have “deep and harmful effects on children that cannot readily be undone” because
“children generally do not possess the same capacity as adults to make informed choices
about whether to view indecent material” (CDA14 p. 20). The problem was twofold:
first, indecent content harmed children and, second, that harm related directly to the
Internet’s complete lack of regulation. The problem required state action.
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Congressional findings supported this assumption and emphasized that “the
pervasiveness and casual treatment of sexual material…erod[es] the ability of parents to
develop responsible attitudes and behavior in their children” (CDA01 pp. 103-104). The
“simple premise” behind the CDA’s diagnostic frame was that “it is wrong to provide
pornography to children on computers” and it could scar them irreparably without strict
regulation (CDA04 p. 2). Nevertheless, one of the key resources Congress relied upon
when drawing this conclusion was itself deeply flawed. In 1995, Martin Rimm, an
undergraduate electrical engineering student at Carnegie Mellon, published an
inflammatory research paper on the issue of children and online pornography.11 Among
other things, the Rimm study concluded that “83.5% of all images posted” on the Internet
were pornographic and many of these images were “pedophilic and paraphilic” in nature
(Rimm, 1995). Time magazine picked up Rimm’s study and repeated his findings in
detail in a cover story that year.12 This widespread coverage, confirming the deepest
fears of Exon and others, was strong ammunition that helped bolster the diagnostic frame
that unregulated access to the Internet harmed children irrevocably. Congressional
supporters of online regulation latched onto both the Rimm study and the Time article and
“waved a copy in front of the Senate” while “the ink was barely dry” (CDA02 p. 5). The
problem with this supporting evidence for the CDA, however, was that Rimm’s
methodology was fundamentally unsound. Most notably, his conclusion that over 80% of
all images online were pornographic was wholly inaccurate. Instead of reviewing
anything close to a representative sample, Rimm had based this figure on “a small subset
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Rimm, M. (1995). Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of 917,410
Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers in Over
2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories. Georgetown Law Journal, 83(5), 1849-1915.
12
Elmer-DeWitt, P. (1995, July 3). Cyberporn – On a Screen Near You. Time.
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of the Internet” composed entirely of adult bulletin boards (Christensen, 1995). As it
turned out, Rimm’s work had not been subject to peer review and, in addition to the
paper’s methodological problems, the author himself had been accused of ethical
misconduct including plagiarism (CDA02 p. 6). In a bit of irony, Rimm had also been
“working both sides of this issue” and in his spare time had authored “The
Pornographer’s Handbook: How to Exploit Women, Dupe Men, & Make Lots of Money”
(Id). When Rimm’s personal and professional shortcomings became public knowledge,
Congressional support for the study evaporated even though support for the diagnostic
frame did not. Congress abruptly cancelled Rimm’s scheduled testimony although, as
Senator Leahy would point out, the study had already exerted significant influence.
Specifically, Leahy criticized his colleagues who had “voted in large part based on
inflammatory stories about pornography on the Internet, like the study by Mr. Rimm”
(CDA26 pp. 7-8). Leahy also noted during the hearing that Rimm “was supposed to be
here, but got disinvited once a number of people brought out the fact that the study,
which was treated as gospel on the Senate floor, was a little bit less than gospel. And I
would expect any time now to see Time Magazine, for example, which did a cover story
based on it, too, point out that even great media can be conned” (Id).
Despite these setbacks, Exon and his supporters continued to rely on the
diagnostic frame that unregulated access to the Internet harmed children. In fact, they
expanded the argument that, not only were kids at risk of continuous exposure to indecent
content online and incapable of dealing with it once exposed, but they were also at risk
because they were uniquely proficient with this new medium. Lawmakers often
connected the argument of pervasiveness and accessibility to the idea that children had
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become “the computer experts in our Nation’s families” (CDA14 pp. 13-14). Even
Senator Leahy, as a leading opponent of the CDA, agreed that the youngest of “children
are so adept with computers that they can sit at a keypad in front of a computer screen at
home or at school and connect to the outside world through the Internet” (Id). Children
as Internet “experts” became a recurring theme as supporters of the CDA defined their
diagnostic frames (CDA19 p. 2). Those who opposed the CDA, they argued, had failed
to recognize “the ease with which children can maneuver today’s computers, especially
in the point-and-click icon format of the World Wide Web” (CDA16 p. 19).
Interestingly, during the major Congressional hearing on this issue legislative
supporters juxtaposed their own ignorance of the technology in stark contrast to the
technological expertise of kids. As Senator DeWine admitted, “My children, if they were
here, would tell you that I am computer-illiterate” (CDA26 p. 48), while he and other
legislators simultaneously suggested that they could effectively regulate the Internet
through technological mechanisms of enforcement (Id p. 50). Despite their inexperience
with the medium and the CDA’s mandated regulatory technologies, Congressional
advocates of the policy believed that only their efforts could safeguard these young
computer savants (and, presumably, that kids would be unable to find their way around
such regulatory systems). Even though Senator Exon agreed that, while others may
“know the technicalities of this far better than I” (CDA26 p. 152), the very “seriousness
of the problem” was rooted in the fact that “computer literate children can easily find and
retrieve” sexually explicit content (CDA14 p. 25). This fact demanded government
intervention through policy (CDA16 p. 22).
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Furthermore, minors’ proficiency with the Internet and their skill at accessing
indecent online content could damage not only their fragile psyches but also the
“educational and informational” (CDA01 pp. 100-101) resource the Internet might
become. Here the legislative diagnostic frame is bound to a strongly instrumental
narrative that portrays the Internet as a “vast new world of information that will
revolutionize how we all learn and work in the future” (CDA19 p. 1). It is interesting to
note that this portrayal of the Internet as a “revolutionary development” (CDA22 p. 1)
that was “unprecedented in world history” (CDA19 p. 1) differs significantly from the
broadcast and zoning metaphors used previously to place the Internet in familiar
regulatory territory. This contradiction appears repeatedly and, on at least one occasion,
Senator Exon simultaneously emphasized that “computers” were a “unique medium”
while arguing that the Internet was the same as “radio or television broadcasts where
youngsters have unique access” (CDA19 p. 2). Despite this inconsistency, it was
precisely because of the radical potential of the Internet that lawmakers must safeguard
kids while using such a unique and powerful tool. Without some regulation and with the
increased risk that kids would find their way to explicit content, the Internet would wither
and die for fear of its seamier side. Although Senator Exon did “not claim to be an expert
at it,” the “Internet system” and its “multitude of good” uses were at risk (CDA22 p. 3).
This is another important part of the problem as defined by those supporting the
CDA: parental fear of exposing their children to harm would act as a deterrent from using
this vast new informational (and commercial) resource. The Internet “developed in part
with taxpayer funds provided by the United States Government” (CDA26 p. 166) would
never reach its full potential if that same government did not step in to correct the
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situation (CDA14 p. 26). Therefore, it was essential that Congress “give America’s
parents a new comfort level in public and commercial computer networks if these are to
be transformed from the private preserve of a special class of computer hackers into a
widely used communications medium. This necessary transformation will never happen
if parents abandon the Internet and computer communications technology remains
threatening” (CDA14 p. 26). It was crucial that the state domesticate this burgeoning tool
of education and commerce if it was to be of use. In harmony with the
Telecommunications Act’s mandate of increasing competition and reducing barriers to
access, this aspect of the CDA’s legislative diagnostic frame sought to increase
participation online. Problem definition in this instance linked the harm inflicted on
children directly to the harm inflicted on use of the medium itself. How was the Internet
to achieve its full potential “if people are unwilling to avail themselves of its benefits
because they do not want their children harmed by exposure to patently offensive
sexually explicit material” (CDA14 p. 17)?
Congress had made its case clear: they must save children from the Internet and
they must save the Internet from itself. If they allowed pornographers to run rampant, the
innocence of America’s children would be lost and the immense potential of this new
medium would be squandered. From the legislative point of view, Congress must
regulate the Internet to avoid these harms. Lawmakers also used this frame to reiterate
the point that they must preserve the Internet for decent and tame uses that would not
frighten away parents or other prospective users. In other national contexts, governments
had used this diagnostic frame to safeguard economic interests and that was the case here
as well. By ensuring that potentially offensive content was off limits, the government
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hoped this would both spur investment in online business and make it more likely that
average citizens would purchase goods on the Internet. In such instances, the “key
regulatory goal” of online content standards “was business and consumer ‘confidence and
certainty’…’Confidence and certainty’ for consumers depended upon notions of a ‘safe’
Internet, and this conception of safety online became central to a government strategy of
promotion of the information economy” (Allen & Long, 2004, p. 232). Allowing bad
actors to rule the online landscape would be “a serious deterrent to other people getting
on the Internet” (CDA24 p. 2). While this economic impetus may have been part of the
subtext of the regulation, both the protection of children and the protection of the Internet
as a resource were the primary motivations offered to the public again and again. If
Congress was going to make the Internet, “even bigger, and even better” then they must
stifle the “raunchy pornography that would turn most people off” (CDA14 p. 14). Only
government regulation could solve this problem which is why “Congress determined that
a legislative response was necessary to ensure that the Internet would be a ‘family
friendly resource’ that would be ‘more frequently used’” (Id).
Interestingly, these diagnostic frames seem to allow more room for commentary
and discussion than previous frames. In this context, it is interesting to note that
supporters of the CDA were much more open to the use of research within the confines of
problem definition. Where the master frame of protecting children had overridden calls
for serious and critical review of the policy, here Exon and others often pointed to various
studies to reinforce their point of view. This does not necessarily indicate that a critical
study of the technological requirements of the CDA was forthcoming but it does at least
suggest that Congress felt it needed some data or proof to bolster their argument. In
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addition to the Rimm study and studies that warned of pornography’s effect on children
(CDA01 pp. 103-104), Congress also relied on demographic data illustrating both the
volume of online activity and the prevalence of children within those numbers.
Specifically, “One study presented to Congress estimated that “[o]f the 6.8 million homes
with on-line accounts currently available, 35 percent have children under the age of 18”
(CDA14 pp. 13-14). Again, Congress tied this figure to the diagnostic frame that vast
numbers of children had access to the Internet as well as large numbers of adults who
may turn away from the Internet if their children were unprotected. This data further
emphasized the need for government intervention through policy and through technology.
Although these frames did not provoke any deep analysis of the technological
requirements of the CDA or any critical discourse on the policy’s constitutional effects, it
did provide an opportunity for the introduction of research data in the debate. While the
master frame of protecting children seems to have been far too ideologically charged to
allow for this kind of reflection, the diagnostic frame did engage with research to support
its definition of the problem. Despite the deep flaws of the Rimm study, its use did
demonstrate that Exon and others were willing to appeal to a broader audience that was
concerned with the objective impact the Internet could have on children. Rather than
appealing to the more emotional nature of the master frame, legislators here offered more
intellectual arguments and withdrew incorrect data from the debate when methodological
flaws appeared. This may indicate that an opportunity exists within the context of
diagnostic frames. When looking for evidence to bolster problem definition, legislators
may be more inclined to reason with opponents and consider alternative points of view.
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Part IV – Oppositional Diagnostic Frames
The opposition concentrated their diagnostic frames on the onerous nature of the
Act’s affirmative defenses, particularly the mandated use of age verification systems, ISP
filtering and other technological barriers to access. Not only did these systems diminish
individual autonomy by centralizing blocking decisions with service providers and other
authorities, they also reduced the ability of users to decide the merit of online content for
themselves by creating a national standard for what constituted “decent” material. In
addition to the injury done to autonomy, these restrictions and the “good faith” use of
technological mechanisms of enforcement would, the opposition argued, curtail free
speech from the outset. Furthermore, content providers, especially private individuals
and non-profit groups, would bear an enormous cost due to the economic realities of
employing age verification and other systems. More importantly, the fear of providing
minors with access to “indecent” content, even content that had political, educational, or
artistic merit, would result in a reduction of that speech. While the legislative diagnostic
frames focused on the harm an unregulated Internet could inflict on children, the
opposition focused its problem definition on the individual and constitutional harm that
the Act might inflict through the technological barriers it required.
The first diagnostic frame employed by the opposition dealt with issues of
individual autonomy. While the related master frame emphasized a normative argument
that policy should strive to preserve autonomy, this diagnostic frame detailed how the
CDA could and would harm autonomy. Specifically, the CDA’s affirmative defenses
would limit choice and “weaken the privacy of all Internet users by turning systems
operators into snoops and censors” (CDA09 pp. 3-4). In addition, by mandating that ISPs
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take preemptive steps to block access to indecent content, this stripped away the ability of
individuals to choose whether that content met their personal definition of indecency or
not. By imposing a national content standard and enforcing it through regulatory
systems, Congress had usurped the power of individual and community standards. As the
EFF argued, “the responsibility for controlling our content lies on us - the citizens and
the parents – and this is a call for all of us once again to demonstrate how we can be
trusted to use this medium responsibly” (CDA08 pp. 1-2). This meant that the “parents,
rather than the government” should be “empowered to make the choice about Internet
content” (Id). This was a common theme employed throughout the opposition’s
diagnostic frame. The EFF, ACLU and others argued that the government had essentially
taken on a paternalistic role, removing parents’ ability to decide what content was
acceptable. As will be discussed shortly, the law delegated these decisions to Internet
service providers and other gatekeepers that now had a unique ability to decide for
parents what was or was not acceptable.
Instead of the centralized technological controls that the Act’s affirmative
defenses would force on ISPs, oppositional groups argued that user-centered systems
were more supportive of individual autonomy and less restrictive of constitutionally
protected content. Specifically, commercial filtering software could “be tailored to
reflect the parents’ values and the age and maturity of the child” (CDA15 p. 8). Users
could voluntarily employ these products at the point of access and this would “empower
parents to exercise individual choice over what material their children could access…
based on the parents’ own particular tastes and values” (CDA13 p. 19). The opposition
consistently pointed to existing “user-based technologies that already provide a great deal
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of protection…such as Cyber Patrol, SurfWatch, CYBERsitter, and Net Nanny” that had
“enabled parents and other adults to limit the access of children to material on the
Internet” (CDA12 p. 13). They emphasized that products like Cyber Patrol already
allowed parents, rather than the government, to “prevent access to particular sites they
deem inappropriate” and to “block access to online material” (Id pp. 13-14). It is
important to note that while this frame underlined the importance the opposition placed
on individual autonomy, it also demonstrated a level of naiveté about commercial
filtering software and overconfidence in its instrumental ability to function as a neutral
tool. As Chapter 6 will describe, these assumptions about the objectivity and
constitutionality of such filtering products would prove to be problematic for the
opposition during negotiation of the Children’s Internet Protection Act.
In addition to the damage it would do to individual autonomy, the opposition also
argued that the CDA’s emphasis on discrete content producers would be ineffective –
especially as it related to foreign websites. One of the major weaknesses of the CDA was
that it was unenforceable outside the United States and, while ISPs could proactively
filter content they deemed inappropriate, foreign speakers would have no obligation to
censor themselves or employ technological barriers to access such as age verification
systems. The opposition argued that the only effect of the CDA would be to harm a large
segment of domestic speakers while failing to protect children from sites outside U.S.
borders (CDA12 p. 14). Besides, there was no guarantee that centralized ISP-level
filtering would protect minors from all indecent content. On the contrary, “The evidence
shows that the CDA will not protect minors from the substantial percentage of indecent
or patently offensive speech that is posted abroad, whereas the user-based
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methods…would block such speech regardless of where it was posted” (Id p. 4).
Therefore, as the government acknowledged, ISPs “would have to rely upon” systems
similar to commercial filtering technology “for foreign speakers” (Id). As the opposition
argued, if filtering software was the answer anyway, why not allow individuals to decide
when and if to use it?
The second diagnostic frame emphasized heavily by the opposition dealt with the
reduced access to protected speech that would result from the Act. Problem definition
here related directly to the limits on speech that regulatory systems required by the CDA
would impose. Not only was all “indecent” content, from pornography to medical
information, lumped into one category but all providers of such material, whether they
were commercial entities or not, were to impose the same technological barriers to
access. While for-profit sites could simply pass the cost of these systems on to the
customer, private and non-profit websites would have to absorb the economic impact.
This was no small matter and the opposition argued that “the administrative burden of
creating and maintaining the screening system, and the ongoing costs for verification
services, put this method beyond the reach of most speakers” (CDA12 p. 7). For
example, one expert witness for the American Library Association estimated that the
Carnegie Library would incur a cost of $30,000 just to review existing content for
indecent material while the annual cost of maintenance and oversight would be $845,000
(Id). This would force websites that could not bear these costs to shut down rather than
risk the criminal sanctions imposed by the CDA for failing to meet its affirmative
defenses.
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Also, as the opposition pointed out, it was because of these costs and the unique
nature of the medium that the CDA would have such an impact on constitutionally
protected speech. It was here that the government’s allusions to physicality broke down.
For example, the serious differences between the disembodied medium of the Internet
and physical outlets meant that, not only would website operators incur a direct cost for
requesting identification, but they would be unable to gauge the age of prospective
viewers accurately. Even if the intent was to provide access only to adults, those running
the websites could be held liable for running afoul of the CDA’s standard if only one
minor made it past the barrier.13 Fear of noncompliance and the threat of being found
“indecent” would prospectively chill the creation of new content. Also, the inability of
non-commercial speakers even to purchase age verification software could be equally
dissuasive for those who wished to speak. 14 Therefore, the very possibility that Congress
would require regulatory technologies was harmful to constitutionally protected speech.
Average users would be unable to meet the economic barriers to entry that the CDA
created, as would many non-profit organizations that provided access to content meeting
broad definitions of indecency. This was problematic for many groups ranging from
Planned Parenthood to the ACLU itself. Since the “breadth of the CDA’s coverage [was]
wholly unprecedented…The general, undefined terms ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’
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As the Supreme Court would later find, “Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in
the absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more
minors will likely view it. Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat group
will be minor-and therefore that it would be a crime to send the group an indecent message-would surely
burden communication among adults” (CDA18 pp. 20-21).
14
In the subsequent legal challenge, the district court’s Findings of Fact would demonstrate “that as a
practical matter, non-commercial organizations and even many commercial organizations using the Web
would find it prohibitively expensive and burdensome to engage in the methods of age verification
proposed by the government, and that even if they could attempt to age verify, there is little assurance that
they could successfully filter out minors” (CDA13 p. 39).
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cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other
value” (CDA18 p. 21). Consequently, this speech would be unavailable for even those
consenting adults who wished to view it. A multitude of websites would shut down if the
costs of compliance exceeded their budgets (CDA13 pp. 28-29).
The technological mechanisms of enforcement required by the CDA were also far
too intrusive for the opposition. In particular, the CDA only offered affirmative defenses
to those website operators who had “restricted access…by requiring use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number”
(CDA01 p. 97). This was a dubious proposition for several reasons. First, as a practical
matter, the opposition considered this method to be “technologically infeasible” (CDA12
p. 6) even assuming credit card companies would allow non-commercial and non-profit
sites to access their client records without charging a fee (CDA17 p. 23). Secondly, there
was no guarantee for the government or those attempting to comply with the CDA that a
minor had not used a credit card that did not belong to them (CDA13 p. 29) or that the
card holder was over 18 (CDA18 p. 9). Furthermore, although the language of the CDA
suggested that the policy would not have any effect on existing privacy law (CDA01 p.
102), the law’s age verification requirements essentially mandated disclosure of
personally identifiable information as a condition of access (CDA11 p. 2). If Congress
tied the age of the user directly to credit card verification, for a myriad of reasons
individuals might not wish to disclose their online habits to a private entity such as a
credit card company. Also, as the opposition pointed out, prior to passage of the CDA
existing age verification services were employed almost exclusively by pornographic
websites and these systems not only required proof of age through a credit card number
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but also a more thorough registration process. Even a government expert on this
technology acknowledged that he would not care to be associated with such a service nor
could he guarantee that “those systems protected the privacy of registrants” and did not
sell those lists to others (CDA17 pp. 23-24).
This provision also assumed that all those consenting adults who wished to view
“indecent” material actually possessed a credit card. In the absence of this sort of
identification, the CDA “would completely bar adults who do not have a credit card and
lack the resources to obtain one from accessing any blocked material” (CDA18 p. 9).
The law forced websites that hosted any content considered even mildly distasteful to
employ age verification systems (assuming they could afford the technology). These
systems forced users to decide whether or not to disclose personal information and credit
card data to websites or to anonymous third-party verification services (assuming they
had a credit card). As mentioned previously, this could have a deterrent effect on the
website operator either indirectly through the economic burden associated with these
systems or directly through their decision to create and distribute any such content in the
first place. The user was equally constrained and the system either barred access from
content at the outset due to lack of a credit card or the user would choose not to proceed
past the locked gate of the website for fear of personal indictment (CDA13 pp. 29-30). In
this sense, the age verification technologies required by the CDA were clearly not neutral
tools and had the potential for negative impact on constitutionally protected speech. The
opposition’s diagnostic frame here made it quite clear “that requiring such screening for
any messages that might be ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive’ for a minor would have the
effect of banning such messages from these types of online communication” (CDA12 p.
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6). Ironically, the opposition noted that the websites of online pornographers would be
among the few that already had the means to comply with the CDA and the customer
base willing to supply age verification and credit card information (CDA13 p. 65). The
websites of libraries and other non-commercial entities would bear the brunt of the Act
for fear of posting “lawful but arguably ‘indecent’ words and images for artistic, political,
or instructional purposes” (CDA17 p. 25).
Even more threatening to this diagnostic frame was the unprecedented
technological control that the CDA would delegate to carriers and Internet service
providers. Through the use of filtering, screening, and blocking technologies, the Act
granted stunning police powers to commercial entities without the benefit of
constitutional oversight or judicial review. In the interest of protecting children at all
costs, the CDA essentially encouraged ISPs and other good faith actors to disallow access
to any content considered even mildly questionable. The “Good Samaritan” provision of
the CDA expanded the affirmative defense for service providers and made them immune
from liability “for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected” (CDA01 p. 101, emphasis added). Despite Exon’s
and other legislative protestations that the law would “not ban any constitutionally
protected material from adults” (CDA06 p. 1), the opposition argued that the CDA had
the direct effect of minimizing the availability of speech whether it was constitutional or
not. Not only did the Act allow service providers to throw aside constitutional
considerations, they were essentially unable to do anything less for fear of criminal
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liability (CDA08a p. 4).15 The threat of prosecution for industry stakeholders was of
concern for several reasons. First, the fear of providing even remotely indecent content
to minors would be a public relations disaster and could have serious consequences for
future market share (CDA13 p. 41). Second, if ISPs were not overly cautious about what
content they allowed through, they could find themselves subject to a government
lawsuit. The prospect of preparing a criminal defense and the associated costs were, at
the very least, unattractive and, at most, financially debilitating. It was extremely
unlikely that any provider would “willingly subject itself to prosecution for a
miscalculation of the prevalent community standards or for an error in judgment as to
what is indecent” (Id).
All of this encouraged service providers to deploy the most thorough
technological mechanisms at their disposal. Since there were no disincentives from
blocking a wide range of speech and because Congress so broadly defined the nature of
“indecency”, the Act might disallow whole swaths of potentially protected speech. As
the opposition argued, it was difficult to imagine a technological and “criminal standard
that provides less guidance, or to conceive of a speech prohibition that would have a
broader chilling effect” (CDA17 p. 18). From this point of view, blocking, filtering and
age verification technologies were not simply the neutral “enabling tools” that Exon and
others in Congress had suggested (CDA01 p. 102). These technologies had a direct and
drastic impact on the most basic constitutional rights of speaking and listening –
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It is interesting to note that, in the years since passage of this provision, it has been used as a defense
against blocking sexually explicit content in the name of protecting minors. For example, in Doe v.
MySpace (528 F.3d 413 - 5th Cir. 2008), the court upheld MySpace’s immunity even though the site did
not require age verification or implement other policies to protect children.
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especially in the vast communicative medium the opposition considered the Internet to
be. Therefore, these enforcement systems ceased to be instrumentally useful objects and
became active mechanisms for dictating what speech was allowable within the
government’s new national content standard. As the opposition emphasized, this broad
imposition of a regulatory standard for speech was essentially a hegemonic means for
controlling discourse. Any policy or technological system “that stifles speech on account
of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes this essential right [of free speech]. Laws of this sort pose the
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but
to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion” (CDA13 pp. 67-68). This is strongly reminiscent of
Pfaffenberger’s warnings about any hegemonic technologies that are “specifically
designed to exercise force, that is, to coerce obedience and suppress deviance” (1992, p.
283).
The opposition’s diagnostic frames again echo this dissertation’s theoretical
framework related to user empowerment and the protection of democratic rights. In
addition to warnings about hegemonic technologies similar to those made by
Pfaffenberger, the opposition also stressed the need for systems that empowered users.
Voluntary use of technologies like commercial filtering products would, the opposition
argued, be immensely preferable to centralized systems that removed the individual’s
ability to choose. This mirrors Lewis Mumford’s calls for fewer “authoritarian” and
“system-centered” technologies and more “democratic” or “man-centered” mechanisms
(Mumford, 1964 p. 2). This is also strongly reminiscent of Richard Sclove’s normative
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assertion that “Democratic societies should seek a balanced mixture of
communitarian/cooperative, individualized, and transcommunity technologies, while
avoiding technologies that establish authoritarian social relations” (Sclove, 1995, p. 62).
The opposition made a strong connection between these centralized technologies
and a diminished ability to exercise constitutional rights. Specifically, use of these
centralized, state-mandated technologies would do harm to the democratic rights
envisioned by Mumford that included “communal self-government, free communication
as between equals, unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection
against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of individual moral responsibility for
behavior that affects the whole community” (Mumford, 1964, p. 1, emphasis added).
Opponents of the CDA consistently argued that the Internet was unique because there “is
no central control” and the “user can determine and control what data the user will be
exposed to…The user does not need a paternalistic government determining what is
appropriate to view” (CDA02 pp. 30-31). The opposition, within its diagnostic frames,
provided a serious critique of the CDA and its technological mechanisms of enforcement.
Since the regulatory systems required by the CDA would reduce individual choice, place
an economic burden on speakers and listeners, chill the creation of protected speech, and
criminalize speech that might have serious literary, political, scientific, or artistic value it
was an illegitimate exercise of state control. Furthermore, the opposition stressed that
Congress should not use these systems to delegate veto power over content to ISPs
without some form of constitutional oversight or judicial review. The ACLU, EFF, CDT,
and others argued again and again that there “are constitutional ways to protect children
from cyberporn but not restrict the freedom of speech” (CDA08d pp. 12-13).
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Part V – Legislative Prognostic Frames
For legislative supporters of the CDA, technology was the only possible solution
to the problems they had defined. If children were to remain unharmed by the prevalence
of pornography online and the potential of the Internet as a commercial and informational
tool was to remain undiminished, the government must act and must employ technologies
that precluded both. In fact, the lack of a legislative response would be detrimental
because, “if the Government were to do nothing to prevent children’s access to online
pornography, this abandonment would itself contribute to the harm about which the
Government has a compelling interest” (CDA16 p. 22). As Senator Grassley
emphasized, within any solution “there is a role for technology and government” and
there was “a very definite need for the involvement of government and not putting the
total responsibility on parents at this point” (CDA26 p. 50). The legislative prognostic
frames consistently referred to the government’s compelling interest in solving the
problems it had identified and made clear that the technologies mandated by the CDA
were the only means to do so.
Within its prognostic frames, Congressional supporters of the Act also
emphasized that user-based systems and other commercial blocking technologies were
inadequate. In fact, because they were voluntary they would fail to curb kids’ access to
indecent content. This argument directly contradicts the opposition’s theme of user
empowerment and individual autonomy. For Exon and others, it was precisely because
these commercial systems left the decisions about what, when and if to filter to parents
that they were insufficient to address the blight of sexually explicit material online. As
supporters of the CDA made quite clear, “Congress has an independent interest in
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protecting children from exposure to or receipt of patently offensive sexual or excretory
depictions, and is not required and should not be compelled to rely on private, voluntary
actions of others, such as parents, but can encourage their assistance” (CDA16 p. 23).
Congress simply could not and would not trust parents to exercise good judgment in this
regard. The technological means to accomplish the state’s interests would be effective
because they were “legislative in nature, and therefore mandatory – never voluntary…adhoc ways for private individuals to address the problems in which Government has a
compelling interest are inapposite to the means by which Government may attempt to
promote its compelling interest” (Id p. 22).
Congress specifically aimed this facet of the prognostic frame at the suggestion
that commercial filtering products could ever be as effective or as pervasive as the
government’s preferred technological mechanisms of enforcement. While voluntary
filters could be part of the solution, they were not reliable enough for supporters of the
CDA to depend upon. These supporters made repeated allegations that these products
were insufficient compared to government intervention because they were grossly
ineffective. Specifically, they suggested that “filename-based Cybersitter does not block
cryptic titles, word-based Net Nanny does not block pornographic images, and Surfwatch
does not work on non-Internet sources, such as BBSs” (CDA16 p. 23). While the
government did not entirely dismiss either “parental involvement in their children’s use
of the Internet” or the “installation of filtering software,” it was clear that neither was an
adequate solution (CDA16 p. 24). Instead, Exon and his supporters argued that these
measures “should be regarded as complements to the CDA” but neither one,
“individually or in the aggregate, eliminates the need for legal prohibition…or supplants
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Congress’ constitutional authority to take action in furtherance of its compelling interest”
(Id).
Congress was determined to take action and ignored oppositional calls for user
empowerment. Individual autonomy was not a mitigating factor when America’s
children and the Internet itself were at risk. The solution must be a centralized,
governmental effort and lawmakers could not leave so important a struggle to parents,
communities, or the voluntary use of filtering products. It was inconceivable that the
state would trust in the “hope that parents will purchase and install blocking software in
the family computer…To the contrary, Congress has a compelling interest to
affirmatively protect children so that they may participate in this new and extraordinary
medium, especially where private actors fail to use even the blocking and screening
methods at their disposal to protect children from the domestic and foreign pornography
that is available online” (Id p. 21). While Congress encouraged parents and communities
to “make use of whatever software products are available” legislators were sadly
confident that “not all parents will purchase such software, and, even if they do, children
have access to many computers which will not employ software filtering devices such as
in schools, libraries, and neighbors’ homes” (Id p. 23). Besides, even if filters were in
place, it was important to remember that kids were America’s computer experts and
“many children are capable of out-maneuvering such technology” (Id). It was clear that,
within the legislative prognostic frame, any solution to the dire problems they had
recognized could only come through government action and through the use of
centralized, state-sanctioned regulatory systems. Only federal law and the mandated use
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of such systems would be sufficient in achieving the government’s compelling interest in
protecting children.
In addition to age-verification technologies and the “Good Samaritan” blocking
performed at the ISP level, the Act’s supporters suggested several other technological
solutions within their prognostic frame. One of the first solutions proposed, and one that
made a great deal of sense both from legislative experience and from the example of
Motion Picture Association, was the idea of rating system. Although ratings eventually
became less promising from a legislative point of view, at the outset of the debate over
the CDA ratings seemed quite promising. In fact, policy directives from the Clinton
administration had tied rating systems directly to voluntary, user-centered solutions.
Specifically, the administration sought to “promote the use of industry ...self-regulation
and rating systems, and technical solutions to empower parents and other users to resolve
contentious access issues (e.g., children’s access, and violence)” (CDA05 p. 3). As
mentioned above, supporters of the CDA eventually found these suggestions too weak a
response but, for a time, this seemed to be a feasible answer. Also from the beginning,
lawmakers directly tied rating systems to technological responses to the problem of
online indecency. There was precedent for this type of response and, from a legislative
perspective, it was not unreasonable to suggest that the government could “develop a
solution for the Internet that is as powerful for the computer as the v-chip will be for
television…With the right technology and ratings systems – we can help ensure that our
children don’t end up in the red light districts of cyberspace” (CDA08a p. 4).
Interestingly (and a bit incongruously), supporters of the CDA eventually dismissed a
rating system as an inappropriate solution because it was not widespread enough to
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guarantee that all material would be labeled suitably and would consequently force
parents to be too restrictive of their children’s Internet access (CDA14 pp. 31-32).
Briefly, two other potential technological solutions suggested by Congress were
to add tags to all adult-themed content on the Internet and to make use of Common
Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts to constrain access to such content only to those 18 and
older. First, it seemed a “technologically feasible,” even “trivial” matter to embed tags
denoting adult content either directly in a site’s URL or less obviously in the HTML code
(CDA13 p. 30). This tagging method would essentially require content providers to label
all indecent content by including “a string of characters, such as ‘XXX’” that would then
be recognized by the user’s computer to “screen out any content with that tag” (Id).
CGI script, as explained by CDA advocates, was “technology by which an
operator of a World Wide Web server may interrogate a user of a Web site” (CDA13 p.
27). Based on the information obtained from the user, the server could then “grant or
deny access to the information sought” (Id). CGI script was, essentially, the means by
which a site could “screen visitors by requesting a credit card number or adult password”
(Id). Content providers could use these methods in conjunction with the age verification
services that websites could employ to qualify for the Act’s affirmative defenses. CGI
script was particularly useful for content distributed via Usenet feeds “where much of the
most graphic and notorious pornography is made available, both hard- and soft-core,
normal and perverted, actual and simulated” (CDA16 p. 26). Alternatively, because
Usenet feeds must be affirmatively selected in order to be carried by any particular ISP,
the service provider could also simply choose not to offer access to any feed that ran
afoul of the content standard (CDA16 p. 26). Conveniently, due to the nature of the
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“Good Samaritan” blocking provisions of the CDA, no court could find an ISP liable for
blocking access to constitutionally protected speech.
All of these prognostic frames for addressing the harms caused by an unregulated
Internet emphasized the state’s need to act to achieve its compelling interest.
Considerations of individual autonomy were insufficient to change the legislative course
that Exon and others had set. Although some members of Congress proffered an array of
existing and as yet undeveloped technologies as the only appropriate solution (CDA16 p.
25), legislative supporters of the CDA did not demonstrate that they placed much faith in
voluntary methods for filtering content. Some legislators actively eschewed the ideal of
user empowerment and the government made clear that, while individuals and parents
could be part of the solution, they would never be as reliable as government intervention
through policy and through technology. This rhetorical strategy deemphasizing parental
autonomy and choice was vastly removed from even the Congressional findings that
predated the CDA. At the outset of the debate, Congress advocated for “technology that
would give [parents] greater control to block” indecent content (CDA01 pp. 103-104).
From the beginning, the compelling government interest was not in centralizing control
or delegating blocking decisions to service providers but instead there was “a compelling
governmental interest in empowering parents to limit the negative influences of [content]
that is harmful to children” (Id). Congress intended Section 230 of the Act to “encourage
the development of technologies which maximize user control” and “to remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents” (CDA21 p. 86). Despite these initial suggestions to the contrary,
the legislative prognostic frames consistently minimized user empowerment.
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Part VI - Oppositional Prognostic Frames
The opposition’s prognostic frames suggested that the only sensible solutions to
the problems caused by the CDA were to: 1.) minimize or remove the access controls
required by the Act; 2.) revise the policy to make accommodations for individual
autonomy and protected speech or; 3.) to simply strike the policy down as
unconstitutional. Since the diagnostic frames employed by opponents of the CDA
emphasized the harms inflicted by the Act’s technological mandate, their proposed
solutions focused on how Congress should reconsider those technologies or eliminate
them altogether. In lieu of such modifications to the policy, the Act remained “a
government-imposed content-based restriction on speech” (CDA13 p. 36). Without
serious revisions, the opposition argued, the policy’s requirements were “either
technologically impossible or economically prohibitive for many…to comply with the
CDA without seriously impeding their posting of online material which adults have a
constitutional right to access” (Id p. 39). As it stood, the CDA was “a hastily drafted
statute…that fails to take account of the unique nature of the Internet and obviously
sweeps far more broadly than the First Amendment permits” (CDA12 p. 5). Without
radical amendment, the only “appropriate response” to the CDA was “to strike down this
statute and give Congress the opportunity to make those policy choices itself” (Id). Such
a drastic reassessment of the policy was necessary because the CDA’s technical
provisions were “in serious conflict with our most cherished protection – the right to
choose the material to which we would have access” (CDA13 p. 43). If Congress
implemented the Act without critical analysis and reassessment, the CDA would,
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“without doubt, undermine the substantive, speech-enhancing benefits that have flowed
from the Internet” (Id pp. 64-65).
The opposition again tied the need for reconsideration of the Act’s technological
mechanisms of enforcement to Congress’ basic misunderstanding of these systems and
their misportrayal of how they would function in application. The use of content tagging,
for example, was problematic to the opposition for several reasons. First, from a
practical standpoint, there was no “consensus among speakers…to use the same tag to
label ‘indecent’ material” (CDA15 p. 8). Although Congress could have conceivably
mandated some uniform tag for indecent content, there was no reason to believe that the
contextual standards for indecency would be consistent across individuals or
communities. Misunderstandings about what constituted decency in a global medium
would make this proposal extremely difficult to implement. Also, the effort required to
label all indecent content proactively would be difficult at best. Accurately tagging all
content “would be extremely burdensome for organizations that provide large amounts of
material” such as libraries or other informational outlets (Id).
Additionally, no precedent or model for content tagging existed and, therefore,
provided no guidance whatsoever to those individuals or ISPs who would be required to
use tags as a part of their affirmative defense under the law. Without any clear
guidelines, “the government’s proposal that ‘tagging’ or self-rating might provide a
defense is ‘purely hypothetical and offers no currently operative defense to Internet
content providers’” (CDA15 p. 11). The legislative suggestion that tagging would prove
to be effective and that it would provide a clear, good-faith defense, was contested by the
opposition who argued that this provision inaccurately described the state of the
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technology. While the government hinted that “some sort of ‘speaker tagging’ system
might constitute a safe-harbor defense at some point in the future… it has pointedly
refused to specify” that tagging would qualify as a defense when Congress passed the Act
(CDA12 p. 8). Therefore, “the Government’s effort to defend the CDA by pointing to the
mere possibility that speaker tagging ‘might’ provide a defense is wholly unpersuasive”
(Id p. 11).
Finally, the very act of tagging speech was constitutionally problematic.
Particularly where the labeled speech may have been on the borderline of “indecency” as
defined by the state, tagging that speech became a political act mandated by the
technological requirements of the CDA. This reemphasizes the opposition’s argument
that the regulatory systems required by the Act amounted to a hegemonic form of control.
Within this scheme, the government essentially approved certain content and would tag
anything falling outside that zone of acceptability accordingly. From this point of view,
“Any de jure or de facto requirement that speakers label their own protected speech
‘patently offensive’ would amount to a pernicious form of governmentally compelled
speech. The Government generally cannot compel citizens to speak, particularly if the
speaker is compelled to attach a pejorative label the speaker does not believe is
warranted” (CDA12 p. 10). From the opposition’s point of view, lawmakers had to
revise this provision to account more realistically for the non-neutral and political nature
of tagging technology or they should excise it from the CDA entirely.
CGI scripts were equally impractical and required serious reconsideration or,
failing that, removal from the Act. This was especially true for those who made use of
the large service providers that dominated the market for private Internet access at the
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time. Specifically, “Content providers who publish on the World Wide Web via one of
the large commercial online services, such as America Online or CompuServe, could not
use an online age verification system that requires cgi script because the server software
of these online services available to subscribers cannot process cgi scripts. There is no
method currently available for Web page publishers who lack access to cgi scripts to
screen recipients online for age” (CDA13 p. 28). In the mid-1990s, there were roughly
12 million Internet users who depended on these services (CDA17 p. 23). Without access
to CGI scripts, this provision would force any “speakers who wished to screen for
age…to establish their own independent Web sites with cgi script capability, which takes
time and costs money” (Id). Although inexpensive websites have become the norm since
that time and have further democratized the ability to distribute speech, this was not the
case some twenty years ago. These economic barriers to the use of CGI scripts would be
dissuasive and “non-commercial organizations and even many commercial organizations
using the Web would find it prohibitively expensive and burdensome to engage in the
methods of age verification proposed by the government” (CDA13 p. 39). Furthermore,
the government’s representation that ISPs could make use of CGI scripts to manage
access to various Usenet groups was also disingenuous. Although it was true that ISPs
could use CGI technology to screen access to Usenet groups, they had no incentive to
employ this expensive method if the Act’s “Good Samaritan” defenses immunized them
from blocking access to a multitude of such groups proactively.
Despite these criticisms of tagging, CGI and the age verification technologies
described in Part IV, the opposition itself offered as part of their proposed solution a
technological fix (CDA02 p. 34). This prognostic frame may have been indicative of an
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instrumentalist understanding of technology similar to that demonstrated by Exon and
other supporters of the CDA. Specifically, the ACLU, EFF, CDT, and a number of
concerned industry stakeholders suggested that a viable alternative to the regulatory
systems required by the Act would be the development of the Platform for Internet
Content Selection (PICS). Proposed by the World Wide Web consortium (W3C), an
international body that sets standards for the Internet, PICS was meant to be a
technological means for limiting government regulation of content on the Internet. In
direct response to Senator Exon’s efforts “a group of companies quickly came to the
consortium asking to do something now, because they knew Congress had plans to draw
legislation very soon that would be harmful to the Internet” (Berners-Lee, 1999, p. 113).
These industry stakeholders, as “members of the W3C realized that without an industry
solution, the government would regulate the industry” (governingwithcode.com, 2004).
Oppositional groups embraced this potential solution based on the belief that,
similar to the voluntary use of filtering software, PICS “would support parents’ ability to
filter and screen material that their children see on the Web” (CDA13 pp. 16-17). PICS
technology would “provide the ability for third parties, as well as individual content
providers, to rate content on the Internet” and when “fully implemented, PICScompatible World Wide Web browsers, Usenet News Group readers, and other Internet
applications, will provide parents the ability to choose from a variety of rating services,
or a combination of services” (Id). Despite their enthusiasm for such an apparently usercentered system, these groups were vague about how third party rating services would
function more fairly than centralized government solutions or be more accommodating of
protected speech. In fact, referring to PICS as “a neutral content-classification scheme”
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(CDA08f p. 20), the opposition demonstrated a misunderstanding of the political nature
of these systems and the bias that could be embedded within them.
For the most part, the oppositional prognostic frames offered a crippling critique
of the regulatory systems proposed by the state. This critique raised serious doubts about
the ability of these technologies to function efficiently and constitutionally. Furthermore,
although Congress had made its case against autonomy, the opposition argued that any
solution to the problems caused by the Act’s affirmative defenses must include some
form of user empowerment. As the EFF made clear, without some acknowledgment of
this and without more rigid safeguards for protected speech, the “CDA was a wholly
inappropriate exercise of governmental power under the Constitution” and “would have
abridged one of the freedoms…that is central to any democratic society” (CDA08c p.
10). Similar to the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2, the opposition made an
argument emphasizing that “all government policies involving technology need to be
reevaluated from the standpoint of their implications for achieving a more democratic
technological order” (Sclove, 1995, p. 224). The opposition’s critique of age verification
systems, tagging technology, CGI scripts, and ISP blocking all demonstrate this deeper
concern for achieving more democratic outcomes. For the opposition, the CDA was so
flawed that, at a minimum, the solution required serious reconsideration and, at most,
“the Act should be struck down on its face on overbreadth grounds” (CDA12 p. 21). The
opposition had invoked frames and raised fundamental concerns that only a different
forum could address. The judiciary would make the final determination on the validity,
constitutionality, and “resonance” of these competing frames.
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Part VII – Judicial Opinion
To say that the opposition wasted no time in filing its legal challenge to the CDA
would be an understatement. The ACLU served its complaint just hours after the
President signed the Act into law (CDA27 p. 1) and reiterated all of the arguments that
this chapter has already described. Filing in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the
ACLU and nineteen other plaintiffs16 sought declaratory and injunctive relief to ensure
that the government would not enforce the Act before it had its day in court (CDA11 p.
1). From the outset, the panel of three federal judges appointed to this case ordered that a
basic but serious review of the technologies at issue be undertaken. In a lengthy Findings
of Fact, the court took a great deal of care to describe the nature of this new medium, the
circumstances leading to its creation and the development of that medium since its
inception (CDA13 p. 6). The court acknowledged that, “in order to apprehend the legal
questions at issue in these cases, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the
exponentially growing, worldwide medium that is the Internet, which presents unique
issues relating to the application of First Amendment jurisprudence” (Id).
The Findings of Fact did not bode well for the government. The first of the
Congressional frames to sustain damage was the metaphorical commitment that Exon and
others had made to the similarities between access controls and physical restrictions. The
court made it clear that the “Internet is not a physical or tangible entity” but was instead a
“giant network” which had no clear precedent (CDA13 p. 6). This would foreshadow the
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The plaintiffs in this case represented a variety of different stakeholders with a multitude of interests.
These plaintiffs encompassed not only activist organizations such as the ACLU, EFF and Electronic
Privacy Information Center but also individual content producers, publishers, journalists, computer
professionals and sexual health/education outlets such as the Aids Education Global Information System
and Planned Parenthood (CDA11 p. 1).
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court’s view on the government’s position that Internet content could be “zoned” in a
form legally analogous to porn shops and theaters. The court also reasoned that the
Internet’s intangible nature and its existence as “a decentralized, global medium of
communications” (CDA13 p. 7) belied the state’s ability to control access from a
centralized point. In fact, the Internet, “From its inception…was designed to be a
decentralized, self-maintaining series” of networks that functioned best “without direct
human involvement or control” (Id). Furthermore, because “There is no centralized
storage location, control point, or communications channel for the Internet…it would not
be technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on the
Internet (Id p. 8). Even before the court had debated the merits of either side’s argument,
it had concluded that it would be neither practical nor desirable for the government to
impose technological barriers to access.
The court also provided a lengthy analysis of the comparison the government had
drawn between Internet content and broadcast regulations. Although supporters of the
CDA had insisted that “the Net is still closer to broadcasting than to print” (CDA08f p.
25), the court remained unconvinced. In their view, broadcasting was vastly different
from the realities of the Internet because it was neither invasive nor controlled by a
centralized authority (see footnote 5). Instead, the court found that online
communication, “while unique, is more akin to telephone communication…than to
broadcasting” (CDA13 p. 36). This was important because it directly contradicted the
government’s assertion that the Internet was a pervasive medium that would expose
children to indecent content consistently and involuntarily. Instead, in vindication of the
opposition’s argument that indecent material must be sought out and the “user [was] not
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likely to stumble upon the offensive” (CDA02 pp. 30-31), the court agreed that “an
Internet user must act affirmatively and deliberately to retrieve specific information
online” (CDA13 p. 36). This struck at the heart of the government’s diagnostic frame
that unregulated access to the Internet would irreparably harm children. By making this
argument, the court had crippled one of the government’s key justifications for
technological regulation and against user autonomy. Based on the Findings of Fact, the
court was confident that the danger to children was nowhere near as dire as Exon and
others had suggested and “Even if a broad search will, on occasion, retrieve unwanted
materials, the user virtually always receives some warning of its content, significantly
reducing the element of surprise or ‘assault’ involved in broadcasting. Therefore, it is
highly unlikely that a very young child will be randomly ‘surfing’ the Web and come
across ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive’ material” (Id).17 This emphasized individual
agency and personal accountability. Instead of relying on state intervention to determine
the acceptability of content, the court suggested that the user had the autonomy to choose
whether to take the “affirmative steps” necessary to access adult content (CDA13 p. 26)
or not. Even children required a degree of “sophistication and some ability to read to
retrieve material and thereby to use the Internet unattended” (Id). Internet content did not
“invade” the home or “appear on one’s computer screen unbidden” and the user would
“seldom encounter content ‘by accident’” (Id). As the court pointed out, even the
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This line of reasoning also undercut the government’s reliance on the precedent set in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Where the Pacifica court had found that broadcasting should merit more
stringent regulation because of the “uniquely pervasive presence that medium of expression occupies in the
lives of our people,” the court here deliberately portrayed the Internet as a medium accessed by choice.
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government’s witness had admitted the “odds are slim” that any user would encounter
such material without actively seeking it out (Id).
The court’s lack of faith in the government’s arguments extended to the use of
CGI scripts and tagging. The court concurred with the opposition that customers of
America Online, CompuServe and other large providers would not have access to this
technology and thus could not employ it as an affirmative defense (CDA13 p. 28).
Without CGI scripts, these millions of users would have no confidence that potentially
indecent content had been completely screened from minors. Therefore, the Act would
dissuade providers of even mildly offensive content from speaking in the first place.
Tagging would be equally prohibitive and the government had failed to establish that
such technology would be either feasible or effective in keeping children away from
“indecent” content (CDA13 p. 30). In fact, such a provision would “require all content
providers that post arguably ‘indecent’ material to review all of their online content, a
task that would be extremely burdensome for organizations that provide large amounts of
material online which cannot afford to pay a large staff to review all of that material”
(CDA13 p. 30). Not only would the prospect of such a massive effort dissuade a number
of content providers from speaking but, if put into effect, tagging could force kids away
from perfectly acceptable speech. Specifically, in “lieu of reviewing each file
individually, a content provider could tag its entire site but this would prevent minors
from accessing much material that is not ‘indecent’ under the CDA” (Id).
Next, the court tackled the primary technological mechanism of enforcement
outlined in the CDA’s affirmative defenses, namely age verification systems. After
confirming the opposition’s assessment that any “credit card requirement would
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completely bar adults who do not have a credit card…from accessing any blocked
material” (CDA13 p. 29), the judges then provided an analysis of the effectiveness such
technology would have in accomplishing the state’s compelling interest in protecting
children. Like the opposition, the court found that the age verification systems mandated
by the law would not function as the government had suggested and, thus, there was no
way for individual content providers to ensure that they qualified for this good faith
defense under the Act. In fact, the court found that “no current technology could give a
speaker assurance that only adults were” accessing certain content (CDA13 pp. 26-27).
Furthermore, the court noted that, even if such systems were put in place, the government
had “presented no testimony as to how such systems could ensure that the user of the
password or credit card is in fact over 18” (CDA13 p. 30).
Furthermore, because many of the age verification systems advocated by the
government relied on credit card numbers as a proxy for age, the court addressed the
practicality of such systems. They found without exception that “verification of a credit
card number over the Internet is not now technically possible” (CDA13 p. 28). In fact,
large credit card companies such as Visa and MasterCard did not consider “the Internet to
be sufficiently secure under the current technology to process transactions in that
manner” (Id). The court acknowledged that commercial transactions were taking place
online at the time but only because “the seller must then process the transaction with Visa
or Mastercard off-line using phone lines in the traditional way” (Id). Although both
companies were conducting feasibility testing for a technology that would eventually
become routine, at the time of the decision, “credit card verification is effectively
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unavailable to a substantial number of Internet content providers as a potential defense to
the CDA” (CDA13 p. 29).
Even assuming that such credit check systems would be widely available in the
very near future, the court agreed that they “will remain economically and practically
unavailable for many of the non-commercial plaintiffs in these actions” (CDA13 p. 28).
Credit card companies and age verification firms did not provide their services for free
and the government’s own expert witness on this issue had testified it was likely that
existing “verification agencies would decline to process a card unless it accompanied a
commercial transaction” (Id). Although commercial websites could potentially absorb
the cost of verification, the court found that “Using credit card possession as a surrogate
for age, and requiring the use of a credit card to enter a site, would impose a significant
economic cost on non-commercial entities” (Id). This would force the educational,
activist and informational groups who comprised the plaintiffs to “incur a monthly cost
far beyond [their] modest resources” and such organizations would “regard charging
listeners to access their speech as contrary to their goals of making their materials
available to a wide audience free of charge” (Id pp. 28-29). Therefore, the court argued
that the CDA would have the unintended effect of making it financially impossible for
some who wished to speak to do so. This was in direct contradiction to the court’s
portrayal of the nature and purpose of the Internet.
Imposing an artificial barrier to access would also negate the advantages inherent
in the medium in the court’s view. What good was the Internet if a series of gatekeepers
made the act of information seeking a lengthy and hostile inconvenience? By mandating
such a technological verification system, the Act would “significantly delay the retrieval
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of information on the Internet” (CDA13 p. 29) and frustrate access to protected content in
the process. The court relied on testimony from both sides on this point. The
government’s witness admitted that even “a minute is absolutely unreasonable” and users
“will not put up with a minute” waiting for credit card verification (Id). Plaintiffs’ expert
agreed that individuals would not tolerate such interruptions and that “excessive delay
disrupts the ‘flow’ on the Internet and stifles both ‘hedonistic’ and ‘goal-directed’
browsing” (Id). From the outset, the court had noted the speed of the Internet as one of
its unique attributes commenting that online “communications can occur almost
instantaneously” (CDA13 p. 7). The court did not wish to see this distinct advantage of
the medium sacrificed and did not agree that the technologies mandated by the Act were
the only means available for accomplishing the state’s compelling interest.
The court was also critical of the government for its apparent lack of analysis of
age verification technology. This relates directly to the oppositional calls for more
substantive study. Perhaps because the court had gone to such lengths to establish its
Findings of Fact about the nature of the medium, all three judges were displeased at the
government’s failure to undertake a similar effort. The court chided the government for
offering “very limited evidence regarding the operation of existing age verification
systems” and, when lawmakers did offer such evidence, it “was not based on personal
knowledge [of the witness]” (CDA13 p. 29). They scolded this government witness for
admitting “that his knowledge of these services was derived primarily from reading the
advertisements on their Web pages” and because he “had not interviewed any employees
of these entities, had not personally used these systems, had no idea how many people are
registered with them, and could not testify to the reliability of their attempt at age

139

verification” (CDA13 p. 29). Such a glaring lack of critical review was, in the court’s
opinion, a blemish on the government’s entire argument.
Finally, the court addressed the opposition’s arguments regarding the effect the
Act and its technological mechanisms of enforcement would have on constitutionally
protected speech. The judges overwhelming adopted the position that the CDA would
harm the ability of both the speaker and the listener to communicate effectively in this
new medium (CDA13 p. 39). These regulatory systems would function not only as
disincentives to speech but also as active criminal deterrents. As the court made clear,
“this is not a case in which we are dealing with a mere incidental inhibition on
speech…but with a regulation that directly penalizes speech” (CDA13 p. 35). In a direct
reference to the opposition’s diagnostic frame that the CDA and its technological
mandate would wreak havoc on the ability to speak without fear of reprisal, the court
noted that “Subjecting speakers to criminal penalties for speech that is constitutionally
protected in itself raises the spectre of irreparable harm” (Id). Furthermore, because the
technological systems necessary to qualify for the Act’s affirmative defenses were
“effectively unavailable for non-commercial, not-for-profit entities” those “speakers who
display arguably indecent content on the Internet must choose between silence and the
risk of prosecution” (CDA13 p. 32). These technological requirements, “if not enjoined,
will have a chilling effect on [plaintiffs’] free expression” (CDA13 p. 35). The court also
directly rejected the CDA’s diagnostic frame stating that “the Government’s asserted
‘failure’ of the Internet rests on the implicit premise that too much speech occurs in that
medium, and that speech there is too available to the participants. This is exactly the
benefit of Internet communication, however. The Government, therefore, implicitly asks
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this court to limit both the amount of speech on the Internet and the availability of that
speech. This argument is profoundly repugnant to First Amendment principles” (CDA13
p. 68).
In a ringing endorsement of the opposition’s case, the District Court found that
“the Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide conversation. The
Government may not, through the CDA, interrupt that conversation. As the most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest
protection from governmental intrusion” (CDA13 p. 70). During the inevitable appeal,
the Supreme Court would go on to validate this decision and emphasized several
important points made by both the District Court and the opposition. The Supreme Court
would provide constitutional validation for these arguments and, by inference, for the
theoretical framework described throughout this dissertation.
First, the Supreme Court upheld the idea that user empowerment should not be
sacrificed through passage of the CDA. The Court here emphasized the right of parents
to make choices for themselves and for their children without the heavy hand of
government regulation. The provisions of the Act and its technological requirements
were, in the Court’s opinion, an illegitimate means for removing deeply personal
decisions from individual families and delegating that power to the state. Specifically,
the CDA did “not allow parents to consent to their children’s use of restricted materials”
even if the parent believed their child could and should have access (CDA18 p. 2). While
the Court acknowledged the “State’s independent interest in the well-being of its youth,”
that interest could not be used to usurp “the parents’ claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children” (Id pp. 13-14). This parental authority,
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and the individual autonomy it represented, was not only necessary but “basic in the
structure of our society” (Id). In the Court’s view, no government interest was so
compelling that it could supplant the ideal of parental empowerment.
The Court would also remain unconvinced of the government’s argument that its
interest in protecting the nascent “educational and informational” (CDA01 p. 100)
resource the Internet might become was so compelling that it trumped any other
considerations (CDA18 p. 4). In fact, the evidence did not support the government’s fear
that the plague of indecent material on the Internet would drive away prospective users.
This struck directly at the legislative diagnostic frame arguing that unregulated access
would harm the Internet’s potential. The Court found it wholly “unpersuasive” that “the
unregulated availability of ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ material is driving people
away from the Internet” (Id). On the contrary, the Court believed that the “dramatic
expansion of this new forum contradict[ed] the factual basis underlying this contention”
(Id) and the “record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues
to be phenomenal” (CDA18 p. 26).18
Next, the Supreme Court expanded on the idea that “cyberzoning” was an
incorrect metaphorical extension of legal and regulatory precedent. The Court made
important distinctions between the physicality of traditional zoning laws and the global
nature of this new medium. Although laws could target the effects of zoning at distinct
pornographic bookstores or theaters and would not inhibit the exercise of free speech
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“By mid-1995, there were more than 50 to 70,000 computer bulletin board (“BBS”) systems operating in
the United States…This growth was accompanied by the emergence of online services such as America
Online, Prodigy, CompuServe, Delphi, GEnie and Apple Computer’s e-World. These services, now [host]
approximately 7 million subscribers” (CDA26 p. 23).
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outside of those zones, the effect of the CDA would be anything but local. On the
contrary, because “the CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace”
(CDA18 p. 15) it would preclude a great deal of adult speech in the name of protecting
minors. In the Court’s opinion, the CDA was more “akin to a law that makes it a crime
for a bookstore owner to sell pornographic magazines to anyone once a minor enters the
store” (CDA18 p. 31). The Court had made a clear distinction between the government’s
metaphors of physicality and the intangible nature of the Internet. While such zoning
laws “might be constitutional in the physical world as a reasonable alternative to
excluding minors completely from the store”, these laws were entirely inappropriate
online (Id).
For the Court, the Act’s affirmative defenses and technical provisions lacked “the
precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of
speech” (CDA18 p. 19). First, the criminal sanctions imposed by the CDA would “cause
speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas,
and images” (CDA18 p. 18). More insidiously, the CDA had the potential to become a
means for endorsing certain kinds of speech over others. Whether it be through the use
of content tagging, ratings systems, or the blocking of content at the ISP level with little
or no oversight, the Act was a hegemonic means for privileging speech that was “decent”
above that which the state defined as “indecent” whether that speech merited
constitutional protection or not. Due to the “risk of discriminatory enforcement” (Id) and
“Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some
speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection” (Id p. 19). The
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law would create a “heckler’s veto” and “confer broad powers of censorship” not only on
the state but also “upon any opponent of indecent speech” (CDA18 p. 3).
The Court also rebuked the government for its lack of critical analysis. The
mechanisms required by the Act were so broad and so intrusive that they could not
qualify for the standards of strict scrutiny that any law regulating speech must meet.19 In
the Court’s view, if Congress had conducted a proper review of the Act’s technical
provisions, it would never have passed such a policy. This was particularly true “in light
of the absence of any detailed congressional findings, or even hearings addressing the
CDA’s special problems” (CDA18 p. 3). Furthermore, not only were content decisions
delegated to ISPs and the blocking technologies they employed, but at no point did the
CDA’s broad prohibitions on speech engage “an agency familiar with the medium’s
unique characteristics” (Id p. 2) or any institution that could provide oversight and
protection for constitutional speech. This was an unacceptable abuse of state power and
an inappropriate technological means for regulating the Internet. As the opposition, the
District Court and now the Supreme Court had made clear, “As a matter of constitutional
tradition…we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more
likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The Interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship” (CDA18 p. 26). The Court had struck down the CDA.
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Specifically, any such law must pass the “Least Restrictive Means Test.” This Test “is a standard
imposed by the courts when considering the validity of legislation that touches upon constitutional
interests. If the government enacts a law that restricts a fundamental personal liberty, it must employ the
least restrictive measures possible to achieve its goal. This test applies even when the government has a
legitimate purpose in adopting the particular law. The Least Restrictive Means Test has been applied
primarily to the regulation of speech” (Farlex, 2014).
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Table 5 – Communications Decency Act Frame Analysis Summary
Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)





Prognostic
(Solution)





Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)





Prognostic
(Solution)





Legislative Themes
Motivated by a desire to protect children from sexually explicit content online.
It is a compelling interest of the state to protect children. It is also within the
state’s authority to regulate the Internet similar to broadcast radio and
television and “zone” pornography on the Web.
Due to the core cultural values and ideology embedded in the state’s desire to
protect children, this master frame does not appear to be particularly amenable
to a sustained and critical debate.
Unregulated access to the Internet harms children.
The “invasive” nature of the Internet not only makes the danger to children
more immediate, but it also speaks to the ability of the state to regulate the
Internet similar to other broadcast media.
The Internet is a lawless frontier that requires intervention through policy and
technology in order to make it safe for minors. Speech rights and autonomy are
secondary to the protection of children.
Access controls and regulatory technologies such as age verification systems
protect children.
It is the duty of the state to provide a solution to this harm in the form of
technological mechanisms of enforcement including age verification systems.
The Internet is uniquely responsive to technological regulation. Those
mechanisms allow the state to regulate content without bias and with
viewpoint neutrality.

Oppositional Themes
Motivated by the need to protect individual autonomy and adult access to
protected speech.
Although children require protection from some online content, the state is
equally compelled to ensure the right of adult access.
The use of regulatory systems should not constrain autonomy, freedom, and
constitutional guarantees systems and Congress must consider that potential
prior to implementation.
Technological barriers to access harm adult rights and autonomy.
The opposition rhetorically defined the Internet as a vast democratic forum that
had the potential to revolutionize and democratize the ability of individuals to
communicate with one another.
The Internet does not conform to traditional metaphors of zoning or broadcast
media and legislators should not unjustly restrict it through poorly understood
regulatory systems.
Congress would apply the technological mechanisms required by the policy
too broadly and would damage constitutional freedom and individual
autonomy.
The solution is to re-draft the legislation, severely limiting the use of these
regulatory systems in the process, or have the CDA struck down as
unconstitutional by the courts.
If legislators must impose regulatory systems, they should implement them
voluntarily and should empower the user to make their own decisions about
content.
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Chapter 5 – The Child Online Protection Act
Introduction
Chapter 5 will provide an analysis of the frames underlying the CDA’s successor,
the Child Online Protection Act. Passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Reno v. ACLU striking down the CDA, this policy would attempt to advance
many of the same master, diagnostic and prognostic frames described previously.
Specifically, this chapter will address the government’s continuing interest in protecting
children from material deemed harmful to them and their reliance on a technological
solution for ameliorating any harm caused by unregulated access to online content.
Similarly, faced with the specific requirements of this new policy, activist
organizations and online content providers would argue that no significant changes had
been made to differentiate it from the CDA. These groups would advance a number of
the same frames and again suggested that the government had failed to account for access
to protected speech in this new online forum as well as the autonomous ability of the
individual to both speak and listen. Lacking any significant modifications, the opposition
continued to argue that Congress should carefully analyze technological access controls
prior to implementation or that the courts must strike COPA down.
Despite the opposition’s insistence that this new policy did not represent any
significant difference, Congress did demonstrate a willingness to address some of the
concerns that had plagued the CDA. Supporters of this new policy had carefully studied
the CDA’s progress through the courts and made several frame shifts in the face of the
opposition’s arguments and the Supreme Court’s constitutional criticisms. These
concessions would narrow enforcement and reassess the use of regulatory technologies.

148

Part I – Legislative Master Frames
The Communications Decency Act failed but the master frame of protecting
children from indecent online content carried on. Even before the Supreme Court had
handed down its decision, there were indications that there would be further legislative
attempts to police the Internet. Although the constitutionality of the CDA was in serious
doubt at the time, “Proponents of Internet content regulation have already indicated their
desire to take a ‘second bite of the apple’ if the Communications Decency Act is struck
down” (CDA07 p. 9). This time Representative Michael Oxley (R-OH) led the charge
and proposed H.R. 3783, commonly referred to as the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA). Oxley and other legislative supporters of COPA had paid close attention to the
debate surrounding the CDA and had “carefully drafted” COPA “to respond to the
Supreme Court’s decision” (COPA21 p. 5). As opposed to the CDA, this bill had the
stated goal of striking “the appropriate balance between preserving the First Amendment
rights of adults and protecting children from harmful material on the World Wide Web”
(Id).
COPA differed from the CDA in a number of important ways. First, it purposely
narrowed the scope of regulation. Where the CDA was overly broad and harmful to a
multitude of private and non-profit speakers, COPA specifically targeted commercial
content providers. The hope was that COPA would be “narrower than the CDA” because
it focused only on “entities engaged in the business of transferring or selling over the
World Wide Web information deemed ‘harmful to minors’” and required them to place
that content “behind a barrier surmountable only by those over 17” (COPA11b p. 11).
By avoiding individual speakers and non-commercial outlets, Oxley hoped that COPA
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would circumvent many of the constitutional concerns raised by the CDA’s broad
mandate. The lesson that Oxley and other supporters of COPA had taken from the
Supreme Court’s decision was that private and non-profit speech was off limits. By
contracting the effect of the law, Oxley believed that COPA’s focus on commercial
pornographers would guarantee its constitutionality. From the Congressional point of
view, COPA’s provisions would “not inhibit the ability of adults to access such speech or
the ability of commercial purveyors of materials that are harmful to minors to make such
speech available to adults” (COPA14 p. 5).
Furthermore, the bill dropped the much more legally ambiguous “indecency”
standard used within the CDA and dealt only with that content more specifically defined
as “harmful to minors.” The CDA’s “indecency” standard had been problematic because
it was both vague and covered a wide range of speech including “any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs” (CDA01 pp. 95-96). By contrast,
COPA’s use of the “harmful to minors” standard was both more specific and better
understood by courts and content providers. The government argued that this standard
would prove to be constitutional in an online context because it “does not cover material
unless it is designed to appeal to the prurient interest of minors; it specifies the particular
sexual acts and parts of the anatomy the depiction of which can be found to be patently
offensive; it makes clear that the prurient interest and patently offensive determinations
should be made ‘with respect to minors’” (COPA17 p. 52). For these reasons, Oxley and
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his supporters believed that the “harmful-to-minors standard [did] not impose an undue
burden on protected speech” (COPA17 p. 34).
This was a clear and direct frame shift – a reduction in the scope of enforcement
predicated on the opposition’s arguments against the CDA and the subsequent legal
challenge. In a move motivated entirely by oppositional First Amendment concerns,
Oxley had tailored COPA to ameliorate some of those anxieties. It was precisely because
the CDA had been struck down that Congress responded with COPA and found that
“H.R. 3783 is currently the most effective, yet least restrictive approach that should be
taken given the current state of the technology” (COPA24 pp. 2-3). By excluding private
and non-profit content providers and by eliminating vague references to “indecent”
content, “Congress responded directly to the Court’s concern about the unprecedented
breadth and undefined parameters of the CDA” (COPA17 p. 52). Other frame shifts were
also manifest in COPA and would relate much more specifically to the opposition’s calls
for a critical review of the policy’s technological mechanisms of enforcement.
Despite this, many of COPA’s specific provisions would remain remarkably
similar to those found in the CDA. For example, while the scope and target of content
regulation had changed, the motivations for COPA were indistinguishable from those
behind the CDA. The prevalence of adult material and the ease with which it kids could
access it was harmful and the state had an obligation to minimize the damage this caused
to children. Supporters of COPA had no compunctions about invoking this same master
frame and, on the contrary, believed that this issue continued to demand legislative
action. They recognized the ideological justifications they shared with proponents of the
CDA and acknowledged that “The protection of America’s children online has been a
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powerful motivating issue for policymakers since the Internet became widely available”
(COPA04 p. 11). Like those that came before them, Congressional supporters of COPA
recognized that the “Internet promises to revolutionize access to information, create new
forms of social interaction, promote economic opportunity, and reinvigorate civic
discourse” while insisting that “this same technology risks exposing children to material,
particularly material of sexually-explicit nature, that many believe is inappropriate or
harmful to their development” (Id). COPA’s advocates believed that Congress must
“take steps to stop our children from being hurt” and failure to act would mean that “our
children will be right to blame us for what we have allowed” (COPA04 p. 70). In
language nearly identical to that used to justify the CDA, Congress found that “the
protection of the physical and psychological well-being of minors by shielding them from
materials that are harmful to them is a compelling governmental interest” (COPA17 pp.
13-14). As will be discussed shortly, the technological means for accomplishing that
compelling interest would also be similar to those mandated by the CDA.
Embedded within this master frame, COPA’s supporters employed some of the
same metaphorical rationales they had used for the CDA. Although the Supreme Court
had deconstructed some of these analogies, this did not prevent Oxley and others from
trying again. Specifically, these frames continued to emphasize the invasive nature of the
medium and appealed to physical analogs for legal and constitutional support.
Lawmakers insisted that protections “from commercial pornography in the real world of
homes, schools, libraries, and neighborhoods…convenience stores and other areas that
children frequent” should extend to “an analogous level of protection online” (COPA4 p.
53). Like laws regulating real world pornographers, the intent of Congress here was to

152

require online pornographers to do the same by placing their wares away from minors.
This was not constitutionally problematic because it was simply an extension of “existing
requirements…that such material be held behind the counter or sold in a paper wrapper in
a physical store” (COPA14 pp. 22-23). There were no implications for adult speech
within the structure of this frame. COPA would be no more than a natural extension of
state laws requiring those who sold adult magazines and videos “to sell them on display
racks that are out of reach or sight of minors, while still available for purchase by adults”
(COPA24 pp. 20-21). Congress believed this was solid regulatory terrain and just “Such
an adult sales method is what this Act intends to and would extend to the commercial
Web, as it fairly should” (Id).
In the absence of such safeguards, harmful material would assault kids’ computers
and even “Innocent search requests [would] turn up lurid descriptions of pornographic
sites that can be accessed via a mouse-click” (Id). Perhaps in reference to Senator Exon’s
assertion that pornography was “only a few click-click-clicks away from any child”
(CDA14 p. 13), COPA’s supporters reemphasized that “In only a few mouse clicks,
children can be exposed to material that can never be erased from their minds” (COPA04
p. 77). The pervasive presence of harmful material and the ease with which children
could reach it demanded government intervention. Supporters of COPA consistently
referred to the invasive nature of this medium as justification for federal regulation. This
new technology created a unique circumstance and “Never in the history of
telecommunications has an entire generation of children been invaded by sexuallyexplicit material with so few restrictions” (Id). Therefore, from the perspective of this
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master frame, it was “incumbent on parents, industry and government to work together to
provide children the protected space of innocence they deserve” (Id).
Despite its apparent novelty, COPA’s supporters did not entirely abandon the idea
that the Internet’s pervasive presence in America’s homes made it comparable to
broadcast radio and television. Keeping in mind the Supreme Court’s ruling that FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation did not justify heavy-handed Internet content regulation (see page
134), Oxley and others did not overtly rely on comparisons to broadcasting. In fact, they
admitted that “While clearly the Internet is not yet as ‘invasive’ as broadcasting, its
popularity and growth because of electronic commerce and expansive Federal subsidy
programs make it widely accessible for minors” (COPA21 pp. 9-10). Allusions to
broadcasting continued to appear throughout the rhetoric supporting COPA. The
Internet, like television, was intrusive, unavoidable, and easy for kids to use. Minors
could find harmful material online “as easily as they can change television channels”
(COPA17 p. 33) and kids, “who can read and type are capable of conducting Web
searches as easily as operating a television remote” (Id p. 10). The veiled assertion
seemed to be that because “television rules limit programming containing indecent adult
material to late evening hours” the Internet should be subject to “an analogous”
regulatory scheme (COPA04 p. 53). Comparisons to broadcast content regulations had
moved to the background but they persisted throughout the debate over COPA.
Congressional support for COPA also relied on the same regulatory systems that
had underpinned the CDA. Specifically, COPA again mandated the use of age
verification systems as the primary “technological tools” (COPA01 p. 6) which would
accomplish the state’s compelling interest in protecting children (COPA03 p. 3).
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Specifically, the Act’s affirmative defenses provided immunity for those commercial
content providers who restricted access “by requiring use of a credit card, debit account,
adult access code, or adult personal identification number…by accepting a digital
certificate that verifies age; or…by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under
available technology” (COPA02 p. 2). Oxley and others believed that there was nothing
inherently wrong with enforcement through age verification technologies only that
Congress had applied these systems overzealously through the CDA. Besides, by more
narrowly tailoring the breadth of COPA and limiting enforcement only to commercial
content providers, the policy was simply formalizing an arrangement that was already
“standard practice” (COPA21 pp. 14-15). It was accepted wisdom that the proprietors of
most adult websites “already put most of their material behind age verification screens”
(COPA17 p. 47). COPA would simply serve to extend that technological arrangement to
any bad actors who allowed access without proof of age.
While the vast array of sexually explicit content on adult websites was of primary
concern to legislators, they were also troubled by the tantalizing images that lured
customers (and children) to these sites in the first place. Due to the enticing pictures of
scantily clad models placed on or before age verification screens, Congress was
concerned that these photographs and animated graphics would be just as damaging to
children, if not more so, because of their readily available nature (COPA14 pp. 1-2). The
master frame of protecting children was, in this instance, directed at these “teaser”
images that offered such unseemly temptation. Without direct government intervention,
“unsupervised minors [would], with the click of a mouse, visit one pornographic site after
another, and view and then print one set of pornographic teasers after another” (COPA17
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p. 33). For Oxley and his supporters, these “Teaser pages should be located only beyond
the front, public page” (COPA04 pp. 45-46) and it was crucial that COPA “require those
commercial pornographers to put their teasers behind age verification screens as well”
(COPA17 p. 26). This would help fulfill COPA’s master frame and would “protect the
great majority of minor children in America from the instant and unrestricted access to
the free pornographic ‘teaser’ pictures now openly available at commercial porn sites on
the World Wide Web” (COPA24 pp. 2-3). Within the context of COPA’s mandate, this
focus on teasers and the enticement they represented was completely appropriate. From
the legislative point of view, this requirement was simply a sterner means for regulating
commercial pornography and keeping all such images “behind the counter” (COPA14 pp.
22-23) of age verification screens.
From the standpoint of the opposition’s previous criticisms, the most important
distinction between the CDA and COPA was its mandated call for critical review. Built
into the language of the policy was a requirement establishing a Commission on Online
Child Protection “to study technological and other methods to help reduce access by
minors to material that is harmful to minors on the Internet” (COPA21 p. 6). This
Commission would represent a broad range of stakeholders and interests although the
collective expertise of those appointed to the Commission overwhelmingly related to the
technology industry and technological barriers to access. By specific statutory provision,
individuals comprising the Commission were to include: members “engaged in the
business of providing Internet filtering or blocking services or software;” members
“engaged in the business of providing Internet access services;” members “engaged in the
business of providing labeling or ratings services;” members “engaged in the business of
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providing Internet portal or search services;” members “engaged in the business of
providing domain name registration services;” members “who are academic experts in
the field of technology;” and members “engaged in the business of making content
available over the Internet” (COPA01 pp. 5-6). It is interesting to note that one of the
Commission’s eventual members would be a representative of the Center for Democracy
and Technology (CDT), one of the key groups responsible for targeting the CDA and one
of the named plaintiffs in the court action that led to its demise. It could be inferred that
legislative supporters of Internet content regulation had learned a valuable lesson from
both the opposition’s arguments against the CDA and from the Court’s ruling. In
requiring this Commission, Oxley and others appear to have heard some of the criticism
that doomed COPA’s predecessor and, accordingly, conducted this critical review in
order to include oppositional perspectives. This particular frame shift appears to have
been a self-conscious move on the part of COPA’s supporters to assuage any ethical,
constitutional, or technological concerns from the outset. This awareness was explicit in
debates surrounding COPA and the law’s supporters were mindful that the Supreme
Court had been critical of the CDA in part because “Congress did not hold legislative
hearings on the CDA, nor did Congress reach any detailed findings addressing the
problem of distributing indecent materials to minors over the Internet” (COPA21 p. 16).
Through this Commission and subsequent hearings, COPA’s supporters meant to avoid
any such oversight if this policy came under constitutional scrutiny. Despite this, the
Commission’s membership and its overpowering focus on technological mechanisms of
enforcement were indicative of Congress’ technological commitments.
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Part II – Oppositional Master Frames
Despite the important policy shifts that had occurred during the interim between
the CDA and COPA, the opposition was unconvinced that this new law would adequately
address their core concerns. Due to this, the oppositional master frames related to COPA
remain nearly identical to those employed during the debate over the CDA. For the
opposition, COPA was strongly reminiscent of the CDA and any differences between the
two were merely window dressing. For all intents and purposes, “COPA traces the same
path as the CDA and suffers from many of the same crippling constitutional flaws”
(COPA23 pp. 4-5). Like the CDA, COPA’s flaws disallowed or actively criminalized a
“broad category of speech that is lawful as to adults” (Id) despite its more narrow focus
on commercial websites. Opponents also remained skeptical that the age verification
systems required by COPA would prove to be less restrictive in this new context than
they had been in the old. In fact, the opposition was relatively certain that these
regulatory systems would impose a direct burden on speech and would “discourage
readers of controversial or potentially controversial material” (Id). Oppositional groups
would also maintain their argument that centralized content regulation disempowered
parents and reduced individual autonomy. Like the CDA, COPA’s mandate implied that
parents were unable or unprepared to take the steps necessary to protect their children.
From this point of view, COPA’s affirmative defenses and age verification requirements
seemed to presume “that parents lack the ability, not the will, to monitor what their
children see” (COPA25 pp. 15-16). The opposition would challenge this presumption
and would offer a variety of technological and non-technological alternatives to what
they saw as an overbroad and unconstitutional policy.
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One of the key differences here was that, for the first time, the opposition focused
one of its key master frames on non-technological methods for both protecting minors
and preserving access to constitutional speech. This master frame intertwined with the
frames of user empowerment and parental oversight while minimizing the need for a
centralized, governmental solution. While “low-tech” options including parental
supervision had been a tangential recommendation offered during the fight over the CDA
(CDA17 p. 31), here they became a core foundation of the opposition’s argument. One
of the primary means for accomplishing this, and for maintaining parental autonomy in
the process, was a wide call for education. The opposition saw this alternative as vastly
preferable to the more restrictive measures required by COPA. Education would also
have the direct benefit of raising awareness in the home and across communities while
keeping the government out of the business of criminalizing content. As one ACLU
spokesman noted, “Lawmakers should stop passing criminal laws for the Internet and
focus instead on educating users to make their own choices about what content to view or
avoid” (COPA09a p. 5). The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) echoed this
call and decried the “expensive cycle of legislation and litigation [that] does little to serve
children and families online” (COPA10b pp. 18-19). Instead, the CDT believed that
“giving users control over what they see and do online – through education…will more
effectively protect kids in ways consistent with their own family values, and with the
Constitution” (Id). Rather than mandating the imposition of inappropriate technical
solutions, the opposition felt that “educating…children to make their own informed
choices” (COPA18 pp. 21-22) better served parents and democratic society.
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According to the opposition, options like education and parental supervision
would have vastly superior outcomes because “non-technological parental controls are
less restrictive than COPA and target inappropriate content more effectively” (COPA18
p. 24). Where COPA lacked “flexibility and specificity” (Id), “Non-technological user
empowerment techniques…are a more effective and less restrictive alternative to COPA
as a way of protecting children from inappropriate online content” (Id p. 25). Clearly,
from the opposition’s point of view, low-tech or no-tech options, particularly education,
were preferable to COPA’s technological requirements that inhibited speech, reduced
autonomy and failed to protect children (COPA10a p. 10).
Of course, these non-technological methods were not the only alternatives offered
by the opposition. If anything, the opposition increased its calls for the use of blocking
and filtering software as Congress considered COPA. Nevertheless, just as they did
during the debate over the CDA, the opposition here cited these systems as voluntary
methods that could be tailored to reflect individual values and customized to account for
the varying maturity levels of children (COPA20 p. 72). Although the emphasis was on
technological filtering software, the opposition based its recommendation of such
systems on the presumption that they would afford parents the opportunity to exercise
some measure of autonomy. The opposition made it quite clear that “a voluntary
decision by concerned parents to use these products for their children constitutes a far
less restrictive alternative than COPA’s imposition of criminal penalties for protected
speech among adults” (COPA16 p. 46). In fact, the opposition seems to have made a
rhetorical choice to differentiate filtering software as “technological user empowerment
tools,” contrasting such systems with those required by COPA which would be both
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“more restrictive of protected speech” and “less effective at achieving the governmental
interest” of protecting children (COPA18 pp. 20-21).
It is interesting to note that in this instance the opposition underwent a frame shift
of its own. Although their advocacy of voluntary filtering software had carried over from
the debate on the CDA, opponents of COPA began to express certain doubts about such
commercial systems. While these “user empowerment tools” offered a degree of
autonomy to individuals and helped safeguard constitutionally protected speech by not
regulating that speech a priori, the subtext of the opposition’s argument differs
significantly from its previous incarnation. Specifically, although these “user-control
tools” offered significant advantages “without need for government regulation”
(COPA23 pp. 3-4), the opposition repeatedly pointed out that “filters may be considered
over- or under- inclusive by various individuals and communities” (COPA11b p. 17).
While the opposition unconditionally supported filtering software in their
arguments against the CDA, here they tempered that support with a growing awareness of
the technology’s shortcomings. Despite the numerous advantages the opposition saw in
filtering products, they increasingly acknowledged that “user-based blocking programs
are not perfect” (COPA16 p. 46). Oppositional groups pointed to the District and
Supreme Court’s rulings on the CDA as evidence of the efficacy of filtering software
(COPA11c p. 23) but their previous enthusiasm was gone. In its place, a more
technically critical and measured approach to such systems dominated the opposition’s
arguments.
Part of the solution offered by the opposition to alleviate this unease was to
mandate that Congress and industry undertake sustained and critical analysis of these
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systems. While industry should work to “improve filtering and blocking technologies”
(COPA04 p. 42), it was incumbent upon government to determine how those
technologies could impact autonomy and speech whether they be used at the individual,
community or federal level. As the opposition noted, to that point there had “been no
study, no discussion, and no comparison of the effectiveness of various approaches, their
likely impact on speech, and their appropriateness for the Internet” (COPA11c pp. 2627). This was especially troubling considering the courts’ stated views on filtering
technology from the CDA opinions. Both courts had noted that “these tools, unlike a
criminal statute, can protect children from domestic and foreign material” (COPA11c p.
23). Despite suggestions from the Supreme Court that these systems could offer at least a
partial solution to the problem of sexually explicit online content, Congress had not
conducted any study of this technology in the interim and had instead proposed another
sweeping statute targeting content providers and criminalizing speech at the source (Id).
This insistence on federal regulation concerned the opposition and they noted Congress’
lack of meaningful review of this promising technology. If the harm done by sexually
explicit websites so concerned Exon, Oxley and their supporters, why were they not
pursuing all alternatives? It was puzzling that Congress had “developed no record to
explain why it was rejecting further efforts that can be undertaken to educate parents and
other care-takers about the availability of blocking and filtering tools” (Id). Although the
opposition had noted that these systems would sometimes “fail to screen all inappropriate
material and…block valuable websites” (COPA13 p. 13), it was still necessary for
Congress to find out what, exactly, the benefits and shortcomings of such technologies
might be. Without such a critical review, the opposition argued, and without “a factual
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record to support this bill, the Court will find it, like the CDA, unconstitutional”
(COPA11c pp. 26-27). If Congress was truly interested in pursuing “the most effective,
yet least restrictive approach that should be taken given the current state of the
technology” (COPA24 pp. 2-3), then they must undertake a critical review of voluntary
filtering software. Without such an effort, the opposition argued, legislators had made it
clear that they were unwilling to pursue any options other than those that centralized
content decisions and criminalized a great deal of protected speech (COPA12a p. 13). It
remained to be seen if the statutory requirements establishing the COPA Commission
would prove to be satisfactory in this regard.
Part of the motivation for this shift in the opposition’s master frame regarding
the utility of commercial filtering software related directly to bills proposed in parallel to
COPA. The opposition’s growing wariness of filtering and blocking products had arisen
in response to the Safe Schools Internet Act, the Child Protection Act and the E-Rate
Policy and Child Protection Act (COPA11b pp. 13-14). Although tangential to COPA
and never enacted, these proposals represented a further frame shift in policy debates. As
opposed to Oxley and other supporters of centralized solutions like COPA, supporters of
these proposed Acts focused content enforcement at the local level, namely schools and
libraries. The technological mechanism for accomplishing the goals of these proposed
policies was primarily the mandatory installation of commercial filtering software within
these local institutions (COPA11b p. 13). The CDT, perhaps out of concern that such
requirements might migrate into COPA’s mandate, prepared a critique of these systems
that would color what had previously been relatively unanimous support for filtering
software on the part of the opposition. In a blistering appraisal of the compulsory
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implementation of filtering software, the CDT essentially set the stage for the debate that
would coalesce around the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA). Although CIPA
will be the focus of Chapter 6, it is important to trace the evolution of this argument
within the context of COPA. In language remarkably similar to that used in future
frames, the CDT argued that such obligatory use of filtering software would remove any
benefits it had as a voluntary mechanism, reduce parental autonomy and “usurp local
communities’ ability to set standards that reflect their values” (COPA11b p. 13).
The ability of communities to set these standards is not simply a rhetorical nod to
some hypothetical, preferred arrangement between federal regulators and localities.
Although certainly not a universal feature of governmental hierarchy in an international
context, municipal autonomy and the local determination of community standards are a
well-established feature of the U.S. political landscape. The Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution guarantees that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.” Implementation of Home Rule or the state’s grant of self-determination to
municipalities can formalize this relationship as long as state laws remain in force (see
Munro, 1930). Based on this precedent, states, municipalities and local library boards
(comprised of community representatives) are not beholden to the federal government
when making determinations as to, for example, the suitability of content in public
libraries. The Supreme Court has historically supported state and local authority and
community standards were the basis for the Court’s obscenity test in Miller v. California
(413 U.S. 15, 1973). Specifically, the Court found that the state should strictly observe
the Tenth Amendment and that the federal government must not interfere with local
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determinations as to the obscenity, indecency, or suitability of material within that
community. Instead, content is classified based on whether or not the “average person,
applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest” (Id). In the context of COPA and, eventually, CIPA,
Congress encroached on rights that local communities took for granted. The opposition
premised its arguments against centralized and/or technological regulation on that
understanding.
The opposition also extended its argument to employ a novel master frame.
Specifically, the opposition argued that mandatory use of filtering software would
minimize technological transparency. First, due to financial constraints, public schools
and libraries would be unable to design and implement their own filters that could meet
both local standards and statutory requirements (COPA11b p. 13). Furthermore, this lack
of options would require the purchase of commercial software, the producers of which
“do not disclose the standards under which they filter or the list of filtered sites” (Id).
This was particularly concerning for the opposition when some filters had demonstrated a
decidedly hegemonic view of “acceptable” content. The CDT pointed to a number of
studies “of commercial [sic] available filters [which] suggest that they curtail access to
information on topics ranging from gay and lesbian issues, women’s health, conservative
politics, and many others” (Id p. 14). As the opposition made clear, “[t]he prospect of
schools and libraries…delegating their traditional power to unchecked private entities
raises troubling First Amendment issues” (Id pp. 13-14). The master frame of
technological transparency would remain a peripheral issue during the debate
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surrounding COPA but it would presage the opposition’s evolving position on
commercial filtering software.
The final master frame employed by opponents of COPA deals with the need for
any policy or technological mechanism of enforcement to preserve access to
constitutionally protected speech. Just as the opposition argued during the debate over
the CDA, it was crucial for government to explicitly consider the impact laws like COPA
could have on both speakers and listeners. Wary of Oxley’s commitment to this
constitutional necessity the opposition remained unconvinced that COPA represented any
significant improvement over the CDA in this area. In addition to concerns directly
related to the age verification technologies required by COPA (concerns that will be
addressed in detail in Part IV), the opposition derided this new policy and Congress for
the continued failure to understand the nature of the Internet.
While Oxley and his supporters had learned a great deal from the controversy
over the CDA and had shifted the scope of enforcement, the opposition continued to
argue that COPA’s “constitutional flaws…were identical to the flaws that led the
Supreme Court to strike down the Communications Decency Act” (COPA09 p. 1).
Despite its narrower focus on commercial speakers, COPA “suppresses a wide range of
socially valuable speech that adults have a right to communicate” (Id p. 3). Rather than
recognizing the policy shifts represented by COPA as constitutionally significant, the
ACLU and others pointed to its overwhelmingly similarity to the CDA. From this point
of view, COPA was simply “Congress’ second attempt to censor free speech on the
Internet” (Id p. 4) and “the successor to the Communications Decency Act” (COPA10c p.
21). By targeting speech at the source and by employing the same technological
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mechanisms of enforcement, Congress had essentially, “created a nearly identical scheme
of government censorship that suffers from the same constitutional deficiencies that the
courts found in the CDA” (Id). Until supporters of centralized content management
realized that these kinds of efforts were entirely inappropriate from the standpoint of free
speech, opponents would maintain their position and continue their legal challenges.
While the opposition did not disagree that the Internet provided access to a great deal of
content that was inappropriate for minors, these groups argued that the CDA’s centralized
technological “approach to protect children online has been an utter failure” (COPA11 p.
2) and that COPA would reproduce that failure.
One of the primary causes of this constitutional failure and why Congress was
doomed to “repeat the mistakes of the CDA” was because, as the CDT put it, lawmakers
had failed “to take into account the special aspects of this potentially powerful medium”
(COPA11a p. 6). From the opposition’s perspective, the Internet functioned as a
“democratizing medium that expands the power of citizens to engage in speech in
unprecedented ways” (COPA04 p. 64). As the ACLU would argue, Congress had “once
again fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the Internet” (COPA09b p. 6) by failing
to recognize that COPA would greatly reduce access to a wide range of constitutionally
protected speech. Specifically, Congress drew false distinction between commercial and
non-commercial speech, walling off a number of educational, informational and artistic
websites simply because they were “engaged in the business of transferring or selling”
information online (COPA11b p. 11). This extended to protected speech including “the
poet Lawrence Ferlinghetti, writers of sexual advice columns, and websites for a
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bookstore, an art gallery, and the Philadelphia Gay News, to name a few” (COPA09b p.
6).
For the opposition, Congress had neither taken the nature of the medium into
account nor recognized the impact regulations like COPA could have on protected
speech. This grave misunderstanding related directly to legislators’ insistence that the
Internet could be regulated based on local standards. In particular, the opposition argued
that COPA’s “harmful to minors” standard would prove to be unconstitutional because it
confined content producers to community standards of what constituted “harmful”
material. This was a facet unique to COPA and differed from the CDA’s attempt to
“establish a uniform national standard of content regulation” (CDA13 p. 49). In contrast,
COPA left determinations of acceptability to local mores, forcing speakers to wall off any
speech that could conceivably be considered harmful and “abide by the most restrictive
community’s standards” (COPA09c p. 9) when doing so. By confining speakers to the
most conservative local standards, this provision of COPA failed to account for the
“geography-free nature of cyberspace” (Id). This would leave Website operators to make
their best guess as to “what contemporary community standards should or could mean in
a medium without geographic boundaries” (COPA15 p. 19). Precisely because COPA
relied on local notions of suitability when regulating content, it would preemptively chill
a great deal of speech from those who did not wish to run afoul of the law’s criminal
provisions. In relation to the opposition’s master frame of protecting access, such a
requirement “must lead inexorably to a holding of…unconstitutionality of the entire
COPA statute” (COPA09c p. 9). If a judgment of content could “only be made in the
context of local community standards” then the law’s foundation and technological

168

requirements raised a serious “constitutional question whether it is possible to reconcile
First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence with the technological fact that the
‘community’ of speakers and listeners on the Internet is inherently global” (COPA04 p.
85).
From the perspective of the ACLU, CDT and other oppositional groups, the
differences between the CDA and COPA were insignificant and constitutionally
irrelevant. The best that could be said of COPA was that it was “not quite as censorious”
as the CDA (COPA09a p. 4). A law regulating Internet content, like “a law banning
books does not become constitutional because it is re-written to remove only every other
book on the shelves” (Id). This was the crux of the opposition’s constitutional argument:
the narrow focus on commercial websites and the reliance on local “harmful to minors”
standards made COPA no less egregious than the CDA. Congress’ insistence on
managing Internet content through federal regulation and through technological
mechanisms of enforcement was unlikely to pass constitutional muster no matter where
or how narrowly it was targeted. For the opposition, any attempt at “[c]entralizing
content decisions in the federal government” would inevitably lead to a reduction in
access to speech otherwise available to adults (COPA11b p. 11). The opposition also
remained adamant that Congress must examine the constitutional implications of policies
like COPA and technologies such as age verification systems prior to implementation.
Although COPA mandated a commission to research some of these issues, that study
would not occur until after Congress had enacted the law. Until such critical analysis was
complete, “Congress should refrain from imposing new access restrictions” (COPA10 p.
7) that had the potential to cause constitutional harm.
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Part III – Legislative Diagnostic Frames
The legislative diagnostic frames employed by Congress to promote COPA are
again remarkably similar to those invoked during the debate over the CDA. The Internet,
and unregulated access to it, were continuing problems due to the pornography readily
available to children. The harm caused to children by such unregulated access was both
irrevocable and irreparable. In the absence of government intervention through policy
and through technology “There is no way to restore innocence lost and a diet of
pornographic fare will lead to disasters in fighting sexual harassment, STDs, and sexual
or domestic violence” (COPA04 p. 70). This time Oxley and other supporters of COPA
had additional evidence to back up their assertions that “A child with minimal knowledge
of a computer, the ability to operate a browser, and the skill to type a few simple words
may be able to access sexual images and content over the World Wide Web” (COPA14
pp. 1-2).
First, Congress relied on a series of Legislative Findings to support their primary
diagnostic frame and to emphasize the need for government regulation of the Internet.
Within these Findings, Congress recognized that there were many “opportunities for
minors to access materials through the World Wide Web in a manner that can frustrate
parental supervision and control” and that the “protection of the physical and
psychological well-being of minors by shielding them from materials that are harmful to
them is a compelling government interest” (COPA17 pp. 13-14). The first point may be
a direct response to the opposition’s argument that parents should be the first line of
defense and should have the ability to decide for themselves what content was or was not
appropriate for their children. While Congress agreed that “custody, care, and nurture of
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the child resides first with the parent” (COPA01 p. 1), parental involvement was
insufficient to stem the tide of “an increasing number of thousands of sites that openly
allow children…to see hard-core and soft-core porn pictures” (COPA24 p. 3). Oxley and
his supporters believed strongly that Congress must take measures to mitigate this harm
at the federal level and show that legislators were “united in protecting our children from
pornography over the World Wide Web” (COPA06 p. 1). Representative Oxley himself
made what may be the clearest articulation of this legislative diagnostic frame when he
asserted that “The ready availability of hardcore pornography to kids on the Web is a
problem we need to solve” (COPA07 p. 2). Direct federal intervention through COPA
was the means by which “Congress sought to address that serious problem” (COPA17 pp.
33). Only a “national solution” could adequately deal with “the problem of minors
accessing harmful material on the World Wide Web” (Id pp. 13-14).
Oxley and his supporters also depended on a Report prepared by Representative
Bliley of the Commerce Committee as evidence that unregulated access to the Internet
caused grave harm to children.20 This Report estimated that, as of 1998, “almost 70
percent of the traffic on the Web is adult-oriented material” (COPA21 p. 10). In the
absence of federal legislation, and despite parents’ best efforts, “minors can move from
Web page to Web page, viewing and downloading this material without restriction” (Id).
Without some sort of age verification technology to mediate this unrestricted access
“children exposed to pornography can become victims or victimizers, encouraged by the
strong sexual images contained in pornography found on the World Wide Web” (Id p. 11
Actual). This Report also strengthened the legislative diagnostic frame by providing
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Report to Accompany H.R. 3783, Submitted October 5, 1998 to the House of Representatives, 105th
Congress (COPA21).
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demographic data about both the number of computers connected to the Internet and the
number of children who had access to those computers. The problem was even more
urgent because these numbers had increased exponentially since the Supreme Court had
struck down the CDA. The implication seemed to be that the CDA, had it been enforced,
could have addressed minors’ access to pornography but, failing that, COPA surely must
be enacted now to mitigate any further harm. Unregulated access to the global network
was cause for concern and for legislative intervention because, “Since January 1996 (one
month before the CDA was enacted), the number of host computers has more than tripled
from approximately 9.4 million hosts to more than 29.6 million hosts” (COPA21 p. 9).
During that same period, and while the CDA could have been enforced, Congress
estimated that the number of children online had increased to about 16 million (Id).
Congress’ mandate was clear; it must act to mitigate any further harm.
In addition to its Legislative Findings and Report to the House of Representatives,
Congress also relied on two major hearings to identify the scope of the problem of
unregulated Internet access and to clarify the form that government intervention should
take.21 These hearings were a direct result of the Supreme Court’s decision to strike
down the CDA and lawmakers sought to create a clear record of Congressional intent and
the need for legislative action (Id). Congress held these hearings to stave off any
potential criticism that they had not bothered to establish “any detailed findings
addressing the problem of distributing indecent materials to minors over the Internet”
(COPA21 p. 16). Not surprisingly, for legislative supporters of COPA, both hearings

21

Cited as “Hearings on H. R. 3783, H.R. 774, H.R. 1180, H.R. 1964, H.R. 3177, and H.R. 3442 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); Internet Indecency: Hearing before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Sci. and
Transp., 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998)” (COPA17 p. 13).

172

seemed to buttress lawmakers’ diagnostic frame. From this point of view, testimony
from a number of witnesses “highlighted the problem of children getting easy access to
pornography and the need for Congressional action to stop the widespread distribution of
material harmful to minors” (Id). Nonetheless, the outcome of these hearings was not
universally agreed upon and, as the opposition pointed out, neither occurred before
Congress finalized COPA’s statutory language (COPA23 p. 15). Furthermore, opponents
of COPA protested loudly that Congress had not done nearly enough to address the
constitutionality of this new policy, its intended scope or its reliance on age verification
systems.22 Although Congress had taken steps toward critical analysis and public review
of policy regulating online content, for the opposition, it was by no means certain that
they had come to the correct conclusions.
It is interesting to note here that, despite its increased propensity for public
hearings, comment, research and review, Congress had still done little to address the
efficacy of commercial filtering software. While legislative supporters of COPA did not
view voluntary filtering mechanisms as part of the problem, they certainly did not view
these systems as part of the solution. The opposition complained loudly about the lack of
serious discussion about these products and noted that “The House Commerce
Committee’s lone panel of non-Congressional witnesses did not include a single
technology expert or provide any basis for a detailed examination of the variety of usercontrol technologies currently available” (COPA23 p. 15). The record established by
Congress to support COPA and its diagnostic frame made clear that Oxley and others
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“Congress did not create the detailed factual record constitutionally required to support its claim that
COPA is the most narrowly tailored means to achieve its intended ends. The Senate held no hearings on
COPA, and the House Commerce Committee conducted only a single hearing, mere weeks before the
passage of COPA, as part of an Omnibus appropriations bill” (COPA23 p. 15).
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took a jaundiced view of filters. In fact, the Report to the House of Representatives
stated explicitly that “While blocking and filtering techniques may be effective for many
parents, schools, and libraries, the Committee does not believe, however, that they are as
effective as the approach taken in H.R. 3783” (COPA21 p. 19). Tangentially, it is
important to point out that Congress’ position of filtering products would evolve
significantly prior to passage of the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA). In the
context of COPA, Bliley’s Report to the House explicitly expressed concern “that a
national mandate requiring the use of blocking or filtering could lead to private
censorship or inadvertent blocking” (COPA21 p. 19). The Report went on to extol the
virtues of age verification systems while, in contrast, minimizing filters as “not the
preferred solution” (Id). Bliley lamented the inability of private actors to create software
which would mitigate the harms outlined in Congress’ diagnostic frame and suggested
that reliance on such systems would create a patchwork solution at best. Commercial
products would never replace the centralized solutions mandated by federal policy and
“industry-led efforts” would never provide “a national or uniform solution to the problem
of children accessing harmful material” (Id p. 17). The Report blasted filtering software
because it employed a “discretionary means to screen information” which increased the
“chance that protected, harmless, or innocent speech would be accidentally or
inappropriately blocked” (Id). This criticism is astonishingly similar to the language that
the opposition would employ in its campaign against CIPA. As will be discussed at
length in Chapter 6, in the interim between COPA and CIPA the two sides would
essentially swap positions on the appropriate use and impact of this technological
mechanism.
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Legislative supporters of this new policy would also, of course, rely heavily on
the COPA Commission’s report to bolster their definition of the problem. Since
Congress did not convene the Commission prior to passage of COPA and the
Commission did not release its findings until two years later, it is fair to say that that
report did not significantly impact the entrenched diagnostic frame. Furthermore, like the
Congressional hearings on COPA, both sides would be able to make inferences from the
Commission’s final report that supported their point of view. For example, in the case of
the legislative diagnostic frame, supporters of COPA would point to the Commission’s
report as further evidence that unregulated access to the Internet “risks exposing children
to sexually explicit material that many believe is inappropriate or harmful” (COPA04 p.
7). In its effort to create a factual record that would demonstrate its careful review of the
problem to both the opposition and the courts, Congress was able to point to the various
reports, hearings, and Commission findings to reinforce the need for government
intervention through policy and through technology. This is, perhaps, one of the key
moments in the policy process where criticism and critical review of regulatory systems
may be successfully advanced. Following the CDA, Congress made great strides in its
commitment to review content regulation policy. While there remained a strong
commitment to the legislative master and diagnostic frames, there is also an increased
need for evidentiary data and objective testimony. Criticism of both the opposition and
the courts forced Congress to create such a record in the interest of completeness and
constitutionality. If such a shift can occur within this diagnostic frame, it is not
unreasonable to assume that this part of the process can shift even further to include a
truly critical review of regulatory systems.
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Part IV – Oppositional Diagnostic Frames
While the COPA Commission’s final report would provide ammunition to both
sides of the debate, based on the evidence it provided the opposition was able to make a
powerful argument that this policy, and the technological mechanisms it required, could
cause serious harm. The opposition primarily based its diagnostic frames on the
argument that centralized, government-mandated technological barriers to access would
do damage to both individual autonomy and constitutionally protected speech. What is
most striking about this is that, for the first time, the opposition was able to point directly
to a congressionally mandated analysis to support its claims.
This report was released on October 20, 2000 – nearly two years after COPA was
signed into law – and the Commission’s purpose was to study “various technological
tools and methods for protecting minors from material that is harmful to minors”
(COPA03 p. 3). Although explicitly mandated by COPA, the Commission received no
federal funding and consisted entirely of volunteers with a wide range of expertise
(COPA04 p. 2). Members of the Commission included individuals representing industry,
academics, activist groups, and government. 23 Although the Commission did examine
some “low-tech” solutions to the problem of minors’ access to sexually explicit material
such as parental education, the Commission’s report primarily dealt with technological
mechanisms of enforcement (COPA04 p. 5). These mechanisms included filtering and

23

The Commission was chaired by Donald Telage of Network Solutions, Inc. and its members included:
Stephen Balkam, Internet Content Rating Association; John Bastian, Security Software Systems; Jerry
Berman, Center for Democracy & Technology; Arthur H. DeRosier, Jr., Rocky Mountain College; J.
Robert Flores, National Law Center for Children and Families; Albert F. Ganier III, Education Networks of
America; Michael E. Horowitz, Department of Justice; Donna Rice Hughes, Author, Kids Online/Founder,
Protectkids.com; William M. Parker, Crosswalk.com; C. Lee Peeler, Federal Trade Commission; Gregory
L. Rohde, Department of Commerce/NTIA; C. James Schmidt, San Jose State University; William L.
Schrader, PSINet Inc.; Larry Shapiro, Walt Disney Internet Group; Srinija Srinivasan, Yahoo! Inc.; Karen
Talbert, Nortel Networks and; George Vradenburg III, America Online, Inc. (COPA04 p. 2)
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blocking software, labeling and ratings systems, age verification systems, domain level
“zoning,” and various other “technologies or methods” (Id).
Aligned with the opposition’s diagnostic frames, the Commission’s report was
also concerned with the impact that federally mandated technological systems could have
on privacy and “First Amendment Values” (COPA04 p. 7). For the first time, a
government body plotted these “adverse impacts” (Id) against the effectiveness and
accessibility of these systems. This created a mechanism by which the Commission
could reduce its findings to a visual representation of the merit of regulatory systems as a
function of the harms potentially caused by requiring their use. For the opposition, the
results of this analysis provided vindication of the diagnostic frames they had been
attempting to advance. The chart created by the Commission (COPA04 p. 8) is
reproduced in its complete form below:
Figure 2 – COPA Commission Scattergram
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The analysis of each technology examined by the Commission included a review
of a number of independent factors including efficacy, practicality, privacy, and impact
on protected speech (Id p. 15). These individual scores resulted in an aggregate total
ranging from 10 to -10 such as those plotted on the chart above. As this diagram makes
clear, the Commission found that the voluntary use of client-side filtering (as advocated
by the opposition) was both effective and accessible while minimizing any adverse
impacts to user privacy and First Amendment values as defined by the Commission.24
The verification of age through credit card information, while effective and accessible to
a wide number of content providers, was problematic from the standpoint of privacy and
free speech. The use of some form of online identification to verify age was neither
effective nor widely accessible and was deeply troubling from the standpoint of privacy
and constitutional rights. Although Congress was able to bolster its diagnostic frame that
unregulated access harmed minors through some of the Commission’s conclusions, the
opposition had a clear advantage in terms of both the master and diagnostic frames they
had employed as they related to autonomy and access. As the Commission would find,
technological access controls had the distinct potential to harm individual choice and to
reduce access to protected speech.
Although the Commission thoroughly examined a number of methods, those
discussed here will only include those advocated either directly through COPA or by the
opposition as a counterpoint to this policy. The first, client-side filtering, received
relatively high marks for effectiveness and accessibility (scoring a 6.5 and 6.9
respectively) (COPA04 p. 21). The Commission noted that commercial “filtering can be
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First Amendment values “refers to impact on overall First Amendment values concerning the free flow of
information, rather than narrowly to actions taken by governmental actors” (COPA04 pp. 15-16).
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effective in directly blocking access to global harmful to minors content on the Web, in
newsgroups, in email and in chat rooms” and that it was “widely available from retail and
other outlets” (Id p. 21). This vindicated the opposition’s assertion that the voluntary use
of commercial filtering products could be at least as effective as centralized, federal
solutions and that they would be less intrusive in the process. This also supported the
argument that Congress need not sacrifice the autonomy of the individual in the rush to
pursue a “national solution” (COPA17 pp. 13-14). Reasonably effective and widely
available, filtering software had the distinct benefit of allowing parents to customize
these products “depending on the ages of their children and what type of content they
find objectionable” (COPA20 p. 72). Personal choice and user empowerment, as
advocated by the opposition, had proven to be features apparent in this type of
technological system. The Commission specifically found that “many of these [products]
can be customized based on family choice” (COPA04 p. 21).
Despite its advantages of efficacy and empowerment, commercial filtering
products had adverse impacts as well. Although these systems scored among the highest
of any of those rated by the Commission, this aggregate rating is somewhat misleading.
In the areas of privacy and First Amendment values, filtering software scored a -2.1 and 1.7 respectively. In findings reminiscent of the cautionary information released by the
CDT, the Commission concluded that “This technology raises First Amendment concerns
because of its potential to be over-inclusive in blocking content” (COPA04 p. 21). This
analysis also echoed legislative criticisms of filtering products that such systems “could
lead to private censorship or inadvertent blocking” (COPA21 p. 19). Both sides, it
seemed, took issue with this feature of the technology and recognized that it could prove
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detrimental to constitutionally protected speech. The Commission was no different and
scored these products accordingly. Again, it is interesting to note that, despite negative
scores related to privacy and speech, commercial filtering software was one of the best
options relative to other technological alternatives examined in the report.
The opposition also advanced a diagnostic frame arguing that technological
barriers to access could cause harm by unnecessarily introducing a level of opacity to the
user. This could damage individual rights because trade secret protected blocking criteria
in the context of commercial products and manufacturers were under no obligation to
make those criteria transparent to the user. It was standard practice that these companies
would “not disclose the standards under which they filter or the list of filtered sites”
(COPA11b p. 13). The Commission essentially concurred with this assessment and noted
that constitutional “[c]oncerns are increased because the extent of blocking is often
unclear and not disclosed” by filtering manufacturers (COPA04 p. 21). This diagnostic
frame ties directly to the opposition’s call for an extended and critical review of any
regulatory systems prior to their implementation – especially if that implementation
occurred as a direct result of government fiat. The Commission would go on to endorse
this point of view as well noting that its mandate, limited scope, and lack of funding were
inadequate in this regard. Instead, the Commission “discussed the need for an
independent, non- governmental testing facility for child-protection technologies” that
would delve into both “search criteria” and “transparency” (COPA10d p. 27). This also
touches on the issue of hegemony if private, commercial notions of acceptability
mediated access to content without the opportunity for comment or review. As the
opposition noted, this could well be the case if individual choice was “replaced by the
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decisions made by private companies — many of which are shut off from public scrutiny
due to lack of disclosures about the process or guidelines for blocking sites” (COPA11b
pp. 13-14). As the opposition made clear, and as the Commission’s findings seem to
support, any delegation of individual autonomy “to unchecked private entities raises
troubling First Amendment issues” (Id). Although Congress had made a step in the right
direction by requiring formation of the Commission, from the opposition’s perspective,
an urgent need remained for critical and sustained review of these technological
mechanisms.
The primary affirmative defense offered under COPA was the use of age
verification systems. Specifically, COPA provided immunity for those commercial
content providers who restricted access “by requiring use of a credit card, debit account,
adult access code, or adult personal identification number [or] by accepting a digital
certificate that verifies age” (COPA02 p. 2). The Commission dealt with this regulatory
scheme as well and their findings appear to justify the opposition’s diagnostic frames. In
the case of age verification through credit card data, the Commission found that this
technology was both effective and easily accessible (COPA04 p. 25). This lent credence
to the government’s assertion that the use of such systems was already “standard
practice” (COPA21 pp. 14-15) among commercial pornographers and that the proprietors
of most adult websites “already put most of their material behind age verification
screens” (COPA17 p. 47). Although supporters of COPA had argued that age
verification was the “most effective” means of mediating access, they had also argued
that it was the “least restrictive approach that should be taken given the current state of
the technology” (COPA24 pp. 2-3). Here, the Commission sharply disagreed.
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First, the Commission found that it “may be difficult or burdensome for small or
non-commercial sites to implement card verification systems” (COPA04 p. 25). The
opposition had made a similar argument for one of its key diagnostic frames.
Specifically, oppositional groups had suggested that “[m]any of the entities likely to be
affected by the bill are unable to make use of the age verification techniques that
comprise the affirmative defenses due to cost and/or availability” (COPA11b p. 12). The
burdensome nature of these systems would have the effect of chilling speech a priori due
to the inability of speakers to meet the costs incurred through this affirmative defense.
Both the Supreme Court and the District Court had made a similar argument in their
rulings on the CDA noting that “even many commercial organizations using the Web
would find it prohibitively expensive and burdensome to engage in the methods of age
verification proposed by the government” (CDA13 p. 39). The Commission went on to
give these systems a rating of -5.2 noting that the “Adverse impacts on First Amendment
values result from cost to publishers and chilling effect of identifying users before
providing access” (COPA04 p. 26).
Although the Commission’s report does support the government’s definition of
the problem and concurs with the assessment that unregulated access to the Internet can
harm children, its findings also directly contradict Congress’ means for addressing that
problem. By detailing the constitutional and ethical deficiencies of age verifications
systems and even commercial filtering software, the Commission had done a great deal to
support the opposition’s arguments. To preserve user autonomy and access to
constitutionally protected speech, Congress should not implement technological
mechanisms of enforcement such as these without a great deal of care and consideration.
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Part V – Legislative Prognostic Frames
Oxley and other supporters of COPA did not respond directly to the
Commission’s criticisms of age verification technologies, nor did they need to. Due to
the fact that the findings were not issued until two years after Congress had passed the
policy and President Clinton had signed it into law (COPA03 p. 3), there was no
possibility that lawmakers could change this central technological requirement of COPA
so long after the fact. The legislative prognostic frame remained in place and Congress
argued that only a centralized solution mandating age verification systems could address
the harm done to minors by unregulated access to the Internet. All that was left now was
to defend that solution as the best and most effective option at the government’s disposal.
Age verification screens, lawmakers argued, were the only possible solution to the
problem because they mediated access to content at the source. As Congress continued
to argue, “it is more effective to screen the material prior to it being sent or posted to
minors, and that such a restriction imposes minimal burdens on adults” (COPA21 p. 16).
This kind of access control was best because “It is always more effective to lock the barn
door before the horse is stolen” (Id).
As mentioned previously, Congress saw age verification technology as the most
effective and least restrictive mechanism at their disposal because the use of such systems
was already “standard practice among some commercial distributors of pornography on
the Web” (COPA21 pp. 14-15). This demonstrated, unlike the technologies required by
the CDA, that age verification systems were both “technologically and economically
feasible” (Id p. 13). Widespread use of these systems seemed to prove that point and
COPA did no more than “reorder the process in such a way as to require age verification
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before pornography is made available” (Id pp. 14-15). Furthermore, for content
providers, economic barriers to entry were relatively low in comparison to those
regulatory systems required by the CDA. In fact, some age verification systems provided
their services to websites for free. For example, Congress noted that Adult Check
offered, “at no cost to a Web site operator, a screen that can be used to block access by
minors” (COPA17 pp. 19-20). This, combined with the policy’s focus on commercial
content, did much to address the courts’ previous concerns that the costs associated with
regulatory technologies would cause a number of individual and non-profits speakers to
remain silent. Age verification was a proven technology that offered a number of
advantages over other regulatory systems. This mechanism was easy to use, prevalent
and would not significantly impact the economic ability of content providers to make
their material widely available. In fact, because COPA required content providers to
place all prohibited content, including teasers, behind these screens, Congress argued that
age verification would bring in even more money due to the prerequisite that customers
pay prior to seeing any illicit images at all. This fact made it “not only economically
feasible for commercial content providers to comply with the bill, but profitable for them
to do so” (COPA21 pp. 14-15).
Supporters of COPA again pointed to the narrowed focus of COPA as proof of its
minimal impact on the right of adults to access constitutionally protected speech. Even
the pornographic industry’s trade association had endorsed age verification systems and,
because these commercial providers would be the only websites affected by the law, this
solution was both “effective and appropriate” (COPA24 p. 30). Mandating the use of
such a “screening process” was the only sensible answer and Congress could enforce
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COPA “Without diminishing free speech” (COPA06 p. 1). COPA’s supporters argued
that the constitutionality of such age verification systems was self-apparent because they
were already in wide use across the pornography industry. By the government’s estimate
there were already “approximately three million people [that] possess a valid” adult ID
number and some “46,000 Web sites accept them” (COPA17 pp. 19-20). Applying for
such an ID and paying the cost would, at worst, impose “a modest burden on adult access
to pornographic material” (Id p. 26). In the context of the legislative prognostic frame,
that burden imposed by age verification technologies would be “outweighed by the
government’s compelling interest in shielding minors from material that is harmful to
them” (Id).
Congress consistently emphasized the minimal financial burden associated with
age verification systems. Again, the benefits of the solution provided by these systems
were preferable to any costs that might result from requiring their use. Perhaps in
response to the COPA Commission’s report and almost certainly as a reaction to the
Supreme Court’s ruling on the CDA, Congress emphasized that adult ID numbers could
be purchased for “less than $20 per year” and because “millions of adults had purchased”
them already, no constitutional harm seemed to be implicated (COPA17 p. 26).
Supporters of COPA argued that any criticism suggesting that a chilling effect would
result from placing speech behind fee-based barriers was alarmist and hypothetical at
best. From this point of view, the opposition’s arguments on this point were only
supposition that age verification services “may deter” adults from accessing speech and
“may affect” some content providers’ ability to speak (Id pp. 19-20). With no direct
proof that this regulatory scheme would hinder access to protected speech and with a
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wide variety of such systems already in place, COPA’s supporters felt confident that the
concerns of the opposition and the Commission were unfounded.
COPA’s supporters also waved away any privacy concerns raised by the
opposition in relation to Congress’ preferred technological solution. Specifically, the
Commission found that the adverse impacts of these systems on personal privacy “could
be high” (COPA04 p. 27) due to the “[c]ollection of individually-identifiable information
at central points via this system” (Id p. 25). Although the Commission had scored age
verification systems quite low in this category (-4.5 for credit card based systems and -5.5
for adult IDs) (Id pp. 25 & 27), Oxley and others argued that the bill would account for
this by limiting the “use and disclosure of personal information collected by those who
provide credit-card or adult verification systems” (COPA11c p. 22). These statutory
protections for personally identifiable information would remove “disincentives to
obtaining an Adult ID by requiring that information collected in that process must be kept
confidential” (COPA17 p. 49). Again, these “significant privacy protections” and the
fact that “millions of adults have had no difficulty in obtaining and using Adult IDs”
bolstered the constitutionality of this provision and the prognostic frame it represented
(Id). If some adults felt “reluctance…to obtain an Adult ID” this, in itself, did “not
render COPA unconstitutional” (Id).
This conclusion was contradictory to both the Commission’s findings and to the
opposition’s arguments. Support for COPA on this point also did not account for those
who would choose not to submit information to age verification services due to the
perceived stigma of accessing material that the system had walled off as “harmful to
minors.” The Commission had made passing reference to an “embarrassment effect”
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(COPA04 p. 27) related to this phenomenon and the opposition had specifically noted
that “in light of concerns about privacy on the Internet, COPA’s requirement that all sites
offering any material that may be unsuitable for children must verify their users’ ages
will discourage adults from accessing material that is appropriate for them” (COPA10e p.
39). From the opposition’s perspective, any “[r]eliance on such systems will create
records of individuals’ First Amendment activities” and an unacceptable hindrance on the
individual’s willingness to seek out such content (COPA11b p. 12).
The constitutionality of COPA’s technological requirements was also selfapparent because it was a natural extension of existing “display laws.” These laws placed
any magazines, videos or other material deemed “harmful to minors” out of view of
children. The appeal to physical analogs of content regulation was comfortable for
Congress and made for a compelling argument in this new and uncharted regulatory
terrain. Access controls would protect children online just as they had in real world
situations and Congress had simply “adopted the same basic approach for the Web that
States have adopted for local stores” (COPA17 pp. 33-34). This was not an outright ban
on such material and did not hinder the right of adults to access it. Instead, COPA
“simply requires that the same kind of material that States require to be placed behind
blinder racks must be placed behind adult verification screens” (Id). Similar to the
physical metaphors that had underpinned calls for the CDA, here Oxley and others made
the case that COPA did not ban teasers or any other pornographic material and did not
persecute those seeking it out. Legislators were simply ensuring that content providers
put the online equivalents of dirty magazines “behind the counter” (Id). This was both
common sense and a necessary technological extension of common decency.
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Part VI – Oppositional Prognostic Frames
For the opposition, the solution to the problems presented by COPA and its age
verification requirements necessitated that Congress minimize such access controls or
remove them entirely. The opposition argued that such systems were so intrusive and so
damaging to constitutional rights that lawmakers must scale back on their use or do away
with them entirely. Failing that, the courts should strike down COPA and should find its
technological enforcement mechanisms unconstitutional. The criticisms of COPA’s
shortcomings and its affirmative defenses were, like the policy’s technical requirements,
extraordinarily reminiscent of the CDA.
From this point of view, the law’s affirmative defenses did not remedy COPA’s
constitutional deficiencies for a number of reasons. First, COPA’s requirement that
adults provide credit card information as a surrogate for age would “prevent many users
from accessing” websites that contained constitutionally protected speech (COPA02 p.
3). Second, the requirement that individuals obtain an adult identification number was
not only burdensome but could dissuade many adults from seeking out this content at all
if they must “disclose their identity in order to access protected speech” (COPA09d pp.
10-11). Third, “use of a credit card will place substantial economic burdens on the web
originator” (Id). Therefore, despite assertions to the contrary, even a minimal charge to
the content producer was an onerous and unconstitutional precondition for speaking
online. While Congressional supporters of COPA had painted a rosy picture of free or
low cost age verification systems and increased profits for website owners, the opposition
argued that any cost “would impose significant residual or indirect burdens upon Web
publishers” (COPA15 pp. 12-13). In the face of these burdens, both content providers
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and content consumers faced an unpleasant and potentially unconstitutional dilemma. As
the CDT put it, the law posed a “Faustian choice to individuals seeking access to
information – protect privacy and lose access or exercise First Amendment freedoms and
forego privacy” (COPA11b p. 12). For the opposition, the government could not
mandate age verification systems and protect the First Amendment. These access
controls, as applied, were inherently unconstitutional and Congress could only solve any
problems presented by COPA by foregoing their use.
Again, the COPA Commission’s report tended to support this prognostic frame.
The Commission found that no technology, even the age verification systems required by
COPA, “could adequately serve as an affirmative defense in a manner respectful of the
First Amendment” (COPA04 p. 65). Lawrence Lessig, who provided expert testimony to
the Commission, concurred with this assessment and noted that age verification schemes
were unlikely to pass constitutional muster (COPA05 p. 2). Just as the opposition had
argued, Lessig suggested that age verification systems could not be implemented
constitutionally because the “burden on adults to carry age-identification is significant;
the burden on sites to verify the identification presented is also high” (Id). In fact, the
Commission went a step further than the opposition and suggested that any technological
barriers to access “may have the effect of restricting speech” and “even voluntarily
implemented” systems “reduce access to fully protected speech” (COPA04 p. 13).
Where the opposition had suggested (albeit with increasing skepticism) that the voluntary
use of commercial filtering software would be preferable to the mandated use of age
verification systems, the Commission found that “no single technology or method will
completely protect children from harmful material online” and remain constitutional in
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the process (COPA03 p. 1). Lessig again agreed with this assessment and argued that
filtering software, especially if it were to be mandated at the federal level, was
“inherently flawed” and would “facilitate a far greater blocking of access to material than
the government’s legitimate interests reach” (COPA05 p. 2). The state’s own findings in
this area, through the Commission, buttressed the opposition’s prognostic frames.
Lawmakers’ had to minimize the use of centralized, governmentally-mandated
enforcement mechanisms in the interest of both children and the constitution.
The solutions proposed by the COPA Commission were also supportive of those
offered by the opposition. While the Commission remained unconvinced of the efficacy
of commercial filtering software or any other regulatory system, they agreed with the
opposition that low-tech or no-tech options were an important component of any eventual
resolution. Again, the opposition had suggested that Congress must revise laws like
COPA or that the courts should strike them down entirely if they imposed broad
technological barriers. Rather than “passing criminal laws for the Internet” lawmakers
should “focus instead on educating users to make their own choices about what content to
view or avoid” (COPA09a p. 5). While centralized technical mechanisms would almost
invariably function unconstitutionally, the opposition and the Commission argued that
education programs would greatly assist both parents and children – ostensibly the two
groups who were to benefit most from COPA. The Commission agreed that, while these
“family education programs do not themselves directly prevent minors’ access to harmful
to minors materials…they are an essential part of an overall solution” (COPA04 p. 18).
As noted previously, the Commission had called for further study of filtering
software, age verification systems and other regulatory technologies (COPA04 p. 15).
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Some members had further requested that Congress extend the Commission’s mandate to
provide a greater depth of analysis (Id p. 78). This recognition that more significant and
extensive review of technology should take place supported the opposition’s continued
calls for a critical analysis of regulatory systems prior to their inclusion in federal policy.
In any solution, there must be a “comparison of the effectiveness of various approaches,
their likely impact on speech, and their appropriateness for the Internet” (COPA11b pp.
12-13). While Congress had made some progress in this area by forming the COPA
Commission, much work remained to be done. As one member noted, legislators had
been deficient in this area and the Commission “has done what Congress has not – it has
examined how to protect children online in ways consistent with the Internet’s
architecture and Constitutional requirements” (COPA04 p. 64). For the opposition, it was
also telling that the Commission’s report, as “the most thorough and searching analysis”
(COPA27 p. 25) of COPA’s requirements, disagreed so fundamentally with some of
Congress’ core assumptions about the policy, the technology and the constitutionality of
both. Congress had undergone a frame shift by acquiescing to calls for more research but
had negated that shift by essentially ignoring the results. Due to this, the opposition
argued that while the Commission’s report “served as a substitute for congressional
findings,” Congress erred by passing “COPA without creating the detailed factual record
constitutionally required to support its claim that COPA is the most narrowly tailored
means to achieve its intended ends, and without adequately considering less restrictive
approaches” (Id). In the absence of such a record, and in the face of evidence to the
contrary, Congress continued to push for COPA’s passage and insisted on the
constitutionality of its technological requirements.
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Finally, the opposition’s prognostic frame demanded that, if Congress did not
heavily revise the law and remove or minimize access controls, the court should strike
COPA down entirely. Oppositional groups insisted that the profound similarities
between the CDA and COPA made the law incontrovertibly unconstitutional. While
Congress had made alterations to the policy, it had not done enough to address the core
problems at the heart of the law – problems that had carried over from the CDA. The
opposition based the call for a permanent injunction against COPA and its technological
affirmative defenses on five key principles. First, age verification systems would deny
adults the right to access constitutionally protected speech if they did not possess a credit
card (COPA12 p. 3). Second, the law extended to a great deal of speech that the
constitution protected. For example, chat rooms where only a portion of the
conversations could be considered offensive would all be locked “behind verification
screens, even speech that is not ‘harmful to minors’” (COPA22 p. 10). Third, adults
would be discouraged from even attempting to access protected speech because the
technological mechanisms of enforcement would “impose costs on content that would be
free, eliminate privacy, and stigmatize content” (COPA12 p. 3). Individuals antagonistic
to certain speech or hostile to certain viewpoints could potentially exercise a heckler’s
veto and force websites to employ age verification systems if they could have the
offending website’s content declared harmful to minors (Id). Fifth, COPA’s affirmative
defenses “impose financial burdens on speakers that will cause them to self-censor rather
than incur those burdens” (Id). Due to this, the opposition felt it was self-apparent that
the courts should find COPA unconstitutional and strike this law down as soon as
possible.

192

The opposition went on to question the efficacy of any government intervention
into online speech. Both the CDA and COPA had, to the opposition, demonstrated an
extreme tendency for legislative overreach, ignorance about the technical provisions
required by these federal policies and a misunderstanding of the medium itself. On these
points, the opposition shared a “common concern about the threat…posed by illconsidered, ineffective, and unconstitutional government regulation of the Internet”
(COPA18 pp. 10-11). The ACLU in particular was outspoken on these shortcomings and
wearily argued that Congress should “end wrongheaded attempts to regulate the unique
medium of the Internet” (COPA09c p. 8). They called on lawmakers and the
administration to “close the book on this early chapter of Internet history and embrace
free speech online” (Id). Again, the similarities between the CDA and COPA made
Congressional attempts to regulate an unfamiliar medium with unfamiliar regulatory
systems ripe for a constitutional challenge. From the ACLU’s point of view, it did not
matter “[w]hether you call it the ‘Communications Decency Act’ or the ‘Congress
Doesn’t Understand the Internet Act,’ it is still unconstitutional” (COPA09f p. 21). Any
law should be struck down if it “bans a wide range of protected expression” (Id) that is
otherwise available online and “Congress’ attempt in COPA to remedy the fundamental
defects in the Communications Decency Act…is unavailing” (COPA18 p. 13). Without
more significant shifts in the scope and enforcement of policies like the CDA and COPA,
the result would be the same. For the ACLU and other oppositional groups that was
clearly the case here. From this perspective, the “constitutional flaws in this law were
identical to the flaws that led the Supreme Court to strike down the Communications
Decency Act” (COPA09 p. 1).
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Validation for this prognostic frame would again come from an unlikely source.
Although Congress had formed the COPA Commission in an effort to bolster the
government’s credibility in the area of online regulation, the Commission’s findings
continued to be problematic for COPA’s supporters. Several of the Commission’s
members shared the opposition’s distrust of federal policy attempting to regulate content
online and were unconvinced that technological mechanisms of enforcement could ever
function constitutionally. One Commission member emphasized the unique nature of this
new medium and, like the opposition, questioned the viability and constitutionality of
attempts to regulate it (COPA04 p. 64). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this member was Jerry
Berman, head of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) – one of the key
groups opposed to both the CDA and COPA. In this instance he also spoke for other
members and noted that the “Commission rejects a legislative approach to protecting
children…because laws restricting distribution of or access to harmful to minors
materials are Constitutionally suspect” (Id). Other members of the Commission shared
this view and they echoed the opposition’s call for limitations on governmental
intervention on the Internet. William Schrader, CEO of PSINet, Inc. and member of the
Commission agreed that COPA was “deeply flawed” (COPA04 p. 84). Schrader
believed, “like several other members of the Commission, that the restrictions on speech
enacted into law by COPA are unconstitutional” and it was impractical for Congress to
assume a solution could be found by “legislating our way out of the problem” (Id). It
appeared that this vindicated the opposition’s calls for a more critical analysis of this
policy because Congress’ own Commission on these issues had found that many of the
opposition’s fears were legitimate.
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Part VII – Judicial Opinion
COPA would go on to traverse a torturous path through the courts. Although the
opposition filed the original complaint in October of 1998 – within hours of the President
signing COPA into law – final adjudication did not come until 2007. For nearly ten
years, COPA languished in the judicial system, passed from District to Supreme Court
and back again. Due to a preliminary injunction that no court ever lifted, Congress never
enforced this policy during the decade it was on trial. Eventually, on March 22, 2007, the
judiciary finally issued a permanent injunction against COPA, essentially killing the
legislation (COPA02 p. 3). Despite COPA’s failures, the government was able to
advance several arguments that would become important to future legislation as well as
to the future of content regulation on the Internet. The fact that COPA took so long to
defeat demonstrates that Congress had undergone enough of a frame shift after the CDA
and had undertaken the minimum amount of critical review necessary to fend off the
opposition’s arguments for years. Where the courts struck down the CDA quickly and
unanimously, COPA would sharply divide District Court judges and Supreme Court
justices alike, setting the stage for the Children’s Internet Protection Act that would soon
follow.
Filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the same venue where the CDA’s
litigation began, the opposition’s complaint represented a number of interests including
those of the ACLU, EFF, and Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). In addition
to these activist groups, the opposition filed the complaint on behalf of a “broad range of
individuals and entities who are speakers, content providers, and users of the Web”
including “online magazines, booksellers, media companies, art vendors, and gay and
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lesbian content providers” (COPA13 p. 2). The opposition’s argument was clear; COPA
“directly violates the First Amendment rights of plaintiffs, their members, and tens of
millions of other speakers to communicate protected expression on the Web. In addition,
the Act violates the rights of millions of Web users to access and view constitutionally
protected speech” (Id). Specifically, they argued that COPA’s technological
requirements prohibited a multitude of speakers and listeners from pursuing
constitutionally protected activities online. The age verification systems that the
government had put such faith in were neither “technologically or economically available
to plaintiffs and other providers of free content on the Web” (COPA13 p. 12). Even if
such systems were technologically practical or economically feasible they would, the
opposition argued, destroy the vast democratic forum created by the Internet and
squander the potential of this new medium. COPA’s primary technological enforcement
mechanism “would fundamentally alter the nature and values of the new computer
communication medium, which is characterized by spontaneous, instantaneous, albeit
often unpredictable, communication by hundreds of thousands of individual speakers
around the globe, and which provides an affordable and often seamless means of
accessing an enormous and diverse body of information, ideas and viewpoints” (Id).
These arguments are nearly indistinguishable from those offered during the CDA
litigation and, from the opposition’s point of view, no deviation in the argument was
strictly necessary. Since the technological requirements of both laws were “nearly
identical” (COPA16 p. 28), the opposition “welcome[d] the opportunity to demonstrate to
the Court that Congress has once again fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the
Internet” (COPA09e p. 12).

196

The District Court would go on to concur with the opposition’s master frame that
access to constitutionally protected speech must be safeguarded and the diagnostic frame
that technological access controls would reduce access to that speech. The court would
find that “the First Amendment was designed to prevent the majority, through acts of
Congress, from silencing those who would express unpopular or unconventional views”
(COPA14 p. 1). COPA, through its technological age verification requirements would
undermine this protection and these “unconventional speakers” would be “limited in their
ability to promote such speech in the marketplace [of ideas] by the costs or logistics of
reaching the masses” (Id). The District Court would also defend the legislative master
frame that the government had a compelling interest in protecting children (COPA14 p.
22) and the diagnostic frame that unregulated access to the Internet could harm minors.
They noted that the “ease of participation and diversity of content and speakers” make the
Internet “a potentially harmful media for children” (Id).
Despite this, the judicial endorsement of these legislative frames did not, in the
District Court’s opinion, save COPA as constitutionally valid. Although the government
had argued that the narrowed scope of enforcement and focus on commercial speakers
would ameliorate the deficiencies that had doomed the CDA, the court did not agree.
Instead, any website that relied on advertising or sales in any way would be subject to
COPA and the burdens associated with age verification systems. Even if these sites
conveyed valuable information, that material could conceivably be considered “harmful
to minors” and locked away behind age verification screens. The court found that
“nothing in the text of COPA…limits its applicability to so-called commercial
pornographers only” (COPA14 p. 6) and its restrictions could extend to content including
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“resources on obstetrics, gynecology, and sexual health; visual art and poetry; resources
designed for gays and lesbians; [and] information about books and stock photographic
images offered for sale” (Id pp. 10-11).
The court would also find that the opposition’s arguments regarding individual
autonomy and user privacy were constitutionally valid and that COPA’s requirements
were far from the least restrictive means by which the government could achieve its
compelling interest. Particularly where information sought by the individual may have
been sensitive, COPA had the likelihood of discouraging users from seeking out that
information. For example, individuals were less likely to search for content on sexual
health and orientation if they could not have “access to this information while preserving
their anonymity” (Id p. 12). Overall, COPA’s technological requirements “would have a
negative effect on users because it will reduce anonymity to obtain speech and reduce the
flow experience of the user, resulting in a loss of traffic to Web sites” (Id p. 18).
Therefore, as the opposition had argued, COPA would irreparably harm the autonomous
ability of the individual to seek out and access constitutionally protected speech.
Based on all of these arguments, the District Court upheld the opposition’s initial
request for a preliminary injunction against COPA because there was a “substantial
likelihood…that COPA imposes a burden on speech that is protected for adults” (Id p.
22). While the judge expressed “personal regret that this preliminary injunction will
delay once again the careful protection of our children” he acknowledged the necessity of
the court’s findings and the “greater good such duty serves” (COPA14 p. 26). In a final
thought, the judge took up the opposition’s argument that the protection of speech should
take priority, especially in this new medium. Without such safeguards, he suggested that
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laws like COPA might do more harm to “the minors of this country…if First Amendment
protections, which they will with age inherit fully, are chipped away in the name of their
protection” (Id).
Where the District Court had found COPA constitutionally offensive because it
would repress speech and invade personal privacy, on appeal the Third Circuit found
against this policy for a different reason entirely. The Court of Appeals would go on to
argue that the policy’s “harmful to minors” standard was unconstitutionally overbroad
(COPA02 p. 2). Oxley and other legislative supporters of COPA had relied on this
language precisely because they felt it would mitigate the overly broad enforcement that
would have resulted from the CDA’s vague “indecency” standard (COPA17 p. 52). The
Court of Appeals, however, argued that COPA’s proscription against content was equally
unclear and would have the effect of chilling a great deal of speech a priori. Specifically,
because the definition of what exactly constituted material “harmful to minors” was
measured by “contemporary community standards” (COPA15 p. 5), it would force
speakers online to tailor their speech to the most conservative community standard in the
country without knowing precisely what that meant. While some communities may have
found some speech entirely appropriate for minors, that material could still be locked
away behind age verification screens in other locations. This scheme was especially
troubling to the court because it employed a local standard to judge content potentially
intended for a global audience. For this reason, the Court of Appeals upheld the
injunction noting that:
“Because material posted on the Web is accessible by all Internet
users worldwide, and because current technology does not permit a
Web publisher to restrict access to its site based on the geographic
locale of each particular Internet user, COPA essentially requires
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that every Web publisher subject to the statute abide by the most
restrictive and conservative state’s community standards in order to
avoid criminal liability” (COPA15 p. 5).
This was strongly reminiscent of the opposition’s argument that Congress simply did not
understand that which they were attempting to regulate. The nature of the Internet as a
decentralized medium and its potential as a vast democratic forum were foreign territory
by regulatory standards. The opposition had argued again and again that Congress had
demonstrated a “fundamental misunderstanding of the reach of COPA” (COPA20 pp. 6768) and any critical “understanding of the scope and diversity of these technologies
makes plain the unconstitutionality of COPA” (COPA23 p. 12). In this case, the Court of
Appeals would agree.
At this point, the case advanced to the Supreme Court but the Justices would
essentially punt the case back to the Court of Appeals. As the Supreme Court would rule,
it was incumbent on the Third Circuit to review the merits of the case more thoroughly
prior to detailed review by the Supreme Court (COPA19a p. 2). It is interesting to note
that the Supreme Court did not agree entirely with the Court of Appeals’ rationale for
upholding the injunction. Instead, the Court found that COPA’s reliance on community
standards to define “harmful to minors” content “does not by itself render the statute
substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes” (Id). The Court’s rationale for
this assertion is, to say the least, novel. In his Opinion, Justice Thomas argued that
relying on community standards to judge the merit of content in a global medium was
neither overly restrictive nor unreasonable. Thomas argued that, in any hypothetical jury
trial on the merits of disputed content, “community standards” would by no means imply
that local mores would rule the day. Specifically, Thomas reasoned “that community

200

standards need not be defined by reference to a precise geographic area” (COPA19 p.
12). In this way, the courts could instruct jurors in any locality to apply a broader
standard that would account for more broadminded tastes. Additionally, because COPA
narrowed the amount of content that the law affected, Justice Thomas found that the
“harmful to minors” standard was sufficiently tailored to avoid constitutional overbreadth
(COPA19 p. 14). Setting aside the assumption that a jury trial on each and every item of
disputed content would not be burdensome, the Court’s logic is somewhat confounding.
If juries need not apply community standards to a specific geographic location, then why
apply community standards at all? Furthermore, this would in no way ameliorate the
confusion over what local standards would apply to globally distributed content. How
could a content provider attempting to comply with COPA know if any particular jury
would be applying conservative community values or a more amorphous, geographically
indistinct set of standards? The Court’s lack of clarity on these points may indicate that
they too were unsure of how to proceed in this new medium while still protecting
children from potentially harmful content.
Following this, COPA would be passed back to the Court of Appeals by the
Supreme Court. The Third Circuit would uphold the preliminary injunction and send the
case back to the Supreme Court who would also uphold the injunction. From there, the
Supreme Court remanded the case to District Court for a full trial on the merits of the
case. The Supreme Court intended the trial to “(1) update the factual record to reflect
current technological developments, (2) account for any changes in the legal landscape,
and (3) to determine whether Internet content filters are more effective than COPA or
whether other possible alternatives are less restrictive and more effective than COPA”
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(COPA02 p. 2). The results would prove to be interesting from the standpoint of both the
legislative and oppositional frames prevalent throughout the debate over COPA.
The District Court’s final adjudication would support the opposition’s arguments
almost entirely. In an 84 page opinion that meant the end for COPA, the court would rule
that this policy, through its technological enforcement mechanism, would burden both
speakers and listeners online. In the interest of safeguarding constitutionally protected
speech in a manner consistent with the opposition’s master frame and because age
verification systems would harm those rights so significantly, COPA’s key provisions
could not be enforced. Specifically, the “utilization of [age verification] devices to
trigger COPA’s affirmative defenses” (COPA20 pp. 67-68) would “deter most users from
ever accessing” websites with content some found distasteful (Id p. 54). This also had
the direct effect of excluding individuals who did not possess a credit card which would
“unduly burden protected speech in violation of the First Amendment” and
“unconstitutionally chill free speech” (Id p. 67).
The law’s technological affirmative defenses were also harmful to individual
rights and autonomy because they would diminish the user’s ability to protect his or her
privacy. Subjecting individuals to the “age verification process would lead to a distinct
loss of personal privacy” and “users are especially unlikely to provide a credit card or
personal information to gain access to sensitive, personal, controversial, or stigmatized
content on the Web” (Id p. 55). COPA discouraged individuals from participating online
simply by requiring the disclosure of personally identifiable information and thus chilled
speech preemptively. Due directly to COPA, individuals would refrain from speaking
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simply because they were “unwilling to reveal personal and financial information in order
to access content” (Id p. 67-68)
COPA would harm online content providers due to the loss of traffic from those
who did not wish to access controversial websites (Id p. 54). Due directly to COPA’s
technological mandate the law “would lead to a significant loss of users” (Id). The threat
of COPA’s regulatory systems would force content providers to “either self-censor, risk
prosecution, or shoulder the large financial burden of age verification” (Id). COPA also
had the potential to act as a hegemonic control on the content of speech by essentially
approving of some content while locking away other points of view. The law would
force website operators to prove that their content was both lawful and acceptable under
COPA’s broad definitions. Specifically, COPA “raises serious constitutional difficulties
by seeking to impose on the [content producer] the burden of proving his speech is not
unlawful” (Id p. 67-68). Furthermore, because COPA’s affirmative defenses were not
entirely bulletproof, website owners may not find out that the law disallowed content they
provided until they had run afoul of the law. The court argued that, in this sense, “Under
the COPA regime, Web site operators are unable to defend themselves until after they are
prosecuted” (Id). For all of these reasons, the court found that neither COPA’s
technological requirements nor its narrowed focus on commercial speakers were
constitutionally sufficient. The nature of age verification systems and the distributed
nature of speech on the web extended the reach of COPA beyond that which was legally
acceptable (Id).
Finally, the court found that the voluntary use of commercial filtering software
was preferable to and less restrictive than the mandated use of a centralized content
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regulation scheme. By imposing “selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end
rather than universal restrictions at the source”, filtering products would “not condemn as
criminal any category of speech” (COPA20 p. 69). As the opposition had argued, filters
were more protective of speech and individual autonomy and, therefore, “more effective
than COPA in furthering Congress’ stated goal” of protecting minors (Id p. 72). This
argument would open the door for the Children’s Internet Protection Act and the court
here essentially invited the government to enact “programs to promote the use of filtering
software” (Id p. 70).
The opposition had successfully made its case and the courts constitutionally
validated the master, diagnostic and prognostic frames they had presented. Individual
autonomy and access to protected speech must take precedent in any effort to protect
children, especially in this new, decentralized medium. The technological access controls
required by COPA would harm that autonomy and would have the direct effect of
reducing access to speech. Due to this, Congress must review the policy’s technological
requirements more critically, minimize them in order to better account for these rights, or
remove them entirely. Despite the legislative frame shifts that COPA represented, these
modifications were insufficient in the face of the law’s remaining constitutional defects.
The law’s more narrow focus on commercial content providers, its reliance on a slightly
less onerous “harmful to minors” standard and its mandated use of age verification
systems that were ostensibly already in use all failed to meet the constitutional,
democratic and ethical threshold necessary for sound policy.

204

Table 6 – Child Online Protection Act Frame Analysis Summary
Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)





Prognostic
(Solution)





Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)




Prognostic
(Solution)





Legislative Themes
Due to the constitutional failure of the CDA, children remained at risk when
online.
While the protection of children remained a compelling interest of the state,
legislators expressed some recognition that they should protect speech in the
process.
However, the core belief that the state must protect children remained and the
master frame itself was inflexible. Legislators were not significantly open to a
critical review of technology.
Congress continued to maintain that it must act because unregulated access to
the Internet caused continuing harm to children.
However, due to the opposition and Supreme Court’s position on the CDA,
COPA did narrow the focus of enforcement to the primary cause of that harm.
Specifically, it targeted commercial content providers.
Again, the diagnostic frame remained essentially unchanged and was not open
to significant debate. However, Congress did require the formation of the
COPA Commission to study the technological enforcement mechanisms
required by the Act.
Congress remained convinced that technological barriers to access, including
age verification systems, remained the best “tool” for solving the harm of
minors’ access to inappropriate content.
Congress largely ignored the COPA Commission’s report and the results were
not available until after they had passed COPA.
Despite some indications that lawmakers were open to a critical review of
regulatory technologies, their primary technological solutions remained largely
unchanged and unexamined.

Oppositional Themes
COPA did not represent a meaningful improvement over the CDA and
continued to prohibit access to a great deal of protected speech.
Centralized content regulation disempowered parents and reduced autonomy.
Just as with the CDA, the opposition insisted that autonomy, freedom, and
constitutional guarantees should not be constrained through use of regulatory
systems and that Congress must consider this potential prior to
implementation.
Despite the narrowed focus of enforcement, COPA’s regulatory systems
remained an illegitimate constraint on adult access, parental empowerment,
and user autonomy.
COPA and its age verification technologies would extend beyond commercial
content providers and restrict a great deal of constitutionally protected speech.
Like the CDA, Congress would apply the technological mechanisms required
by COPA too broadly and would damage constitutional freedom and
individual autonomy.
The solution offered by the opposition was to consider no-tech or low-tech
alternatives or, failing that, have COPA struck down as unconstitutional by the
courts.
If Congress must impose regulatory systems, they should be voluntarily and
should empower parents to choose material they deemed appropriate for their
children.
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Chapter 6 – The Children’s Internet Protection Act
Introduction
Despite the failure of both the CDA and COPA to pass constitutional muster,
legislative support for online content regulation persisted. Many in Congress remained
convinced that the Internet, although a vast resource for education and commerce, had the
potential to do great harm to America’s children. In light of this harm and considering
the government’s inability to enforce either the CDA or COPA, lawmakers proposed a
new regulatory strategy. The Children’s Internet Protection Act would represent a drastic
shift in how the state pursued its compelling interest in protecting kids. As will be
described, this new policy sought to regulate the Internet in what the government
perceived to be a much more limited manner than the CDA or even COPA. This new
legislation would also call for the use of different technological mechanisms of
enforcement than previous policies. Regardless, both the scope of enforcement and the
regulatory technologies required by this law would again be the subject of heated debate
and strong opposition from a number of groups.
Although the particulars of content regulation had changed, the legislative
motivation for this kind of policy had not. Congress would continue to express concern
that “Pornography and other material harmful to minors is widespread on the Internet”
and that “The danger posed by this material is particularly acute for the nation’s children”
(CIPA03 p. 3). Due to this continuing harm and in the absence of functional federal
policy, it was the state’s obligation to step in and provide “the tools necessary to protect
children from material inappropriate for their age” (Id). Nevertheless, these “tools”
would again have implications for individual autonomy and access to protected speech.
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Part I – Legislative Master Frames
COPA had changed the playing field in the government’s mission to protect
children from inappropriate content online. The narrowed focus of enforcement and
demonstrated willingness to undertake some substantive review of regulatory systems
had made this policy much harder to strike down as unconstitutional. Just as they had
during the debate over the CDA, some members of Congress watched very carefully
while COPA laboriously made its way through the courts. They noted that COPA’s most
significant difficulties involved the breadth of its impact on online speakers and its
potentially improper use of age verification systems (COPA15 p. 5). Senator John
McCain (R-AZ) was particularly interested in these developments and decided to take
action. He would introduce new legislation long before COPA’s official demise in the
hope that the law would offer children some level of protection from online content that
could be harmful to them. His bill, S. 1619, became the Children’s Internet Protection
Act (CIPA or CHIPA). Like COPA before it, CIPA would represent a drastic frame shift
from its predecessor and would accommodate many of the arguments that the opposition
employed to doom its predecessors. Nevertheless, CIPA would face many of the same
challenges due to its scope and primary technological mechanism of enforcement.
CIPA was a self-conscious departure from previous legislation. Supporters of
governmental initiatives to police the Internet purposely refined the target of CIPA in the
hope that it would pass constitutional muster and silence those critical of such regulatory
schemes. These politicians and supporting organizations acknowledged that, due to the
controversy over the CDA and COPA, the scope of enforcement needed to be revised and
limited. This acknowledgement led to one of the primary frame shifts that shaped
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CIPA’s enforcement structure in that McCain targeted his legislation specifically at
public schools and libraries (CIPA03 p. 3). Rather than policing content producers and
distributors directly, CIPA would attempt to block content at the receiving end in these
institutions. Supporters of CIPA believed that this refined target of enforcement and
focus on minors’ access put this policy on much firmer legal terrain than either the CDA
or COPA. After all, CIPA would only block content on computers designated for use by
minors and uniquely under the control of the government. Rather than attempting to
define a national content standard as they had with the CDA, “Members of
Congress…narrowed the scope of the law so that [it] would more adequately apply to the
Internet” (CIPA19 p. 24).
Using as his blueprint the Safe Schools Internet Act, the Child Protection Act and
the E-Rate Policy and Child Protection Act (see Chapter 5, p. 143), McCain proposed
that “schools and libraries that receive federal funding” must use “filtering technologies
to block from minors Web pages that contain material that is obscene, child pornography,
or harmful to minors” (CIPA07 p. 4).25 Specifically, any such public institution would be
required to implement some “technology protection measure” that guarded against
images that were obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors (CIPA01 pp. 2-3) if

25

The exact statutory language reads: “No funds made available under this title to a local educational
agency for an elementary or secondary school [or library]…may be used to purchase computers used to
access the Internet, or to pay for direct costs associated with accessing the Internet, for such school unless
the school, school board, local educational agency, or other authority with responsibility for administration
of such school both; ``(A)(i) has in place a policy of Internet safety for minors that includes the operation of
a technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet access that protects
against access through such computers to visual depictions that are;``(I) obscene; ``(II) child pornography;
or ``(III) harmful to minors; and ``(ii) is enforcing the operation of such technology protection measure
during any use of such computers by minors; and ``(B)(i) has in place a policy of Internet safety that
includes the operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet
access that protects against access through such computers to visual depictions that are; ``(I) obscene; or
``(II) child pornography; and ``(ii) is enforcing the operation of such technology protection measure during
any use of such computers” (CIPA01 pp. 2-3).
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they benefited from federal assistance. While Congress vaguely described these
technological measures as any “technology that blocks or filters Internet access”
(CIPA01 p. 1), most organizations subject to CIPA would interpret this to mean
commercially available filtering products (CIPA26 p. 29). Congress was not inclined to
disabuse schools and libraries of this interpretation of the law and would go to great
lengths to provide information about filtering products while discussing the merits of this
policy. For example, on the Senate floor McCain pointed to the efficacy of commercial
filtering software as “not only good at protecting children but also well-received and in
high demand” (CIPA05 p. 8). Lawmakers argued that filters were the natural choice for
schools and libraries because they were effective enough and flexible enough to “to
address just about every different value or need relating to child safety on the Internet”
(Id).
This emphasis was a direct result of the Supreme Court’s rulings on both the CDA
and COPA that “suggested that the use of filtering or blocking systems in order to
regulate what comes out of the Internet is a more narrowly-tailored method of protecting
children from harmful Internet material than an attempt to criminalize what is placed on
the Internet” (CIPA03 p. 8). This is a particularly interesting frame shift considering the
legislative position on filtering software expressed previously. During the debates over
both the CDA and COPA, Congress had taken a dim view of this technology noting that
such systems were “not the preferred solution” and “that a national mandate requiring the
use of blocking or filtering could lead to private censorship or inadvertent blocking”
(COPA21 p. 19). Now, however, Congressional supporters of CIPA would extol the
virtues of contemporary commercial filtering software noting that technologically
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advanced systems had “risen far above these early products by using computers that
scour the Internet coupled with human review to ensure a high level of accuracy”
(CIPA19 pp. 50-51). Conveniently, the government noted that many of these “filtering
products…have been specifically designed to operate in a more commercial application
such as large corporations, schools and libraries” (Id). Due directly to oppositional
pressure (and, perhaps, prior endorsement of filtering software) as well as judicial
opinion, McCain and other legislators were convinced that “The installation of filtering
or blocking systems is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s
compelling interest” of protecting children (CIPA03 p. 9). While COPA languished in
the courts, it was imperative that Congress act to protect children. Commercial filters
seemed the best option for doing so.
Also, even if filters had some flaws and raised some constitutional concerns, like
Senator Exon, McCain was “willing to sacrifice some of our civil liberties to protect
these children from these terrible things that are being inflicted on them” (CIPA25 p. 45).
If the law burdened adult access, it was a small price to pay considering what was at
stake. It is interesting to note that McCain and Exon were also similar in that they both
had little personal familiarity with either the Internet or the regulatory technologies they
had proposed. McCain himself had described his ignorance of such systems noting that
he was “an illiterate who has to rely on my wife for all of the assistance that I can get,”
and that he “never felt the particular need to e-mail” (Terkel, 2008). Despite this,
McCain insisted that he did not need personal knowledge to draft sound legislation –
even legislation that would drastically impact online access for millions of users across
thousands of institutions. As one of McCain’s aides noted, “You don’t necessarily have
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to use a computer to understand how it shapes the country … John McCain is aware of
the Internet” (Id). Based on this awareness and based on prior experience with the CDA
and COPA, McCain would offer legislation that would take online content regulation in a
new direction. While he had little personal knowledge of either the Internet or filtering
software, in CIPA McCain had constructed shrewd policy that incorporated key elements
of the opposition’s arguments. As the opposition would find, these shifts would make
CIPA a much more difficult policy to oppose. Despite this, CIPA would remain
contentious and filtering would continue to raise constitutional concerns.
Despite this novel shift in CIPA’s regulatory approach, the primary motivating
force behind this policy was no different from that which Congress had used to justify the
CDA and then COPA. Many members of Congress still believed that much of the
content available on the Internet was completely inappropriate for children and should be
regulated in a manner, which protected minors from it (CIPA03 pp. 3-4). Despite
Congress’ previous disavowal of similarities between the Internet and broadcast media
(see page 153), the suggestion that the pervasive nature of the Internet required
government intervention through policy and through technology persisted. These
legislative supporters of content regulation remained concerned that the Internet was a
“pervasive tool” that was frequently “used by children to research school projects, look
for entertainment, or chat with friends” (CIPA07 p. 1). This pervasive nature of the
technology left many parents and legislators “concerned that children are encountering
unsuitable material – such as pornography – while they use the Internet” and they insisted
that new legislation was required (Id). Also, for the first time, concerned lawmakers,
conservative religious organizations and other groups supportive of content regulation
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argued that pornography was not the only material that must be limited. In order to
buttress the master frame that it was a compelling government interest to protect children
from the Internet, legislators argued that a multitude of harmful material existed online
and that regulation should keep it from kids. In a report submitted to Congress in 1999,
McCain and other anxious legislators noted that the Internet was a “tool for spreading
hate, illicit drug use information, and bomb-making information” (CIPA05 pp. 6-7). The
invasive nature of the medium and the exponential growth of the Internet had “provided
an opportunity for those promoting hate to reach a much broader audience” (Id).
Precisely because the Internet had the potential to penetrate into every corner of life,
government regulation was needed now more than ever to control this dangerous
information. The very nature of the medium allowed this content to be distributed widely
and, like never before, “these organizations are able to deliver a multimedia hate message
through every computer, and potentially into the minds of every child with a computer
and a mouse” (Id). As Senator Exon, Representative Oxley and now Senator McCain
argued, the worst pornography imaginable, the most illicit endorsement of substance
abuse and the most “toxic” hate speech available were now “just one click away from
children” (Id). Where the opposition saw this new medium as a vast democratic forum,
McCain and his supporters saw the Internet as an existential threat to the innocence of
America’s children.
When crafting CIPA McCain and his supporters admitted that some of the
regulatory metaphors on which they had relied were inapplicable to this new medium.
As noted above, McCain introduced CIPA, in part, as an alternative to the CDA, which
had depended so heavily on comparisons between the Internet and traditional broadcast
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regulation (Id). Also, while the CDA and COPA depended on the centralized regulation
of content at the source, here Senator McCain would attempt a drastically different
approach. By targeting only those computers in public schools and libraries where the
government itself was funding Internet access, CIPA was able to avoid many of the
complications that had resulted from “zoning” content at the level of speakers. This was
a novel approach and offered a striking counterpoint to those failed attempts discussed
previously. This approach also flipped the speaker/listener argument on its head.
First, supporters of CIPA implied that filtering technology was particularly well
suited to avoid constitutional difficulties because it only limited content for minors who
were at the receiving end of any communication. They argued that courts and
oppositional groups could not dispute this point because “Filtering or blocking systems
restrict what the user may receive over the Internet, rather than what a speaker may put
on to the Internet” (CIPA03 pp. 4-5). Second, supporters of CIPA argued that the law did
not harm speakers because the government itself was the speaker. This argument would
be particularly persuasive in the case of public schools. Since Congress tied CIPA to
federal subsidies for computers and Internet connectivity and because Internet content
“was to be used in the schools as part of their curriculum, the government, through the
school, remains the speaker, or at least the subsidizer of the Internet speech” (CIPA03 p.
7). CIPA was not harming the ability of adults to produce and consume material
considered inappropriate for minors; this law was only ensuring that such material did not
invade the learning environment. If the Internet introduced such a distraction to
impressionable children, it “would tend to ‘garble’ and ‘distort’ the educational message
the government is seeking to promote” (Id). Schools were welcome to opt out of this
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scheme if they deemed it too restrictive but they would forfeit federal funding in the
process. McCain and others hoped that budget-conscious schools and libraries would
choose CIPA as the more reasonable option and would consider “the required installation
of filtering or blocking systems…as an appropriate measure to ensure that the
government’s message is not distorted” and to ensure that the state’s compelling interest
in protecting children was served (CIPA03 p. 7).
In order to create an empirical record for Congress to point to if it became
necessary to defend these suppositions about filtering and blocking software or the
constitutionality of their use, CIPA included a codicil that served the same function as the
COPA Commission. Specifically, Section 1703 of CIPA mandated that a study of
technology protection measures take place. The primary purpose of this study would be
to evaluate “whether or not currently available technology protection measures, including
commercial Internet blocking and filtering software, adequately addressed the needs of
educational institutions” (CIPA01 p. 1). Despite this and similar to the COPA
Commission’s report, no study would take place prior to passage of the law. In fact,
Congress did not require that the study even begin until 18 months after enactment of the
policy (Id). While Congress had again demonstrated at least some willingness to
undertake a serious review of the technological enforcement mechanisms they were
proposing, the retroactive nature of the study diminished its usefulness to the point of
absurdity. It was unlikely that any report, no matter what the conclusions, would force
legislators to reconsider the language or requirements of an Act that they had already
voted and signed into law. As will be discussed in upcoming sections, this report did
reach some surprising findings about the nature of filtering technology, its efficacy, and
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its constitutionality. Regardless, these findings would do little to alter McCain’s course
or the details of his regulatory scheme.
Finally, CIPA offered a significant departure from both the CDA and COPA in
one more important and novel way. Due directly to judicial opinion and, by inference, to
oppositional pressures, McCain and his supporters emphasized that CIPA would increase
the autonomy of local schools and libraries. Where oppositional groups had criticized
previous policies for the centralized nature of content regulation and the creation of a
national standard to judge content, Congress intended CIPA to place some of those
choices back into the hands of communities (see pages 163-164). First, legislative
supporters presented this new policy as a way for schools and libraries to protect children
as they best saw fit by choosing the technology that would block content. Senator
McCain went to great lengths to emphasize the autonomy granted by CIPA and noted in a
press release that “This legislation allows local communities to decide what technology
they want to use and what to filter out so that our children’s minds aren’t polluted”
(CIPA08 p. 1). The implication seemed to be that, as long as local institutions met the
“technology protection measure” requirement of CIPA, local administrators were free to
choose from a multitude of options. Despite this, it seems appropriate to mention here
that this may have been a false choice. While legislative rhetoric implied that “School
and library administrators are free to choose” their preferred technological mechanism of
enforcement, lawmakers rhetorically limited that choice to “any filtering or blocking
system that would best fit their community standards and local needs” (CIPA08 p. 2,
emphasis added). Despite this, the government consistently presented this policy as a
boon to local decision-making. McCain and other supporters of the law used this master
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frame of local autonomy to reinforce the mission of protecting children and continually
insisted that “CIPA advances legitimate local library decisions. CIPA permits local
library officials to determine which software filter they will use” and how best to
safeguard their values (CIPA19 p. 11).
This rhetoric of community autonomy extended beyond local determinations of
which filtering software to purchase. In a more meaningful way, Congress intended
CIPA to grant decision-making authority to communities by allowing public schools and
libraries to decide what content they would filter. The government would argue that
“CIPA provides local determination of what the filter will attempt to block by allowing
the receiving school or library to decide what could constitute” material inappropriate for
minors (CIPA19 p. 27). This was a logical solution to the constitutional inadequacies of
both the CDA and COPA. Where these previous policies had run afoul of the First
Amendment because they placed undue burdens on speakers and listeners, CIPA
purposely avoided making any determinations as to the acceptability of content. In fact,
under CIPA “the government is expressly banned from prescribing what material
constitutes ‘matter deemed to be inappropriate for minors’” (CIPA03 p. 9). Instead, it
was “expected that the school and library authorities that install the filtering or blocking
systems will clarify and make concrete this standard according to their local community’s
norms” (Id). In this way, the application of CIPA and the filtering software it required
would be no different from the local enforcement of motion picture ratings by schools
and libraries. Many of these institutions, supporters argued, already employed MPAA
ratings as a guideline for “preventing children from being exposed to films containing
excessive sex, violence, or profane language” in an educational environment (Id p. 8). In
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this way, communities did not disallow content based on viewpoint, only on a local
determination of what would be appropriate for minors in a school or library setting (Id).
While this aspect of CIPA appeared to be an improvement over previous iterations of the
law and made more accommodations for local autonomy, there were deep flaws in this
logic. These flaws are based on several assumptions about the nature of filtering
software and its propensity to act as a political object rather than the neutral tool
Congress considered it to be.
CIPA’s master frame was indistinguishable from the master frames that had
motivated both the CDA and COPA. The protection of children was paramount and it
was the state’s duty to provide that protection through policy and through technology.
Like the CDA, CIPA’s master frame does not appear to be particularly amenable to a
critical review of the regulatory systems the law required. Although CIPA did mandate
some study of filtering systems, this review was unlikely to reincorporate any findings
critical of filters back into the policy. This is strongly reminiscent of the motivation
behind both the CDA and COPA and the propensity for that master frame to leave little
room for informed debate. Due to the highly charged nature of this frame, legislators
appear to be less likely to engage with critical points of view. Nevertheless, CIPA does
represent a significant evolution in federal content regulation. The law’s allowances for
local autonomy regarding the acceptability of content are vastly different than centralized
content standards. CIPA’s targeted enforcement, focusing on minors in public
institutions, is also a significant improvement over previous policies. Despite these key
differences, the opposition would continue to take exception to online content regulation
and would point specifically to filters as cause for constitutional concern.
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Part II – Oppositional Master Frames
CIPA was a vastly different policy than either the CDA or COPA. At first glance,
it would seem that Congress had made accommodations for most of the opposition’s and
the courts’ criticisms. CIPA appeared to allow for local autonomy and Congress had
mitigated constitutional concerns regarding the regulation of online content by
controlling access at the recipient level. Despite these significant policy alterations,
oppositional groups remained skeptical of the government’s constitutional ability to put
these kinds of barriers in place. In particular, the damage that commercial filtering
products could cause concerned these groups in the context of the key master frames they
had identified. First, there was concern that CIPA and the filters it required did not
account for the autonomy of the individual, nor did it do nearly as much for local
autonomy as advertised. Second, the opposition would argue that filtering and blocking
systems – particularly commercial products – would introduce a level of opacity for both
individual users and the institutions that purchased them. Without a minimum level of
transparency the opposition suggested that determinations as to what content the
technology filtered and why would remain impervious to critical review. Specifically,
due to the categories and keywords on which blocking software relied and the trade secret
protections that shielded them from scrutiny, individuals, schools, and libraries would be
unable to judge the appropriateness of those blocking decisions. This coincides with the
opposition’s third master frame that CIPA in general and filters in particular did not allow
for adult access to constitutionally protected speech. This point was particularly
important in the domain of public libraries, institutions primarily intended to provide
access to information.
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While CIPA did, at least in principle, leave determinations as to the acceptability
of Internet content in the hands of local administrators,26 the opposition remained
unconvinced. As will be described in greater detail in Part IV, the opposition took
specific exception to the suggestion that communities had any power to make true
decisions about the (un)acceptability of content. The technical specifications of most
filtering software, due to determinations made by designers, categorized content as
acceptable or not prior to its purchase by public schools or libraries. The opposition
expressed concern that this preemptive categorization would disempower institutions
from making meaningful decisions in this regard. McCain and his Congressional
supporters had insisted that CIPA provided local administrators with “the authority to
determine what technology is used” to protect children from harmful material and the
ability to formulate the “policies for determining how such technology is used” (CIPA05
p. 10). Despite the suggestion that CIPA empowered local judgments as to content, the
opposition argued that the policy, through commercial filters, actually “supersedes those
judgments, effectively preventing public libraries from determining, on a local level,
what information to provide to their communities” (CIPA16 p. 52). Due to the nature of
filtering software and its use of predetermined content categorization, the opposition
suggested that this put CIPA in the same category as the CDA and COPA. By removing
local autonomy in this way, “Congress has overridden those local decisions, imposing its
own, one-size-fits-all solution nationwide” (Id). This was strongly reminiscent of the
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CIPA strongly mandated that “A determination regarding what matter is inappropriate for minors shall be
made by the school board, local educational agency, library, or other authority responsible for making the
determination. No agency or instrumentality of the United States Government may; (A) establish criteria
for making such determination; (B) review the determination made by the certifying school, school board,
local educational agency, library, or other authority; or (C) consider the criteria employed by the certifying
school, school board, local educational agency, library, or other authority” (CIPA01 p. 18)
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CDA’s stated goal of “establish[ing] a uniform national standard of content regulation”
(CDA13 p. 49). In contrast, instead of the state setting that standard, CIPA allowed the
private entities that manufactured filtering software to set it for them. From the
opposition’s point of view, this granted stunning power to commercial technology and
those who designed it. Due to their ability to hide blocking decisions behind trade secret
protections, these companies could “make their decisions without any input from or
regard for the views of librarians or local communities, much less prior judicial review”
(CIPA17 pp. 3-4).
Related to its master frame of safeguarding local autonomy, the opposition also
argued that CIPA stripped agency from adult citizens. This was particularly problematic
in the context of public library patrons who were in no way the target of CIPA. Due to
CIPA’s requirement that all library computers with Internet access funded by federal
subsidy must install filters, the law forced adult users to contend with these systems. The
opposition argued that this requirement had the potential to hinder adult access and
reduce individual choice by subjecting these users to the same content blocking that
Congress intended for minors. This caused difficulties in the context of this master frame
because the filters’ predetermined content categories could “block library patrons and
staff from accessing speech” protected by the constitution (CIPA17 pp. 3-4). This was
particularly damaging to autonomy if the filters blocked adults “from accessing speech
that does not meet the categories of the law” but only the “broader categories defined by
the private companies” (Id). Considering the scope of the law and the potential for the
filters to block so many legitimate search requests, the opposition argued that CIPA could
“block library patrons and staff from reading constitutionally protected speech literally
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millions of times” (Id). Like the CDA, this effect of CIPA “would be to reduce adults to
obtaining access by computer to only that information that is fit for children” (CDA11 p.
23) – a prospect that was both constitutionally questionable and damaging to individual
autonomy.
McCain and other supporters of CIPA anticipated this criticism and made
allowances for just such an eventuality. Although the Act targeted children, lawmakers
were also aware that the law might impose filtering software on adults in public library
settings. Due to this, CIPA’s proponents had included a “disabling provision” intended
to avoid any constitutional concerns that might arise in such a situation. Specifically, the
disabling provision allowed “An administrator, supervisor, or person authorized by the
responsible authority [to] disable the technology protection measure concerned, during
use by an adult, to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose” (CIPA01
p. 11). The government argued that this provision provided a remedy for any
unauthorized blocking of adult access to constitutionally protected speech and, if such
blocking occurred, “the patron need only ask a librarian to unblock the site or (at least in
the case of adults) disable the filter” (CIPA14 pp. 44-45). Nevertheless, this provision
did not satisfy the opposition’s master frame related to individual autonomy. The
government’s accommodation did not mollify the opposition and these groups argued
that this provision was both “hopelessly vague” and granted broad discretionary powers
to local librarians and system administrators (CIPA11 p. 5). Specifically, the opposition
asserted that this statutory language would “grant library employees unbridled discretion
in deciding whether to disable the blocking software ‘for bona fide research or other
lawful purposes’” (Id). Equally troubling was that the law did nothing to define what

223

research would qualify as “bona fide” (Id). As will be discussed, through this provision
Congress also inadvertently granted an inordinate amount of discretion to filtering
manufacturers whose products would make initial determinations as to what content was
or was not acceptable and, by extension, what research was or was not bona fide. In the
context of adult access to constitutionally protected speech accessed through a public
institution, this would have important ramifications for both individual autonomy and
First Amendment considerations.
In addition to concerns related to local and individual autonomy, the opposition
was also apprehensive about the opaque nature of commercial filtering software. Part IV
will discuss the design and technical specifications of these products in more detail but it
is useful to introduce the opposition’s arguments here briefly. Specifically, the
opposition intended one its primary master frames to preserve a level of transparency for
any user confronted with government-mandated blocking technology such as that
required by CIPA. As noted above, this was particularly important for adult library
patrons who had the right to view constitutionally protected speech in these institutions.
Failing that, these patrons had the ability to request that librarians disable filters so that
they could exercise this right immediately. Despite this, neither library patrons nor
librarians themselves were aware of how filters made blocking decisions and had no idea
what websites were on blocking lists (CIPA09a pp. 4-5). Due to this, it was impossible
for either individuals or local administrators to make true determinations about the
acceptability of content based on community standards. This gutted McCain’s assertion
that CIPA placed power back in the hands of hometown schools and libraries. Instead,
the opposition argued that “Blocking decisions made by private filtering companies –
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which typically refuse to disclose their blocking criteria or list of blocked sites – are not
subject to any review, either by a proper judicial authority, or by the librarians who use
the software” (CIPA11 p. 31).
This opacity was cause for serious concern because commercial filtering software
had proven itself unreliable in several ways. First, filters were prone to “underblocking,”
a situation where a school or library’s software did not successfully block content that
was of concern for minors in the context of CIPA’s statutory language (CIPA09a p. 5).
This underblocking was substantial and a Consumer Reports study had noted that “most
of the products we tested failed to block one objectionable site in five” (CIPA11 pp. 1417). Studies broadly defined underblocking as “the percentage of ‘offensive’ sites that
the filter fails to block” (Heins & Cho, 2001). While most studies do not give specific
examples as to the precise content that was underblocked, these sites did include those
that contained the sexually explicit content that motivated Congress to pass CIPA. The
opposition repeatedly noted that underblocking was a design flaw of filtering software
and one expert witness characterized underblocking as “a fundamental tradeoff faced by
blocking companies as they seek to balance overblocking against underblocking. In
particular, when judgment calls determine the classification of a site, or when technical or
practical constraints prevent perfect classifications, any action is likely to contribute to
either overblocking or underblocking…Representatives of blocking companies
consistently agree that underblocking affects their products’ accuracy” (CIPA06 p. 28).
Even more alarming to the opposition was the propensity of filters to “overblock”
vast amounts of online content that was in no way objectionable under the law including
educational, medical, political, informational, literary, and artistic material. To contradict
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this point, Congress did cite some research suggesting that overblocking – especially
overblocking of medical information - was trivial (see Richardson, et al., 2002) and that
“when a filter is set to the least restrictive setting, such as the ‘pornography’ setting on
one of the most widely used filters in public libraries (N2H2), it blocks 1.4% of all health
sites” (CIPA14 pp. 43-44). Despite this, filtering critics and consumer groups
documented the phenomenon much more exhaustively with overblocking being defined
as any circumstance where filters arbitrarily “prevent access to a substantial number of
sites that do not contain content that fits within the blocking company’s stated category
definitions” (Id p. 23). The scope and breadth of content overblocked by filters was
staggering and examples are plentiful. First, one study showed that filters disallowed
large swaths of “educational, cultural, historical, and political information” (EPIC &
Peacefire, 2000). More specifically, overblocked content included “sites hosted by the
Knights of Columbus, Vision Art Online (which sells wooden religious wall hangings),
Wisconsin Right to Life, a Jewish lesbian and gay group, an amputee support group, a
California libertarian candidate, a bed and breakfast resort, and a home schooling group”
(Smith, 2009, pp. 290-291). This overblocking was widespread among commercial
products (CIPA09a p. 5) and, by mandating their implementation, Congress had created a
situation where “valuable, useful, and legal information inevitably is blocked” (CIPA10c
p. 8). It seemed clear that “all available filtering technology blocks access to a
tremendous amount of constitutionally protected expression” and that Congress had
presented “public libraries with an impossible choice: either install mechanical,
imprecise, and incredibly broad speech restrictions on Internet resources, or forgo vital
federal funds to which the libraries are otherwise entitled” (CIPA11 p. 4). Not only was
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the opposition concerned that filters erroneously blocked a great deal of constitutionally
protected content but that these concerns were “increased because the extent of blocking
is often unclear and not disclosed” (CIPA12 pp. 24-25).
Oppositional groups blasted legislators on this point and suggested that “Congress
was well aware of the inherent problems of blocking software when it passed CIPA” (Id).
There is certainly evidence on this point and even the COPA Commission’s report had
alerted legislators to this potential problem. Specifically, the Commission’s report had
noted that filtering technology “raises First Amendment concerns because of its potential
to be over-inclusive in blocking content” (COPA04 p. 21). This awareness, in
conjunction with CIPA’s technological requirements, created “a prior restraint because
the blocking decisions made by private filtering companies effectively silence speech
prior to its dissemination in public libraries” (CIPA12 p. 31). Again, it is important to
note that this potential chilling effect created by the software was not only problematic in
itself but was even more dangerous because the blocking criteria employed by filtering
manufacturers were completely invisible to the public. Congress predicated CIPA’s
content blocking on specific statutory language – language based in part on constitutional
considerations. Not only did commercial filters fail to block content based on those same
legislative criteria but the software could be blocking content based on political bias,
private notions of acceptability or religious considerations that should not be imposed on
the public (CIPA19 p. 42). No one, not adult library patrons, librarians, school
administrators, or even federal legislators could be certain of these criteria or the
motivations behind them. The opposition argued vehemently that these kinds of
determinations should be transparent to the public if filters were to be compulsory.
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Filtering manufacturers should not be able to hide behind trade secret protections and
computer code if Congress required that their products be used in these institutions –
particularly if these companies were blocking constitutionally protected speech simply
because they might “deem the content too controversial” for their customers to view
(CIPA12 p. 27). This level of opacity for the user and its chilling effect on speech was
entirely unacceptable to the opposition in the context of this master frame.
This argument intertwines with the opposition’s third master frame requiring that
the government protect access to a wide range of online content. McCain and other
Congressional supporters of CIPA had argued from the outset that this policy did not
raise constitutional concerns or, at least, that it did not raise as many concerns as the
CDA or COPA. First, legislators suggested that because CIPA “would apply only to
obscenity, which is not protected by the First Amendment, it would be constitutional”
(CIPA02 p. 2). Second, even if this law did infringe on some protected material, the
government had the ability to “constitutionally limit minors’ access to protected material”
(Id). Also, because McCain and others had argued that, within this regulatory scenario,
the government itself was the speaker, then “Congress may, to some extent, discriminate
on the basis of content of protected speech in choosing what speech to fund” (Id).
Congress also tied these arguments for the constitutionality of CIPA to the point made
previously that this law, unlike the CDA and COPA, targeted speech at the level of
recipients instead of directly at speakers. In this sense, legislators believed filtering was
constitutional because these technological “systems restrict what the user may receive
over the Internet, rather than what a speaker may put on to the Internet” (CIPA03 pp. 45). Supporters of this legislation believed that all of this, in combination with the
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disabling provision, ensured the constitutionality of the law and the legal application of
filtering software. Despite this, the opposition took exception to this legislative rationale
and argued that the law and the technology it required hindered access to protected
speech.
A summary of the opposition’s discussion on this point follows: First,
oppositional groups argued that “the software required to block the material cannot
determine which material is protected by free speech” (CIPA07 p. 4). Second,
organizations including the American Library Association (ALA) and American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) argued that “the law is unenforceable” because it “censors
speech to adults as well as children, is overbroad and vague” (Id). From a design
perspective, these groups believed that “It is currently impossible…to develop a filter that
neither underblocks nor overblocks a substantial amount of speech” (Id). The opposition
seized on this point to imply that McCain and the rest of Congress did not understand the
technology they had imposed upon public schools and libraries. These groups also
suggested that this misunderstanding was willful and flew in the face of previous
Congressional findings. This is where the COPA Commission’s report would again
haunt CIPA’s supporters. The ACLU in particular pointed out what they saw as political
hypocrisy and noted that “Congress approved the censorship law [CIPA] even after its
own 18-member panel set up to study ways to protect children online rejected blocking
software because of the risk that ‘protected, harmless, or innocent speech would be
accidentally or inappropriately blocked” (CIPA09 p. 3). Congress, the opposition argued,
had failed to address the nature of filtering software and had ignored any findings critical
of this technology.
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While the ACLU could certainly make this point, they may have been guilty of
some hypocrisy as well. Congress had expressly written CIPA in response to the
Supreme Court’s suggestion that filters may be a constitutional solution to the problem of
minors’ access to online pornography (CIPA03 p. 8). This, in turn, was the result of the
opposition’s endorsement of filters during the debate over the CDA and COPA. During
the debate over the CDA, oppositional groups had specifically made the case that
commercial “filtering technologies provided a less restrictive means to achieve Congress’
stated goal of protecting children” (CDA08 p. 2). While that endorsement became more
tepid while Congress negotiated COPA, the opposition still argued that “user-controlled
filtering and blocking software and other user-controlled technologies were more
effective and less restrictive means of protecting children than government mandates”
(COPA10 p. 33). While the opposition may simply have been advocating for the
voluntary use of filters in contrast to centralized content regulation, they had made their
point. Furthermore, Congress had little choice but to employ this strategy when the
courts took up this argument. It is not difficult to see why the government turned to
filtering products when the District Court’s opinion on COPA had practically invited
them to do so. Specifically, the court had noted that, “By enacting programs to promote
use of filtering software, Congress could give parents that ability [to protect kids] without
subjecting protected speech to severe penalties” (COPA20 p. 70). It is no wonder then
that Congress had “good reason to believe that the filtering or blocking conditions” set by
CIPA “are constitutional” (CIPA03 p. 6). The opposition, therefore, would have a
difficult argument to make when criticizing filters on constitutional grounds, especially
because they had spent the previous five years singing their praises.
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Part III – Legislative Diagnostic Frames
The “problem” as defined by Congress had not changed significantly as these
policies evolved. In the case of the CDA, COPA, and now CIPA, the Internet was a
problem because it had not only the potential to expose children to harmful content but
also the likelihood of doing so. This aspect of the medium and the tendency of online
content to be harmful to minors required swift and decisive government intervention.
Not surprisingly, the stated purpose of CIPA was to “protect American children from
exposure to harmful material while accessing the Internet from a school or library”
(CIPA03 p. 3). With the CDA dead and COPA dying, it was crucial that Congress act
immediately to mitigate the damage being done every day. McCain’s report to Congress
emphasized this danger noting that “Pornography and other material harmful to minors is
widespread on the Internet…there are currently some 28,000 adult Web sites promoting
hard-and-soft-core pornography” (CIPA03 pp. 3-4). Appalled by these numbers,
supporters of CIPA were quick to point out that “12-17 year old adolescents are among
the larger consumers of porn” (CIPA04 p. 1). Despite the fact that “Congress tried to
protect children from obscenity with the ‘Child Online Protection Act’…children are still
in danger” (Id). If legislators could not directly regulate online content and “protect our
children from the obscenity on websites” then “the only solution is to protect them when
they use the Internet” (Id).
As noted previously, McCain extended the rhetoric of this legislative diagnostic
frame to the harm caused by online hate speech, exposure to illicit drug content and
exposure to violence. Using this modified frame, CIPA’s supporters painted a dark
picture of all the “Web sites [that] depict graphic violence or provide how-to instructions
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on drug or bomb-making [and] high stakes gambling” (Id). Perhaps most importantly,
Congress also stressed that unregulated access to the Internet had a direct correlation to
sexual abuse and the “danger posed by this material is particularly acute for the nation’s
children, who are unable to guard themselves with the sophistication of an adult” (Id).
Not only was the World Wide Web dangerous but, “Because of unfiltered or
unsupervised access to the Internet and online services, children are being enticed and
lured away from home, sexually molested and victimized through the distribution of child
pornography” (CIPA25 p. 14). As expressed by McCain and CIPA’s supporters through
this diagnostic frame, it was specifically because no regulation existed that these dangers
continued to haunt children online.
Precisely because the government had thus far been unable to regulate online
content directly, it was imperative that the state safeguard the primary points of access for
minors. Schools and libraries became the natural target of enforcement and, as these
institutions became “increasingly connected to the Internet, it is incumbent on them to
assume a supervisory role in protecting children from harmful material encountered on
the Internet” (CIPA03 p. 5). Even if schools and libraries did not leap at the chance to
install filters on their computers, Congress expected these publicly funded institutions to
at least “participate in the supervision of children’s Internet use by taking the steps
necessary to prevent children from being exposed to harmful online content” (Id). With
that in mind, Congress was determined to “make sure that schools and libraries…have the
tools necessary to protect children from material inappropriate for their age or for the
school or library environment” (Id). Congress believed that filters were exactly the right
“tool” to accomplish this goal and, based on prior court rulings, had “good reason to
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believe that the filtering or blocking conditions set on…schools and libraries are
constitutional” (Id p. 6).
Based on this frame, filtering products were not only constitutional from a
legislative point of view but these systems also had the benefit of being specifically
designed to protect children. Congress latched onto the fact that these companies had
already done the heavy lifting by designing “technology applications that seek to protect
children from exposure to inappropriate material that is disseminated and available on the
Internet” (CIPA05 pp. 7-8). Although intended for a commercial audience, filtering and
blocking software seemed the perfect fit for achieving the government’s compelling
interest of protecting children in these public institutions as well. It is unfortunate that
legislators’ interest in the design process ended there. As they had argued with the age
verification screens used by online pornographers, legislators also noted that filters were
already in use by public schools and libraries. This went a long way toward legitimizing
the software as an option friendly to local autonomy and as an efficient mechanism
familiar to these institutions. To prove this point, legislators would come to rely on
studies demonstrating that, even prior to CIPA, “many public libraries have installed
filtering software that blocks access to pornographic sites” in order to “address the
problems associated with online pornography” (CIPA14 pp. 12-13). Without direct
government requirements, “Almost 17% of public libraries [already employ filters] on at
least some of their Internet-connected computers” (Id). Additionally, 7% of libraries had
installed filters on all of their Internet terminals (Id). These systems were ideal for public
institutions, lawmakers argued, because schools and libraries had already implemented
them with no obvious adverse consequences.
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Not only did CIPA allow “for libraries to draw distinctions” about content but it
allowed them to do so based on community standards rather than “any particular
viewpoint” (CIPA14 pp. 40-41). This policy and the filters it required would allow
public institutions to continue their mission of providing access to information without
discriminating against certain points of view. This was important, particularly in a public
library setting, where viewpoint neutrality was a constitutional necessity.27 If material
was to be restricted for adults, the library could not do so because of some preexisting
bias about the content of the message. Congress argued that commercial filtering
products, like librarians, were uniquely qualified to accomplish this goal. From the
legislative point of view, this technology would only “filter or block material based on its
inappropriate content, not based on any particular viewpoint” (CIPA03 p. 7). Congress
argued that CIPA, through the use of filters, simply extended the similar role that
librarians played into the realm of online content.
Public libraries, Congress argued, were deeply involved in the mission of
protecting children from inappropriate material long before the advent of CIPA.
Libraries had a distinguished history of choosing what reading and research materials
were best for the community they served and were obligated to “to separate out the gold
from the garbage, not to preserve everything” (Katz, 1980, p. 6). From this perspective,
requiring the use of filtering software in public libraries was no different than recognizing
the broad discretionary powers libraries enjoyed when practicing traditional collection

27
In Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1259 (3d Cir. 1992), the court had ruled that public
libraries are a limited public forum open to the public for “reading, studying, [and] using the library
materials.” Although libraries can control any additional activities that take place on the premises, these
institutions “must not become engaged in viewpoint discrimination even at the direction of its funding
agency. Not only are libraries enjoined from viewpoint discrimination but they are involved in the
promotion of access - the protection of the rights of end users to receive ideas” (Latham, 2001).
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management. After all, in the context of the legislative diagnostic frame, “The Internet is
simply another method for making information available in a school or library. It is no
more than a technological extension of the book stack” (CIPA05 p. 9). As such, “The
deference owed to public library’s collection decisions extends to its judgments about
what material to collect from the Internet” (CIPA14 p. 20). Again, libraries seemed the
perfect place to confront the problem posed by the Internet. These institutions were
already disinclined from providing access to pornography in their physical collections, so
they should have no problem restricting access to such material online. McCain and
CIPA’s supporters pointed out this serendipity time and again, noting that “While
libraries retain ultimate control over their book collections, they also retain ultimate
control over their Internet collections” (CIPA14 p. 36). As public institutions, “libraries
have broad discretion to exclude pornography from their print collections, [just as] they
have broad discretion to exclude pornography from their Internet collections” (Id p. 20).
The use of commercial filtering and blocking products simply augmented the library’s
ability to exercise this discretion. The Internet, after all, was rife with both “gold” and
“garbage” and more was added every day. How were librarians to keep pace with this
onslaught without the help of some technological tool? In this sense, Congress argued
that filters would be a boon to public librarians and would help them sift through the
massive amounts of inappropriate material that could harm children. Specifically, the
government would argue that “because of the vast quantity of material on the Internet and
its rapidly changing nature, libraries cannot possibly segregate, on an item-by-item basis,
all the Internet material that is appropriate for inclusion in the library’s collection from all
the material that is not” (Id p. 34). While superficially sensible, the opposition and
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librarians themselves would take great exception to this simplification. As will be
discussed, the suggestion that filters were in any way comparable to true collection
management or that these regulatory technologies aided librarians in their mission of
providing unfettered access to information particularly disturbed these groups.
In spite of this, Congress continued to emphasize that libraries were a perfect
place to address the harm caused to minors by unregulated access to the Internet. As long
as libraries practiced viewpoint neutrality when exercising filtering decisions, no
constitutional difficulties would present themselves. Besides, CIPA did not require
public librarians to ban constitutionally protected speech, only to choose that content
which best served their patrons. If some overblocking or underblocking were to occur as
an unavoidable consequence of the technology and even if “filtering software erroneously
blocks some constitutionally protected speech” this “does not undermine the
reasonableness of its use” (Id p. 21). If some patron took offense to this reasonable use
of filters, they had many other avenues available for accessing material online. This is
another instance where CIPA’s focus on recipients rather than speakers came into play
and the government was able to argue that “Any material blocked by a filter remains on
the Internet and may be obtained from millions of computers throughout the world. A
library’s decision not to provide such material through its own computers is a collection
decision, not a restraint on private speech” (Id). Simply because the library blocked
access did not mean that filters “imposed a ‘restraint’ on Internet content” (CIPA14 p.
54). Since Congress had directly equated Internet access in public libraries with physical
collection management, legislators were able to imply the constitutionality of commercial
filtering products by association. If one was constitutional, then the other surely must be.
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Based on this analogy, CIPA’s supporters were able to argue that “Libraries decline to
collect many books that are constitutionally protected, and declining to collect
constitutionally protected materials form the Internet is equally unproblematic” (Id p. 21).
Like the CDA and broadcast regulations, with CIPA Congress needed to latch
onto some sensible metaphor in order to bolster its diagnostic frame. Comparing
technological content filtering with traditional collection management served this purpose
well. Inappropriate content undoubtedly existed online and Congress continued to insist
that some form of federal legislative response was necessary to regulate minors’ access to
it. Public libraries, as a clearinghouse for information of all sorts, seemed a natural point
for that regulation. Books, magazines, periodicals, and research materials of all kinds,
lawmakers argued, were no different from the vast array of information offered on the
Internet. If librarians had the constitutional discretion to keep pornography out of their
print collections, why could they not do the same when providing Internet access?
Although legislators did acknowledge that the “unique nature of the Internet and the
problems posed by it to public libraries have no real analogue in First Amendment
jurisprudence” (CIPA15 p. 3), the differences were overshadowed by the similarities.
Whatever the medium, the government was adamant that “There is no principle of law
that can be pressed into service to require…that a library carry Penthouse or other
sexually explicit material” (Id). If the state was funding both the library and Internet
access within it, “There is simply no legal basis to assume that government libraries are
required to provide pornography to their patrons” (Id). In this way, the law could keep
inappropriate Internet content from minors without repeating the mistakes of the CDA
and COPA.
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Part IV – Oppositional Diagnostic Frames
Congress had metaphorically reduced the Internet to the equivalent of an online
encyclopedia that public librarians could censor at will. The American Library
Association (ALA) took particular exception to what it saw as a gross oversimplification
of the library’s traditional mission of providing access to information. When confronted
with the legislative diagnostic frame comparing mandatory filtering to the historical
practice of selecting content for physical collections, the ALA and other groups would
offer a powerful counterargument. Specifically, the ALA would argue that CIPA
“imposes unprecedented, sweeping Federal speech restrictions on public libraries across
the nation. Filters are contrary to the mission of the public library, which is to provide
access to the broadest range of information for a community of diverse individuals”
(CIPA10b p. 5). Within the context of its diagnostic frames, the opposition would argue
that filters were not only antithetical to this mission but that this technological
mechanism of enforcement harmed both local and individual autonomy, introduced an
unacceptable level of opacity for the user and had the tendency to reduce access to
protected speech.
The issue of local autonomy was particularly important to the ALA and other
oppositional groups confronted with the technological requirements of CIPA (see pages
163-164). While McCain had vehemently argued that this policy “allows local
communities to decide what technology they want to use and what to filter out” (CIPA08
p. 1), librarians would suggest that CIPA had the opposite effect. Often, the law confined
local libraries to commercial filtering products in order to fulfill the Act’s technological
requirements but also, due to constraints of budget, time, and expertise, these institutions
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were limited to the predetermined categories of content embedded within filtering
software. As the ALA would argue, these products had already demonstrated a
propensity for blocking a great deal of valuable content that in no way ran afoul of the
law (CIPA10d p. 9). As professionals with the mission of keeping their communities
informed, it was of grave concern to public librarians that commercial filters had the
proven tendency to “block access to medical information, political information and
information related to the arts and literature” (CIPA10b p. 5). The regulatory
technologies required by CIPA were damaging to the library’s ability to serve their
patrons completely and accurately if filters were blocking an array of content useful to
them. As the ALA would emphasize, “Librarians play a unique role in our society; we
bring people together with the information they need and want. Librarians do this by
making sure libraries have information and ideas across the spectrum of social and
political thought, so people can choose what they want to read” (CIPA10c p. 8). Despite
McCain’s assertions to the contrary, filters would actively prevent librarians from serving
this unique function.
As with the CDA and COPA, the opposition was extraordinarily concerned with
the negative impacts that regulatory systems could have due to their technological
specifications. Commercial filtering products were no different in this regard than
cyberzoning or age verification systems because they placed decision-making authority
with those designing the technology. Filtering software, the opposition argued, was
particularly damaging to local autonomy because it would not and could not account for
local notions of acceptability. Instead, these systems relied on the manufacturers’ values
and ideology embedded in the predetermined categories and keywords that made initial
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decisions about what content to block. As the ALA would make clear, “This legislation
imposes a one-size-fits-all mechanical solution on libraries that are as diverse as our
families and takes away local and parental control, ceding it to unaccountable filtering
companies” (CIPA10a p. 3). Furthermore, because filtering manufacturers designed
these products for a market of concerned parents and employers, they had the tendency to
be overly restrictive. Nancy Kranich, then President of the ALA, argued that “If the same
standards used in online filters were applied to a library’s books the way they are to the
Internet, our shelves would be practically empty” (Id). If the mission of librarians was to
“help people find exactly the information they need, whether it is online or on paper”
then CIPA and the filters it required would make it impossible to fulfill that mission
(CIPA09d p. 12).
The ALA eventually advocated for true autonomy by arguing that Congress
should discard CIPA’s filtering requirement. Instead, the ALA and other oppositional
groups suggested that local computer use policies and educational programs would be
much more respectful of community empowerment than the imposition of commercial
products. CIPA, they argued, failed to respect the diversity of interests and tastes that
local libraries must accommodate. Filtering software was a poor fit for community taste
and federal regulation. Instead of requiring filters, the law should make accommodations
for local autonomy by acquiescing to “Internet-access policies that were developed
locally to meet community needs” (Id p. 1). From this point of view, it was insulting for
McCain to suggest that technology could “substitute for an informed community,
effective librarians and teachers, educated families, and trained Internet users” (CIPA19
p. 38). The ALA and librarians took great umbrage that Congress would remove their
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real autonomy and impose a “blunt, indeed crude instrument that cannot respect First
Amendment freedom [or] distinguish between the needs of adults and children” (Id p.
40).
The issue of autonomy directly relates to the library’s traditional mission of
choosing the best materials for their physical collections. The ALA had made its case
that, by employing this metaphor, Congress did not truly understand the nature of the
regulatory technology they sought to impose or the medium itself. Due to the “vast size
of the Internet”, it seemed inevitable to public librarians that “the blocking software will
operate in practice free of any application of the professional judgment of librarians to
particular sites” (CIPA16 p. 23). This problem, and the accompanying diagnostic frame,
also extended to the unacceptable level of opacity that filtering software introduced for
both library administrators and adult library patrons. Due to commercial considerations,
manufacturers withheld from customers the lists of categories and keywords on which
filtering software relied (CIPA06 pp. 21-22). While these customers, including public
schools and libraries, did hypothetically have the ability to work with software vendors in
order to customize blocking lists, this process was neither easy nor encouraged. For these
public institutions, it was “nontrivial to…deploy customized site lists to blocking servers”
and the “difficulty, cost, and complexity of these tasks is likely to reduce the interest of
most companies or institutions in doing so” (Id). While perhaps acceptable in the private
market, this feature of the technology became vastly more problematic when government
mandate imposed it upon public institutions with limited resources. The opacity of
content blocking conflicted deeply with public libraries’ ability to provide access to a
vast array of information that would otherwise be available. Furthermore, if they could
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not readily customize filters as legislators had suggested, then librarians were giving
away the power to make truly informed blocking decisions to private entities without
consultation or consent.
Filtering manufacturers had a commercial interest in withholding their blocking
criteria, categories, keywords, and lists from customers and competitors. These
companies had “invested significant resources in the creation of these lists” and, due to
this substantial investment of time and money, they sought “to avoid public
dissemination of the contents of the lists” (CIPA06 p. 20). For the opposition, financial
concerns were, at best, secondary to issues of autonomy and transparency for public
schools, libraries, and adult library patrons. For schools, CIPA’s filtering requirement
had the potential to keep a great deal of valuable material from students and delegated
“educational decisions about what students should read and learn to these private
companies, which will not even reveal their lists of blocked sites” (CIPA09b p. 6). For
libraries, where minor access was only one consideration, this delegation of decisionmaking authority was even more problematic. Due to the imposition of filters, librarians
were no longer able to exercise autonomous authority through local determinations about
content or through computer use policies. Instead, librarians granted that authority to
private filtering companies who then had “unfettered discretion to determine which Web
sites a patron may view” (CIPA13 p. 166).
If adult library patrons, local librarians, and even Congress had no idea what sites
filtering software blocked or why, this could be extremely damaging in the context of
both individual rights and the formation of sound federal policy. One of the core
concerns of the opposition in general and the ALA in particular was that the “unfettered
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discretion” given vicariously to private entities may not account for local empowerment,
viewpoint neutrality or, perhaps, even for First Amendment speech. The required
installation of filtering software would, the opposition argued, distort “the usual
functioning of public libraries…by requiring libraries to (1) deny patrons access to
constitutionally protected speech that libraries would otherwise provide to patrons; and
(2) delegate decision making to private software developers who closely guard their
selection criteria as trade secrets and who do not purport to make their decisions on the
basis of whether the blocked Web sites are constitutionally protected or would add value
to a public library’s collection” (CIPA13 p. 190). As noted previously, CIPA regulated
minors’ access to content that fell under strict legal definitions of that which was harmful
to them. These definitions invariably relied on constitutional considerations –
considerations that the technical specifications of the filtering software did not embed. In
the District Court’s eventual ruling on CIPA, it was found that no product “blocks
material on the basis of legal categories; all use variously defined categories of their
own” (CIPA09a pp. 4-5). Also, where CIPA required the installation of a technology
protection measure “that blocks or filters Internet access to visual depictions” (CIPA01 p.
1) of material harmful to minors, of the filtering products reviewed, “None blocks on the
basis of visual depictions; all consider and block text as well” (CIPA09a pp. 4-5). When
considered alongside the propensity of filters to over and underblock, it seemed clear to
the opposition that filters were far too crude to replace the judgment, experience, and
expertise of local librarians.
Filters also subverted the viewpoint neutrality that underpinned the library’s
legitimacy to make content-based decisions when choosing their collections. This
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technology, based on its commercial utility and due to its trade secret opacity, had the
likelihood of making blocking decisions based on criteria other than those specified
within the law. Specifically, the opposition argued that filtering products made “contentand viewpoint-based filtering decisions” that were “subjective” in nature and “seldom
made public” (CIPA11 pp. 4, 14-17). Besides, even these legal categories of disallowed
content did not apply to adult library users and would, in fact, harm the democratic rights
of those patrons if the law forced them to operate under such constraints.
All of these points encompassed the opposition’s next diagnostic frame. That is,
the opacity of the software’s filtering categories, due to trade secret protections, had the
propensity to deny access to a great deal of speech that the constitution clearly protected.
Furthermore, the subjective nature of blocking categories and keywords did not account
for the strict legal definitions of unacceptable content delineated by the law. Lastly, the
tendency of commercial filtering software to block content based on arbitrary or
subjective criteria eviscerated the viewpoint neutrality required within the limited public
forum of the library. Not only did this misrepresent the professional judgment
traditionally exercised by librarians when making collection decisions but it also put the
library at risk of imposing a prior restraint on free speech. Congress had insisted that
there was nothing within CIPA “that necessitates a violation of viewpoint neutrality”
(CIPA03 p. 7). Instead, Congress only intended the law “to filter or block material based
on its inappropriate content, not based on any particular viewpoint” (Id). Nonetheless,
the opposition argued that this instrumental representation of the filtering software was
dangerously incorrect and demonstrated a lack of understanding at the legislative level.
Instead, the ALA and other oppositional groups were convinced that “All currently
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available filtering software is created and maintained by private parties, whose contentand viewpoint-based filtering decisions are seldom made public, do not incorporate
individualized determinations of contemporary community standards, and are never
subjected to the requisite exacting judicial scrutiny” (CIPA11 p. 4). Worst of all, “all
available filtering technology blocks access to a tremendous amount of constitutionally
protected expression” (Id).
Not only did filtering software have the tendency to block speech that qualified
for First Amendment protection but also, as the opposition argued, designers intended it
to do so. Manufacturers deliberately targeted these products for a commercial
marketplace where no accommodation for constitutionally protected content was
necessary.28 When imposed on public institutions, this intentional design feature meant
that filters would invariably block “substantial amounts of fully protected expression on
the Internet based solely on the content and viewpoint of that expression” (CIPA11 pp.
14-17). Manufacturers’ definitions of “objectionable content” would unavoidably “curb
access to web sites addressing political and social issues” (Id). McCain and Congress
repeatedly emphasized that, in the interest of local autonomy and community standards,
“the government is expressly banned from prescribing what material constitutes ‘matter
deemed to be inappropriate for minors’” (CIPA03 p. 9). Supporters took this position to
place CIPA above the fray in any conflict over viewpoint neutrality. Nevertheless, the
opposition had made a powerful argument that, rather than placing true authority in the
hands of individuals and local administrators, Congress had really only delegated that

28

As of 2013, one market research firm calculated the filtering software market to be worth $1.044 billion.
That market has been defined “primarily by parental spending; to a lesser extent, educational institutions,
such as schools and public libraries, and information and communication service providers” (ABI, 2013).
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power to private filtering manufacturers. Within the context of this frame, access to
restricted speech was harmed because “Blocking decisions by private filtering
companies…are not subject to any review, either by a proper judicial authority, or by the
libraries who use the software” (CIPA12 pp. 23-24). Without real transparency and “In
the absence of proper blocking standards…decisions by private filtering companies as to
what constitutes, for example, obscenity, amount to an unlawful scheme of ‘informal
censorship’” (Id).
The only potential saving grace for CIPA was the policy’s disabling provision.
This could ameliorate many of the opposition’s First Amendment concerns. This was
especially true for adult access in public libraries where a patron only needed to ask the
librarian to disable the software before they could access almost any site they wished. In
practice this provision did not alleviate the opposition’s concerns and the ALA was
convinced that “these completely discretionary provisions create even more constitutional
problems than they solve” (CIPA12 p. 26). For example, the requirement that patrons
must ask for filters to be disabled might discourage them from doing so. This could
qualify as a prior restraint and was a deterrent that did not present itself when a patron
wished to peruse the library’s physical collection. As the opposition would argue, “The
dangerous chilling effect” represented by a disabling request “arises precisely because of
the disfavored nature of filtered speech; most people are aware that filters often block
access to materials that, although constitutionally protected, are undesirable, offensive, or
reprehensible to some” (Id p. 27). As the ALA would point out, “the chilling effect
created by CIPA’s disabling provisions is particularly problematic because it requires
library patrons to petition the government for access to protected speech” (Id p. 28).
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Part V – Legislative Prognostic Frames
Despite these oppositional concerns, Congress insisted that “Schools and libraries
have the affirmative duty to protect minors while in their custody” and that CIPA helped
them exercise this duty (CIPA19 p. 55). The use of filters in these institutions (whether
voluntary or not) demonstrated “that educators are taking reasonable steps to protect their
kids” (Id). In order to solve the problem of minors’ unregulated access to the Internet,
the clear choice was commercial blocking and filtering software. In a somewhat circular
argument, legislators maintained that “Effective filtering technology exists and is
effective” (Id). This would be a consistent theme throughout the legislative prognostic
frames and Congressional supporters of CIPA would argue that filters were the best
option of any available alternatives, that contemporary filters were vastly improved
relative to older versions and that the mere existence of CIPA and its filtering
requirement would spur additional innovation in the filtering market. Such advancements
would, lawmakers hoped, further ameliorate any constitutional concerns and improve
filters’ ease of use for schools and libraries.
McCain and his legislative supporters were convinced that commercial filtering
products were the best and most obvious solution to the problems they had identified.
Time and again, they emphasized that, as opposed to the CDA and COPA which would
have imposed “censorship from above,” CIPA was preferable because it simply required
the use of “technology to make sure kids don’t have access to harmful materials”
(CIPA25 p. 5). Legislators maintained that filters were “effective” and able to “keep
pace with the Internet…very easy-to-use and configure, and can be set to block all variety
of objectionable material” (Id). It was obvious that the Internet was a valuable “tool for
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business, education, and commerce” but it was undeniable that there was a “significant
amount of obscenity and illegal information” online as well (CIPA19 p. 50). If the goal
of Congress was “to limit access to this type of material without affecting the overall
Internet experience for the user” then CIPA’s filtering mandate was “the best alternative
to solving these issues” (Id).
CIPA and commercial filtering products were, to Congress, the clear solution in
the context of their prognostic frame. When confronted with the question of whether or
not filtering technology was capable of meeting the requirements of the law, for CIPA’s
supporters “The answer is a resounding yes” (CIPA19 p. 55). The government brushed
away librarians’ First Amendment concerns and Congress referred these naysayers to at
least one “recently released study [which] confirms that blocking software has only a
negligible impact on access to valuable information” (CIPA14 pp. 43-44). Besides,
patrons had a multitude of options to pursue if filters were overly exclusive and “Any
information that may be erroneously blocked can often be found on another Web site or
on the library’s bookshelves” (Id). Congress also relied on studies demonstrating to
librarians that they were already using filtering software and were quite happy doing so.
In partial response to the ALA’s concerns about CIPA’s technological requirements,
Congress reminded them that “In the past two years, use of software filtering by public
libraries has increased 121 percent” and that “90 percent of school librarians and public
school librarians are either ‘very well’ or ‘somewhat well satisfied’ with filtering
software” (CIPA19 p. 11). What they failed to mention was that this 90% only accounted
for those librarians who had voluntarily implemented filtering software prior to CIPA’s
mandate and may have been predisposed to be satisfied with their decision. It does not
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appear that Congress ever polled librarians who either had no experience with filtering
software or had purposely chosen to refrain from using it. To be fair, CIPA’s supporters
did rely on the testimony of at least one public librarian who recognized the need for
legislative action.29 Although she acknowledged that she did “not propose to be an
expert on filters,” this witness presented anecdotal evidence that “librarians who have
real experience with them tell me they suit their purposes quite well” (CIPA19 p. 37). In
response to the ALA’s arguments against overly aggressive filters, this librarian
unilaterally declared that these assertions “are simply not true” (Id). While she did agree
that “no filter claims to be or is one hundred percent effective”, they were more than
adequate as a solution to the problem of minors’ access to inappropriate content (Id). In
fact, she argued that filters were exceptionally effective and that the “odds of accessing
an inappropriate site with a filter on is ‘about as likely as winning the lottery’” (Id).
Although Congress had been tone deaf to the ALA’s primary concerns about the
nature of filters, their propensity to overblock protected content and the tendency of these
systems to remove decision-making authority from local librarians, CIPA’s supporters
did at least engage with some contemporary research about filters and did include some
testimony from those who would be forced to employ filters in order to remain CIPAcompliant. None of this evidence addressed filters as anything other than an instrumental
and viewpoint neutral solution to the problem Congress had identified. Despite this,
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Prepared Statement of Laura G. Morgan, Public Librarian. “E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the
Children’s Internet Protection Act.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, April 4, 2001 (CIPA19 pp. 29-48). The testimony of
this single librarian differed significantly from the ALA’s independent research (see CIPA09a p. 5).
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Congress was quick to admit that filters were not technically perfect nor were they likely
to be in the foreseeable future.
In an effort to acknowledge this reality while still promoting the efficacy of their
preferred solution, Congress would again rely on physical metaphors to bolster their
claims. For example, the failure of software to block all harmful material or to allow
access to all protected speech was not dissimilar, they argued, to seatbelts and turn
signals. Filters, they suggested, were not so different from “the safety equipment on cars,
e.g., the brakes, seat belts, and headlights” (CIPA19 p. 11). Automobile regulatory
agencies did not “require 100 percent effectiveness by any safety equipment before we
use it” and it was ridiculous to assume that filters should be held to such an impossible
standard (Id). It was equally ridiculous, and even dangerous, to suggest that children be
let out on the road without driver training, seatbelts and airbags simply because these
technologies were not entirely effective. Why should Congress allow such risky behavior
on the information superhighway when filters could block a wide range of questionable
material? Congress appealed to common sense, decency and the ease of implementing
this simple solution. Simply put, filters were “the most effective way to safeguard kids
from inappropriate content online” and these systems were nothing more or less than
“safety technology, like seatbelts, for Internet surfing” (Id p. 43). Furthermore, while
“Seatbelts are not 100 percent guaranteed to save a child’s life…there is no parent in
America that doesn’t buckle up when they get in the car” (Id). It would be irresponsible
to deny the safety provided by filters simply because the “technology may not be 100
percent fool-proof” (Id). This was a powerful rhetorical turn within the legislative
prognostic frame and, from this perspective, the “90 percent effective” rate of some
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filters seemed to offer a miraculous solution in the effort to protect kids from offensive
material.
With confidence in the ability of filters to regulate content successfully in the vast
majority of circumstances, Congress bolstered their claims about this technology by
suggesting that it would continue to evolve. Senator McCain noted that most objections
about filtering were “based largely on problems associated with earlier versions of clientbased software that are admittedly crude and ineffective…filtering has gone through an
extensive evolution” (CIPA05 p. 8). Not only had these products shown a tendency to
improve over time but the mere presence of CIPA’s filtering requirement would
encourage even more and faster improvements. In an argument reminiscent of legislative
claims made during the fight over the CDA, CIPA’s supporters would echo assertions
that “the market is encouraged by the presence of a legal obligation” (CDA16 p. 25) and
there existed “the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops”
(CDA01 pp. 100-101). Simply by passing CIPA, Congress all but ensured that “filter
companies are going to be able to develop the technology with the help of this law so that
it will” more accurately carry out its intended function (CIPA19 p. 26). Filters would
improve as a direct consequence of the law and Congress emphasized the idea that “CIPA
has a future-looking, beneficial purpose of encouraging the development of filter
technologies, thus furthering the mass communications and Internet development goals of
Congress” (Id p. 29). In this way, CIPA was a self-fulfilling prophecy by which
Congress could ensure the safety of today’s children through filters and even expand that
protection through the incentives it provided to filtering manufacturers. Regulatory
technology was the answer today and it would be an even better answer tomorrow.
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In conjunction with this argument, CIPA’s supporters also pointed to the already
increased accuracy and efficiency of filtering software as opposed to the technology of
just a few years before. Congress touted the evolutionary leap that filters had taken
during this time, suggesting that these products embodied almost none of the flaws of
earlier versions. They argued that “Today’s technology has risen far above these early
products by using computers that scour the Internet coupled with human review to ensure
a high level of accuracy…today’s technology protection measures are more advanced
than ever before” (CIPA19 pp. 50-51). Filtering companies, perhaps aware of the
potential for a vastly expanded market, did not disabuse Congress of this assumption. In
fact, one filtering manufacturer would point to its opposition of previous legislation as
vindication of both the effectiveness of filters and the role this technology could play as a
solution to the problem of minors’ access. Specifically, CyberPatrol would argue that,
during the debate over the CDA, “One of the chief arguments in that case was that
filtering technology was more effective than the law in protecting children from
inappropriate content on line. It still is. The difference between now and then is that
there are vastly more children on line and the technology is vastly better” (Id p. 43). The
opposition’s prior arguments regarding the efficacy of filters had essentially become
ammunition for CIPA’s supporters. Equally, where Congress had once eschewed filters
as “not the preferred solution” (COPA21 p. 19), they now embraced this technology
wholeheartedly. Both sides had undergone a frame shift in the context of filtering
technology and had essentially swapped positions when it came to the appropriateness of
their use. The key difference for the opposition was that it had advocated for the
voluntary use of filters as opposed to CIPA’s mandate.
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Furthermore, in order to buttress their claim that filters were the obvious solution
to the problems posed by minors’ unregulated Internet access, legislators would also cast
doubt on the opposition’s arguments detailing the gross inaccuracy of filters. Here,
lawmakers would suggest that the ALA and other groups had “misled the public into
believing that filtering does not work, or more accurately, does not work well” (CIPA19
p. 43). When finally released, the Congressionally-mandated report on filters would
serve to vindicate this point of view, at least obliquely. Specifically, the report would
find “little doubt that technology plays a role in reducing a child’s exposure to
inappropriate content” and “Nineteen of the twenty-six product tests found filters
effective” in this regard (CIPA26 pp. 12-13). Yet this finding is somewhat misleading
because it only relates to the ability of filters to block offensive content, not its ability to
accommodate educational, valuable, or otherwise protected speech. The comments of
Senator Markey (D-MA) during the public hearing on CIPA exemplify this contradiction.
Specifically, Mr. Markey insisted that “you can argue that [filters are] an unconstitutional
infringement of First Amendment rights of Americans, and at the same time you can
argue that it is imperfect in blocking out sites. But you can’t have both arguments
simultaneously” (CIPA19 p. 68). This demonstrates a misunderstanding of both filtering
technology and the opposition’s arguments against it. Commercial filters can, in fact, do
both at the same time. As the opposition would point out repeatedly, filters both missed a
great deal of offensive content (underblocking) and erroneously restricted a great deal of
constitutionally protected speech (overblocking). The crux of the opposition’s argument
was that filters were inadequate in both circumstances simultaneously.
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So, while Congress did, at least to some extent, engage with both contemporary
research about filters and with the opposition’s arguments against filters, they do not
appear to have addressed the implications of these products for autonomy, transparency,
and access to protected speech. In fact, time and again, legislators passed over a more
substantive review of such systems in favor of an instrumental portrayal of these
technologies. At no point did McCain’s supporters address the potential for embedded
bias within these systems or the delegation of decision-making authority to filtering
manufacturers. Instead, legislators continued to approach these regulatory technologies
as nothing more than useful tools that blocked content based on objective, viewpoint
neutral categories instead of subjective judgments based on the values of company
owners and product designers. Filters were simply effective tools, comparable to
automobile safety equipment and other objects that had no adverse impact on individual
rights and autonomy (CIPA25 p. 5). These products were simply a “technology tool” that
was “well suited to be able to block that which is defined in this Act” (CIPA19 pp. 8889). At the same time, there was at least some awareness at the legislative level that
filtering technology had the potential to encroach upon individual rights. CIPA’s
disabling provision is a direct result of this awareness and, at least by subtext, indicates
that Congress was cognizant of the potential for inappropriate restrictions on access to
information (CIPA26 p. 16). Senator McCain was also directly aware of this facet of the
technology and indicated that he shared the opposition’s concerns about censorship
(CIPA25 p. 45). McCain simply argued that we should accept this downside of the
technology and be “willing to sacrifice some of our civil liberties to protect these children
from these terrible things that are being inflicted on them” (Id).
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Part VI – Oppositional Prognostic Frames
Not surprisingly, the opposition in general and the ALA in particular were
unconvinced by the government’s suggestion that commercial filtering products were the
best and only solution available. In language familiar from the controversy over the
CDA and then COPA, the opposition would argue vehemently that the problems
presented by the mandatory imposition of filters necessitated immediate action. In order
to ameliorate the harms caused by these systems, the opposition proposed three primary
solutions. First, because filters were inherently flawed and unable to account for the legal
and constitutional considerations that underpinned CIPA, lawmakers should minimize
use of these access controls or remove them from the statutory language entirely.
Second, any such technology, especially commercial filters, must operate in as
transparent a manner as possible if they were to mediate access to such a wide range of
online content. Finally, because it was so unlikely that proponents would make such
amendments to the policy or that they would remove filtering requirements, the
opposition felt it had no alternative but to demand that courts strike down the policy as an
unconstitutional restraint of free speech.
This first point, that the use of access controls such as filtering software should be
minimized or removed from CIPA’s language entirely, was predicated on the critical
understanding that filters could not account for the legal definitions of “harmful” content
on which CIPA relied. This was a fundamental part of the opposition’s argument and the
ALA in particular was adamant that “the Children’s Internet Protection Act is
unconstitutional” and the “filtering mandate imposed by Congress is unworkable in the
context of a public institution because it restricts access to constitutionally protected
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speech on the users served by libraries” (CIPA10b p. 5). Even more alarming for the
opposition was the fact that Congress knew of this feature of the technology and chose to
implement CIPA’s filtering provision anyway. Due to the COPA Commission’s report to
Congress (CIPA09 p. 3), legislators should have been conscious of this constitutionally
fatal flaw of the technology. As the opposition would point out, “Congress was well
aware [that] no technology exists that can effectively block the precise categories of
speech enumerated in the Act.” (CIPA11 p. 4). The opposition hammered the
government on this issue and pointed out again and again that “Filtering software blocks
access to Internet content in advance of any judicial test of the legal status of the blocked
information and without any assessment by a court or jury as to local community
standards. It would be impossible as a legal matter for nongovernmental private filtering
companies to determine which websites or visual depictions on the Internet fall within the
narrow legal definitions of ‘obscenity,’ ‘child pornography,’ and ‘harmful to minors’” (Id
pp. 14-17). Expert testimony supported this argument and confirmed this portrayal of the
technology. When asked to a provide substantive review of filtering systems, this expert
would testify that, including the four products he tested specifically, he was “unaware of
any other blocking program that uses CIPA’s specific categories and definitions”
(CIPA06 pp. 15-16). This same expert would point to deposition testimony from major
filtering manufacturers who “specifically agreed that their companies cannot speak to the
compliance of their systems with CIPA’s requirements and that they cannot guarantee
that their products block only images targeted by CIPA” (Id).
Nor was it any comfort to the opposition that future filtering technology would
hew more closely to the law’s definitions of harmful content. While Congress was
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convinced that filters had improved significantly and would continue to do so, the
opposition strongly disagreed. As they would argue, “The problems with filters are not
simply short-term glitches that will be solved by technological advances, as the
Government suggests” but instead “the flaws identified with blocking software inhere in
the nature of the Web and the necessary tradeoff between the goals of blocking as much
content as possible (to prevent underblocking) and correctly categorizing the content of
individual Web pages (to prevent overblocking)” (CIPA16 p. 27).
The opposition had made a forceful argument that the technological mechanisms
required by CIPA failed to meet the strict statutory definitions set out by Congress.
Intertwined with this aspect of the technology was the propensity of these systems to
“function as automatic censors that irrationally and arbitrarily” restricted access to a wide
range of valuable content (CIPA09d pp. 12-13). Filters denied “access to critical,
constitutionally protected speech related to many subject areas” including “medical
information, political information and information related to the arts and literature”
(CIPA10b p. 5). Due to its inability to account for all (or only) that content defined as
harmful by the law, filters would invariably block valuable material based on the
ideology embedded within the software by filtering manufacturers and designers. These
private actors undoubtedly had ideas of their own about what content warranted filtering
either due to their own preconceptions or because they were anticipating what their
customers might find offensive (CIPA19 p. 42). If manufacturers did not ground these
decisions in constitutional considerations, they were, by definition, not viewpoint neutral.
This was the basis for the opposition’s argument that filtering “software blocks a host of
valuable expressive content and viewpoints on the Internet” (CIPA11 pp. 31-32) in
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violation of the neutrality librarians were supposed to exercise when making collection
decisions. If filters imposed arbitrary blocking on adults, it would “reduce adults’
Internet access to material suitable only for children” (Id). The opposition was certain
that “Filtering software blocks substantial amounts of fully protected expression on the
Internet based solely on the content and viewpoint of that expression” (CIPA11 p. 16).
The arbitrary nature of filtering products was of even greater concern to the ALA
and other oppositional groups because they had no idea what the filters blocked or why.
One of the key reasons why these groups demanded that the courts strike the filtering
provision from CIPA was because there was no way of knowing what went on inside the
software. In the absence of critical study and without the ability to conduct a substantive
review of these blocking processes, neither the opposition nor Congress could really
know how the exclusion of content took place. In short, “Because most filtering software
operates on undisclosed, secret criteria, filtering companies are free to implement their
own subjective judgments in their blocking programs” (CIPA11 pp. 14-17). Congress
had made it clear that commercial filtering products were the preferred means for schools
and libraries to remain CIPA compliant. Despite this, none of the thousands of
institutions subject to CIPA truly had any sense of what they were imposing on their
communities. The inherent opacity of this technology and its embedded categories
troubled the opposition. The filtering provision could not stand, they argued, if “no one
but the filtering companies has access to the complete list of URLs in any [blocking]
category” and as long as this information was “unavailable for review by customers or
the general public” (CIPA13 p. 57). The ACLU would eventually attempt to have these
blocking lists and categories disclosed through court action based on the premise that, if
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the government were to “mandate the use of blocking programs, the public has a right to
know what is being blocked” (CIPA09c p. 8). Regardless, this demand would fall on
deaf ears and the court denied the ACLU’s request due to filtering companies’ strong
trade secret protections. For the opposition, this was simply more evidence that CIPA’s
filtering requirements were ill conceived and misunderstood even by those who had
written the law.
Concurrent with their anxieties about the subjectivity and opacity of filters, the
ALA expressed concern about the impact this kind of blind filtering could have on adult
access. The ALA believed strongly that this policy would spill over into adult Internet
use and subject these library patrons to the same kind of filtering that Congress only
intended for children. The ALA felt that the “Children’s Internet Protection Act is a
misnomer” and the “legislation would not strictly limit access for minors, but for adults
and all Internet users in a library” (CIPA10b p. 6). Therefore, the opposition argued that
while CIPA was “commonly referred to as a ‘child protection measure,’ it goes further
and operates to block adult access as well” (CIPA19 p. 18). By doing so, the opposition
suggested that this law would “follow the CDA and COPA along the trail of
unconstitutional attempts to censor the Internet” (Id).
In addition to this, the opposition would note that the disabling provision was no
remedy for this deficiency. While legislative supporters of CIPA believed that this
provision added a layer of constitutional legitimacy to the law, the ALA and other groups
were not so sanguine. Again, they pointed to the nature of filtering technology and its
inability to accommodate disabling requests with the ease that Congress had implied. On
the contrary, careful study had demonstrated that “While blocking programs purport to
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have capabilities that would facilitate this [disabling] process, numerous practical
problems make it unlikely that, in practice, such a system could be successfully
implemented using existing network-based software” (CIPA06 p. 32). The only possible
solution to the harm this would inflict on adult patrons’ rights and autonomy was the
minimization of the use of filters in public libraries or the removal of CIPA’s mandate
requiring their installation.
This prognosis went hand in hand with the ALA’s deep ideological conflict with
filtering patrons’ access to information. In fact, the ALA’s own internal Bill of Rights
strongly required that “Materials should not be excluded because of the origin,
background, or views of those contributing to their creation. Libraries should provide
materials and information presenting all points of view on current and historical issues.
Materials should not be proscribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal
disapproval” (CIPA11p. 17). Filtering online content clashed sharply with this
philosophy and the ALA was adamant that the public library should remain “an
invaluable forum for the communication and receipt of information…for the interest,
information, and enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves” (Id).
While Congress had insisted that the use of commercial filtering software was on the rise
in public libraries and that this technology mostly satisfied librarians (CIPA19 p. 11), the
ALA told a much different story. Based on its own research, this oppositional group
would argue that “Prior to this law, over 90 percent of American libraries, after careful
consideration, decided not to require patrons to use blocking software” (CIPA09a p. 5).
Based on a careful and critical review of the potential impact of filtering technology, the
ALA argued, public libraries had overwhelmingly chosen not to impose filters on their
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communities. Specifically, “Those libraries, after looking at the deficiencies of existing
blocking software products, concluded that other means of preventing unwanted Internet
content were at least as effective and were more protective of the values shared by
libraries and the First Amendment” (Id). Due to these findings and grounded in
librarians’ deep ideological concerns, “The vast majority of libraries offering public
Internet access have opted not to impose content blocking software on patron Internet
use” (CIPA11 pp. 18-19). In the infrequent cases where “public libraries have instituted
mandatory filtering policies applicable to all patron use” filtering had consistently “raised
serious constitutional concerns” (Id).
As a solution to the problems posed by commercial filters, the opposition offered
several alternatives of their own. First, as the ACLU pointed out, there was no need to
mandate the strict use of this technology. The Congressional study on CIPA’s filtering
requirement would offer some support in this regard and would find that the Act’s
insistence on filtering and blocking technology was too restrictive. Specifically, the
report would conclude that Congress should amend the statutory language because “many
educational institutions default to ‘filtering” technology only” (CIPA26 p. 29). The
report found this aspect of CIPA unacceptable due to the fact that “filtering and blocking
software has not been able to overcome problems of overblocking, inability to generate
an updated index for the Internet, and lack of correspondence to statutory definitions and
categories” (Id). Clearly, most librarians did not concur with the government’s
assessment that filters were a natural fit for public libraries. The ALA’s evidence
undermined the government’s reliance on the unsubstantiated testimony of a single
witness and cast doubt on the suggestion that librarians would rush to implement filters.
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From the opposition’s point of view, there were a multitude of alternatives that
placed true autonomy in the hands of public libraries and library patrons. For example,
while “Some libraries offer optional use of blocking software” many others relied on
“training on Internet searches, lists of recommended sites, privacy screens or other
methods of assisting patrons in finding the material they want and avoiding material they
do not want” (CIPA09a p. 5). The ACLU would repeatedly point to these options, each
of which emphasized, “the importance of local control in determining library Internet
policies” (Id p. 10). Rather than conflating the use of filtering software with librarians’
thoughtful collection decisions, the opposition was resolute that librarians should
continue to function as they always had. One library director suggested that “Long
before blocking programs ever became an issue, libraries have made it their mission to
help people find exactly the information they need, whether it is online or on paper” but
CIPA made “it impossible for us to do our jobs” (Id p. 12). The ACLU emphasized that
“Librarians are uniquely qualified to teach library patrons how to find the content they
want and avoid inappropriate content without the government trying to deputize them
into the thought police” (Id). Many librarians took great umbrage that Congress would
suggest otherwise, misrepresenting the work librarians did in the process. Nancy
Kranich, then president of the ALA, would summarize the role of libraries and librarians:
“It is the mission of libraries to provide access to the broadest range of information for a
community of diverse individuals. The vast majority of children and adults use the library
responsibly and appropriately. We must ensure that they continue to have access to the
materials they need to thrive in the 21st-Century information society” (CIPA10 p. 1).
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Part VII – Judicial Opinion
Signed into law on December 21, 2000, the Children’s Internet Protection Act
was the subject of an immediate legal challenge. As with COPA and the CDA before it,
the opposition filed a complaint against the government in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The American Library Association and
the ACLU led the charge against this policy, alleging that it “imposes unprecedented,
sweeping federal speech restrictions on public libraries nationwide” (CIPA11 p. 2).
These groups and the government would defend their positions in alignment with the
arguments described throughout this chapter. Almost without exception, the District
Court would take up the opposition’s point that CIPA in general and filtering software in
particular were inherently flawed, could not account for constitutionally protected speech
and did not accommodate individual or institutional autonomy.
The court initially expressed sympathy for the legislative master frame that the
government had a compelling interest in protecting children and its diagnostic frame that
unregulated access to the Internet could harm minors. Specifically, the three-judge panel
would agree that the Internet could facilitate “the widespread dissemination of hardcore
pornography within the easy reach of…children and adolescents to whom it may be quite
harmful” (CIPA13 pp. 4-5). This sympathy did not extend to the technological means by
which Congress hoped to achieve its compelling interest. The judges would find that
“the government’s interest in preventing the dissemination of such [harmful] speech
cannot justify the use of the technology protection measures mandated by CIPA, which
necessarily block substantial amounts of constitutionally protected speech” (Id p. 158).
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This perspective strongly echoed the opposition’s master and diagnostic frames and
would exemplify the court’s position on CIPA.
First, similar to the CDA courts, this court would focus on the unique nature of
the medium and its potential as a vast democratic forum. Quoting liberally from Internet
scholar Lawrence Lessig’s work, the court here would argue strongly that the
“architecture of the Internet, as it is right now, is perhaps the most important model of
free speech since the founding…Two hundred years after the framers ratified the
Constitution, the Net has taught us what the First Amendment means” (Id p. 141). Public
libraries, like the Internet, were “effective vehicles for free speech” (Id p. 139). When
combined, there was a “unique speech-enhancing character of Internet use in public
libraries” that “derives from the openness of the public library to any member of the
public seeking to receive information, and the openness of the Internet to any member of
the public who wishes to speak” (Id p. 140). Like the opposition, the court would suggest
that CIPA squandered the potential of both the medium and the institution if filters
diminished the freedom to choose and “if we assume the Government is best positioned
to make these choices for us” (Id p. 141).
The court was also gravely concerned that filtering software was wholly
inadequate for achieving the government’s compelling interests while preserving both
autonomy and constitutionally protected speech. First and foremost among these
concerns was that this technology failed to account for the strict statutory definitions of
the law. The court would take up the opposition’s argument that “No category definition
used by the blocking programs is identical to the legal definitions of obscenity, child
pornography, or material harmful to minors…defined by CIPA” (Id pp. 13-14). All of
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the filtering programs examined by the court were “intrinsically unable to block only
illegal Internet content while simultaneously allowing access to all protected speech” (Id
p. 9). Given these “constraints of the technology” and after careful review of an array of
filtering software, the court found that “it is currently impossible…to develop a filter that
neither underblocks or overblocks a substantial amount of speech” (Id pp. 9-10). Also,
like the opposition, the judges would remain unconvinced that future technological
advances would ameliorate these deficiencies. Instead, the court would rule that “Given
the state of the art in filtering and image recognition technology, and the rapidly changing
and expanding nature of the Web, we find that filtering products’ shortcomings will not
be solved through a technical solution in the foreseeable future” (Id pp. 99-100).
Equally distressing to the judges was the subjective manner in which the software
blocked content. The court would find that, because manufacturers primarily designed
filters for customers who did not, by law, have to account for constitutional
considerations, they were incapable of accomplishing the state’s goals. Both automated
categorization of content and human review would inevitably fail in this regard due to
designers’ and reviewers’ “boredom or lack of attentiveness, overzealousness, or a desire
to ‘err on the side of caution’” (Id pp. 65-66). Therefore, the technology would
invariably filter some protected material based on the anticipation of what “might be
offensive to some customers” (Id). There was no accommodation for the judicial review
of disallowed content, no filtering companies trained their staff to account for the strict
legal definitions of unacceptable content, and no company “instructs reviewers to take
community standards into account when making categorization decisions” (Id). Without
these safeguards, filtering software would continue to deny access to religious, political,
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medical, and educational content inappropriately (Id pp. 91-94). The subjective nature of
this regulatory system would, therefore, result in a situation where “filters single out for
exclusion particular speech on the basis of its disfavored content” (Id p. 142).
Additionally, because the methods and categories of disallowed speech were proprietary
information, they were “unavailable for review by customers or the general public” (Id p.
57). For the court, this opacity was unacceptable, particularly within public libraries
where content-based decisions must include viewpoint neutrality.
Next, the three judges addressed the impact this subjectivity and opacity would
have on adult library patrons. CIPA, the court found, was not strictly limited to minors
in that the law required that “a library must also certify that filtering software is in
operation during adult use of the Internet” (Id p. 21). While the government had offered
CIPA’s disabling provision as proof that the law would not unduly constrain adult access,
the court did not agree. Specifically, the court took issue with the fact that any such
disabling request would “deter many patrons because they are embarrassed, or desire to
protect their privacy or remain anonymous” (Id pp. 15-16). Additionally, there was no
guarantee that librarians could disable the software without delay or in a manner that
would not significantly hinder adult access. When confronted with the practicalities of
filtering software, the court agreed with the opposition that “the unblocking may take
days, and may be unavailable, especially in branch libraries, which are often less well
staffed than main libraries” (Id). The disabling provision also placed librarians in an
inappropriate gatekeeping role in which they now had the discretion to approve or deny
such a request “pending a determination of the validity of a Web site blocked by the
blocking programs” (Id p. 51). In the court’s view, this essentially placed a hegemonic
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restriction on speech and unlawfully burdened adult rights and autonomy. Not only could
the request itself act as a deterrent if the individual found the material in question to be
personally embarrassing (Id pp. 51-52), but “the requirement that library patrons ask a
state actor’s permission to access disfavored content violates the First Amendment” (Id
pp. 174-175). Considering the power that filters had to make initial determinations as to
the acceptability of content and the undesirable position that the disabling provision put
librarians in, the court felt it had no alternative but to find that CIPA created an
“impermissible prior restraint on speech” (Id p. 8). In the court’s opinion, they must
strike CIPA down because it granted, “filtering companies and library staff unfettered
discretion to suppress speech before it has been received by library patrons” (Id).
Finally, the court would find that this law both misrepresented the traditional
function of public librarians and “distort[ed] the usual functioning of public libraries” (Id
p. 190). By providing access to the Internet, public libraries had essentially opened this
“vast democratic forum” for public use and any subsequent decision to narrow the scope
of that forum must account for constitutional considerations (Id pp. 12-13). Again, the
court implied hegemonic control over speech because “the state’s decision selectively to
exclude form the forum speech whose content the state disfavors” risks “distorting the
marketplace of ideas that the state had facilitated” (Id). This directly contradicted the
government’s strong insistence that “a public library’s decision to limit the content of its
digital offerings on the Internet” was analogous to the library’s “decisions about what
content to make available to its patrons through the library’s print collection” (Id p. 115).
The court’s position differed strikingly from this assessment and the judges would rule
that, by providing patrons with any access to the Internet, “the library permits patrons to
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receive speech on a virtually unlimited number of topics, from a virtually unlimited
number of speakers, without attempting to restrict patrons’ access to speech that the
library, in the exercise of its professional judgment, determines to be particularly
valuable” (Id p. 125). The court’s ruling rested heavily on this perspective and what it
saw as the proper role of the public library as well as the “severe limitations of filtering
technology” (Id pp. 183-184). Due directly to the “inherent limits of the filtering
technology mandated by CIPA,” the court concluded that “it is not possible for a public
library to comply with CIPA without blocking a very substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech” (Id).
Once again, the government would appeal the District Court’s ruling and apply
for Supreme Court review. Another round of briefing from both sides would ensue and
the Supreme Court would issue its final ruling in June of 2003. The result would be a
split decision where the majority of the Court found in favor of the government and, for
the first time, took exception to most of the points put forward by the opposition. In his
majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist prioritized the state’s master frame of protecting
children above the concerns of the ALA, ACLU and other oppositional groups. The
Court agreed that the accessibility of Internet pornography and other material
inappropriate for minors “has created serious problems for libraries, which have found
that patrons also expose others to pornographic images by leaving them displayed on
Internet terminals or printed at library printers” (CIPA18 pp. 2-3). In the Court’s view,
Congress had no alternative but to put forward legislation to address this ongoing harm
particularly if government subsidies provided to libraries were “facilitating access to
illegal and harmful pornography” (Id). In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
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agreed with this justification for CIPA and that there were “substantial government
interests at stake” (CIPA18a pp. 1-2). Specifically, Kennedy found that, in the interest of
“protecting young library users from material inappropriate for minors” and considering
“the failure to show that the ability of adult library users to have access to the material is
burdened in any significant degree, the statute is not unconstitutional on its face” (Id).
Besides, from the Court’s point of view, “CIPA does not ‘penalize’ libraries that choose
not to install such software, or deny them the right to provide their patrons with unfiltered
Internet access” (CIPA18 p. 15). Instead, “CIPA simply reflects Congress’ decision not
to subsidize their doing so” (Id).30 This coincided directly with the government’s
argument that filters were not prohibiting speech because the state itself was the speaker.
Specifically, by providing funds for Internet access the state “remains the speaker, or at
least the subsidizer of the Internet speech” (CIPA03 p. 7). Therefore, Congress was free
to impose CIPA’s filtering requirements on public libraries and was constitutionally
correct in doing so.
Furthermore, while the Court acknowledged that filtering technology had the
potential “to erroneously block access to constitutionally protected speech” (CIPA18 pp.
11-12), this regulatory mechanism remained a “reasonably effective way to prevent”
access to inappropriate content (Id pp. 3-4). If some “constitutional difficulties” were to
result from such overblocking, the majority of the Court was convinced that “any such
concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software
disabled” (Id pp. 11-12). The opposition’s arguments against the disabling provision did
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In this the Court had established precedent to draw from. In particular, in National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), the Court had found that the provision of federal funding could be
conditioned on judgments as to the “decency” of the content being subsidized by the government.
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not sway the Court’s opinion and Justice Kennedy concurred that “If, on the request of an
adult user, a librarian will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter
without significant delay, there is little to this case” (CIPA18a p. 1). Furthermore, the
Court believed that this provision was neither a deterrent nor would it result in an adult
library user’s public embarrassment because “a patron would not have to explain…why
he was asking a site to be unblocked or the filtering to be disabled” (CIPA18 pp. 11-12).
Although more of a burden than not having to make such a request, to the Court this
provision was “no more onerous than traditional library practices associated with
segregating library materials in, say, closed stacks, or with interlibrary lending practices
that require patrons to make requests that are not anonymous and to wait while the
librarian obtains the desired materials from elsewhere” (CIPA18d p. 5).
This was a recurring theme in the Court’s opinion and many of the justices would
agree that filtering software was nothing more than a tool for extending librarians’
traditional role to the Internet. The Court would echo the government’s instrumental
argument that “[t]he Internet is simply another method for making information
available…It is no more than a technological extension of the book stack” (CIPA18 pp.
9-10). While acknowledging that “A library’s need to exercise judgment in making
collection decisions depends on its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile
material” the Court would affirm that the library “is no less entitled to play that role when
it collects material from the Internet than when it collects material from any other source”
(Id p. 11). Therefore, “A library’s decision to use filtering software is a collection
decision, not a restraint on private speech” (Id p. 13). The Court discounted the
opposition’s argument that CIPA subverted this traditional role by delegating decision-

270

making authority to private software manufacturers. The Court also did not address what
the opposition believed was the subjective and opaque manner in which filters
accomplished the state’s goals. Instead, the Court would find that “it is entirely
reasonable for public libraries to…exclude certain categories of content, without making
individualized judgments” as to the merit of material within those categories (Id).
The Supreme Court had issued a strong, although divided (6-3), opinion on the
constitutionality of CIPA and the mandated use of commercial filtering software.
Senator McCain and his supporters had crafted policy that addressed many of the
opposition’s key arguments against the CDA and COPA. Furthermore, in CIPA,
Congress had attempted to balance the power of the government’s master frame with the
necessary constitutional considerations. In the Court’s view, lawmakers narrowly
targeted CIPA, the law did not place an undue burden on speakers, and it did not
significantly hinder adult access to protected speech. Specifically, public libraries’ “use
of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First Amendment rights,
CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution, and is a valid exercise of
Congress’ spending power” (Id p. 17). The government finally had its victory and CIPA
remains in force today.
That being said, the Court did leave some room for future legal challenges to this
policy. Perhaps in acknowledgment of the opposition’s anxieties, some justices would
admit that the law may not, in application, function as Congress intended. Based on the
use of commercial filtering software in public institutions, the Court expressed some
concern that “If some libraries do not have the capacity to unblock specific Web sites or
to disable the filter or if it is shown that an adult user’s election to view constitutionally
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protected Internet material is burdened in some other substantial way, that would be the
subject for an as-applied challenge” (CIPA18a p. 1). It was quite clear that if the filters
were to demonstrate any of the negative tendencies the opposition had described then, for
the Court, “it goes without saying that our decision today would not foreclose an asapplied challenge” (CIPA18b p. 3).
With this in mind, it is important to note that, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling,
many of the opposition’s arguments have proven to be prescient in the years following
the passage of CIPA. The harms they identified at the outset of this debate are ongoing
(see Mauger, 2012) and, although the technical processes of filtering software have been
refined in the intervening years, they have not been perfected. For example, the ten most
highly rated filtering products today all continue to rely heavily on URL and keywordbased filtering. Only two of these ten offer “dynamic blocking” or the “ability to block or
allow a website based on the ever-changing content on a website as opposed to its URL”
(Top Ten Reviews, 2014). Furthermore, as recently as 2012, CyberPatrol (one of the
products named specifically in the 1999 Senate Report on CIPA) still invited customers
to “block sites by category” and “select pre-set profiles” for inappropriate content
(CyberPatrol Online Protection Pro: Features, 2012). Manufacturers continue to market
the CyberPatrol software directly to public institutions in order to “make it easy to block
adult and obscene material and help keep schools and libraries CIPA compliant”
(CyberPatrol Library Web Filtering: CIPA Compliance, 2012). The categories and
profiles employed by this software remain undisclosed.
Furthermore, while the software’s categorization of websites has undoubtedly
become more sophisticated, many products still fail to discern between legitimately
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harmful content and constitutionally protected speech. For example, in 2012 a court
ordered the Camdenton School District of Central Missouri to cease its use of a filtering
product designed to categorize LGBT content as unacceptable. In an effort to comply
with CIPA’s requirements, the school district had installed filtering software that
consistently and methodically “target[ed] the highest-quality informational sites that
express a positive viewpoint toward LGBT individuals” (PFLAG v. Camdenton, 2012).
This kind of categorization bias is not limited to public schools. For instance, an adult
patron sued a regional public library consortium in Washington State in federal court on
constitutional grounds. In this case, the libraries had installed FortiGuard, a commercial
filtering product that blocked access to the website womenandguns.com. This Second
Amendment Foundation, a “Washington nonprofit corporation dedicated to issues
associated with the constitutional right to keep and bear arms” (Bradburn v. NCRL,
2006), published the site. Although considered controversial by local administrators, this
site clearly contained material that dealt with constitutional issues.
Commercial filtering products continue to dominate the landscape for institutions
subject to CIPA. While these regulatory technologies have undoubtedly blocked access
to content inappropriate for minors in the intervening years, it is equally true that filters
have blocked material not contemplated by CIPA. It remains to be seen if this
technology will continue to dictate the acceptability of content or if constitutional
confrontations will require a critical re-evaluation of their use.
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Table 7 – Children’s Internet Protection Act Frame Analysis Summary
Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)





Prognostic
(Solution)





Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)





Prognostic
(Solution)





Legislative Themes
With the CDA dead and COPA in limbo, Congress intended CIPA to address
the continuing issue of protecting children online.
In order to observe constitutional concerns while safeguarding kids, Congress
narrows CIPA’s target of enforcement to public schools and public libraries.
The master frames remain inflexible and Senator McCain continues to suggest
that First Amendment protections are secondary to the protection of children.
Congress targeted schools and libraries as a point of access for minors that is
uniquely within the government’s control.
Legislators tied federal funding for Internet access to the requirement that
schools and libraries provide a filtered online environment for minors.
Congress has not significantly altered the diagnostic frame. Lawmakers
remain convinced that unregulated access is a harm and this perspective does
not appear to be open for debate.
Congress shifted the primary enforcement mechanism to commercial filtering
software that teachers and librarians must administer.
Lawmakers suggest that commercial filters are the best solution because
schools and libraries can customize them to meet community standards of
decency and disable them upon request.
By adjusting CIPA’s preferred regulatory technology, the government has
demonstrated some flexibility in the kinds of technological solutions they are
willing to consider.

Oppositional Themes
CIPA continued to be a threat to individual autonomy and constitutionally
protected speech online.
Although Congress had again narrowed the target of the law’s enforcement,
the opposition argued that CIPA must still preserve access for adults within
public libraries.
The opposition argued that legislators had not carefully considered the
implications of commercial filtering systems for rights, autonomy, or
transparency.
The opposition framed commercial filtering systems as biased and overly
restrictive mechanisms for the regulation of online content.
The imposition of filtering software at public access points would constrain
adult rights and would require adults to request access to protected speech
affirmatively.
The opposition argued that the installation of filters, their technological
categorization schemes, and trade secret opacity limited rights and autonomy
illegitimately.
The primary solutions are either to strike CIPA down as unconstitutional, or to
pursue other, less intrusive alternatives such as public education or computer
privacy screens.
CIPA was unconstitutional because of both the technological requirements of
the law and the burden placed on adults by the “disabling provision”.
If libraries voluntarily chose to implement filters, or if adult patrons were able
to access unfiltered computers, this offered a better solution than governmentmandated filtering through flawed commercial systems.
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Chapter 7 – The Stop Online Piracy Act
Introduction
With the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision on CIPA, Congress had finally passed
legislation designed to protect children from the dangers of harmful online content.
CIPA was the end result of a lengthy and contentious political process that demonstrated
the resonance of this master frame but that also exposed the weaknesses of policy that
relied on broad technological mechanisms of enforcement. Use of these regulatory
systems had a propensity for curtailing individual rights and content regulation schemes
that relied on them had negative constitutional implications. This was especially true in
the context of the Internet and the vast democratic forum it represented.
Despite the difficulties that had confronted supporters of the CDA, COPA and
CIPA, some members of Congress advocated for the expanded use of regulatory
technologies in other policy domains. These proponents of content regulation again
turned to these systems when confronted with a new threat to America’s interests.
Specifically, supporters of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT
Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) argued that technological mechanisms of enforcement
were the only solution to the problem of online copyright and counterfeiting violations.
Again these legislators would marvel at the continuing “advances of technology, and in
particular, those represented by the Internet” (SOPA23 p. 6) while lamenting those bad
actors who “facilitate the illegal distribution of copyrighted works through many different
forms, including streaming, downloading, or linking to another site or service offering
unauthorized content” (SOPA06 p. 73). Congress offered SOPA, PIPA and regulatory
technology as the only solution to this problem.
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Part I – Legislative Master Frames
The desire to protect intellectual property and to safeguard national security were
the primary motivations behind these new policy proposals. Lamar Smith (R-TX) first
proposed H.R. 3261, or SOPA, in the House by Representative in October of 2011.
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) had introduced a bill nearly identical to SOPA in the Senate in
May of that same year. The Senate version would become known as the Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011
(PROTECT IP Act) or PIPA. Both policies had similar stated goals and Smith presented
SOPA as a means “To promote prosperity, creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation
by combating the theft of U.S. property” (SOPA01 p. 1). Again, the language used to
promote PIPA was nearly identical and the purpose of this bill was “To prevent online
threats to economic creativity and theft of intellectual property” (SOPA02 p. 1).
Both SOPA and PIPA were successors to The Combating Online Infringement
and Counterfeits Act of 2010 (COICA). Proposed by Senator Leahy, COICA targeted
websites dedicated to infringing activities and provided the blueprint for these new policy
proposals. This included COICA’s focus on technological mechanisms of enforcement,
particularly its requirement that service providers and DNS operators impose a
technological barrier to access between users and the domain names of allegedly
infringing websites. Specifically, in language that foreshadowed SOPA and PIPA,
COICA required that service providers “take technically feasible and reasonable steps
designed to prevent a domain name from resolving to that domain name’s Internet
protocol address” and “the domain name registrar or domain name registry shall suspend
operation of, and lock, the domain name” of infringing entities (SOPA27 p. 7).
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COICA initially met with support from key members of the Senate and
unanimously passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in a 19-0 vote on January 20, 2010
(SOPA28 p. 1). Despite this early approval, COICA eventually met with strong
resistance from many of the same lawmakers who would offer similar concerns about
SOPA and PIPA. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) was instrumental in postponing COICA
and, based on his suggestion that this bill was moving too quickly, it was essentially
tabled before it could come to a full vote (SOPA29 p. 1). This set the stage for a new
round of legislation that would embody many of the same technological requirements
and, as the opposition would argue, many of the same flaws as COICA. SOPA and PIPA
provide the case for this frame analysis because they both embody and extend many of
the same arguments against COICA. Additionally, SOPA and PIPA resulted in some
novel oppositional approaches that did not manifest during COICA’s brief history.
Supporters of these new policies were convinced that the Internet had become a
clearinghouse for all manner of material that pirates had stolen, copied, counterfeited, and
distributed without the consent of the copyright or patent holder. This phenomenon
occurred to the detriment of American industry and the economy. Many in Congress
argued that they must pursue a legislative solution to stem the tide of lost jobs and
revenue resulting from stolen intellectual property. For these legislative supporters, both
SOPA and PIPA were “fundamentally about jobs and about protecting the jobs that
Americans have, creating products that are enjoyed all over the world” (SOPA06 p. 70).
It was incumbent on Congress to “pass sound legislation” that would “provide tools to
prevent websites…that do nothing but traffic in infringing material or counterfeits from
continuing to profit from piracy with impunity” (SOPA23 p. 7).
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The “tools” offered by Congress through SOPA and PIPA would invariably
include an array of technological mechanisms designed to block access to any website
deemed to be infringing. The primary targets of enforcement in this effort were the
service providers, domain name systems (DNS), advertisers, and search engines that
were, according to legislators, facilitating access to “rogue” websites (SOPA01 pp. 5-6).
In the context of this legislation, Smith defined “rogue websites” as “foreign websites
that are primarily dedicated to the illegal sale and distribution of counterfeit or pirated
goods or foreign websites that market themselves as such” (SOPA04 pp. 1-2).
In order to combat these rogue sites, these policies obligated service providers,
advertisers and search engines to “take the least burdensome technically feasible and
reasonable measures designed to prevent” further infringement (SOPA02 pp. 9-10). In
the case of search engines, Congress intended these technological measures to “prevent
the foreign infringing site…from being served as a direct hypertext link” (SOPA01 pp.
16-17). This essentially meant that any rogue site suspected of or found to be violating
U.S. intellectual property laws would be invisible in subsequent search results. For
service providers and DNS operators, entire domain names were subject to these
technological barriers in order “to prevent the domain name…from resolving to that
domain name’s Internet protocol address” (SOPA02 pp. 9-10). Again, the end result for
any user attempting to access the contested site would be the effective removal of that
site by the service provider. Both SOPA and PIPA absolved service providers of any
action taken in defense of U.S. interests including any “voluntary action against websites
stealing American intellectual property” (SOPA02 pp. 24-25). This provision was
strongly reminiscent of the CDA’s “Good Samaritan” blocking and ensured that there

281

would be no liability “if the entity acting in good faith and based on credible evidence has
a reasonable belief that the Internet site is an Internet site dedicated to infringing
activities” (Id). These technological barriers to access and the latitude given to private
entities to block websites would be the most contentious issues surrounding this policy
initiative.
In a rhetorical flourish that would contradict the statutory language, supporters of
these bills would argue that “this legislation is ultimately not about technology”
(SOPA06 p. 79). Instead, they argued that this kind of policy “focuses not on technology
but on preventing those who engage in criminal behavior from reaching directly into the
U.S. market to harm American consumers” (SOPA09 p. 1). Therefore, the need for
federal regulation was a common sense extension of existing intellectual property
protections. As the Motion Picture Association would suggest, copyright and patent
represented “the foundation on which American industry has rested for over two hundred
years” (SOPA06 p. 79). This cornerstone of the U.S. economy deserved the highest level
of protection whether laws offered that protection online or off. While adequate laws
existed for safeguarding physical property, new legislation was needed because “there is
no equivalent protection for American companies from foreign online criminals who steal
and sell American goods to consumers around the world” (SOPA10 p. 1). Senator Leahy
agreed that the medium was unimportant in this quest to protect intellectual property and
he asserted that “We cannot excuse the behavior because it happens on the Internet” and
if it “existed in the physical world, everyone would agree that they should be shuttered
and their proprietors arrested” (SOPA18 p. 189). These rogue websites were “no more
than digital stores selling stolen” and “often dangerous products” (Id).
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Confronted with such greed and lawlessness, Smith, Leahy and others insisted
that lawmakers should extend federal policy to online infringers. Where the CDA,
COPA, and CIPA had attempted to police indecent content, Congress intended SOPA and
PIPA to regulate infringing content. In this instance, the master frame of protecting
intellectual property would encompass legislators’ insistence that they must no longer
allow such rampant piracy to exist. In this view, the need for regulation trumped the need
for unfettered access and freedom on the Internet. As Representative Smith would
suggest, “Internet freedom does not and cannot mean Internet lawlessness” and “the goals
of freedom and lawfulness are no more incompatible in the Internet space than they are in
the physical world” (SOPA06 p. 40). In the interest of addressing Congress’ master
frame, Smith admitted that “crafting a bill governing the online environment requires
attention to technological details” while insisting that by doing so it was entirely possible
to “avoid unintended consequences, maintain the integrity of the Internet, and preserve
certain freedoms” (Id). This would be a recurring theme throughout the debate over
SOPA and PIPA and supporters of these policies would repeatedly assert that the
protection of intellectual property online would neither censor speech nor implicate First
Amendment rights. Freedom and regulation were not mutually exclusive and responsible
legislation could accomplish one while preserving the other. As one supporter would
argue, “Freedom of speech is not the same as lawlessness on the Internet. There is no
inconsistency between protecting an open Internet and safeguarding intellectual property”
(Id pp. 121-122). The opposition would not be as confident in this policy’s commitment
to free speech or the proposed technological mechanisms of enforcement and would
argue vehemently that the net effects of these policies would harm individual rights.
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Perhaps in anticipation of potential arguments against SOPA and PIPA,
legislators and other groups in favor of regulation argued forcefully from the outset that
these policies would not harm protected speech. SOPA and PIPA must be constitutional
because they simply targeted “conduct that is already illegal” (SOPA07 p. 1) and,
therefore, “Legitimate and lawful websites like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter have
nothing to worry about” (SOPA08 p. 1). There was no protection under the law or the
First Amendment for theft and, from the legislative perspective, these bills eliminated
threats to the U.S. economy while preserving the potential of the Internet as a public
forum. Within this frame, legislators suggested strongly that these bills would “not
threaten the Internet as a tool of communication and commerce” but they would “threaten
the profits generated by those who willfully steal intellectual property by trafficking in
counterfeit or pirated goods” (Id p. 2).
Considering the havoc piracy had wrought on U.S. interests, Smith and Leahy
presented technological blocking of these rogue sites as the only answer. Despite their
insistence that nothing in SOPA or PIPA was unconstitutional, when confronted with the
choice between tough regulation and total freedom online, many legislators invariably
chose the former over the latter. Any concerns about negative impacts on speech were
summarily swept aside and lawmakers insisted that “it is constitutional to block access to
a website that is primarily infringing, even though such blocking may incidentally impact
protected speech” (SOPA06 pp. 139-140). Within this master frame, lawmakers must
impose technological barriers to access at the DNS level and within search results in
order to protect America’s workers, artists, and entrepreneurs. Any incidental effect on
speech, although regrettable, was not an excuse to sacrifice such vital U.S. interests.
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Lawmakers admitted that “Prior restraint and censorship are antithetical to the First
Amendment, but doing nothing in the face of rampant online piracy disgraces the goals of
freedom of expression as well” (SOPA06 p. 268). The subtext of these arguments
seemed to be that many in Congress were aware of the potential adverse effects of SOPA
and PIPA for free speech but chose to pursue regulation anyway because economic
interests trumped “lawless” freedom.
Legislators had constructed a strong master frame asserting that intellectual
property was the cornerstone of the American economy and, in order to protect hard
working citizens, it was the duty of the state to safeguard that property. It is no surprise
then that Congress had to find a rhetorical solution to the conflict between speech rights
and property rights. Time and again legislators made the case that “there is no
inconsistency between protecting free speech and an open Internet and safeguarding
intellectual property” (Id p. 113). In fact, within this master frame, supporters presented
creative endeavors that resulted in copyrighted material as the very epitome of free
speech. As such, creators of intellectual property were the “creators of free speech” (Id p.
37) and deserved the highest level of protection. Not only were piracy and counterfeiting
illegal but they were an assault on the First Amendment itself. Therefore, “The notion
that adopting legislation to combat the theft of intellectual property on the Internet
threatens freedom of expression…is thus insupportable” (Id). From this perspective,
SOPA and PIPA did not prohibit access or limit free speech, they simply punished
“activity that is already illegal” (SOPA04 p. 1). Legislators insisted that “SOPA is a
constitutional bill that protects free speech and America’s intellectual property”
simultaneously (Id). There was nothing special about the Internet that made it immune
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from regulation and “simply because illegal activity occurs online does not mean that it is
protected speech” (Id). Congress was convinced that these bills and the regulatory
technologies they required were precise instruments that would excise only that content
that encroached on intellectual property. Legislators would leave everything else as it
was so that everyone could enjoy the benefits of a free and open Internet.
Piracy and other intellectual property violations were insidious for reasons above
and beyond their impact on American economic interests. Legislators would offer an
additional master frame suggesting that such infringement was also a danger to the
health, safety, and well-being of American consumers. Supporters of SOPA and PIPA
would argue that, while piracy was a major cause for concern, there were more sinister
implications of such lawless behavior. Specifically, legislation was required in order to
“protect trademark owners and consumers from counterfeit and unsafe products, like fake
prescription medicines and misbranded drugs that are often presented to the public by
unlicensed online pharmacies” (SOPA06 p. 1). This was nothing less than a menace to
public health and these rogue websites did not limit themselves to prescription
medication. Often, these illicit sites trafficked in counterfeit “automobile parts…baby
formula, and other products that can pose serious threats to the health and safety of
American citizens” (Id p. 38). In addition to the dangers posed by adulterated and
mislabeled products, this kind of counterfeiting could “deteriorate[] the reputation of the
legitimate maker of these goods” (Id). Those who supported such criminals, either
directly through advertising or indirectly by including them in search results, were
vicariously aiding and abetting behavior that “poses an unacceptable risk of serious
bodily injury or death to our citizens” (Id p. 39). It was incumbent on such private
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entities to support SOPA and PIPA in order to mitigate the damage that had been done
and would continue to be done absent regulation.
Intertwined with this master frame related to public safety was the explicit
assumption that counterfeit goods could cause harm to national security. While copyright
infringement resulted in serious economic harm, the ready availability of counterfeit and
mislabeled products was nothing less than an assault on America’s infrastructure.
Specifically, legislators argued that “The penetration of hazardous products and goods
into the American marketplace, including our military supply chain, poses an
unacceptable risk of serious bodily injury or death to our citizens” (SOPA06 p. 39).
Rampant intellectual property violations were all symptoms of the same disease and it
was necessary for Congress to act immediately to protect domestic interests. As one
Senator would argue, “we do have to see this as urgent. It is too important to our
economy and to our national security not to see it as urgent” (SOPA18 p. 22). SOPA and
PIPA provided the best and most comprehensive solution to these dire problems because
these policies specifically protected against the “trafficking in inherently dangerous
goods or services” (SOPA01 pp. 60-64). Congress must erase websites dealing in these
false and dangerous products from the Internet in order to safeguard public safety and
national security. Illicit streaming of copyrighted works, counterfeiting prescription
medication and dealing in fake military goods were all part and parcel of the same
phenomenon. Therefore, from the legislative perspective, action had to be taken and, for
policymakers, the “goal must be to confront the criminal enterprises that are flourishing
on the Internet, stealing from the rightsholders, and visiting untold harm on consumers.
Doing nothing is not an option” (SOPA06 p. 39).
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Congress, then, offered SOPA and PIPA as the best means for countering the
onslaught of piracy and counterfeiting. Targeting the “service providers, search engines,
payment processors, and advertising networks” that facilitated these crimes was
“essential to stopping the economic devastation caused by rogue websites” (Id p. 53).
Technological blocking at the level of service providers and search engines was the only
way to address this “rampant theft” (Id p. 72) and “blocking access to websites may be
the only quick and effective course of action and…is therefore a critical part of the
equation” (Id pp. 53-54). Although blocking may have some minor implications for free
speech and unfettered access to information, the choice was clear. In the context of this
strong and deeply resonant master frame, “It is a choice between illegal and legitimate. It
is a choice between a safe, vibrant Internet for everyone and [an] all black-market
Internet. It is a choice between protecting American creativity and jobs or protecting
thieves. These are simple choices from our perspective” (Id p. 70).
Despite proponents’ claims, it was not nearly that simple and groups opposing
this legislation would frame these choices quite differently. Nonetheless, for many
legislators and intellectual property advocates, the need for regulation was both obvious
and immediate. In fact, these master frames were so strong and so intertwined with deep
economic interests that they do not appear to have been amenable to alternative or critical
assessments of these policies. Although SOPA’s statutory language did call for further
study, the purpose of that study was not to examine the technological mechanisms of
enforcement required by the law. Instead, legislative supporters intended the report to
detail the damage done by foreign infringers to the U.S. economy, not the potential
damage done by these policies to individual citizens (SOPA01 pp. 53-54).
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Part II – Oppositional Master Frames
The oppositional groups that coalesced around SOPA and PIPA represented a
broad range of interests and stakeholders. These groups encompassed civil libertarians,
network engineers, security experts, consumer groups, human rights advocates
educational institutions and venture capitalists (SOPA06 p. 42). Online resources
including Wikipedia and Google would also join this oppositional movement arguing that
these policies would stifle creativity, entangle legitimate websites in regulatory
obligations, and irreparably hinder free speech online. From this perspective, the
opposition argued that Congress did not fully understand the regulatory mechanisms they
were about to unleash on the Internet and the detrimental impact policies like SOPA and
PIPA could have on individual rights. Google was one of the loudest voices in this
opposition and, while sympathetic to the problems posed by online infringement, insisted
that these laws “would expose law-abiding U.S. Internet and technology companies to
new uncertain liabilities, private rights of action, and technology mandates that could
require monitoring of web sites and social media” (Id pp. 101-102). The opposition
believed that this policy initiative “sets a precedent in favor of Internet censorship” (Id).
The master frame used repeatedly in arguments against SOPA and PIPA
emphasized the harm these policies would cause to the free speech and unfettered access
to information that underpinned the Internet. By employing technological mechanisms of
enforcement such as DNS blocking and filtered search results, Congress had imposed an
overly broad mandate that reached into every corner of the Web. Groups including the
American Library Association (ALA), Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Center
for Democracy and Technology (CDT) believed that passage of these bills “would come
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at too high a cost to Internet communication and noninfringing online expression” and
“would set an irreversible precedent that encourages the fracturing of the Internet,
undermines freedom of expression worldwide, and has numerous other unintended and
harmful consequences” (Id p. 158). Instead of broad technical blocking and filtering, the
opposition would argue vehemently that “We want to make sure that when we are dealing
with speech, that we use a scalpel” (Id p. 137). SOPA and PIPA, on the other hand,
would not only allow but require intermediaries to deny access to a great deal of
legitimate content and websites that were in no way “dedicated to the theft of U.S.
property” (SOPA01 p. 25). Furthermore, the opposition would make a strong case that
the use of such technological “tools” encouraged the repressive behavior of authoritarian
regimes that had already demonstrated the ability and willingness to curtail the online
speech of their citizens.
The master frame of maintaining a largely free and open Internet was not limited
to groups external to Congress. Many members of the Senate and the House expressed
concern about the effects of these policies on free speech and the term “legislative
frames” as used here is not meant to imply monolithic agreement. For example, Senator
Ron Wyden (D-OR) would recognize the uncomfortable parallels between these new
policy proposals and failed policies of the past. Senator Wyden essentially articulated
some of the frame shifts that had (or had not) taken place in the interim between the CDA
and SOPA. Wyden acknowledged that “Over 15 years ago, when Congress first started
thinking about Internet regulation the concern was protecting children from
pornography…and some argued that Congress should simply censor the Internet and use
the government to cut off access to objectionable material” (Id p. 262). Yet Wyden and
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others recognized in the interim that there “was value in letting the Internet develop free
from corporate or government control” and rather than “having government censor the
web” we should develop “an approach that would empower users and technology to
address content concerns on their own” (Id). Here Wyden provided an excellent
summation of both the government’s attempts to pass the CDA and COPA and the
oppositional stance that the Internet worked best when left mostly unregulated. Wyden
also encapsulated the master frame that freedom and individual autonomy were
inextricably bound to the ideals of free and open access. These cyberlibertarian ideals
would again form the foundation of the opposition’s arguments against SOPA and PIPA
and demonstrated, from this point of view, that Congress continued to impose heavyhanded technological tools without clearly understanding the implications of such
systems.
One of the opposition’s key points was that Congress must act carefully and
deliberately when considering copyright legislation – especially when those laws were
meant to function in an online environment where discussion, linking, sharing and critical
commentary were all intertwined. As the opposition would point out, “By their very
nature, laws protecting copyrights constrain free speech and access to information”
(SOPA12 p. 2). This was of particular concern if one believed that “access to
information of all kinds – even disfavored information – is a fundamental right that must
be protected” (Id). While supporters of SOPA and PIPA had insisted that these laws
would “not censor legal activity on the Internet” but only “target[] activity that is already
illegal” (SOPA04 p. 1), the opposition argued strongly that this conception of the law’s
impact demonstrated a gross misconception of how websites and social media actually
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functioned. This misconception and the broad technological mechanisms that these
policies called for would hinder an array of protected speech and stifle critical debate. As
the opposition pointed out, “Copyright protection in theory only impacts the speech rights
of those who would steal the rights in works entitled to protection. But the
implementation of such a system can have an effect that goes far beyond the copyright
pirate and restrict perfectly lawful non-infringing content” (SOPA12 p. 2). The
requirement that search results be filtered and that DNS providers “delist entire domain
names based on the criteria outlined in the bill would have the effect of chilling lawful
speech” (SOPA18 p. 135). Essentially, these bills and the regulatory systems they would
impose granted “new powers to both law enforcement and private actors to filter the
Internet and block access” at the expense of protected speech (SOPA14 p. 4).
By requiring search engines to remove links to sites that inadvertently included
infringing content or blocking the domain name of sites that simply linked to “rogue”
actors, SOPA and PIPA had enormous potential to entangle vast amounts of legitimate
speech. It was true that Congress primarily intended SOPA and PIPA to target foreign
websites that represented the “worst of the worst” (SOPA06 p. 220). Nevertheless,
because both of these bills allowed liability to extend to any website found to be
“enabling or facilitating” (SOPA02 p. 3) infringement, the overall effect was that the law
would sweep a great deal of blameless and worthwhile content into the same dragnet. As
the opposition would point out, SOPA “targets an entire website even if only a small
portion hosts or links to some infringing content” and enforcement “is not limited to
foreign sites, or to the worst of the worst” (SOPA14 p. 6). Websites of all kinds would
be subject to the vague and expansive statutory language of these bills.
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With the inclusion of sweeping terms such as “enabling” and “facilitating,” the
opposition feared that SOPA and PIPA would force social media sites, blog hosts, video
posting sites and many others to police the content uploaded by their users. From this
perspective, ancillary service providers would be subject to the same blocking and
filtering provisions as Internet service providers (ISPs), DNS providers and search
engines. This presumptive requirement directly contradicted the safe harbor provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 that had specifically provided
immunity for all content providers and hosting services. The DMCA made clear that
these intermediaries were merely the conduits through which information flowed and it
was in the best interest of Internet users and businesses to shield these entities from
liability.31 SOPA and PIPA offered no such protections and threatened to shut down a
number of valuable services that simply hosted or linked out to content that might be
infringing. Congressional supporters of SOPA and PIPA had strongly asserted that
websites like Facebook and YouTube would not be subject to liability for secondary
infringement because they were “not ‘primarily dedicated to’ illegal activity” (SOPA04
pp. 1-2). Despite reassurance that these services “have nothing to worry about” (Id), the
opposition remained unconvinced. They argued that the extensive scope of these new
laws would “bypass and effectively overturn the basic framework of the [DMCA], by
pushing user-driven sites like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook to implement ever-more
elaborate monitoring systems to ‘confirm,’ to the satisfaction of the most aggressive and
31

See DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512 - Limitations on liability relating to material online. As long as service
providers met certain conditions and responded to reports of infringing content on their networks, these
entities would “not be liable for monetary relief, or…for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for,
material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of
the intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or
providing connection.”
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litigious rightsholder, whether individual users are exchanging infringing content”
(SOPA06 p. 158). SOPA and PIPA would essentially gut the DMCA’s safe harbor
provision and eviscerate the principle that “intermediaries need not monitor or supervise
the communications of users” (Id p. 253).
Like the CDA’s “Good Samaritan” blocking, SOPA and PIPA would also grant
extraordinary police powers to private entities. Fear of vicarious or even direct liability
for intellectual property infringement would encourage these service providers to practice
heavy-handed blocking and filtering. Not only could the Department of Justice put direct
pressure on providers to curtail access, but SOPA and PIPA also allowed copyright and
patent holders to pursue private legal action. In order to “protect themselves, platforms
of all kinds would be pressured to actively monitor and police user behavior” (SOPA13
p. 2) and any “rightsholder can pressure a service provider to censor a site…by
threatening to sue the service provider with a claim of contributory infringement”
(SOPA14 p. 9). Confronted with these direct and indirect threats and with a guarantee of
immunity, any “service provider will have a strong incentive to shut down the accused
website” (Id).
Oppositional groups and even members of Congress were “very concerned about
the voluntary authority and legal immunity” that SOPA and PIPA would “give[] Internet
service providers to block access to sites they reasonably believe are infringing sites”
(SOPA06 pp. 235-236). With this power and without direct judicial oversight, service
providers were likely to block a great deal of content preemptively. SOPA and PIPA not
only encouraged but also required these private firms “to substitute their own judgment
for that of law-enforcement officials and censor content without consequence” (SOPA18
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p. 136). This was of particular concern if “ordinary users” did not have either “the
resources or the technical know-how to contact DNS providers and contest the decision
to take down lawful websites” (Id). This potential for unchecked private blocking also
concerned some lawmakers and one legislator cautioned that service providers “can
always err on the side of censorship because there are broad provisions…to censor
something because you thought maybe it was a problem” (SOPA21 p. 1). Without some
oversight, the opposition believed that the potential for private blocking would have
drastic consequences well beyond any worthwhile intent the law might have. Giving this
kind of blank check to private entities “to limit and censor Internet service providers and
web sites…is like shooting an ant with an elephant gun” (SOPA06 p. 41). Opponents of
these bills repeatedly expressed grave concern that the number and variety of websites
subject to blocking would be extravagant and illegitimate, particularly if that filtering was
the result of broad “voluntary immunity provisions that contain no court review” (Id p.
152).
The end result of this aggressive private blocking would be to condemn a vast
number of websites to extermination without any legal recourse. There was no
mechanism included within SOPA or PIPA that would guarantee website operators the
chance to dispute claims of infringement prior to the delisting of their site or removal
from search results. Without due process, these sites were “guilty until proven innocent”
(Id p. 151) and would have to initiate a lengthy and potentially expensive court challenge
against the service provider and/or rightsholder in order to argue their case. This created
“a system that allows a mere accusation [of infringement] without any court review to
lead to potentially damaging actions” (Id). This extra-judicial process was extraordinary
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and conflicted directly with legislative claims that only those websites subject to an order
from the Department of Justice would be “removed” from the Internet (SOPA04 p. 1).
Despite these claims and due to SOPA and PIPA’s vague language entangling sites
(foreign or domestic) that were allegedly “enabling” and “facilitating” infringement, a
multitude of service providers, search engines, advertising networks and other private
entities would be encouraged to “shut down, block access to, and stop servicing U.S. and
foreign websites that copyright and trademark owners allege are illegal without any due
process or ability of a wrongfully targeted website to seek restitution” (SOPA14 p. 4).
While there was some ability of targeted websites to submit a counter-notice against
service providers and rightsholders, it was likely that the site would be removed and
blacklisted so quickly that there was little chance to do so (Id p. 6). Also, due to the
immunity provisions of these bills, the service provider, search engine or other entity had
“no obligation to restore service once it receives a counter-notice” (Id). Essentially, there
was “no due process for the innocent website owner to defend themselves before the
action is taken or seek restitution after their website has been removed” (SOPA06 p.
222). Therefore, the opposition argued that this “legislation favors the copyright owner’s
intellectual property rights and, based on unfounded claims of infringement, strips the
accused website owners from their property right” (Id).
Not only was the prospect of private blocking without due process a concern in
and of itself, but it also set a dangerous global precedent. While the U.S. had strongly
criticized the authoritarian Internet policies of countries like China and Iran (Id pp. 4445), the opposition argued that SOPA and PIPA would impose the same illegitimate
restrictions on speech. By implementing DNS blocking and by adulterating search
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results, the U.S. was imposing on its own citizens the same repressive technologies it had
criticized. Through SOPA and PIPA’s technological requirements, the U.S. would be
“legitimizing methods of online censorship to enforce its domestic laws” and “Nondemocratic regimes could seize on the precedent to justify measures that would hinder
online freedom of expression and association” (Id p. 159). If the U.S. were to employ the
same technological measures, the opposition argued that it would essentially “abandon
the moral high ground in the Administration’s efforts to secure the ability for Internet
users across the globe to access the legal content of their choice” (SOPA18 pp. 159-160).
Once the U.S. had sacrificed that high ground, it essentially invited repressive regimes to
“abuse their technological capacity to take down content they find objectionable or
threatening” (SOPA12 p. 6). Mandated use of the technological mechanisms of
enforcement required by SOPA and PIPA would directly encourage other countries “to
use the same mechanisms to enforce a range of domestic policies” whether they be
democratic or not (SOPA15 p. 2). Within the context of this master frame, the opposition
was adamant that the U.S. “should not adopt a domestic policy that implicitly condones
the very kinds of practices we attempt to condemn abroad” (SOPA18 p. 136).
For the opposition, SOPA and PIPA represented an existential threat to a free and
open global Internet. This legislation would drastically change the way websites
operated and it would force service providers to surveil users. For the opposition, these
policies would destroy the democratic potential of the Internet.
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Part III – Legislative Diagnostic Frames
Although SOPA and PIPA shifted the focus of content regulation from indecent to
infringing content, the primary diagnostic frame remained largely unchanged. From the
legislative point of view, a mostly unregulated and lawless Internet was harming
American industry, its economy, and its consumers on a daily basis. In the case of
intellectual property, supporters of this new legislation argued strongly that
Congressional intervention was necessary to staunch the flow of money and jobs being
lost due to piracy and counterfeit. The state required new mechanisms to combat this
theft because “Technology has created a new front in this battle” (SOPA06 pp. 60-61).
Lawmakers would wage this battle on the Internet where “rogue websites…are stealing
American property, harming American consumers, hurting the American economic
recovery and costing us American jobs” (SOPA23 p. 6). The strong protection of
intellectual property was a regulatory necessity, particularly in “the virtual world where
the systematic and willful violation of intellectual property rights now poses a clear,
present, and growing danger to American creators and innovators, U.S. consumers, and
our collective confidence in the Internet ecosystem” (SOPA06 p. 38). Where Senator
Exon had warned that, without regulation, online dangers were always just “a few clickclick-clicks away” (CDA14 p. 13) from children, supporters of SOPA lamented that
American intellectual property was being stolen online “every day, over and
over…sometimes with nothing more than the click of a mouse” (SOPA06 p. 72).
Clearly, the Internet had exaggerated the harm to U.S. interests and it was incumbent on
lawmakers to mitigate that harm with new and aggressive legislation.
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When detailing the economic and financial harms embedded within this
diagnostic frame, Congressional supporters of this new legislation certainly had a
multitude of evidence to support their claims. American dominance in the global
marketplace was at least partly “tied to the success of America’s intellectual property
industries” which “provide an estimated 19 million jobs to American workers and
account for more than 60% of U.S. exports” (SOPA05 p. 1). As Representative Smith
would argue, the rampant “online theft of America’s intellectual property results in
billions of dollars in lost revenue and thousands of jobs” (Id). Specifically, Smith
contended that these crimes cost the domestic economy about $100 billion annually and
these policy proposals would help “stop the flow of revenues to rogue websites”
(SOPA06 pp. 2-3). The implication seemed to be that pirates, counterfeiters and
trademark infringers were pocketing this vast wealth because the Internet essentially
remained ‘‘the wild, wild Web’’ (SOPA18 p. 21) in the absence of regulation. This
rhetorical definition of the problem also intimated that this enormous amount of money
was being fed directly to “the criminals and organized crime cartels who profit from
digital piracy and counterfeit products” (SOPA05 p. 1). The monetary harm inflicted by
this phenomenon and the brazen outlaws who were profiting from it had to be stopped.
Proponents argued that Congressional action was required because “existing tools are not
strong enough to root out the worst online pirates beyond our borders” (SOPA23 p. 7).
This reference to the failure of “existing tools” was a pointed criticism of the
DMCA and its perceived lack of protection for digital copyright. There was a growing
sense among members of the content producing industry and within Congress that the
DMCA had failed to accomplish its mission. While they acknowledged that the DMCA
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had provided “some relief to copyright owners,” they argued that it really only helped “in
limited circumstances” (SOPA06 p. 1). These limitations meant that this outdated law
provided “no effective relief when a rogue website is foreign-based” and did nothing to
“assist copyright owners when rogue websites contribute to the theft of intellectual
property on a massive scale” (Id). The DMCA was inadequate to deal with these new
and exceptionally virulent forms of online infringement because the “means of willful
and commercially destructive infringement” had advanced exponentially “since
enactment of these [DMCA] provisions” (Id p. 76). Rightsholders desperately needed
SOPA and PIPA to mitigate this harm and to close any “loophole in our nation’s
intellectual property laws” (Id).
While oppositional groups, including many in the technology industry, decried the
loss of the DMCA’s safe harbor protections for intermediaries, supporters of these new
policies argued specifically that the law should hold these service providers and search
engines to account. Those who advocated for new, more comprehensive regulatory
mechanisms were convinced that “current legislation does not help us in enforcing our
intellectual property” and the “safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, while well intended,
have not functioned well” (SOPA18 p. 16). While SOPA and PIPA’s staunchest allies
railed against the failure of the DMCA and the safe harbor it provided (see footnote 31),
more moderate supporters of content regulation offered a different interpretation of these
new laws. Specifically, they insisted that search engines, payment and service providers
would not be held to a new standard of liability and “cannot be held liable for the illegal
or infringing actions taken by the rogue site” operating on their networks (SOPA04 p. 1).
Nevertheless, the fact that immunity was contingent on the intermediary’s agreement “to

300

remove the direct link to an illegal site” or “to stop working with the illegal site” (Id)
tempered this reassurance. Not surprisingly, this somewhat contradictory point of view
did not comfort many of the service providers, payment networks and search engines
subject to SOPA and PIPA.
When confronted with oppositional arguments suggesting that SOPA and PIPA
subverted the due process afforded to websites that might become entangled in this new
regulatory scheme, supporters of this legislation swept aside such concerns and insisted
that a great deal of judicial oversight protected entities affected by these policies.
Legislators pointed to provisions within both bills that would require the Justice
Department to “go to court and lay out the case against the site” and if “the judge finds
that the site is primarily engaged in illegal activity, a court order can be issued that
authorizes the Justice Department to request that the site be blocked” (SOPA08 pp. 1-2).
Supporters argued that the blocking and filtering provisions of these policies would only
be “required after significant due process and federal judicial oversight” (SOPA04 p. 3).
Although it is true that SOPA and PIPA included provisions requiring the Justice
Department to seek judicial approval prior to technological enforcement, this did not
necessarily apply to the ability of individual rightsholders to bring private action against
websites or even intermediary service providers. For example, Section 103 of SOPA
allowed a “qualifying plaintiff” to pursue independent legal action against anyone they
believed were infringing upon their intellectual property. Such a “qualifying plaintiff”
was broadly defined as any “holder of an intellectual property right harmed” by
infringing activities (SOPA01 p. 27). Supporters of this legislation argued that any
private action would be controlled by strict guidelines requiring the copyright owner to
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provide “specific facts to support the claim that the Internet site, or portion thereof, is
dedicated to the theft of U.S. property” and “clearly show that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result” without immediate action (SOPA06 pp. 270-271).
Nevertheless, when presented with a demand for action from a private rightsholder (even
a demand that may have been unfounded), it remained in the best interest of
intermediaries to act swiftly even in the absence of proof or counternotice from the
website operator. Immunity from prosecution depended on timely cooperation from the
intermediary and the “burden is on the [service provider] to defend its action (or inaction)
under the threat of monetary sanctions” (SOPA14 pp. 2-3). In such a circumstance, it
was likely that networks would block a site and erase it from search results prior to the
presentation of any substantive proof and before the website owner had the ability to
respond.
In practice, it was unclear how this private right of action would actually impact
websites alleged to be infringing. The testimony of Go Daddy, one of the largest domain
name registrars in the world, exemplified these contradictions. When asked to share her
views on the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act of 2010 (COICA),
Senator Leahy’s first attempt to diminish online infringement and the immediate
predecessor of SOPA and PIPA, Go Daddy’s Executive Vice President, Christine Jones,
offered conflicting testimony. COICA included many of the same blocking and filtering
provisions of its successors and would have placed DNS providers like Go Daddy in the
position of taking down entire domain names when confronted with a complaint from a
private rightsholder. When asked about her company’s position on these requirements,
Jones asserted that Go Daddy was already “very aggressive in taking action against”
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infringing websites but “to allay the fears of the EFF and ACLU”, she specified that “our
position as a default is to leave the website up” (SOPA18 pp. 8-9). Jones was very clear
that her company was “in favor of the open exchange of ideas on the Internet” but that
Go Daddy would “not provide a platform for illegal activity” (Id). While this would
seem to validate the legislative position that private action would not result in significant
overblocking, some confusion remained. In remarks made later in that same hearing,
Jones reversed her position and noted that, in practice and “As the company that probably
responds to more of these [takedown requests] than anybody else, our position is if there
is any offending content, the whole website comes down” (Id pp. 31-32). Jones did note
that Go Daddy would put websites back up once operators had removed infringing
content but did not indicate how a website owner would be able to notify Go Daddy or
prove to the rightsholder that they were in compliance.
Furthermore, the staunchest allies of content regulation felt even this response
was too weak. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) was adamant that the constant
removal and replacement of infringing websites was “an insufficient deterrent” and, for
serial infringers, was simply “part of the cost of doing business” (Id pp. 32-33). Due
directly to the weak and inconsistent response of service providers, Senator Blumenthal
argued strongly that “a private right of action, with damages, maybe treble damages,
punitive damages, and an effective enforcement mechanism is absolutely necessary” (Id).
The implications for wrongly accused sites or for the free speech of sites inappropriately
entangled in blocking and filtering requirements was negligible. If there was some
“overuse or even abuse” of this system, the danger was “no different…than exists in
many of our consumer protection laws where there are private rights of action and where
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it imposes costs that are in effect commensurate with the damage that is done” (Id).
Essentially, the medium made no difference and, even if lawful sites were harmed and
protected speech hindered, the state must enforce laws on the Internet just as they are
“enforced in the brick and mortar world…It’s not censorship to enforce the law online”
(SOPA08 pp. 1-2). In order to mitigate the harm of online infringement and
counterfeiting, some in Congress had a made a strong case for expanded intellectual
property rights, the need for rightsholders to be able to pursue intermediaries to stop
infringement and the need for broad technological mechanisms of enforcement such as
DNS blocking and search result filtration.
Perhaps in anticipation of oppositional concerns about First Amendment
restrictions related to broad blocking and filtering requirements, legislative supporters of
SOPA and PIPA addressed this issue throughout the debate over these two policies. For
example, embedded in the opening text of SOPA, legislators guaranteed that “Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to impose a prior restraint on free speech or the press
protected under the 1st amendment to the Constitution” (SOPA01 p. 2). On the Senate
floor, Senator Leahy offered the same promise for PIPA’s provisions and reassured
concerned groups that the Act would not entangle lawful websites and service providers
in regulation that could curtail First Amendment speech. Specifically, Leahy asserted
that “Nothing in PROTECT IP can be used to cut off access to a blog. Nothing in
PROTECT IP can be used to shut off access to sites like YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, or
eBay. Nothing in PROTECT IP requires anyone to monitor their networks. Nothing in
PROTECT IP criminalizes links to other websites” (SOPA23 p. 7). Such promises not
only addressed oppositional concerns but also strengthened the diagnostic frame that new
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regulation and enforcement mechanisms were both necessary and constitutional. As
noted previously, legislators insisted that the harm caused by online piracy and
counterfeiting was so dire that the benefits of this new regulatory scheme were selfapparent and would only affect those bad actors who would steal America’s economic
lifeblood. Besides, from this point of view, free speech was “not the same as lawlessness
on the Internet” and “Protecting intellectual property is not the same as censorship”
(SOPA06 p. 114). Supporters portrayed oppositional arguments against SOPA and
PIPA’s enforcement mechanisms as alarmist and cast these legislative proposals as
saviors of the U.S. economy. When faced with the opposition’s arguments related to free
speech, supporters of content regulation argued that such criticism was not only untrue
but that “more robust enforcement of digital copyrights would likely lead to a stronger
Internet ecosystem and more innovative content and services for consumers” (SOPA18 p.
138). To bolster this claim, legislators consulted “First Amendment scholar” Floyd
Abrams who affirmed the government’s position that nothing in either of these bills
“threatens freedom of expression” (SOPA06 p. 25). Abrams laid out the case that
“Copyright violations have never been protected by the First Amendment and have been
routinely punished wherever they occur, including the Internet. This proposed legislation
is not inconsistent with the First Amendment” (Id p. 37).
The perspectives of both the legislative supporters of these bills and those groups
opposed to them represented nothing less than competing views about what the Internet
should be. As one advocate for content regulation put it, the opposition’s points of view
betrayed “these groups’ and individuals’ overarching view of the Internet as a medium
whose chief function is to liberate individuals from control by, or dependence on, big
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organizations. For these groups, the Internet is first and foremost about individual
freedom, not about collective responsibility” (SOPA18 p. 142). SOPA and PIPA’s
supporters were clearly of the opinion that such a cyberlibertarian conception of this
medium was incorrect and dangerous to American interests. Regulation was a necessary
part of responsible government and, from the legislative point of view, SOPA and PIPA
offered the best of both worlds: through these Acts, Congress could successfully mitigate
the harm of online infringement while preserving free and open discourse on the Internet.
Technological blocking and filtering was both necessary and consistent with the First
Amendment despite what opposition groups, service providers, and search engines might
suggest. The legislative diagnostic frame of protecting America’s property resonated
strongly with these supporters precisely because it was both an economic necessity and a
core value. When confronted with views opposing this position, advocates of content
regulation were not disposed to take kindly to those groups who they saw as apologists
for pirates and counterfeiters (SOPA23 p. 7). It is perhaps because of this and because of
the resonance of this diagnostic frame that there was very little critical reflection of the
practical and ethical impacts of these legislative proposals. Rather than acknowledging
the technical realities of broad blocking and filtering, legislative supporters instead
suggested that such arguments were simply obstructionist. Arguments for free speech
and against illegitimate restrictions on access were “simply taken from the playbook of
those people who have consistently opposed every effort that the Congress has come
forward with in the past few years to protect intellectual property” and these groups were
simply guilty of making “false and incendiary charges…designed to inflame emotions”
(Id).
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Part IV – Oppositional Diagnostic Frames
Oppositional groups and concerned members of Congress, while sympathetic to
the problems posed by online infringement, were convinced that SOPA and PIPA would
cause harms worse than those legislators meant them to address. Not only was the
language of these bills vague but the blocking and filtering provisions recommended by
Congress would be ineffective in combating online theft. The opposition also argued that
the technological mechanisms of enforcement required by these policies would be easily
circumvented, harming national security rather than protecting it. Additionally, removal
of the DMCA’s safe harbor protections would force intermediaries, search engines, and
social networking sites to adopt practices that placed them in a monitoring and
surveillance role that would ultimately be harmful to both user rights and legitimate free
expression. Such requirements and strict content regulation would also encourage
authoritarian regimes to continue repressive behavior that was damaging to critical
discourse and political speech. As a legislator skeptical of these proposals,
Representative Tom McClintock (R-CA) would argue on the House floor that “SOPA
and PIPA pose a crippling danger to the Internet because they use legitimate concern over
copyright infringement as an excuse for government to intrude upon and regulate the very
essence of the Internet – the unrestricted and absolutely free association that links site to
site, providing infinite pathways for commerce, discourse, and learning” (SOPA25 p. 1).
McClintock would concisely summarize the opposition’s chief concerns and diagnostic
frames by noting that “Upon mere accusation, these measures would allow the
government to shut down Web sites, ruin honest businesses, impound property [and]
disrupt legitimate speech” (Id).
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One of the primary reasons why the opposition believed SOPA and PIPA to be so
harmful was the inclusion of vague and broad language requiring intermediaries to deny
access to a wide range of content that was not infringing. SOPA in particular was
targeted for this reason and oppositional groups contended that the “problem begins with
the sweeping definition of a website ‘dedicated to theft of U.S. property’” (SOPA14 p. 5).
This language did nothing to define what constituted “dedication” to theft clearly and did
nothing to alleviate the concern that the law could sweep primarily legitimate sites into
blocking and filtering schemes merely by association through links or other nonsubstantive connections. It was conceivable that, “Under this definition, a site is
‘dedicated to the theft of U.S. property’ if even a portion of it ‘enables or facilitates’
someone else’s infringement” (Id). With such a broad and unspecific mandate,
intermediaries and service providers would have no clear guidelines for policing
infringing content on their networks and, in order to retain immunity protections, would
have no incentive to refrain from taking down questionable websites preemptively.
Lacking clear instructions and with a potential barrage of complaints from individual
rightsholders, the opposition argued that SOPA was “vague and ripe for abuse,
particularly when combined with a private right of action for rightsholders” (SOPA06 p.
204). In the context of the opposition’s diagnostic frames, this ambiguous standard had
the potential to harm a multitude of legitimate websites and silence a great deal of
legitimate speech.
In addition to the immediate effects of blocking and filtering, many of those
opposed to SOPA and PIPA were concerned that the technological enforcement of these
laws would require additional regulatory mechanisms above and beyond those already
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described. While service providers were obligated to “take technically feasible and
reasonable measures designed to prevent access” to infringing sites (SOPA01 p. 14),
including the prevention of access to specific domain names, these entities were not
strictly limited to such methods. Due to this and because, “the service provider domain
name remedy is not the exclusive remedy, the Attorney General and a judge can require a
service provider to create other technology solutions to block access to illegal sites.
What else might be required beyond these steps is not specified” (SOPA14 p. 7). The bill
provided search engines, service providers, advertisers and payment providers with an
affirmative defense if they did not have “the technical means to comply…without
incurring an unreasonable economic burden” but, as the opposition would point out, this
was “a highly ambiguous standard” (Id p. 8). Furthermore, it was conceivable that these
intermediaries would bear the burden of proof when attempting to qualify for this defense
and “would presumably be required to provide expert testimony, subject to crossexamination, to establish that it had met its burden” (Id). Again, this ambiguity was
distressing to the opposition because it could impose new and invasive technological
requirements on them and their customers. In turn, users and legitimate websites would
bear the brunt of any overly aggressive blocking and filtering with all of the inherent
implications for speech such measures would have.
The opposition would also argue that, in addition to its ambiguity for
intermediaries and the collateral harm visited on legitimate websites, neither SOPA nor
PIPA would have much impact on digital piracy or counterfeiting. Due to the realities of
online infringement, websites truly dedicated to piracy would continue to do business as
long as they made a profit. The profitability of infringement all but ensured that “tech
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savvy criminals around the world will find ways” to continue their activities whether
Congress passed SOPA and PIPA or not and “ordering ISPs and search engines to
disappear websites from the Internet will not change this fundamental reality” (SOPA06
p. 100). As will be discussed shortly, the opposition would make a strong case that,
although harmful to legitimate speech, the technical blocking and filtering required by
these policies were extraordinarily easy to circumvent thus strengthening the argument
that pirates and counterfeiters would continue to operate despite SOPA and PIPA.
Legislative opposition to these bills also adopted this argument and Congresswoman Zoe
Lofgren (D-CA) would echo the sentiment that, if passed, these laws would result in
“major costs and unintended consequences, while doing little to achieve the laudable goal
of reducing online piracy” (SOPA06 p. 43). The CDT would take this argument one step
further, specifying that the DNS filtering required by these policies would incur major
costs by interfering “with core Internet infrastructure” while having “little effect on
infringement” (SOPA13 p. 2). For the CDT and other groups, the unintended
consequence of greatest concern was that “Where DNS filtering does have an effect, for
technical reasons its impact is likely to be overbroad and result in blocking lawful
expression rather than just infringement” (Id). The technical realities of this regulatory
scheme were not only harmful from the opposition’s perspective but their inclusion in
this legislation underlined a grave misunderstanding of their implications on the part of
legislative supporters. The failure of some in Congress to examine the consequences of
these technological barriers to access was of deep concern to both the technology
industry and civil libertarians. A broad coalition of industry and activist groups argued
forcefully that “The proposed DNS technological remedy is not only ineffective and risky
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to critical infrastructure; it runs contrary to the U.S. government’s commitment to
advancing a single, global Internet and free flow of information across it” (SOPA14 p.
10).
As alluded to above, those with the technical ability could easily circumvent the
technological blockades mandated by this legislation. Meanwhile, innocent users without
such skills and legitimate websites that depended on traffic for reasons of discourse or
commerce would suffer the greatest harm from blocking and filtering. Those sites truly
dedicated to online infringement and those individuals determined to seek out infringing
material would continue to do so whether such sites appeared in search results or not.
Similarly, the failure of a site’s domain name to resolve due to DNS blocking did not
erase it from existence. Although blocking obscured the site’s name, the underlying
numeric Internet Protocol (IP) address would continue to function quite well. With an IP
address, anyone could continue to access an infringing site by entering those numbers in
their browser. As Congresswoman Lofgren would point out, “the domain filtering
scheme envisioned by [this legislation] will not be effective. Anyone determined to reach
a blocked site may do so easily, merely by typing in the website’s IP address…Any ten
year old could do it” (SOPA06 p. 43).
This was not only the conclusion reached by concerned legislators and activist
groups but also of the technology sector. Citing reports from “Leading Internet security
engineers,” the opposition asserted strongly that “the proposed measures to block the
domain name from resolving to the Internet Protocol address (‘DNS remedy’) will not
work because it…is easily circumvented by the user or targeted website” (SOPA14 p.
10). Since technically savvy users could find easy routes around any DNS blocking and
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because it was an inconsequential matter for any infringing site to adapt to the block,
SOPA and PIPA’s enforcement mechanisms would meet with little success. As the CDT
would suggest, these “filters will be trivial to circumvent, and will thus have too small
and diminishing impact on infringement” to warrant the damage they could do to
individual rights and online activity (SOPA13 p. 2). This damage was not simply
hypothetical and previous incidents had demonstrated the collateral damage done to
innocent websites. For example, in 2011 the Department of Justice mistakenly shut down
mooo.com as part of an operation to seize ten domain names suspected of hosting child
pornography (Samson, 2011). What federal law enforcement failed to realize was that
mooo.com is one of the largest domain sharing projects on the Internet (mooo.com,
2014). In seizing this larger domain, the Justice Department inadvertently blocked
“upwards of 84,000 innocent subdomains” which were clearly not trafficking in child
pornography (SOPA15 pp. 1-2). Perhaps in reference to this mistake, Go Daddy, one of
the largest domain name registrars on the web, would caution the government that
ancillary harm “based upon the filtering of lawful sites is a stark reality” (SOPA18 p. 54).
Due to these concerns and “combined with the fact that DNS filtering is unlikely to
actually stop anyone who wants to visit the websites that contain infringing or counterfeit
content” the opposition was convinced that “DNS filtering is an ineffective mechanisms
for combating the theft of intellectual property online” (SOPA18 p. 54).
The ease with which users could circumvent these technological measures created
an additional harm above and beyond those mentioned above. Due to the likelihood that
these laws would block a great deal of material, innocent and infringing, the opposition
argued that SOPA and PIPA would frustrate the autonomous ability of the individual to
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seek out the content they were looking for. Overly aggressive blocking and filtering
would drive many users to circumvention techniques and away from secure DNS servers
and other protected service providers. Again, as Go Daddy warned, “The widespread
implementation of DNS filtering would absolutely result in a large number of Internet
users attempting to circumvent such filtering” (Id). The impact of this exodus from
legitimate intermediaries would be extraordinarily destructive to U.S. cybersecurity
efforts. While the government had insisted that access to counterfeit goods and
adulterated medications would harm national security and consumer safety, the
opposition argued that mandated DNS filtering would be even more damaging to a secure
Internet. Specifically, this would severely limit the effectiveness of the Domain Name
System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), an initiative that had “high-level US
Government support and investment” (SOPA06 p. 152). DNSSEC added a layer of
security to data sent across various networks by providing “secure authentication” of
those packets in a way that was “critical for combating the distribution of malware and
other problematic behavior” (Id). Without this authentication and protection, users would
be vulnerable to a multitude of bad actors who could exploit this potential gap in U.S.
cybersecurity. In addition to forcing users away from secure service providers, SOPA
and PIPA’s DNS filtering provisions interfered with the authentication process. As the
opposition and many involved with national security argued, “Altering DNS
results…causes significant problems for cybersecurity” and such filtering would be
“inconsistent with DNSSEC…and circumvention of filters will expose U.S. users and
networks to increased cybersecurity risk” (SOPA13 p. 2). By attempting to access
blocked sites by other means, the law would force users employ systems other than those
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protected by DNSSEC. The DNS blocking requirements of SOPA and PIPA “would
encourage consumers to use alternate servers, which would promote the development of
techniques and software that circumvent the use of the DNS and, therefore, undermine
the value, security and resiliency of a single, unified, global communication network”
(SOPA06 p. 152). Despite these oppositional and industry concerns, supporters of
content regulation would continue to argue that DNS blocking had no such implications
for U.S. cybersecurity efforts and there was “no reason to suggest that the use of this
technology by intermediaries in the U.S. would lead to” less secure outcomes (Id pp. 7677).
Based on these concerns, the opposition had outlined strong diagnostic frames
indicating that SOPA and PIPA’s technological mechanisms of enforcement had the
potential to harm free speech, legitimate websites, and U.S. cybersecurity. In particular,
the DNS filtering provisions of these bills would drastically change the way that
intermediaries, service providers, and social networking sites operated. Rather than
enjoying safe harbor protections as conduits for Internet traffic and outlets for
information sharing, SOPA and PIPA would force these entities to police the vast
amounts of content they hosted in order to avoid strict sanctions from the Department of
Justice or from private rightsholders. This created a situation where the law would force
these intermediaries to surveil their users and the material that they created or shared with
other users (SOPA14 p. 5). In addition to SOPA and PIPA’s requirement that
intermediaries block access to allegedly infringing sites, these private entities would also
“impose new responsibilities on ISPs to scrutinize and screen all user traffic” (SOPA13 p.
2). As the CDT argued, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other sites would not be
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immune from this requirement and this legislation “would chill the growth of social
media and force sites to adopt a new role as content police…To protect themselves,
platforms of all kinds would be pressured to actively monitor and police user behavior”
(Id). Not only would this surveillance place users under new and intense scrutiny without
any semblance of due process but it would also limit the discursive potential of these
sites, undermining “social websites’ central role in fostering free expression” (Id). This
essentially unlimited surveillance and control of online behavior was, for the opposition,
uncomfortably close to an authoritarian mechanism of control. These groups argued that,
if Congress passed SOPA and PIPA, it was not only damaging to the freedom of U.S.
citizens but would also “set the dangerous international precedent that governments
seeking to blocking online content that violates domestic law should look to online
communications platforms as points of control” (Id).
This argument against surveillance and control underpinned the opposition’s point
that SOPA and PIPA could encourage authoritarian regimes to continue to repress their
citizens. While the U.S. had “long been a strong advocate of for the protection and
promotion of an open Internet” the technological blocking and filtering required by these
policies “undermines its moral authority to criticize repressive regimes” (SOPA06 p.
160). By signing SOPA and/or PIPA into law, the U.S. would essentially be legitimizing
oppressive technological mechanisms of control, sending “an unequivocal message to
other nations that it is acceptable to censor speech on the global Internet” (Id). Without
some moral high ground from which to criticize repressive regimes, it was entirely
conceivable that “foreign governments [could] point to this law in order to rationalize
new uses of DNS blocking to suppress internal speech” (Id p. 223). The opposition

315

argued vehemently that, when considering policies such as SOPA and PIPA, it was
equally important to consider the “international ramifications” the use of such
technologies “will have on free expression globally” (Id pp. 253-254). It was true that
U.S. constitutional guarantees provided some protection for the exercise of individual
rights but the opposition remained “concerned with the example that an overly broad
online infringement scheme would set for other countries with fewer free speech
protections” (SOPA12 p. 6). The harm that would result from these practices was
inextricably tied to the regulatory technologies mandated by these policies and
oppositional groups were convinced that the “proposed DNS technological
remedy…risks setting a precedent for other countries, to use DNS mechanisms to enforce
a range of domestic policies…that would hinder online freedom of expression and
association” (SOPA14 p. 10). The same was true for the search engine filtering required
by this legislation that was essentially, “government-mandated censorship of Internet
search results” (Id). Like DNS blocking, the adulteration of search results set “an
alarming precedent that undercuts” the ability of the U.S. to criticize similar mechanisms
employed by repressive regimes (SOPA14 p. 10). Simply implying moral authority by
claiming that SOPA and PIPA were aimed at the infringement of intellectual property
rather than legitimate speech was insufficient and did nothing to differentiate it from
other “filtering with more sinister motives” (SOPA15 p. 2). By enforcing strict content
regulation, the U.S. would be “legitimizing methods of online censorship to enforce its
domestic policies” in a way that was extraordinarily similar to authoritarian governments.
So, not only could technological blocking and filtering harm the rights of U.S. citizens,
but it essentially absolved repressive states of doing the same thing to their people.
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Part V – Legislative Prognostic Frames
In the face of these concerns and confronted with such a large and varied coalition
of oppositional groups, supporters of SOPA and PIPA began to falter. For the first time,
a more nuanced and critical view of the technological mechanisms required by these bills
forced legislative support for them to recede prior to intervention by the judiciary.
Advocates of content regulation did, however, remain convinced that some legislative
action was required to stop the theft of America’s intellectual property. As part of the
legislative prognostic frame, these supporters insisted that Congress must act in order to
solve the problems of piracy and counterfeiting. SOPA and PIPA were necessary
because they would “secure creators’ rights online” and “help restore the security of
copyright online” (SOPA06 p. 268). In order to ensure that U.S. economic interests were
protected and to keep those profits out of the hands of bad actors (SOPA08 p. 1), SOPA
and PIPA would help “American innovators by protecting U.S. intellectual property from
foreign criminals” (SOPA07 p. 1). Lawmakers continued to insist that legitimate
websites, intermediaries and social networking sites were in no danger because these bills
made “clear that the legislation specifically targets the worst-of-the-worst foreign rogue
websites” (SOPA08 p. 1). In the context of this prognostic frame, legislative intervention
was also an economic necessity because the “problem of rogue websites is real,
immediate and wide-spread. It harms all sectors of the economy” (SOPA09 p. 1). SOPA
and PIPA must be part of any solution because, “Protecting America’s intellectual
property will help our economy, create jobs, and discourage illegal websites” (Id p. 2).
The technological “tools” provided by these bills were a crucial part of any such solution.
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Despite the insistence of some voices within Congress and from the content
producing industry, the master and diagnostic frames offered by the opposition began to
take their toll. For the first time, the opposition’s point of view created a situation where
legislative support for certain provisions within these bills began to erode. Specifically,
the opposition had railed against the DNS blocking provision because it had the potential
to be so damaging to individual rights and to the normal operation of intermediaries,
search engines, and social networking sites. Due to the potential loss of the DMCA’s
safe harbor protections in favor of immunity contingent on technological blocking, this
regulatory mechanism would drastically shift the role of these intermediaries from simple
conduit to policed network. Also, because it would drive many users away from
legitimate service providers while attempting to circumvent blocking and filtering, the
DNS provision could be extraordinarily harmful to U.S. cybersecurity. All of these
reasons forced even the staunchest supporters of SOPA and PIPA to back away from
mandatory DNS blocking.
On January 13, 2012, Representative Smith issued a press release announcing that
he would remove the DNS blocking provisions of SOPA from draft language of the bill.
In recognition of the pressure placed on him, Smith acknowledged that “After
consultation with industry groups across the country, I feel we should remove Domain
Name System blocking from the Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA10 p. 1). This
announcement came one day after Senator Leahy stripped the DNS provision from PIPA.
In his own press release, Leahy also alluded to the barrage of criticism that had
confronted this blocking requirement and the arguments put forward by an array of
oppositional groups. Senator Leahy grudgingly acknowledged that the harms of this
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provision might outweigh its benefits and that more study was needed prior to its
inclusion in future drafts of the bill. Leahy admitted that, since introduction of PIPA on
the Senate floor, he “and the bill’s cosponsors have continued to hear concerns about the
Domain Name provision from engineers, human rights groups, and others” (SOPA26 p.
1). Nevertheless, this acknowledgement was, at best, reluctant and Leahy seemed
convinced that he had done all that was necessary to seek approval for this provision
from the groups that mattered most - in this case, the ISP industry. Leahy seemed to
imply that the criticisms of the opposition lacked merit despite the broad coalition of
groups they represented. Specifically, he seemed to minimize oppositional concerns and
Leahy remained “confident that the ISPs – including the cable industry, which is the
largest association of ISPs – would not support the legislation if its enactment created the
problems that opponents of this provision suggest” (Id). In a single press release, Leahy
had bowed to oppositional pressure and simultaneously dismissed it. This encapsulated
the legislative position that SOPA and PIPA remained the best and most appropriate
solution to the problem of online infringement. Despite the removal of DNS blocking
requirements, Leahy continued to stand behind PIPA and insisted that the “bill remains a
strong and balanced approach to protecting intellectual property” (Id). Smith took a
similar stance and noted that, even without the DNS provision, SOPA still “cuts off the
flow of revenue to these foreign illegal sites and makes it harder for online criminals to
market and distribute illegal products to U.S. consumers” (SOPA10 p. 1).
For the first time, legislators made drastic alterations to active bills before the
opposition had filed a lawsuit. Even without the insistence of the courts, legislators like
Smith and Leahy adopted oppositional concerns and bowed to pressure from a broad
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coalition of stakeholders. Unlike the CDA, COPA or CIPA, during the debate over
SOPA and PIPA the opposition compelled supporters to amend the technological
requirements of these bills based on concerns over free speech and the loss of a mostly
unregulated Internet. Advocates of content regulation, perhaps sensing the direction of
public opinion, initiated a frame shift of their own and discarded a controversial
mechanism in order to preserve the master frame of protecting America’s intellectual
property. Specifically, support for these bills continued to describe the economic harms
that online infringement caused, the lost jobs and compromised safety of American
consumers. None of these frames deviated from the narrative that legislators had
constructed even though they had scrapped a core provision of these bills. Leahy
demonstrated this point most clearly by noting that he was removing the DNS blocking
requirement from PIPA because it had become a distraction from the real issues. He was
removing this provision not because of its implications for free speech or because the ISP
industry felt it was dangerous but “so that we can focus on the other important provisions
in this bill, which are essential to protecting American intellectual property online, and
the American jobs that are tied to intellectual property” (SOPA26 p. 1).
Most interestingly, as part of this shift both Smith and Leahy acknowledged that
the technical aspects of these bills required further study. Finally, they recognized that
more critical review was a necessary component for crafting sound legislation and both
press releases gave some attention to this issue. Specifically, Smith acknowledged that
he was rescinding SOPA’s DNS provision so that he and others “can further examine the
issues surrounding this provision” (SOPA10 p. 1). The “issues” in this case presumably
referred to the many concerns brought forward by the opposition. Senator Leahy was

320

more expansive on this point and suggested, “that the positive and negative effects of this
provision be studied before implemented” (SOPA26 p. 1). Leahy acknowledged that this
kind of remedy “is in fact a highly technical issue, and I am prepared to recommend we
give it more study before implementing it” (Id). Despite this, Leahy’s response seems to
imply that the removal of DNS blocking was probably no more than temporary and, in
the meantime, he expressed “regret that law enforcement will not have this remedy
available to it when websites operating overseas are stealing American property,
threatening the safety and security of American consumers” (Id). Perhaps this was
simply political grandstanding and a way for Leahy and Smith to save face while
regrouping. At the least, it demonstrates a level of pragmatism and a deep commitment
to the master and diagnostic frames underpinning this legislation. Both Leahy and Smith,
as those who introduced these bills, were willing to sacrifice what was perhaps the key
technological mechanism of enforcement in order to ensure that legislation would go
forward to protect U.S. intellectual property.
It is also interesting to note that, even though the sponsors had excised the DNS
provision from these bills, all of the other controversial technological requirements
remained. SOPA and PIPA still required payment providers and advertisers to cease all
business arrangements with those sites suspected of infringing activity. Representative
Smith was unyielding on this point and touted this aspect of SOPA even as he was
admitting defeat on DNS blocking. Smith lamented the loss of the DNS provision but
remained confident that SOPA would help resolve the problems of online piracy and
counterfeiting by strangling the economic incentive of these bad actors. Even though
DNS blocking had failed, Smith reassured concerned supporters that “the bill maintains
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provisions that ‘follow the money’ and cut off the main sources of revenue to foreign
illegal sites” (SOPA10 p. 1). SOPA’s mandate for search engines also remained and the
bill still required these intermediaries to filter search results for any website suspected of
hosting, linking to, or being associated with infringing content. Again, Representative
Smith made clear that this requirement would remain and that SOPA would continue “to
protect consumers from being directed to foreign illegal websites by search engines” (Id).
Finally, the private rights of action that had so concerned oppositional groups remained in
force. Although domain names were safe for now, SOPA would continue to provide
“innovators with a way to bring claims against foreign illegal sites that steal and sell their
technology, products, and intellectual property” (Id).
So, while even the strongest of proponents had been forced to back down, they
remained convinced that SOPA and PIPA, as well as the remaining technical provisions
they included, were the best way to solve the problem of online infringement. Although
Smith and Leahy had to publicly step away from DNS blocking due to oppositional
pressure, they showed no sign of heeding similar warnings about the other regulatory
systems required by these bills. Similarly, none of these legislative advocates seems to
have taken seriously many other oppositional concerns such as those related to the
entanglement of legitimate websites in overly restrictive enforcement, complications due
to actions brought by private rightsholders and the precedent that search result
adulteration would set for global Internet governance and for repressive regimes.
Removal of the DNS provision from SOPA and PIPA was a victory for the opposition
but it would be a small one if the remaining technical requirements were enforced.

322

Part VI – Oppositional Prognostic Frames
Even though DNS blocking was no longer part of the Congressional solution to
the problem of online infringement, oppositional groups continued to express concern
about the remaining technological provisions of these bills. As they had when confronted
with the CDA, COPA and CIPA, these opponents would argue strongly that Congress
must reconsider the technical requirements of such bills prior to passing them into law.
Failing that, these groups insisted that the courts strike down such content regulation
schemes as unconstitutional due to their detrimental impact on individual rights and
speech on the Internet. In addition to arguments that had now become familiar, these
groups would also pursue a much more aggressive and public form of activism that
placed additional pressure on legislative supporters of these bills. In lieu of waiting to air
their grievances in court, those opposed to SOPA and PIPA would take their complaints
directly to the online spaces that they argued would be harmed so drastically by these
laws. While the opposition to the CDA, COPA and CIPA had mostly consisted of a few
activist groups and concerned professional organizations, those fighting against SOPA
and PIPA represented a wide range of stakeholders with differing interests. Perhaps
because of this breadth, the opposition here was able to fight a campaign against these
bills and their technological requirements that was impossible to ignore. Websites as
varied as Wikipedia and Reddit were able to place pressure on legislative supporters of
these bills alongside Google, Facebook and other massive players in the Internet industry.
Individual users also spoke out against SOPA and PIPA and, in the aggregate, were able
to change the direction of U.S. policy. Essentially, these groups and individuals would
make it impossible for legislators to continue to support these proposals.
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As SOPA and PIPA progressed through the legislative process, members of both
the House and Senate began to feel the political pressure placed on them by oppositional
groups. Due to this pressure, many legislators began to take note of both the opposition’s
arguments against these bills and the impact that they could have on the Internet. For
example, Congressman Henry Johnson, Jr. (D-GA) noted that some of these stakeholders
including “the technology industry and payment processors” had “identified some
legitimate concerns with SOPA” (SOPA06 p. 44). Johnson acknowledged the wide range
of groups opposing these bills and drew attention to the fact that “public interest and civil
rights groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the Consumers Union, and the
Consumer Federation of America, have expressed concerns about this legislation” (Id).
Confronted with such a broad yet unified opposition, Congressman Johnson expressed his
own “concerns with the legislation in its current form” and strongly recommended that
Congress “consider any unintended consequences SOPA may cause” prior to its
enactment (Id). Johnson was not alone in his doubts about these bills and other
legislators would begin to echo the opposition’s calls for serious reconsideration of
SOPA and PIPA. Representative J. Randy Forbes (R-VA) summarized this position well
and adopted the opposition’s criticisms. Forbes noted that “as drafted, SOPA presents
serious free speech and free press concerns, and would allow the First Amendment rights
of innocent, uninvolved Americans to be curtailed” (Id p. 41). Like the opposition,
Forbes strongly suggested that “Congress would be well-served to go back to the drawing
board and write a much more narrowly-tailored bill that reaches only the bad actors and
offending parties” (Id). Forbes took this position almost verbatim from the opposition’s
vehement criticism that “SOPA as constructed would come at too high a cost to Internet
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communication and noninfringing online expression” (Id p. 158). While the opposition
had almost unanimously agreed that online infringement was a serious problem, they also
were unanimous in their assertion that Congress should reconsider the language and
technical requirements of SOPA and PIPA. Without serious reconsideration, the
opposition agreed that “we cannot support SOPA, and in fact we oppose it in its current
form, given its broad sweep and its heavy hand that will land largely upon innocent
content producers” (SOPA12 p. 3). For the first time, a majority of legislators began to
accept the wisdom of these critiques and adjusted their political positions accordingly.
Many legislators had also begun to agree that they could not enact SOPA and
PIPA barring major revisions. As mentioned previously, Representative McClintock was
one of the early adopters of this oppositional position and was personally convinced that
the sponsors of these bills should remove them from consideration in the House and
Senate. McClintock was adamant that neither bill should proceed due directly to their
mandated technological mechanisms of enforcement. Specifically, McClintock would
charge that “these measures would allow the government to shut down Web sites, ruin
honest businesses, impound property, disrupt legitimate speech, and dragoon innocent
third parties into enforcing laws that may or may not have been broken” (SOPA25 p. 1).
Other legislators took up this perspective and argued that “SOPA and PIPA directly
threaten the very Internet that has brought humanity great prosperity and even greater
peace” (SOPA20 p. 1). Representative Jared Polis (D-CO) would go so far as to request
that his colleagues take up the public outcry over these bills and “join in solidarity with
Internet users across the world in making sure that we tackle online piracy in a way that
doesn’t throw out the baby with the bathwater” (Id). The opposition and now a great
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many legislators agreed that SOPA and PIPA were “very poorly drafted” (SOPA21 p. 1)
and included technological provisions that would almost certainly disrupt speech on the
Internet. While it was universally agreed that “selling fake Nikes or movies you don’t
own is a problem that needs to be addressed,” it was also true among a growing number
of voices that the problem could be solved “in ways that do not threaten speech, that
allow for the legitimate sharing of information and protect the architecture and value of
the Internet” (SOPA22 p. 3).
Also for the first time, legislators began to call for a serious and critical review of
the technological mechanisms required by SOPA and PIPA. Recognition of this need for
sustained and detailed review of these technologies had been partly responsible for the
demise of the DNS blocking provision and some legislators had taken note of the lack of
technical expertise represented at hearings before Congressional committees.
Representative Zoe Lofgren had drawn attention to this issue just two months prior to
Leahy and Smith’s press releases announcing the removal of this requirement from
SOPA and PIPA. During the major hearing on SOPA, Lofgren had noted the one-sided
nature of those invited to testify. Of the six witnesses, Lofgren found it troubling that
“Five are in favor [of the bill] and only one is against” (SOPA06 p. 201). She also noted
the serious “lack of any technical expertise on this panel” and the need for such voices
when considering the consequences of “the DNS portions of this bill” (Id). When the
technology industry became involved in the process, companies like Verizon had
cautioned legislators that “Government-sanctioned website blocking represents a major
shift in U.S. policy that requires careful consideration and input from a wide variety and
group of stakeholders” (SOPA18 p. 11). Many legislators began to heed these warnings

326

and chastised their colleagues for not considering the political and constitutional
implications of what they were proposing. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) noted on the
Senate floor that Congress must begin to include a critical review of technological
barriers to access prior to imposing them and that lawmakers must include a broad range
of stakeholders in such conversations. Perhaps in reference to the broad coalition of
groups opposing SOPA and PIPA, Wyden argued that Congress should begin to
“construct legislation in a transparent way that responds to our broad collective interests”
(SOPA22 p. 3). Wyden was also critical of the penchant of his fellow legislators to
deliberate “behind closed doors” (Id) on issues and technologies that they may not fully
understand. In Wyden’s opinion, it was dangerous for legislators to impose technological
barriers to access without some critical study and that there would continue to be “serious
unintended consequences when Members of Congress and staff think they have all the
answers and rush to construct and pass legislation” (Id). Wyden was adamant that
legislators should not impose draconian restrictions on Internet access or “make
assumptions about a medium that is still taking shape and that few in Congress fully
understand” (SOPA06 p. 261). Other legislators took up this call for more serious
deliberation and a more comprehensive understanding of that which Congress proposed
to regulate. Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS) would argue that “Congress has the
responsibility to remain engaged and up to speed on all issues” especially those involving
such regulatory technologies (SOPA22 p. 4). These legislative calls for a critical review
of regulatory systems and for a broader engagement with stakeholders and activist groups
echoed the opposition. Dating back to the CDA, oppositional groups had repeatedly
pointed to the need to engage with all interested parties “before we start imposing
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liability in ways that could severely damage electronic communications systems [and]
sweep away important constitutional rights” (CDA25 p. 32). In the debate over SOPA
and PIPA, it appeared that the majority of legislators were starting to agree with this
assessment.
More pragmatically, legislators may have also found it politically expedient to
take note of the public criticisms made by a wide array of oppositional groups that had
organized against this legislation. Opposition to SOPA and PIPA was both widespread
and vocal in a way that had not presented itself during the conflicts over the CDA,
COPA, or CIPA. Specifically, many high-profile players such as Wikipedia and Google
organized to “black out” their respective services on January 18, 2012 in order to
demonstrate that these bills would ruin the ability of intermediaries to function without
fear of liability for infringing behavior on their networks. Wikipedia and the community
of users it represented used this protest to highlight the potential damage these bills and
their attendant technological requirements could inflict on this resource. While its
administrators argued that Wikipedia did not actively aid in the infringement of
intellectual property, they feared that SOPA and PIPA would eviscerate their ability to
continue to link out to the additional sources that strengthened the reliability and
authoritativeness of its entries. Importantly, Wikipedia did not represent a single
individual or corporate entity but a non-profit community of users representing a large
cross-section of individuals (and voters). Legislators took notice when such a large
constituency argued so publicly that “SOPA and PIPA endanger free speech…and set a
frightening precedent of Internet censorship for the world” (SOPA16 p. 1).
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More than one hundred websites, search engines, networks and social media sites
joined Wikipedia in an organized strike that drew the attention of the media, the public
and, of course, those on Capitol Hill (sopastrike.com, 2014). Wyden again urged his
colleagues not to ignore the millions of Americans “who visited Wikipedia [and] took
action to influence their members of Congress” or the millions who “signed Google’s
petition to block consideration of PIPA” (SOPA22 p. 1-2). Through this widespread
action, these oppositional groups, companies and individuals were able to draw attention
to the dangers posed by SOPA and PIPA’s mandated regulatory systems and,
“empowered by the Internet” itself, “effected political change” (Id). Just two days later,
on January 20th, Smith removed SOPA from consideration in the House indefinitely.
PIPA met a similar fate and no legislator has reintroduced either bill in the intervening
years. Smith and Leahy were forced to surrender the prognostic frames that had
underpinned SOPA and PIPA based on the arguments put forward by the opposition and
the immense network of activists that organized to protest these bills, Nonetheless, the
master frame expressing the need to protect America’s intellectual property remained at
the forefront of Smith’s rhetoric. In a final press release announcing the demise of
SOPA, Smith admitted that “We need to revisit the approach on how best to address the
problem” of online infringement, but made clear that he remained “committed to finding
a solution to the problem of online piracy that protects American intellectual property and
innovation” (Wasserman, 2012). Nevertheless, any future solution would not take the
same technological approach nor was Congress likely to be enact it without some critical
review of any proposed technological solutions or without input from a variety of
interested groups.
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Table 8 – Stop Online Piracy Act/PROPTECT IP Act Frame Analysis Summary
Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)





Prognostic
(Solution)





Frames
Master
(Motivation)





Diagnostic
(Problem)





Prognostic
(Solution)





Legislative Themes
The government was motivated to pass SOPA and PIPA due to the desire to
protect intellectual property and national security.
Legislative supporters of SOPA and PIPA were adamant that the law protect
property at all costs and that free speech concerns were secondary.
These master frames are deeply entrenched and do not appear to be amenable
to technologically critical perspectives
Congress argued that the Internet was a clearinghouse for stolen intellectual
property and for piracy. This caused grave economic harm to U.S. interests.
Supporters portrayed the Internet as a “lawless” medium that required
intervention through policy and through technology in order to mitigate this
harm.
Core political and economic beliefs form the basis for this diagnostic frame.
Alternative interpretations of the Internet and digital rights were not
persuasive.
Technological mechanisms such as DNS blocking, ISP filtering and search
result adulteration were the best and only means for combating the theft of
intellectual property online.
Lawmakers suggested that these regulatory systems would allow the U.S.
government and private rightsholders to pursue criminal action against online
infringers.
This prognostic frame eventually demonstrated that lawmakers were willing to
sacrifice some technological solutions in order to preserve the master and
diagnostic frames. This may be the best point for inserting an alternative view
of regulatory technologies.

Oppositional Themes
SOPA and PIPA had the massive potential to restrict individual rights,
autonomy, and constitutionally protected speech.
The technological mechanisms proposed by Congress were intrusive, overly
broad, and burdensome for both online speakers and listeners.
Oppositional groups argued that legislators had not considered the implications
of these enforcement mechanisms prior to including them in statutory
requirements.
DNS blocking, ISP filtering and search result adulteration would harm the
ability of individuals and website administrators to operate without fear of
criminal liability.
These technological systems would entangle legitimate websites and
individuals in an overly zealous regulatory scheme.
The technical requirements of SOPA and PIPA would force providers and
platforms to take on a surveillance and policing role.
The primary solutions were to strike SOPA and PIPA down as unconstitutional
or to ensure that neither ever reached a vote in Congress.
For the first time, a grassroots movement of online actors took up protest and
dissent as a means to draw attention to these policies and to address the flaws
of these regulatory systems.
Through this prognostic frame, the opposition was able to sway public opinion
and convince a number of lawmakers that these policies and technologies were
damaging to rights, autonomy, and speech.
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Chapter 8 – Theoretical Discussion and Conclusion
Introduction
The preceding frame analysis has described in detail many of the implications of
Congressional attempts to regulate content online. Across the CDA, COPA, CIPA,
SOPA, and PIPA, lawmakers’ master frames all represent the state’s goal of protecting
children from indecent content and safeguarding intellectual property from theft.
Particularly in instances where the primary motivations for these policy initiatives have
been grounded in fundamental values such as these, legislators have demonstrated a
propensity to rely on technological mechanisms of enforcement that have direct
implications for constitutional rights within the U.S. democratic context. When
lawmakers directly equate unregulated access to the Internet to the harms identified
within diagnostic frames, this magnifies that propensity. Again and again, legislators
have approached the Internet as a technological medium that is uniquely responsive to
technological regulation. Lawmakers’ prognostic frames clearly demonstrate this view of
technology and Congress has consistently required the implementation of technological
solutions for the problems they have identified.
Despite this approach to technology and to regulation, oppositional groups have
continually offered competing points of view. While these groups have remained
sympathetic to the worthwhile goals of protecting children and property, they have also
been adamant that the state must not sacrifice individual autonomy, regulatory
transparency, or access to constitutionally protected speech in the process. Oppositional
master frames consistently rely on these core values. The same is true for the
opposition’s diagnostic frames that have identified the technological solutions imposed
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by Congress as having the potential to cause continuing harm to these ideals. In the face
of regulatory technologies that may limit individual choice, illegitimately restrict access,
or introduce opacity for the user, the opposition has argued that Congress must consider
the political and constitutional implications of these systems prior to implementation. As
judicial opinion has demonstrated in many of the cases described throughout this
dissertation, this oppositional point of view has proven to be more constitutionally sound
and more respectful of individual rights. As will be described, many of the opposition’s
perspectives align closely to concepts articulated throughout STS research.
Despite repeated attempts to regulate through technology, it is clear that there
remains some flexibility within legislative prognostic frames for competing points of
view and many of the frame shifts identified throughout this research have taken place at
this moment within the policy process. Despite entrenched beliefs and confidence in
regulatory technologies, lawmakers have demonstrated that they are willing to adapt in
order to advance their prevailing master and diagnostic frames. As this dissertation has
described, Congress has often narrowed the scope of these policies and has modified their
preferred regulatory technologies in response to oppositional pressure. This observation
is useful in that it provides a point of entry for inclusion of several perspectives from STS
research that will be the focus of the following discussion. Now that this research has
identified these frames and frame shifts, it is necessary to discuss how to employ specific
concepts from STS to not only articulate the problems inherent in these policy actions but
also to demonstrate how they might provide guidance for the policy process moving
forward. This chapter will address several of these core concepts including: Congress’
reliance on the technical rationality of regulatory systems; the impact of technological
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affordances on individual rights; the non-neutral, subjective and potentially biased nature
of these systems; the political implications of these systems for liberty, individual
autonomy, community autonomy and local knowledge/practice; the potential for cultural
and technological hegemony; the imposition and exercise of non-democratic power
relations; the consequences of technological ordering; and the implications of Congress’
closed relationship to technology. This chapter will conclude with practical
recommendations for including these STS perspectives within the policy process so that
future lawmakers will be better prepared to address these issues and to ensure that they
protect democratic rights from the outset.
Technical Rationality
In the context of the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and PIPA, Congress’ portrayal
of regulatory systems appears to rest on the assumption that such regulatory technologies
are simply rational tools that can curb certain behaviors and curtail access to certain
speech without significant impact on individual rights. Based on the analysis provided
throughout this dissertation, many lawmakers have approached these technologies from a
belief that they represent the end product of a rational design process that neither embeds
values nor embodies biases. For example, in the case of the CDA and COPA, age
verification systems, as the preferred instrument of control, were presented as sterile
“enabling tools” that would function invisibly to “filter, screen, allow, or disallow
content” (CDA01 p. 102). In the case of CIPA, “technology protection measures”
(CIPA01 p. 1) such as commercial filters were presented as apolitical artifacts that
controlled access based on objective categorization and “not on the basis of any
viewpoint” (CIPA14 p. 31). In each of these policies and within each of the frames
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employed by legislative supporters of these Acts, lawmakers essentially presented
technology as a black box that provides the best and least restrictive means for realizing
the state’s goals with little apparent consideration for how they may function in
application. This is emblematic of Latour’s “blackboxing” where the efficiency and
utility of a technological system discourages any deeper investigation into its design,
embedded values, or implications. As Latour suggests, it is the very success of these
systems that increases their opacity (1999, p. 304).
This is particularly true within the master frames used by legislators to justify
both the need for policy and the need for regulatory systems. The normative concerns
represented by these master frames are so fundamental that they appear to make it even
less likely that lawmakers will question the rationality of these systems. It is important to
note that, in relation to efforts to protect children, Congress had legitimate cause for
concern and there was (and is) a multitude of sexual material available online.
Lawmakers also had an indisputable and well-established responsibility for protecting
minors. It was entirely reasonable for lawmakers to believe that “the ultimate
responsibility for overall child welfare and legislative protection does still lie with the
state and its politics” (Staksrud, 2013, p. 169). The prevalence of this material and the
precedent of state responsibility underscored the resonance and power of this master
frame. Despite this, the problem described throughout this dissertation is that Congress
used its overpowering desire to protect children to justify the imposition of a number of
technological mechanisms of control. Equally, during these attempts to accomplish
policy goals, considerations of how regulatory systems would actually function were not
“in the forefront when considering how and what to regulate” (Id). Instead, legislators
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directly tied the utility of these enforcement mechanisms to the normative motivation for
the policy. Regulatory systems were “good” because they were effective and, from this
point of view, it was better to impose “new and rapidly changing technology” than it was
“to leave children unprotected” (CDA14 pp. 18-19).
Legislators repeatedly tied the instrumental utility and apparent objectivity of
these artifacts to the ideological motivations for these policies. Use of these “tools” may
have seemed self-apparent because they could demonstrably achieve the government’s
core interests. Perhaps because of this, supporters of these Acts rarely contested these
systems at the legislative level and lawmakers appear to have been surprised that the
opposition would take issue with their use. When opponents of these policies attempted
to challenge the use of these technologies prior to implementation, proponents of
regulation called for immediate application of these objective “technology tools”
(CIPA19 pp. 88-89) and berated the opposition for requesting “more study” (CDA25 p
28) of their design and implications. This portrayal of regulatory systems implies a
reification of scientific and technical expertise that places these artifacts out of the
“sphere of legitimate controversy” (Hallin, 1989, p. 116). Technological enforcement
was “rarely contestable” from this point of view because these mechanisms appeared
“non-arbitrary” and “impersonal” (Ezrahi, 2003, p. 64). The reaction of Exon, McCain,
Oxley, and other legislators to the opposition may have been so vehement precisely
because the justifications for both these policies and for the use of regulatory systems
seemed above reproach.
Oppositional groups repeatedly contested this supposed feature of regulatory
technology across all of the policies and across all of the frames identified here. The
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application of age verification systems, commercial filtering software, DNS blocks and
search result adulteration became “sites of contestation” (Flyverbom, 2011, p. viii) where
the technical objectivity and rationality of these systems became the primary issue of
contention. These groups consistently and vocally opposed the state’s portrayal of such
systems as rational, objective, and benign and instead made numerous arguments
detailing the arbitrary and distinctly political features of these technologies. For example,
the opposition recognized that technologies like filtering software depended on embedded
values when categorizing content as acceptable or not and that filtering companies
continually rely on “subjective judgments in their blocking programs” (CIPA11 pp. 1417). This oppositional perspective provided a crucial counterpoint to the legislative
approach to technology and, in the majority of instances, that perspective proved to be
constitutionally correct from the standpoint of rights and individual autonomy. This
validates the prediction that these contests will provide new opportunities for advocacy
on the limits and appropriate use of technology in the policy arena (Monberg, 2005, p.
283) and can help guide legislators when considering enforcement mechanisms. If future
lawmakers are to avoid the long cycles of legislation and litigation that have
characterized these policies, they might adopt this oppositional perspective and, as some
in STS suggest, should reconsider any presumptions about the technological rationality of
regulatory systems.
Despite this, in the examples described throughout this research, lawmakers have
consistently approached regulatory systems as non-arbitrary and apolitical. Implicit
within this presentation of the technology is the assumption that these systems would not
impede rights or autonomy but would simply isolate users from problematic content.
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Congress could safely enact the technical requirements of the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA
and PIPA because the underlying enforcement mechanisms were functionally appropriate
for accomplishing the state’s compelling interests. Even when lawmakers acknowledged
technological shortcomings, they consistently portrayed these systems as the best
available tools given the current state of the art. Furthermore, legislators not only relied
on the self-apparent efficacy of existing technologies but implied that the presence of
technologically dependent regulation would spur additional innovation in this area –
innovations that would afford even “more ways to comply” in the future (CDA16 p. 25).
This implies a recursive relationship wherein the state reifies technical objects and
expertise through policy. Imposition of the policy simultaneously encourages the
continuation of a rational design process that then produces more of these “tools” that can
assist in realizing the state’s regulatory goals (see Pfaffenberger, 1992, p. 290). This is a
recurring theme throughout these policies and Congress noted that the design process
would be “encouraged by the presence of a legal obligation” (CDA16 p. 25). Based on
the documentation examined here, at the legislative level there was almost no suggestion
that regulatory systems were anything but useful policy instruments that would continue
to improve in the future. By imposing more policies and more technologies, lawmakers
would be able to perpetuate the “beneficial purpose of encouraging the development
of…technologies, thus furthering the mass communications and Internet development
goals of Congress” (CIPA19 p. 29).
With this insight, it is possible to describe alternative framings that are useful in
circumstances where even the most fundamental motivations for policy are involved.
When ideologically and emotionally charged frames (such as those related to the
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protection of children and the protection of property) confront those concerned with these
policies, it is useful to interject one of the core STS themes presented throughout this
dissertation. Specifically, that technological artifacts, such as those enforcement
mechanisms at issue here, are socially constructed and non-neutral. As lawmakers debate
the merits of these policies in the future and as they consider regulatory mechanisms, it is
extraordinarily useful to remember that these “tools” embody the value judgments and
biases of those who design them. Particularly in circumstances where lawmakers employ
them in a regulatory context, they should consider these systems as objects that can
function to constrain individual rights and autonomy. Within these policies, lawmakers
have imbued technological mechanisms of enforcement with “constitutional force”
(Jasanoff, 2003, p. 175) and that force is part of what makes these mechanisms political
objects. By mandating the use of such systems in a regulatory environment, they become
coercive objects that exercise legal authority on the state’s behalf. What STS
perspectives tell us is that use of this force “should be explicitly authorized” (Id). That
authorization is less than explicit when the state delegates power to these systems without
first understanding the value-laden and subjective nature of the design process. While this
reminder may not serve to blunt the resonance of their master frames, it can help
lawmakers begin to consider the implications of the technologies they might impose. The
policy process in these instances should include such a reminder and lawmakers would
benefit from an understanding of technology that includes the contingent nature of
technological design. This is the first and most basic requirement for “unpacking the
politics of artifacts” (Bijker, 1997, p. 281) at the legislative level and for the formulation
of sound policy.
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In contrast, oppositional groups have consistently emphasized that these
enforcement mechanisms are more than just useful objects and it could serve Congress
well to remember these points when considering such policies in the future. Specifically,
when confronted with legislative assertions as to the neutrality of regulatory systems, the
opposition has countered with arguments that echo the fundamental principle that these
systems are anything but impartial. The opposition repeatedly relied on the requirement
that any policy should, first and foremost, guarantee rights and access to protected
speech. This extended to the assertion that many of the technological solutions offered
by Congress were, by design, incapable of such protections. Oppositional groups hinted
at the non-neutral nature of the design process when, for example, they criticized
commercial filters for imposing “content- and viewpoint-based filtering decisions” that
were “subjective” in nature (CIPA11 pp. 4, 14-17). More explicitly, the opposition
affirmatively recognized that the Internet itself was the product of a socially constructed
design process that purposefully embedded certain ideological considerations. As the
ACLU would suggest, the Internet, as a conscious design feature, “embodies the values
that underlie the First Amendment by nurturing the robust exchange of ideas and
equalizing the distribution of information” (CDA15 p. 2). This is not simply wishful
thinking on the part of the opposition that these are the values that designers should
embed in the Internet’s architecture. In fact, this understanding aligns directly with the
philosophy of the World Wide Web’s original designer, Tim Berners-Lee. From the
inception of the Web, Berners-Lee conceived of and designed this system to allow for the
broad dissemination and receipt of information without prioritizing (or discriminating
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against) messages based on their content (Berners-Lee, 2010). The ACLU’s point speaks
directly to the idea that the technological design process can embody values.
Although STS is not a monolithic body of work, the opposition’s statements in
this regard are strikingly similar to the position shared by many scholars within STS that
technology, “is value-laden [and] that technologies are developed in a social context that
pushes and pulls and shapes its development” (Johnson, 1997, p. 20). This research
suggests that the policy process in general and the framing process in particular should
include some understanding by lawmakers that technology’s apparent rationality overlays
a number of political and ideological commitments. If such considerations were at the
forefront during legislative debate, lawmakers could explicitly address this aspect of
technology and benefit from this theoretical insight. As noted earlier, this recognition
will not necessarily curb the desire to enact laws based on emotionally and ideologically
charged master frames but concerned organizations and individuals can usefully insert
these ideas into legislative diagnostic and prognostic frames. For example, instead of
consistently portraying the Internet as a problem that required government intervention,
lawmakers might approach online communication quite differently. With an
understanding of embedded values and the design process, legislator might begin to
consider Internet communication as something more than an opportunity for
pornographers and thieves to harm children or steal intellectual property. Instead, to use
the Supreme Court’s phrase, the Internet is a “vast democratic forum” where speech of
many different kinds is a primary good (CDA18, p. 16). Unregulated access, from this
perspective, is not a flaw in the system, but a conscious design feature harmed by
centralized content management and control.
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In turn, this perspective can guide the prognostic solutions offered by Congress
when legislation is required. It can also assist legislators when choosing the means for
enforcing regulation. In situations where online content is the target of regulation,
Congress can benefit from the reminder that technological mechanisms of enforcement
have the distinct potential to act in contradiction to democratic and constitutional
principles. While objects like age verification systems may seem to be expedient tools
for the realization of policy goals, they have the ideological potential to impede a number
of beneficial societal activities. Especially when buttressed by the force of law, Congress
should consider the effects of those impediments prior to implementation. This alteration
to the policy process may serve to reverse some U.S. precedent in this area and, as
Richard Sclove suggests, can help to avoid future situations where lawmakers allow for
“the introduction of many technologies having the potential for profound societywide
impacts without any evaluation of their social or political ramifications” (1995, p. 219).
The policies at issue here have consistently run afoul of constitutional requirements
because they did not consider technology, for good or bad, to be objects embodying
values and ideology.
Technological Affordances
In order to address the socially constructed nature of technology and regulatory
systems, the process of policy formulation should also include an understanding of
technological affordances. Lawmakers should actively consider that the design features
of some technologies allow or disallow certain activities. Designers build affordances (or
the lack thereof) directly into the architecture of a technical system and these features
have the potential to constrain a number of activities. As discussed in the engineering
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literature, affordances are self-conscious design choices that “encourage us [i.e.
designers] to consider devices, technologies, and media in terms of the actions they make
possible and obvious. It can guide us in designing artifacts which emphasize desired
affordances and deemphasize undesired ones” (Id p. 83). As Latour (1992) suggests, the
interactions allowed or disallowed by designers can guide and limit a user’s range of
available actions and constrain a variety of possibilities. Therefore, technological
affordances are a “property of an artifact that suggests how it should be used”
(Pfaffenberger, 1992, p. 284). Lawmakers should actively consider how use of that
artifact can limit individual autonomy by denying certain actions or access to certain
content. By incorporating an understanding of affordances into the policy process,
lawmakers can begin to assess how certain regulatory systems may impact the exercise of
rights and unduly constrain access to protected speech. Legislators may take quite a
different view of technological regulation and may choose different regulatory
mechanisms if they consider these systems as artifacts that mediate the ability of the
individual to pursue a number of activities online and that can be designed/deployed in
ways that enhance or detract from constitutional rights.
For example, in the case of age verification systems that require credit card
information as a condition of access, lawmakers would have had an enhanced ability to
consider how this requirement constrains constitutional action if they had been able to
address the concept of technological affordances explicitly. Most notably, supporters of
the CDA and COPA may have hesitated to impose these systems if they had considered
that the ability of a consenting adult to access constitutionally protected speech was not a
given if that adult did not qualify for or wish to carry a credit card. An intentional design

344

feature of this system afforded access only upon entry of a credit card number.
Constitutional guarantees include no such prerequisite for access to protected speech. As
Latour, Pfaffenberger, Brey, and others have argued, any technological system that
“discourages or prevents a user from behaving in certain ways while using an artifact”
(Brey, 2006, p. 73) implicates the autonomy and rights of the individual. When
considered in the context of technological affordances and constitutional rights,
lawmakers could have improved the policy process by incorporating an understanding of
this concept.
By contrast, oppositional groups frequently adopted language against these
policies and these technologies that demonstrated some understanding of technological
affordances. Taking again the example of age verification systems, the opposition was
quite clear that the design of these systems was troubling in that it conditioned access to
protected speech on the provision of personal information including credit card data.
Specifically, the Center for Democracy and Technology based its argument against these
systems on the observation that they would “require individuals to disclose personal
information (e.g., name, address, social security number, credit card) to a third party prior
to being afforded access to constitutionally-protected speech” (COPA23 p. 9).
Alternatively, the opposition endorsed the “development of user-controlled technologies
that afford the least restrictive means by which to protect minors from material on the
Internet deemed harmful to them, while ensuring that children have rich, educational, and
entertaining experiences on the Internet” (Id pp. 3-4). The opposition predicated its point
in this instance on an understanding of regulatory systems as artifacts with the potential
to function in ways that affirmatively protect rights and autonomy. The design process is
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not a predetermined course that inevitably results in the best and most rational tools. As
such, it is important for legislators to consider how certain systems and technological
arrangements are, by design, more restrictive than others. This consideration should
extend to the legitimacy of those restrictions in the context of democratic rights.
Based on the frame analysis conducted here, STS perspectives sensitive to
technological affordances can be included to greatest effect during articulation of and
debate over legislative prognostic frames. It is at this point in the policy process that
Congress is most amenable to alternative points of view about the solutions included
within policy requirements. Time and again throughout the policies at issue here,
legislators have demonstrated that they are capable of adapting the regulatory and
technological solutions they have proposed. While this did not often occur during the
negotiation of discrete policies, it did happen between policies. This means that, after a
policy has failed, the legislative master and diagnostic frames tend to carry over into the
next policy with a new and often more narrow enforcement structure. For example, when
the Supreme Court struck down the CDA, many members of Congress did not abandon
the core belief that certain online content was a danger to minors. Similarly, these same
lawmakers continued to assert that unregulated access to the Internet was the cause of this
harm and it was the state’s duty to intervene. When COPA failed to pass constitutional
muster, Congress repeated the process and focused a new regulatory mechanism much
more specifically on children’s Internet access in public schools and libraries.
Legislative motives did not change, nor did problem definition. Instead, lawmakers’
proposed technological solution to these issues shifted to better account for arguments
against technical limitations on access and speech put forward by the opposition and the
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courts. SOPA and PIPA best demonstrate this phenomenon of prognostic frame
adaptation where legislators withdrew support for DNS blocking during policy
negotiation. Political, oppositional, and public pressure, forced legislators to
acknowledge that this barrier did not afford individuals the necessary opportunity to
communicate or receive protected speech. Due to this lack of affordances and the
constitutional and ethical implications of this technological mechanism, lawmakers chose
to excise it from statutory requirements. These arguments also echo many of the same
perspectives offered by some STS scholars and, if incorporated into the policy process
from the outset, could help avoid any need for the continual adaptation and frame shifts
described throughout this research.
Neutrality, Subjectivity, and Bias
In addition to the technological affordances that allow or disallow certain
activities, regulatory systems may also constrain autonomy and access due to the
normative positions or biases of designers. The subjective nature of technological design
embeds the values of those who create such systems. While some affordances may be an
intentional but non-political design feature, others are direct features of an ideological
motivation. Some of the regulatory systems described throughout this analysis have
demonstrated design bias when categorizing online content as “acceptable” or
“unacceptable.” Again, however, due to the perceived rationality and neutrality of its
design, legislators often presented technologies like commercial filters as tools that
simply served a useful function. Based on this analysis, legislators presumed the design
of such tools to be free of moral judgment or political bias because the designers
themselves focused solely on accomplishing an instrumental goal. For example, when
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filtering technologies were employed in the legislative and regulatory context of CIPA,
the assumption was that they were merely “effective tools” (CIPA25 p. 5) for achieving
the government’s interests. In contrast, as some in STS have suggested, reliance on
technical solutions has consequences beyond its utility. Lawmakers often presented
objects like filters as neutral tools because they demonstrated a “promiscuous utility” that
obscured the values embodied within them (Winner, 1986, p. 6). The usefulness of
things like filtering software often hides the impact it can have.
Due to its “promiscuous utility,” Congress deployed regulatory technologies
under the assumption that they embodied no values or biases. Using again the example
of CIPA, this appears to be the case when, for instance, the government asserted that “the
commercial filtering products used by public libraries draw distinctions based on whether
the material falls into a category…not on the basis of any viewpoint” (CIPA14 p. 31).
This is extraordinarily telling because it presumes that such a category does not itself
represent a viewpoint. Such a statement suggests that, in and of themselves, categories
are neutral heuristics – nothing but useful shortcuts for organizing content into inclusive
or exclusive domains. This also suggests that the filtering software itself is drawing such
distinctions, not the designers or manufacturers who created such categories and defined
their boundaries in the first place. Yet the act of categorization is a political process (see
Suchman, 1994) and those creating these domains may have been anything but neutral
when delineating these kinds of borders. In fact, critics have consistently argued against
filtering software due to its definitively non-neutral design.
For instance, religious and political bias may be a design feature opaque to the
user but prevalent in the philosophy of those writing the code. Commercial filtering
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products in particular have demonstrated these inherent biases and the categories of
content that are blocked are instructive in this regard. In one survey exploring the depth
and breadth of commercial filters, “The political attitudes of the different filter
manufacturers were reflected in blocking decisions, particularly with respect to such
subjects as homosexuality, human rights, and criticism of filtering software” (Heins, et
al., 2006, p. 1). Researchers have also found religious bias in commercial products and
many filtering manufacturers “have filtering categories in which they are blocking web
sites presenting information known to be of concern to people with conservative religious
values” (Willard, 2002). This religious connotation “raises the concern that filtering
products used in schools [and libraries] are inappropriately preventing students from
accessing certain materials based on religious or other inappropriate bias” (Id). This kind
of “preexisting bias” (Friedman & Nissenbaum, 1996, p. 332) is deeply problematic in
the context of public institutions that are required to install filtering software in order to
remain compliant with CIPA. Forced to implement filters that legislators mistakenly
assume are value neutral, this creates a situation in which public institutions unwittingly
and vicariously assume the moral and political points of view of filtering companies.
These ideological commitments may be constitutionally unsound and may go beyond the
definitions of harmful content delineated by the law. This potential of the technology has
been recognized by some in STS who argue that “Those who use or purchase the
technology, in effect, support or endorse or promote the values that create it” (Johnson
1997, p. 22).
Armed with the knowledge that objects like commercial filters can embody these
kinds of biases, lawmakers can proceed to explore whether those biases and embedded
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values conflict with the ideals of individual autonomy and the preservation of access to
protected speech. They can also examine whether those viewpoints are appropriate for
public venues like schools and libraries. When considering future policies, it would serve
Congress well to make explicit inquiries into the substance of criteria that delineate
access for users – especially adult citizens and public library patrons. In circumstances
where these systems may deny access due to the normative perspectives of designers and
manufacturers, lawmakers should question the appropriateness of those perspectives in
the context of federal regulation. Lacking a clear and cognizant investigation into the
conditions of access defined by the mandatory imposition of regulatory systems,
Congress will be unable to make informed choices about the best and most democratic
means for achieving policy goals.
Technology is Political - Liberty
This, then, leads to the recommendation that legislators approach regulatory
technologies as political objects when negotiating future policies. Armed with an
understanding of design affordances and the non-neutral, potentially biased nature of
these systems, lawmakers can begin to address the political implications of technology.
These artifacts are “political” in more than one sense. As mentioned above, these objects
are political in that the policy process has imbued them with the legal, regulatory, and
constitutional force of the state. Delegation of this force is of concern when legislators
do it without explicit understanding of the underlying nature of the technology. As will
be discussed shortly, these systems are also political because they can dictate the
structure and hierarchy of social power relationships in ways that can erode the ability of
the individual to function autonomously. Individual interests may become subservient to
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the motivations of those designing or deploying the technology. More fundamentally,
these technologies have the potential to function politically because they may directly
control the liberties of individuals within the U.S. constitutional context. This may occur
in two ways.
First, this implicates the negative liberty (Berlin, 1969, p. 2) of the individual
when regulatory technologies illegitimately interfere with the user’s ability to seek out
the information that he or she wishes to access. When considering policies like those at
issue here, Congress should explicitly ask at what point the state’s imposition of
regulatory systems becomes an improper hindrance on a citizen’s ability to, essentially,
be left alone. If individual access does not conflict directly with legal prohibitions on
content (such as child pornography) and falls within constitutional protections, the
threshold for restricting online speech should be set quite high (see below regarding
Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). As the Supreme Court found in regard to the CDA, “we
presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it” (CDA18 p. 26). Despite this,
throughout the analysis conducted here, these policies have demonstrated that the
imposition of these technologies has tended to hinder the individual’s liberty to act
without interference. Again, age verification systems impose an artificial barrier to
access that interferes with activities otherwise allowed for adult users. Requiring credit
card information as a condition of access compounds this interference. Commercial
filters hinder the adult library patron’s ability to seek out information without first
requesting that filters be disabled and/or legitimizing their interest as “bona fide research”
(CIPA01 p. 11). DNS blocks and search result adulteration interfere with the individual’s
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liberty to access or even locate desired websites. Considering these factors and the high
bar set for individual access, lawmakers must accommodate the adult citizen’s right to be
free of having to negotiate technological barriers.
These technologies are also political in instances where they implicate the
positive liberty (Id, p. 2) of the individual. Positive liberty goes beyond the ability to act
free from external interference and extends to the freedom to pursue goals and realize
one’s potential. Access to information, as a means for realizing a good and full life (see
Nickel, 2007), then, should be affirmatively protected by the state. When state action
erodes access and self-actualization through regulatory systems, citizens and lawmakers
should explicitly question that erosion. As Berlin (1969, p. 2) suggests, these questions
should address the nature of any impediment that limits individual potential. Congress
must consider the impediments they would impose on the individual and the legitimacy
of those criteria that allow or disallow access. Again, this must include an investigation
into the subjectivity of the design process, the substance of technological affordances and
the content of embodied values or bias. As Richard Sclove suggests, “From the
viewpoint of strong democracy, it is vital to challenge any social structure that sacrifices
opportunities for self-actualization” (Sclove, 1995, p. 87).
Technology is Political - Autonomy
Inextricably intertwined with the concept of liberty is personal autonomy.
Autonomy is a key requirement for democratic society and the ability to function
autonomously allows individuals and communities to determine for themselves what
information is necessary and appropriate. In the U.S. context, this right falls within the
penumbra of protections afforded by the 14th Amendment that is intended to safeguard
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“the freedom of individuals to choose whether or not to perform certain acts or subject
themselves to certain experiences” (Cornell Legal Information Institute, 2014). The
government’s imposition of technological mechanisms between individuals and those
experiences diminishes autonomy. This is also true when discussing the autonomous
ability of the individual to access information and U.S. Constitutional law provides
guidance on this point. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that, “[T]he State
may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of
available knowledge” (see Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). Here, the Constitution
directly ties autonomy to the speech rights of individuals and technological mechanisms
have the potential to restrict individual choice and access illegitimately. Perspectives
from STS are also useful here because, above and beyond U.S. constitutional
commitments, freedom and autonomy are presented as the basic prerequisites of
democracy that are “a fundamental precondition of all our willful acts, and hence of
pursuing all other goods” (Sclove, 1995, p. 34). When the state inhibits the exercise of
autonomy, including informational autonomy, it contracts the ability of citizens to pursue
a number of ancillary goods and to realize their own goals. Regulatory systems become
social structures that impede autonomy when the state imposes them on individual in a
manner that hinders the ability to receive and impart information.
While some in STS have argued that technological systems can and should
empower users, bolster self-expression and enhance democracy (see Jasanaoff, 2003 and
Sclove, 1995), the policy actions described throughout this dissertation have tended to
have the opposite effect. In addition to the minimal affordances provided by age
verification systems, commercial filters, DNS blocks, etc., the centralized regulation of
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content by the state has directly disempowered individuals, parents, librarians, and
communities. Within this frame analysis, legislative supporters of these policies
consistently argued that centralized regulation through technical systems was the only
solution for piracy and childhood access to indecent content. These mechanisms,
Congress suggested, were the sole means for accomplishing policy goals because they
were the only way to ensure consistency and pervasiveness throughout the Internet
ecosystem.
This reduces autonomy because it removes the individual’s ability to make
determinations about the acceptability of content and grants that choice to the state. It is
especially true that this implicates fundamental speech rights when regulatory systems
mediate access. The ability of the adult citizen to realize their own goals and to seek out
the information they deem valuable becomes contingent on the state’s approval and that
approval is, in turn, dependent on successfully negotiating the technological barriers to
access imposed by the state. This is troubling when “these technological constraints
occur in the context of cultural and informational content basic to human flourishing, a
further insult to the autonomous choice of the individual.” (Burke & Gillespie, 2006, p.
244). When the state imposes regulatory technologies from above at a centralized core, it
removes individual choice from the equation. By recognizing the power these systems
have to limit autonomy, Congress might begin to ameliorate this harm by allowing
individuals to decide when (and if) to filter information and then employ regulatory
technology accordingly. This is particularly true in situations when the target of
regulation is childhood access but where the diminishment of adult access becomes an
unintended consequence. In the case of CIPA, for example, if adult users were able to
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choose where and how filtering takes place, it could re-focus power with the individual
and remove it from technical systems. By considering this principle, Congress could
begin to protect the autonomy of the individual affirmatively when considering future
regulation. First Amendment scholar Jack Balkin has suggested just such an approach in
his best practices model for filtering Internet content. Here the emphasis is on user
autonomy and Congress should approach regulation from the position that “facilitation of
end-user choice through technology provides a better solution” than centralized,
government-mandated systems (Balkin, et al., 1999, p. 2).
This principle applies equally to parental autonomy and Congress could look to
the oppositional groups who took the position that, if the law was to employ
technological systems, parents should be able to use them voluntarily to protect their
children. By making use voluntary, this would reverse the power relationship and parents
could now affirmatively choose to use technology in ways they felt were appropriate and
allowed access to information based on their own normative criteria. That the opposition
took to calling these voluntary systems “user empowerment tools” (COPA18 p. 20) is
telling because it distinguishes them from the mandatory authority represented by age
verification systems, commercial filters, etc. Here the opposition directly echoed Richard
Sclove’s suggestion that technologies, including regulatory systems, have become an
important part of the “social structure” (1995, p. 27). As such, it is important that
“technological design and practice should be democratized” (Id). As the opposition
argued, if regulatory systems were to be included in the policy landscape, then the state
should employ them in a way that it is empowering. Specifically, the use of such systems
should be “a voluntary decision by concerned parents to use these products for their
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children” (COPA16 p. 46). This would satisfy both Sclove’s requirement for the
democratization of technological practice and the opposition’s call for user
empowerment.
A key criticism of STS is the failure of policymakers “to include local
knowledges and stakeholders” within technological policy debates or within deliberations
about the appropriate use and limits of technology (Gomart & Hajer, 2003, p. 36). Local
knowledge has often been a powerful force in defining and contesting the limits of what
policies and technologies should do (see Mukerji, 2009). Acknowledgment of this local
wisdom and of local practice can help ensure more democratic outcomes for citizens. As
will be discussed, this can also help avoid many of the pitfalls that may result when
Congress imposes technology that, in application, orders the lives of individuals in ways
that bear little resemblance to the realities of daily life (see Scott, 1998 and Jasanoff,
2003). CIPA provides perhaps the best example of how the state discounted community
autonomy, local knowledge, and practice. This diminishment of local autonomy occurred
in two major ways.
First, at least theoretically, CIPA depends on notions of “community standards” to
define the boundaries of acceptable content. Yet the law stripped these determinations
from local communities and delegated them to the technical categorization processes
embedded within filtering software. As mentioned previously, the 10th Amendment of the
Constitutional formally guarantees the right of self-determination for communities and
forbids the federal government from exercising any power over local communities above
and beyond those specific powers already designated to the state. This principle ties
together with the ideals of local autonomy, community standards, and home rule (see
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pages 163-164). Local librarians were disturbed that technology became the arbiter of
decency in the context of online content and that the state, through filters, had imposed
subjective restrictions on access on their communities and their patrons. Congress could
have explored this aspect of the technology prior to hindering the ability of local
librarians to provide access to the information that best suits the needs of their
communities. The state demoted the needs of patrons at the local level in the interest of
protecting children through technological blocking and filtering. Lawmakers discarded
local practice in favor of a technological solution, imposed from above, and designed
with commercial interests in mind.
Second, CIPA impacted the professional autonomy of the local librarian through
the imposition of regulatory systems. Congress repeatedly presented filtering software as
a technological extension of the traditional expertise employed by librarians to manage
physical collections for the benefit of their communities. Lawmakers conflated local
practice and expertise with the blunt ability of filtering software to sift through vast
amounts of material. Also, manufacturers design filters to exclude digital content, not
select material for inclusion in a library’s collection. Librarians only exclude content
based on thoughtful collection policies and with viewpoint neutrality. Not only did CIPA
subvert the exercise of librarians’ crucial content management role but it also usurped the
authority librarians have traditionally enjoyed in selecting the information that best serves
their patrons. That filtering software may employ subjective or biased criteria when
categorizing content only exacerbates this harm to professional judgment and community
standards. Again, considering the constitutional, ethical and normative implications of
imposing potentially biased technical systems from above, the state should examine how
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this kind of “impersonal rule” (Mukerji, 2009, p. 205) may disenfranchise and disregard
local expertise and sensibilities. When negotiating future policies that have the potential
to impact local practice, community standards and professional autonomy, Congress
should engage with the individuals and municipalities they are attempting to regulate.
Hegemony
Congress intended age verification systems, commercial filtering software, DNS
blocking and search result filtration to bar access to online content based on criteria predetermined by the state. By definition, these criteria are non-neutral and imply value
judgments about the kinds of speech that have, or do not have, merit. As noted
throughout this research, the framing employed by Congress in the context of these
policies has repeatedly portrayed technology as a neutral tool. These “tools” serve to
accomplish this important categorization function on behalf of the government by
delimiting the boundaries of acceptable online content in a presumably objective manner.
Despite this assumption of objectivity, the act of imposing a regulatory system between
users and websites containing “indecent” content implies that the state essentially favors
certain material. Acceptable content is freely accessible while these systems lock
unacceptable content behind technological gates. This technological arrangement can be
harmful because it both deters users from seeking out such content and discourages
content producers from creating it in the first place. By declaring some material to be
beyond the boundaries of “a uniform national standard of content regulation” (CDA13 p.
49), any speech falling outside that standard appears to be of lower value. That Congress
would mediate access to that content through the mandated use of technological gateways
adds another layer of deterrence to accessing it at all. If designers embed their normative
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considerations within these gateways, and those considerations become the means for
delineating between the acceptability and unacceptability of content, they may become
hegemonic mechanisms of control. In this sense, regulatory systems may become the
hegemonic technologies described by Pfaffenberger. Such systems are “specifically
designed to exercise force, that is, to coerce obedience and suppress deviance” (1992, p.
283).
If Congress employs technological mechanisms of enforcement without first
exploring the affordances, values and biases embedded within them, lawmakers
essentially consent to the delegation of state power to these systems without a full
understanding of the potential implications. Also, within the context of legislative
frames, the scope of regulation was often so broadly defined that “indecent” material
could consist of anything ranging from hard core pornography to foul language. Based
on the presumed neutrality of these instruments and the scope of these laws, the pervasive
use of these mechanisms had the potential to extend to a vast amount of content. It was
conceivable that the law would force websites providing access to health information to
implement the same barriers to access as sites containing extreme violent or sexually
explicit content. Congress, through regulatory systems, might have imposed an artificial
barrier to access on a great deal of material that was informative, artistic, or educational.
Without incorporating some understanding of technological design, affordances, and bias
into the policy process, legislators were poised to delegate a great deal of normative and
legal power to the technology. If delegated to regulatory technologies and, by inference,
to those who designed them, this power can become a form of hegemonic control.
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This serves as another example of how the policy process can usefully apply
perspectives from STS literature during policy negotiation, formulation, and
implementation. For example, perspectives from STS can help explicate the risks of
cultural and technological hegemony. Cultural hegemony is undesirable because it is the
control of social life, thought, opinion, norms and values by some dominant force (see
Gramsci, 1971/2005). Government policies that impose this dominance on the public
may be harmful if they reduce the diversity of opinion and quell unpopular speech. As
those opposed to these policies recognized, “Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that
the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress
unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather
than persuasion” (CDA13 pp. 67-68). Simply attempting to impose a national standard
for online content hints at this coercive potential. Additionally, the use of regulatory
technologies in these instances can result in the imposition of technological hegemony.
Here, the state delegates the suppression of unpopular ideas and determinations as to the
kinds of speech that are societally acceptable to regulatory systems. Not only are these
systems categorizing speech as favored or disfavored but the legal, constitutional, and
coercive force of government is essentially given over to enforcement mechanisms with
very few questions being asked.
Feenberg’s work can serve as a reminder to Congress that, “[M]odern forms of
hegemony are based on the technical mediation of a variety of social activities” (1992, p.
2). In the context of these policies, technologies may become objects of hegemonic
control by illegitimately imposing content-based judgments as to the suitability of online
content. The values implicit in regulatory systems can co-opt diversity of thought and
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opinion if these values remain unexamined. This potential is disturbing enough when the
state essentially endorses some kinds of speech while removing others from the
marketplace of ideas. It is even more alarming when the state gives that power to those
who design technological mechanisms of enforcement with no oversight or judicial
review. By including some examination of these circumstances within the policy process
from the outset, it may be possible to negotiate thoughtful terms of access that truly
represent the government’s (and the people’s) interests.
Congress should also examine the potential for hegemonic control where the
exercise of state power is, in part, dependent on the consent of those who would be
subject to “the general direction imposed on social life” (Gramsci, 1971/2005, p. 12).
Here, the people vicariously give that consent to the state through representative
democracy. The state has the responsibility to honor that consent and to exercise that
power in good faith. One of the key mechanisms for the use of legislative power is
“primarily through domination – that is, by monopolizing the instruments of coercion”
(Lears, 1985, p. 568). As Feenberg suggests, the regulatory mechanisms chosen by
Congress in the policies at issue here all have the potential to hegemonically coerce
individual behavior by suppressing “deviant” content. Where Gramsci suggests that the
state is in control of these coercive instruments, in the case of the policies examined here,
this relationship is reversed. Legislators who mandate their use do not dominate
regulatory systems nor do those citizens that function under them. Instead, design criteria,
normative positions of manufacturers, embedded values, and bias control access to and/or
suppression of online content. Lacking a political process sensitive to the subjective
nature of technological design, lawmakers risk forfeiting true consent (both their own and
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that of those they represent) to these systems. If lawmakers incorporated this concept
into legislative considerations, it would improve the policy process and reduce the
potential for this kind of illegitimate delegation of power. Lawmakers might be reticent
to forfeit their power and the power of the democratic process without first asking
pointed questions about the use of that power.
Two examples from the policies described here demonstrate the potential for
technological hegemony. The first instance occurs when the state gives its power to
block content to Internet service providers and other network administrators. In the cases
of both the CDA and SOPA/PIPA, Congress provided those operating these conduits
with a great deal of latitude when deciding when and how to mediate access to
problematic content. It is important to remember that the CDA’s Good Samaritan
provision not only allowed ISPs to proactively deny access to a great deal of online
content but shielded them from any legal consequences “for any action voluntarily taken
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected”
(CDA01 p. 101, emphasis added). Here the normative position of an ISP’s administrators
becomes the standard for judging content and this imposes those subjective criteria on
those who rely on these networks for access to online material. Due to the vast amounts
of content travelling through these networks, the ISP was essentially required to pass this
blocking function on to automated systems that would “filter, screen, allow, or disallow
content” on their behalf (CDA01 p. 102). Within this analysis, Congress gave no
indication that the criteria used by either ISPs or these automated systems might conflict
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with constitutional guarantees. In fact, the statutory language implies that it was not only
possible that constitutional speech would be swept into this blocking scheme but
acceptable. This demonstrates the potential for technological hegemony when legislative
authority is delegated to network operators and the regulatory systems they implement to
meet the statutory requirements of policies like the CDA.
While Congress did not intend SOPA and PIPA to mediate access to indecent or
obscene content, their focus on infringing content had the same potential for the
imposition of technological hegemony. Like the CDA, SOPA and PIPA included broad
provisions that allowed ISPs to block access preemptively to entire websites in instances
where infringing activity was alleged. These voluntary blocking provisions provided
ISPs with legal immunity and were not subject to any judicial review (SOPA06 p. 152).
In fact, it was in the best interest of ISPs to act aggressively for fear that courts would
hold them liable for contributory infringement. Charges of infringement could come
either directly from the Justice Department or from private rightsholders and this created
“a system that allows a mere accusation [of infringement] without any court review to
lead to potentially damaging actions” including the suppression of problematic speech (Id
p. 151). Again, the realities of Internet communication essentially required ISPs to
undertake this blocking and filtering through automated systems. Regardless of whether
the criteria used to block content came from the ISP or from the designers of regulatory
systems, this policy had the potential to hegemonically control the direction of social life
on the Web as well as the content of speech. Congress has the responsibility to examine
the potential for illegitimate suppression of protected content and should exercise caution
when granting this kind of authority to networks that provide access to an enormous
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number of individuals. Lawmakers should also consider that ISPs often pass these
decisions to automated systems that embed the subjective and normative positions of
those who design and deploy them. These policy actions have the potential to promote
private interests above the individual’s right to access constitutionally protected speech.
The possibility that the state would delegate its power to control access to content
to these private entities is disturbing. The opacity of these systems due to technical
complexity or, in the case of commercial filtering software, trade secret protections can
compound this concern. When legislators do not include a provision for judicial review
and when citizens are unable to question the specifications of those technologies imposed
on them, the capacity for informed consent or dissent disappears into the black box of
technology. From the standpoint of democracy, it would be in Congress’ best interest to
move the internal design criteria of these filtering and blocking mechanisms to the
foreground so that citizens, communities, and public institutions may comment on the
appropriateness of their use. Lacking a clear articulation of these features, Congress,
“Shielded by the conviction that technology is neutral and tool-like,” may impose
improper restrains on its people “without the slightest public awareness or opportunity to
dispute the character of the changes underway” (Winner,1977, p. 324).
Non-Democratic Power Relations
The policies and technologies at issue here allow those in power to regulate the
kinds of activities individuals may pursue online. This technical mediation is a political
phenomenon because of the values embedded in technology and the social relationships it
perpetuates. It is important to keep in mind that politics are essentially “arrangements of
power and authority in human associations as well as the activities that take place within
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those arrangements” (Winner, 1986, p. 22). The use of regulatory technology to
implement policy creates a mechanism whereby non-democratic outcomes may result.
The user must comply with the legal and technological requirements of the system or face
the consequences. The individual also remains at the low end of the hierarchical power
structure that this use of technology reinforces.
This kind of hierarchy relates directly to the imposition of regulatory systems that
may result in “the formation of coercive power relations, and the curtailment of human
freedom and autonomy” (Brey 1998, p. 2). This, then, is the basis for the assertion that
regulatory systems have the potential to become non-democratic mechanisms of control.
As some in STS have suggested, “a technology may have: (a) intractable properties that
require democratic patterns of authority; (b) intractable properties that require nondemocratic (or anti-democratic) patterns of authority; or (c) flexible properties that are
compatible with either pattern of authority” (Johnson 1997, p. 21). Based on the
tendency of the systems described throughout this dissertation to inhibit autonomy and
access to protected speech, these systems often seem to require non-democratic systems
to fulfill the purposes for which they were designed.
The exercise of constitutional rights becomes dependent on the specifications of
these technological mechanisms of enforcement and subjective determinations as to the
acceptability of problematic content. In addition to making individual interests
subordinate to these features of the technology, the deployment of these barriers between
adult citizens and protected speech creates a structural impediment to the exercise of
rights. Hierarchically and materially, regulatory systems may illegitimately constrain and
mediate a variety of online activities. In the case of CIPA, for instance, the Supreme
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Court insisted that librarians “disable the Internet software filter without significant delay
on an adult user’s request” in order for the law to remain constitutional (and for the
software to function constitutionally) (U.S. v ALA 2003, Syllabus at pp. 3-4). This
suggests an intractable and non-democratic property of filtering software in that librarians
must turn it off in order to ensure democratic rights for adult patrons.
Even when deployed in the democratic context of the U.S., technologies like age
verification systems and commercial filtering software centralize power. For example, an
adult patron who confronts filtering software in a public library must actively request that
the librarian disable the software in order to access material that the filter had erroneously
blocked. In this social relationship, control is given to librarians who are then authorized
(and presumably able) to turn off the filter. Nevertheless, despite the Supreme Court’s
assertions to the contrary, even this outcome is uncertain. Remember that CIPA’s
disabling provision grants additional authority to librarians to accept only those requests
deemed to be legitimate and “for bona fide research” (CIPA01 p. 11). It can be assumed
that the categories embedded within filtering software make the initial judgment as to
what content is “bona fide” and the librarian then has the option to confirm or refute that
assessment. Patrons are subservient to both the software and to the librarian’s
assessment. In turn, librarians are subservient to software administrators who have the
power to re-classify websites as acceptable (or not) based on the request. When such
power is delegated to the system and subsequent activity is dependent on the
administrator’s authorization, the “autonomy of users is consequently eroded, and users
may come to feel dependent and constrained in their actions” (Brey, 1998, p. 8). By
requiring that “technology protection measures” (CIPA01 p. 2) be used to mediate the
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acceptability of content in public libraries, Congress essentially legislated that the power
to enforce the law be left with the designers, manufacturers and administrators of filtering
software.
Due to the nature of their design and the context of their deployment, technologies
like those required by the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA and PIPA appear to be most
compatible with and supportive of non-democratic political systems. SOPA and PIPA
directly support this observation where critics condemned lawmakers for mandating the
use of technologies employed by a number of authoritarian and repressive regimes. DNS
blocking and the manipulation of search engine results are common tactics employed by
countries like China, Saudi Arabia and others where the goal is to suppress the
dissemination of politically dangerous or religiously offensive content (see Faris &
Villenueve, 2008, p. 10). The use of similar systems in the U.S. context is problematic
precisely because it implies a non-democratic relationship between the state and its
people – a relationship where technological systems mediate access to information.
Mandated use of systems like DNS blocking was, for the opposition, not only nondemocratic in a domestic sense but also in a global context where repressive states might
be encouraged to “abuse their technological capacity to take down content they find
objectionable or threatening” (SOPA12 p. 6). It is important to remember Langdon
Winner’s warning that “the adoption of a given technical system unavoidably brings with
it conditions for human relationships that have a distinctive political cast – for example,
centralized or decentralized, egalitarian or inegalitarian, repressive or liberating…to
choose them is to choose unalterably a particular form of political life” (1986, p. 29). By
imposing the policies and technologies described throughout this research, Congress
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risked choosing a political life for the United States that was distinctly non-democratic,
unconstitutionally hierarchical and potentially damaging to individual rights.
Technological Ordering
The history of these policies demonstrates Congress’ relationship with regulatory
technology. Legislative supporters of the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and PIPA
demonstrated the tendency of the high modern society (Scott, 1998) to order the lives and
Internet access of individuals according to the state’s interests and through the use of
unexamined regulatory systems. While Scott critiques the high modern society for its
reliance on scientific technique to isolate and organize nature, human behavior or
economic production, this analysis critiques the state’s attempt to control the flow of
information through mechanisms meant to restrict access. This attempt at ordering is
deeply disruptive to the complex relationships and technical arrangements that define
communication on the Internet. Such situations are constitutionally problematic because
the state’s presumptions about how best to accomplish its instrumental goals are often
grounded in a faulty premise. This premise suggests that the state can only regulate the
technological medium of the Internet through the use of technological barriers to access.
Many of the sponsors of these policy initiatives have also demonstrated that they have
very little understanding of or personal experience with the medium they would regulate.
Therefore, the imposition of technological “tools” to mediate access appears to them as a
proper solution that brings to bear the products of technical expertise for the benefit of
minors, parents and the state itself. In such circumstances, to paraphrase Scott,
everything that interferes with the goal of protecting intellectual property or protecting
children from harmful content is set aside. The state disregards everything that does not

368

seem related to its goals. This includes oppositional arguments against regulation and for
the protection of individual rights and autonomy.
The “cyberzoning” metaphors employed by Congress to justify the CDA provide
one illustration of this ordering identified by Scott. By relying on this physical analog as
justification for the imposition of age verification systems, the state was essentially using
this technological mechanism to shape behavior online in a manner similar to the one it
had used for years in neighborhoods, near schools and near churches. If the nation was to
realize the educational and commercial potential of the Internet, Congress argued, it was
incumbent on the state to order online behavior in ways that would not threaten these
interests. Due to this, lawmakers portrayed age verification systems as a beneficial and
unbiased tool of scientific and technical progress that they could harmlessly interject into
the online ecosystem. Physical zoning laws had proven effective in accomplishing the
“government’s interests in reducing crime, maintaining property values, and preserving
the quality of urban life” (CDA14 p. 27). Age verification systems were the means by
which the state could transfer this control of human activity onto the Internet for the
benefit of children and commerce and to the detriment of those who dealt in “smut”
(CDA19 p. 2). Nevertheless, as Scott suggests, this kind of ordering fails to
accommodate “the autonomy of existing social life” that falls outside the state’s
conceptions of appropriate behavior (1998, p. 93). As the opposition would suggest,
these systems and the concept of cyberzoning were inappropriate for this new medium
because they became gateways to access that stifled the spontaneous and free flow of
information. These enforcement mechanisms were nothing less than checkpoints that
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would force individuals to identify themselves prior to entry. In the presence of this new
ordering, it was unsurprising that adult users would hesitate to cross that threshold.
Again, Scott’s insight is helpful in addressing the state’s attempt to isolate and
order behavior according to seemingly rational criteria. While both the means and ends
for such technical ordering may seem self-apparent from a certain point of view, when
taken in context, this ordering both ignores and disrupts a wider, more complex network
of relationships. For example, legislators believed they could neatly separate
“appropriate” from “inappropriate” speech. In the case of COPA, part of the legislative
criteria for such separation was, simply put, the difference between commercial and noncommercial speakers. Commercial speakers were those that were “engaged in the
business of transferring or selling” information online (COPA11 p. 11) and, if that
business was “designed to appeal to the prurient interest of minors” (COPA17 p. 52),
then it was locked behind age verification screens. Non-commercial speakers were,
within this scheme, protected from regulation because they did not sell potentially
prurient material. Nevertheless, non-profit and educational outlets would be entangled in
this same regulatory standard if the content offered on their sites could, in any way, be
considered sexually explicit, titillating or otherwise harmful to minors based on some
intangible and ill-defined standard.
This was especially true in circumstances where advertisements, self-promotion,
fundraising, or other commercial material may have been included on websites that were
not actually selling content. By COPA’s definitions, any site that operated in this way
was transacting business in a manner that qualified for technological regulation. The law
would place educational, informational, and activist websites in the same regulatory
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category as hard core pornography. What was, from the legislative perspective, a clear
and rational means for delimiting access and curbing certain online behaviors was
actually a much more complicated technical arrangement. By relying on the ability of
regulatory systems to demarcate the state’s boundaries for acceptability, lawmakers had
assumed that they could draw such borders in the first place. Congress had also erred by
presuming that some online content had no redeeming value for minors simply because it
included some material that was sexual in nature. Regulatory systems could not
categorize and control websites, the Internet, and individual activity as neatly as
lawmakers seem to have believed. Congress must keep in mind that it is never a simple
matter to regulate and order something as messy as online communication. With some
understanding of how policy and technology can impact these complex arrangements,
Congress can mitigate some of these unintended consequences before they occur.
The Legislative Relationship to Technology
Within this frame analysis, lawmakers continued to insist that technological
regulation was the only solution to the problems they had identified and that regulation
itself was a simple exercise in categorization and organization. Systems made decisions
about the suitability or legality of online content in an objective, impersonal manner that
were “not based on any particular viewpoint” (CIPA03 p. 7). Across all of the policies at
issue here, Congress still maintained a certain relationship to technology that does not
adequately recognize the core of the systems they chose to impose upon users. When
negotiating future policies, lawmakers must consider the embedded values and biases
designed into any technical system if they are to employ it in a regulatory context. While,
for instance, bodies like the COPA Commission could have articulated some of these
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considerations and unpacked some of the political implications of these artifacts, many in
Congress chose not to listen and their commitments remained firmly in place. The
Internet was a tool that was subject to regulation and ordering by the state. As a
technological medium, it was uniquely suitable for control through technological
mechanisms of enforcement. These mechanisms, as the product of a rational design
process, were above reproach and could mediate access in a manner that did not implicate
individual rights or autonomy. Content itself could be classified, walled off, and
controlled.
This also relates directly to the state’s perception of the Internet as a technological
tool that was uniquely responsive to technical regulation. This implies a rigid
understanding where the solution to technological problems is invariably technological.
By maintaining the neutrality of technology as a given, legislators may have been
incapable of addressing the implications of both regulatory systems and the problems
inherent in any technological solution. This is reminiscent of Heidegger’s warnings
about a limited and closed relationship with technology where we risk even greater harm
when we fail to examine the essence of technology (1977, p. 3). As many in STS have
described, this failure to understand the socially constructed nature and biases embedded
in technology can lead to even deeper problems when we apply it to curb and control
behavior. Heidegger’s point is directly relevant to Congress’ use of regulatory systems
within these policies because they took the neutrality of these systems for granted and
because lawmakers’ conception of technological “problems” left little room for anything
but technological “solutions”. When Congress mandates the use of regulatory
technologies to order behavior and, in these cases, curtail access, we are limited not only
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by the technology but by this worldview. Heidegger cautioned that the technologically
ordered society, even one with benevolent intentions, is not the solution to our problems
but the problematic result of this approach (see Dreyfus, 1995).
This closed relationship to technology is most apparent in circumstances where
Congress declined to consider the no-tech or low-tech solutions offered by the opposition
that would have circumvented the need for centralized mechanisms of control. For
example, Congress could have implemented local use policies that were truly respectful
of community standards in public places where children had access to the Internet. The
opposition also suggested that Congress develop educational opportunities where parents
and children could learn how to use the Internet respectfully and responsibly in ways that
best reflected their individual values. Although the opposition suggested both of these
options as the two primary alternatives to technological regulation, neither gained traction
with lawmakers. Perhaps due to the state’s reification of expert knowledge and technical
solutions, these alternatives were dismissed as ineffective and insufficient (CDA16 p.
22). From the government’s view, it was imperative that the state impose technological
systems in order to manage problematic content.
Not only did Congress decline to consider alternatives that did not include
technological enforcement mechanisms but they often did not heed the warnings of their
own investigations. For example, the COPA Commission’s findings, and Congress’
reaction to it, demonstrate that lawmakers were unwilling to address the problem of
childhood access to questionable material with anything but their preferred technological
solutions. Although the Commission took the unprecedented step of critiquing various
regulatory technologies on the basis of the values they could promote or demote, most of

373

Congress did not directly address the Commission’s findings. Again, this implies a
certain relationship to technology and a dependence on the portrayal of regulatory
systems as instrumental tools above reproach. Even when confronted with direct
evidence that technologies like age verification systems and commercial filters were
demonstrably non-neutral, lawmakers essentially refused to reconsider their position on
technology. Furthermore, the fact that the Commission was unfunded and would not
publish its findings until two years after Congress had passed the law says something
about Congress’ willingness to entertain any perspectives that would contradict their
view of technology.
Investigations like the one conducted by the COPA Commission can provide
insight into, as Heidegger would put it, the essence of technology (1977). When this
essence and the social processes that underpin it are laid out for examination, only then
can Congress unpack “the politics of artifacts” (Bijker, 1997, p. 281). As the opposition
would note, the Commission was able to examine “how to protect children online in ways
consistent with the Internet’s architecture and Constitutional requirements” (COPA04 p.
64). This is a crucial distinction because it demonstrates that a truly critical review goes
beyond lawmakers’ more instrumental understanding where “good” regulatory systems
are those that are simply the most effective. For the Commission, regulatory systems
were good not simply because they were an effective barrier to access but because they
accomplished the goal of protecting children while simultaneously enhancing the
“privacy” and “First Amendment values” of individual citizens (COPA04 p. 15). For the
first time, Congress had to confront the reality that the technologies they had considered
to be apolitical were anything but. Despite this, the report does not appear to have shaken
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their relationship to technology. Going forward, Congress should undertake more of
these types of sustained review and should be more responsive to the results. This could
help meet Richard Sclove’s requirement that any government-mandated technology
should be subject to studies that account for that technology’s “compatibility with
democracy as a highest order evaluative consideration” (1995, p. 222).
Recommendations and Conclusion
Solutions to the complex problem of Internet content regulation are more complex
than they might first appear. As long as Congress considers the use of technological
artifacts to be rational and self-apparent, issues of neutrality, autonomy, hegemony,
rights, and power will persist. This is particularly true in circumstances where
emotionally and ideologically charged master frames may compel lawmakers to
implement technological systems where the efficacy of those systems is the primary
consideration. Efficiency and constitutionality are not necessarily synonymous and
Congress must undertake a more rigorous effort to understand the potentially subjective
and restrictive nature of these systems prior to imposing them in a regulatory
environment. Equally, the act of problem definition that takes place within diagnostic
framing requires room for more nuanced insight into the nature of these problems.
Although the problematic content identified by Congress has the potential to harm
children, the economic interests of intellectual property rightsholders and even national
security, regulation itself may be as damaging as the problem initially identified.
Congress exacerbates this possibility when it mandates the use of poorly understood
regulatory systems as the best and only solution within prognostic frames. Despite this, it
is likely that lawmakers will continue to devise new schemes to regulate the content and

375

conditions of online communications. With such a possibility on the horizon, it is useful
to interject the core STS themes identified throughout this dissertation into that policy
process. While the opposition has consistently and clearly articulated alternative
framings that describe the detrimental implications of these technologies, a more explicit
articulation of these STS concepts can guide future policy initiatives. Including these
concepts within the policy process will help to avoid the continuous cycle of legislation
and litigation discussed throughout this dissertation while simultaneously protecting
individual rights.
One way to ask meaningful questions about the technology we choose to deploy
in a regulatory context is to interrogate the conditions created by use of that technology,
the values that these technologies embody, and their direct impact on access to
information. If the preceding frame analysis is any indication, Congress should take
additional time to analyze regulatory systems prior to implementation in order to identify
any aspects of technologies and technological practices that have the potential to be
politically, constitutionally, or ethically problematic. By examining the potential for
harmful outcomes prior to deployment, legislators and concerned citizens can make
normative judgments about technological systems and protect individual rights from the
outset. Age verification systems, commercial filtering software, DNS blocking, and other
regulatory technologies all, in one way or another, restrict information flows and hinder
the autonomous ability of the individual to acquire, possess, or distribute information.
These technologies then become the target of a normative analysis of the values they
should embody. Since designers primarily intended many of the systems identified here
to serve as a means for restricting access to information and/or monitoring use, we can

376

evaluate them as negative in the context of democratic values such as autonomy and
individual constitutional rights.
Now that this frame analysis has identified opportunities within the policy process
for including specific perspectives from STS, it is necessary to recommend the means for
accomplishing that task. Based on this research, the primary solution recommended here
is the establishment of an investigative agency to explore these issues prior to the
deployment of potentially biased and restrictive regulatory technologies. This agency
should remain external to Congress and, as much as possible, exist outside the political
process. Although any public agency runs the risk of regulatory capture due to the
influence of political, commercial, financial, or other interests, by focusing this
organization’s mission strictly on the impact and nature of proposed regulatory systems,
this outside influence may be reduced. The composition of this agency should include, at
least in part, experts from academia, civil rights organizations, and technology policy
advocacy groups that are familiar with the non-democratic potential of technological
enforcement mechanisms. Again, based on this research, these groups have already
demonstrated the ability to recognize the potential of these mechanisms to harm
individual rights and autonomy. Additionally, these oppositional groups have
consistently taken positions that acknowledge the non-neutral and subjective nature of
technology as well as the affordances that may limit the range of possible actions for
users. In the context of U.S. constitutional rights, these organizations have also, through
their master frames, prioritized the preservation of autonomy, transparency, and access to
protected speech. This, in addition to including the STS concepts discussed throughout
this chapter, can provide a strong foundation for helping Congress formulate sound
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policy in the future. Without some acknowledgment of these principles and without
room for critical voices, legislative history may simply repeat itself.
There is precedent for just such an agency and legislative bodies have benefited
from this kind of advice both domestically and internationally. For example, in 1972
Congress tasked the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) with a mission similar
to that proposed here. Specifically, in establishing the OTA, Congress recognized that,
“As technology continues to change and expand rapidly, its applications are large and
growing in scale; and increasingly extensive, pervasive, and critical in their impact,
beneficial and adverse, on the natural and social environment” (Public Law 92-484, 1972,
p. 797). In order to mitigate any potentially adverse impacts of these increasingly
pervasive technologies, the OTA was intended to explore “the consequences of
technological applications” so that they may be “anticipated, understood, and considered
in determination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems” (Id).
Unfortunately, due to a variety of political motivations, Congress defunded and
decommissioned the OTA in 1995 (see Bimber, 1996). Despite this, an organization like
the OTA, founded on the principles outlined throughout this dissertation, could provide
useful recommendations to Congress on these issues.
The Parliament of the European Union currently employs a European Technology
Assessment Group (ETAG) that is meant to examine the “social, environmental and
economic aspects of new technological and scientific developments” and provide advice
regarding the “complex social, ecological and economic implications of modern
technology and scientific research” (ETAG, 2014). Although this current iteration was
founded in 2005, the European Parliament (a different body than the EU Parliament) has
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relied on recommendations of this sort since the late 1980s (Id). In its current form, the
ETAG is comprised of several cooperating academic and governmental bodies that, in
addition to providing advice to the EU, conduct similar analyses in their home countries.
Again, the U.S. Congress can look to these organizations as blueprints for conducting the
kind of rigorous and critical studies recommended here.
Any group or agency may fail to accomplish its goals or its warnings may go
unheeded by the legislative body it reports to. In addition to the possibility of regulatory
capture alluded to above, these organizations may also fall prey to internal politics or
honest disagreements about how technological means may accomplish regulatory ends.
Despite this, it is important to invest some group with the power to conduct these kinds of
studies because, as it stands now, Congress has no consistent mechanism for examining
these issues. Until lawmakers explicitly address problems of neutrality, autonomy,
hegemony, rights and power, they may continue to create the same conditions that led to
such deep disagreements over the CDA, COPA, CIPA, SOPA, and PIPA. Nevertheless,
with these issues in mind, Congress will be able to formulate sound policy that employs
technology appropriately and in ways that respect democratic processes, constitutional
rights and the autonomy of the individual.
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